Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 71

Latin	English
[CAP. 71. AD VIDENDUM QUANDO TERMINUS COMMUNIS HABET UNAM SUPPOSITIONEM ET QUANDO ALIAM]	[Chapter 71. For seeing when a common term has one kind of supposition, and when it has another]
Istis visis videndum est quando terminus communis habet unam suppositionem personalem et quando aliam. Et primo videndum est de nominibus, secundo de pronominibus relativis, quia diversae regulae dantur de istis et de illis.	Having looked at these cases, we should see when a common term has one kind of supposition, and when it has another. And first we should look at names, second, at relative pronounds, because diverse rules are given for the former and the latter.
Est ergo primo sciendum quod quando in categorica nullum signum universale distribuens totum extremum propositionis additur termino, nec mediate nec immediate, hoc est nec a parte eiusdem extremi nec a parte extremi praecedentis, nec negatio praecedit nec aliqua dictio includens aequivalenter negationem vel signum universale, semper talis terminus communis supponit determinate.	And it should first be known that in a categorical proposition, when no universal sign distributing the whole extreme of the proposition is added to the term, either directly nor indirectly, i.e. is not added either on the part of the same extreme, or on the part of the preceding one, and negation does not precede it, or any expression equivalently including negation or the universal sign, then such a common term always supposits determinately.
Verbi gratia in ista 'homo est animal' nullum signum universale additur, nec negatio nec talis dictio aequivalenter includens negationem vel signum universale, ideo uterque terminus supponit determinate. Idem est dicendum de ista 'aliquis homo currit', quia signum particulare additum vel non additum non variat suppositionem personalem, quamvis faciat frequenter terminum stare personaliter. Similiter in ista 'animal est omnis homo', quamvis ponatur signum universale, non tamen praecedit hunc terminum 'animal', ideo li animal supponit determinate. Similiter hic 'animal non est homo', quamvis ponatur negatio, quia tamen non praecedit istum terminum 'animal', ideo 'animal' stat determinate.	For example, in the proposition 'a man is an animal', no universal sign is added, nor a sign of negation, nor any expression equivalently including negation or the universal sign, therefore both terms supposit determinately. The same should be said of 'some man runs', because the particular sign that is added or not added does not vary personal supposition, although it frequently makes the term stand personally. Similarly, in 'an animal is every man', although the universal sign occurs, nonetheless it does not precede the term 'animal', therefore the word 'animal' supposits determinately. Similarly, in 'an animal is not a man', although negation is given, it stands determinately, because, nevertheless, it does not precede the term 'animal'.
Sed in ista 'omnis homo est animal', 'homo' non habet suppositionem determinatam, quia distribuitur signo universali, nec 'animal' habet suppositionem determinatam, quia sequitur mediate signum universale. Sed hic 'videns omnem hominem est animal', quia hoc signum 'omnem' non distribuit totum subiectum, ideo non facit praedicatum stare nisi determinate.	But in 'every man is an animal', 'man' does not have determinate supposition, because it is distributed by the universal sign, nor does 'animal' have determinate supposition, because it indirectly follows the universal sign. But in 'someone seeing every man is an animal' the sign 'every' only makes the predicate stand determinately, because it does not distribute the whole subject.
Unde bene sequitur 'videns omnem hominem est animal, igitur videns omnem hominem est hoc animal, vel videns omnem hominem est illud animal vel illud', et sic de singulis. Sed in ista 'omnem hominem videns est animal', quia signum distribuit hoc totum 'hominem videns', ideo praedicatum non stat determinate. Et consimiliter est de ista 'cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit', nam hic praedicatum supponit confuse tantum; in ista autem 'asinus cuiuslibet hominis currit' praedicatum stat determinate. Similiter in ista 'homo non est animal', quamvis 'homo' stet vel supponat determinate, tamen 'animal', quia negatio determinans verbum praecedit, ideo non stat determinate. similiter in ista 'Socrates differt ab homine', praedicatum supponit non determinate, quia hoc verbum 'differt' includit negationem aequivalenter.	Hence it follows well that 'someone seeing every man is an animal, therefore someone seeing every man is this animal or that' etc. But in 'omnem hominem videns est animal', because the sign distributes the whole 'hominem videns', the predicate does not stand determinately. And similarly with 'Every man's donkey runs', for here the predicate supposits confusedly only, but in 'The donkey of every man runs,' the predicate stands determinately. Similarly, in 'A man is not an animal', 'man' stands or supposits determinately, yet because the negation which determines the verb precedes it, 'animal' does not stand determinately, similarly in 'Socrates differs from man' the predicate does not supposit determinately, for the verb 'differs' includes a negation equivalently.