Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 72

Latin	English
[CAP. 72. DE DUBIIS QUAE MOVERI POSSUNT CONTRA PRAEDICTA]	[Chapter 72.  On doubts that can be raised against the above]
(1) Circa praedicta potest dubitari. Primo, qualiter supponit 'homo' in ista 'Socrates fuit homo'; ponatur quod Socrates non sit. Similiter, qualiter supponunt termini in illis de praeterito et in illis de futuro et de possibili et in aliis propositionibus de modo.	Doubts can be raised about the above. First, how does ‘man’ supposit in ‘Socrates was a man’? (supposing that Socrates does not exist). Similarly, how do the terms supposit in propositions of the past and of the future and about the possible, and in other modal propositions?
(2) Et est ratio dubitationis, quia dictum est prius quod termilius numquam supponit pro aliquo nisi de quo verificatur; sed 'homo', si Socrates non sit, non verificatur de Sorte, quia tunc est haec falsa 'Socrates est homo'; igitur non supponit pro Sorte, et per consequens non supponit determinate.	And the reason for the doubt is because it was said before that a term never supposits for anything except what it is verified of. But ‘man’, if Socrates does not exist, is not verified of Socrates, because then ‘Socrates is a man’ is false. Therefore, it does not supposit for Socrates, and as a consequence it does not supposit determinately.
(3) Secundo est dubium de istis 'homo albus est homo', 'cantans missam est homo', 'creans est Deus', supposito quod nullus sit albus et quod nullus cantet missam et quod Deus non creet. Pro quibus subiecta supponunt? Quia videtur quod pro nulla re significata, quia de nulla tali verificantur; nec pro se ipsis, quia tunc non haberent suppositionem personalem; igitur non supponunt determinate pro aliquo, et per consequens non habent suppositionem determinatam.	Second, there is a doubt about ‘A white man is a man’, ‘The one singing the Mass is a man’, ‘The one creating is God’, supposing that no one is white and that no one sings the Mass and that God does not create. What do the subjects supposit for? For it seems that for no thing signified, because they are not verified of any such thing, nor for themselves, because in that case they would not have personal supposition. Therefore, they do not determinately supposit for anything, and as a consequence, they do not have determinate supposition.
(4) Tertium dubium est, qualiter subiectum supponit in talibus 'equus tibi promittitur', 'viginti librae tibi debentur'. Et est ratio dubitationis, quia si terminus supponat pro contentis, videntur esse falsae, cum quaelibet singularis sit falsa; et ita si terminus subiectus supponat determinate, propositio est falsa.	The third doubt is how the subject supposits in such propositions as ‘A horse is promised to you’, ‘Twenty pounds are owed to you’. And the reason for the doubt is that if the subject term supposits for the things contained under it, the propositions seem to be false, since each singular is false, and so if the subject term supposits determinately, the proposition is false.
(5) Quartum dubium est de talibus 'iste privatur visu', 'iste est aptus natus habere visum', et sic de multis talibus.	The fourth doubt is about such propositions as ‘He is deprived of sight’, ‘He is naturally suited to have sight’, and so for many others.
(6) Quintum: qualem suppositionem habet praedicatum in ista 'genera et species sunt secundae substantiae' ?	Fifth, what kind of supposition has the predicate in ‘Genera and species are second substances’?
(7) Sextum de istis 'actio est res extra animam', 'relatio est vera res', 'creatio est idem realiter cum Deo', et de huiusmodi multis.	The sixth is about ‘An action is a thing outside the soul’, ‘A relation is a true thing’, ‘Creation is really the same as God’, and about many such propositions.
(8) Septimum est de ista 'iste bis fuit albus'; quia videtur quod 'albus' non supponat determinate.	The seventh is about ‘He was white twice’. For it seems that ‘white’ does not supposit determinately.
(9) Octavum dubium: quomodo in ista 'tantum animal est homo' subiectum et praedicatum supponant?	The eighth doubt. How do the subject and predicate supposit in ‘Only an animal is a man’?
(10) Item, de talibus 'Apostolus dicit hoc', 'Anglia pugnat' 'bibe cyphum', 'prora est in mari', 'bonitas tua misericorditer agit', 'clementia principis gubernat regnum' et huiusmodi.	Again, about ‘The Apostle says this’, ‘England fights’, ‘Drink the cup’, ‘The prow is in the sea’, ‘Your goodness acts mercifully’, ‘The clemency of the prince governs the realm’, and so on.
(11) Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod in omnibus talibus termini supponunt personaliter. Pro quo est intelligendum quod tunc terminus supponit personaliter quando supponit pro suis significatis, vel pro his quae fuerunt sua significata vel erunt vel possunt esse.	To the first of these it should be said that in all such propositions the terms supposit personally. For which it should be understood that a term supposits personally when it supposits for its significates, or for things that were its significates or will be or can be.
(12) Et sic intelligendum est prius dictum; quia dictum est prius quod uno modo 'significare' sic accipitur. Hoc tamen intelligendum est quod non respectu cuiuscumque verbi supponit pro illis; sed pro illis quae significat stricte accipiendo 'significare' supponere potest respectu cuiuscumque verbi, si aliqua talia significet.Sed pro illis quae fuerunt sua significata non potest supponere nisi respectu verbi de praeterito. Et ideo quaelibet talis propositio est distinguenda, eo quod talis terminus potest supponere pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae fuerunt.	And in this way should be understood the statement above. For it was stated above that in one way ‘to signify’ is so taken. But it should be understood that a term does not supposit for those things with respect to any verb whatsoever, but rather, it can supposit for the things it signifies, taking ‘signify’ narrowly, with respect to any verb whatever, if it signifies any such things. But it cannot supposit for what were its significates except with respect to a verb of the past tense. Therefore, each such proposition has to be distinguished, insofar as the term can supposit for things that exist or for things that used to exist.
Similiter pro his quae erunt non potest supponere nisi respectu verbi de futuro, et ideo illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod terminus potest supponere pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae erunt. Similiter pro his quae possunt esse significata et non sunt non potest supponere nisi respectu verbi de possibili vel de contingenti, et ideo omnes tales sunt distinguendae, eo quod subiectum potest supponere pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae possunt esse vel contingunt esse. Et ideo omnes tales sunt distinguendae 'omnis homo fuit albus', 'omne album erit homo', 'omne album potest esse homo', 'omnem hominem contingit currere'.	Similarly, a term cannot supposit for what will exist except with respect to a verb of the future tense. Therefore, a proposition containing a verb of the future has to be distinguished, insofar as the term can supposit for things that exist or that will exist. Similarly, a term cannot supposit for what can be its significates, but which do not exist, except with respect to a de contingenti or de possibiliverb. And therefore, all such propositions should be distinguished, in that the subject can supposit for things that exist or for things that are able to exist or contingently exist. Therefore, all the following have to be distinguished: ‘Every man was white’, ‘Every white thing will be a man’, ‘Every white thing is able to be a man’, ‘Every man can run’.
(13) Intelligendum est tamen quod ista distinctio non cadit a parte praedicati sed tantum a parte subiecti. Unde ista non est distinguenda 'Socrates fuit albus', 'Socrates potest esse albus'; et hoc quia praedicatum appellat suam formam. Quod est sic intelligendum: non quod supponat pro se vel pro conceptu, sed quod per talem propositionem denotatur quod propositio in qua ipsummet praedicatum sub propria forma, hoc est ipsummet et non aliud, praedicatur de illo pro quo subiectum supponit, vel de pronomine demonstrante illud praecise pro quo subiectum supponit, fuit vera, si talis propositio sit de praeterito; vel quod erit vera, si talis proposito sit de futuro; vel quod sit possibilis, si prima propositio sit de possibili; vel necessaria, si prima propositio sit de necessario; vel ompossibilis, si prima propositio sit de impossibili; Vel per se, si prima propositio sit de per se; vel per accidens, si prima propositio sit de per accidens. Et sic de aliis propositionibus modalibus.	Yet it must be understood that this distinction does not fall on the side of the predicate, but only on the side of the subject. Hence, ‘Socrates was white’. ‘Socrates can be white’ should not be to be distinguished, and this because the predicate "appellates its form". This should be understood as follows: not that the predicate supposits for itself or for a concept, but in the sense that by such a proposition it is denoted that another proposition in which the very same predicate, under its own form (that is, itself and none other), is predicated of that for which the subject of the first proposition supposits, or of a pronoun referring precisely to that for which its subject supposits, was true if the proposition is past tense, or that it will be true if the proposition is future tense, or that it is possible if the first is de possibili, or necessary if the first proposition is about de necessario, or per se if the first proposition is about the per se, or accidental if the first proposition is about the per accidens, and so on for the other kinds of modal propositions.
Verbi gratia ad veritatem istius 'album fuit nigrum' non requiritur quod haec unquam fuerit vera 'album est nigrum', sed requiritur quod haec fuerit vera 'hoc est nigrum', demonstrando aliquid pro quo subiectum supponit in ista 'album fuit nigrum'. Similiter, ad veritatem istius 'verum erit impossi bile' non requiritur quod haec unquam sit vera 'verum est impossibile', sed requiritur quod haec erit vera, si formabitur, 'hoc est impossibile', demonstrando aliquid pro quo subiectum supponit in ista 'verum erit impossibile'. Similiter est de aliis. Sed de istis amplius dicetur in tractatu de propositionibus et de consequentiis.	For example , for the truth of ‘A white thing was black’ it is not required that ‘A white thing is black’ was ever true. Rather, it is required that ‘This is black’ was true, referring to something the subject supposits for in ‘A white thing was black’. Similarly, for the truth of ‘The true will be impossible’ it is not required that ‘The true is impossible’ ever be true. Rather, it is required that ‘This is impossible’ will be true (if it is formed), pointing to something the subject supposits for in ‘The true will be impossible’. It is similar for the other cases. But these cases will be discussed more fully in the treatise on propositions and on consequences.
(15) Ad propositum dico quod in ista 'Socrates fuit homo' praedicatum supponit pro Sorte. Et similiter est de omnibus illis de praeterito et de futuro et de modo, quod termini supponentes personaliter supponunt pro illis quae sunt vel fuerunt vel erunt vel possunt esse supposita; et si non sit aliquod signum, nec negatio nec aliquid tale impediens, supponunt determinate.	To the case in hand, I say that in ‘Socrates was white’ the predicate supposits for Socrates. And similarly, it is the case for all propositions of the past and of the future and modal propositions, that terms suppositing personally supposit for what are or what were or what will be or can be their supposita. And if there is no sign or negation or any such hindrance, they supposit determinately.
(16) Sed tunc ad rationem in contrarium dicendum est quod bene dictum est quod terminus numquam supponit pro aliquo nisi de quo verificatur. Non tamen fuit dictum quod numquam supponit pro aliquo nisi de quo verificatur per verbum de praesenti, sed sufficit quod aliquando verificetur per verbum de praeterito, quando supponit pro illo respectu verbi de praeterito; vel per verbum de futuro, quando supponit respectu verbi de futuro, et sic de aliis. Sicut patet in ista 'album fuit homo', posito quod nullus homo modo sit albus, sed quod Socrates fuerit albus, tunc 'album' supponit pro Sorte, si accipiatur pro his quae fuerunt. Et ideo 'album' verificatur de Sorte non per verbum de praesenti sed per verbum de praeterito, nam haec est vera 'Socrates fuit albus'.	But then, against the reason to the contrary, it should be said that it was well stated that a term never supposits for anything except for what it is verified of. Nevertheless, it was not said that it never supposits for anything except for what it is verified of by a verb of the present tense, but it suffices that sometimes it is verified [of it] by a verb of the past, when it supposits for it in respect of a verb of the past, or by a verb of the future when it supposits in respect of a verb of the future, and so on. For example, it is clear for ‘a white thing was a man’, assuming that no man is now white but that Socrates was white. Then ‘white’ supposits for Socrates, if it is taken for [things] that used to be. And so ‘white’ is verified of Socrates not by a verb of the present but by a verb of the past. For ‘Socrates was white’ is true.
(17) Sed adhuc restat dubitatio: pro quo praedicatum supponit hic 'Socrates fuit albus'? Si pro his quae sunt, falsa est:.	But still a doubt remains: what does the predicate supposit for in ‘Socrates was white’? If for things that exist, it is false.
(18) Dicendum est quod praedicatum supponit pro his quae fuerunt, sive eadem fuerunt quae sunt sive non. Et ideo in isto casu capit instantiam illa regula quam dixi aIias, scilicet quod terminus semper supponit pro his quae sunt, ubicumque ponatur, vel potest pro eis supponere. Nam illam regulam intellexi de termino posito a parte subiecti; sed quando ponitur a parte praedicati non est universaliter vera. Unde posito quod nullus homo modo sit albus, sed quod fuerint multi homines albi antea, in ista tunc 'homo fuit albus' praedicatum non potest supponere pro his quae sunt sed tantum pro his quae fuerunt. Unde generaliter praedicatum in illa de praeterito non supponit pro aliquo alio quam pro illo quod fuit, et in illa de futuro pro eo quod erit, et in illa de possibili pro eo quod potest esse. Cum hoc tamen requiritur quod ipsummet praedicatum praedicetur de illo pro quo subiectum supponit, modo praedicto.	It should be said that the predicate supposits for things that used to exist, whether or not the same things existed which exist now, or not. And therefore in this case the rule I stated elsewhere has an exception, namely, that a term, no matter where it occurs, always supposits for things that exist, or can supposit for them. For I understood that rule as applying to a term occurring on the side of the subject. But when it occurs on the part of the predicate, the rule is not universally true. Hence, given that no man is now white, but that there were many white men before, then in ‘A man was white’ the predicate does not supposit for things that exist but only for things that did exist. Hence, in general, the predicate in a past tense proposition does not supposit for anything other than for what used to exist, and in a future tense proposition for what will exist, and in a de possibili for what can exist. In this case, nonetheless, it is required that the very same predicate be predicated of what the subject supposits for, in the way stated before.
(19) Ad secundum dubium dicendum est quod de virtute sermonis est concedendum, si nullus homo est albus et si nullus homo cantat missam et si Deus non creat, quod in praedictis propositionibus subiecta pro nullo supponunt. Et tamen sumuntur significative, quia 'sumi significative' vel 'supponere personaliter' potest dupliciter contingere: vel quia pro aliquo significato terminus supponit, vel quia denotatur supponere pro aliquo vel quia denotatur non supponere pro aliquo. Nam semper in propositionibus talibus affirmativis denotatur terminus supponere pro aliquo, et ideo si pro nullo supponit est propositio falsa. In propositionibus autem negativis denotatur terminus non supponere pro aliquo, vel supponere pro aliquo a quo vere negatur praedicatum, et ideo talis negativa habet duas causas veritatis. Sicut ista 'homo albus non est' habet duas causas veritatis: vel quia homo non est, et ideo non est albus; vel quia homo est, et tamen non est albus. In ista autem propositione 'homo albus est homo', si nullus homo sit albus subiectum sumitur significative et personaliter, non quia supponit pro aliquo, sed quia denotatur supponere pro aliquo; et ideo quia pro nullo supponit, cum tamen denotetur supponere pro aliquo, est propositio simpliciter falsa.	To the second doubt, it should be said that it must be conceded that, literally speaking, if no man is white and if no man is singing the Mass and if God is not creating, then in the propositions mentioned the subjects supposit for nothing. And yet they are taken significatively, because to be taken significatively or to supposit personally can happen in two ways: either because the term supposits for some significate orbecause it is denoted to supposit for something or because it is denoted not to supposit for anything. For always in such affirmative propositions the term is denoted to supposit for something, and therefore if it supposits for nothing the proposition is false. But in negative propositions, the term is denoted not to supposit for anything, or to supposit for something of which the predicate is truly denied, and therefore such a negative has two causes of truth. For example, ‘a white man is not [i.e. does not exist]’ has two causes of truth: either because a man does not exist and therefore is not white, or because a man does exist and yet he is not white. But in the proposition ‘A white man is a man’, if no man is white, the subject is taken significatively and personally, not because it supposits for something, but because it is denoted to supposit for something, and therefore, because it supposits for nothing, although it is denoted to supposit for something, the proposition is absolutely false.
(20) Et ideo si aliquid prius dictum videatur isti repugnare, intelligendum est in propositione affirmativa et vera, quia semper in propositione affirmativa et vera, si terminus stet personaliter, supponit pro aliquo significato, secundum modum praeexpositum.	Therefore, if anything said before seems to conflict with this, it must be understood in the case of an affirmative and true proposition, for in an affirmative and true proposition, if the term stands personally, it always supposits for some significate, in the manner explained before.
(21) Et si dicatur: ista non stant simul 'supponit' et 'pro nullo supponit', quia sequitur 'supponit, igitur pro aliquo supponit', dicendum est quod non sequitur, sed sequitur 'supponit, igitur denotatur pro aliquo supponere, vel denotatur pro nullo supponere'.	And if someone objects, “‘It supposits’ and ‘It supposits for nothing’ are inconsistent, because ‘It supposits; therefore, it supposits for something’ follows.” It should be said that it does not follow. Instead it “It supposits; therefore, it is denoted to supposit for something or denoted to supposit for nothing” follows.
(22) Ad tertium dicendum quod tales propositiones 'equus tibi promittitur', 'viginti librae tibi debentur' de virtute sermonis sunt falsae, quia quaelibet singularis est falsa, ut patet inductive. Tamen si termini tales ponantur a parte praedicati, possunt aliquo modo concedi. Et tunc oportet dicere quod termini sequentes talia verba virtute illorum verborum habent suppositionem confusam tantum, et ideo non contingit descendere disiunctive ad singularia sed tantum per disiunctum praedicatum, connumerando non tantum praesentia sed etiam futura. Unde non sequitur 'promitto tibi equum, ergo promitto tibi hunc equum vel promitto tibi illum equum', et sic de singulis praesentibus; sed bene sequitur 'promitto tibi equum, igitur promitto tibi hunc equum vel illum vel illum', et sic de singulis, connumerando omnes, tam praesentes quam futuros, et hoc quia omnia talia verba aequivalenter includunt verba de futuro. Unde ista 'promitto tibi equum' valet istam 'tu habebis ex dono meo unum equum', et ideo in ista 'promitto tibi equum' potest li equum supponere pro futuris, sicut in ista 'tu habebis equum'.	To the third, it should be said that such propositions as ‘A horse is promised to you’, ‘Twenty pounds are owed to you’ are literally false, because each singular is false, as is clear inductively. Yet if such terms are given on the side of the predicate, they can be conceded in some way. And then we have to say that terms following such verbs, by virtue of those verbs, have merely confused supposition, and therefore, we cannot descend disjunctively to singulars, but only by a disjunctive predicate, counting not only present things but also future ones. Hence ‘I promise you a horse; therefore, I promise you this horse or I promise you that horse,’ and so on for present singulars, does not follow. But ‘I promise you a horse; therefore, I promise you this horse or that one or that one’, and so on, counting all [horses], both present ones and future ones, it does follow well. This is because such verbs equivalently include verbs of the future. Hence ‘I promise you a horse’ validates ‘You will have a horse by my gift’, and so in ‘I promise you a horse’, the word ‘horse’ can supposit for future things, for example in ‘you will have a horse’.
(23) Sed numquid ista 'promitto tibi equum' li equum supponit confuse tantum, loquendo de virtute sermonis? Dicendum quod stricte loquendo li equum non supponit confuse tantum, quia non supponit, cum sit pars extremi. Et praedicta regula de suppositione determinata data est de illis quae stricte loquendo supponunt, quia sunt extrema propositionum et non tantum partes extremorum. Tamen extendendo nomen potest dici quod li equum supponit confuse tantum, et hoc quia sequitur tale verbum. Et ita est universaliter quod terminus communis sequens verbum tale, ita tamen quod sit pars extremi tantum, semper supponit confuse tantum et non determinate, personaliter tamen.	But does the word ‘horse’ supposit merely confusedly in ‘I promise you a horse’, speaking literally? It should be said that, strictly speaking, ‘horse’ does not supposit merely confusedly, because it does not supposit, since it is a part of an extreme. And the previous rule given about determinate supposition above is about those terms that strictly speaking supposit, because they are the extremes of propositions and not merely the parts of the extremes. Nevertheless, by extending the name, it can be said that the word ‘horse’ supposits merely confusedly, and this is because it follows such a verb. And so, generally, a common term following such a verb, yet such that it is not merely a part of the extreme, always supposits merely confusedly and not determinately, still supposits personally.
(24) Unde sciendum est quod quandocumque in aliqua propositione tali de praesenti vel de praeterito vel de futuro ponitur verbum virtute cuius denotatur quod aliqua propositio erit vera, vel deberet esse vera, in qua ponitur a parte praedicati terminus communis, et non denotatur de quacumque propositione in qua ponitur a parte praedicati singulare contentum sub illo communi quod erit vera, tunc ille terminus communis, isto modo accipiendo 'supponere' quo pars extremi potest supponere, non supponit determinate, hoc est non contingit descendere ad singularia per disiunctivam sed tantum per propositionem de disiuncto extremo vel de parte extremi disiuncta. Nunc autem per istam 'ego promitto tibi equum', virtute istius verbi 'promitto' denotatur quod haec erit vera, vel quod debet esse vera aliquando, 'ego do tibi equum' vel consimilis, et non denotatur quod aliqua talis 'ego do tibi istum equum' - quocumque equo demonstrato - erit vel debet esse vera. Et ideo non sequitur 'ego promitto tibi equum, igitur promitto tibi istum equum vel promitto tibi illum equum'. Et consimiliter est de talibus 'ego debeo tibi viginti libras', 'iste tenetur Sorti in viginti marchis'.	Hence, you should know that whenever in any such proposition of the present or of the past or of the future there occurs a verb by virtue of which it is denoted that some proposition will be true, or ought to be true, in which a common term is given on the side of the predicate, and it is not denoted of any proposition in which a singular [term] contained under that common [term] is given on the side of the predicate that it will be true, then (taking ‘supposit’ in the sense in which a part of an extreme can supposit) the common term does not supposit determinately. That is, we cannot descend to singulars by a disjunctive [proposition] but only by a proposition with a disjoint extreme or with a disjoint part of an extreme. But now, by ‘I promise you a horse’, in virtue of the verb ‘promise’, it is denoted that ‘I give you a horse’ or something like that will be true, or that it ought to be true some time, and it is not denoted that something like ‘I give you this horse’ – pointing to any horse whatever – will be or ought to be true. Therefore ‘I promise you a horse; therefore, I promise you this horse or I promise you that horse’ does not follow. And similarly for such as ‘I owe you twenty pounds’, ‘He is in debt to Socrates for twenty marks’.
(25) Sic igitur patet quod ista potest concedi 'ego promitto tibi equum', et tamen ista de virtute sermonis nullo modo debet concedi 'equus tibi promittitur'. Cuius ratio est quia in ista 'equus tibi promittitur' li equus est subiectum et non est pars subiecti, et ideo oportet quod supponat determinate, cum neque signum neque negatio neque aliquid includens aliquid tale praecedat, et ideo oportet quod contingat descendere ad singularia. In ista autem 'promitto tibi equum' li equum non est extremum sed pars extremi, quia istud totum est praedicatum 'promittens tibi equum', quia istae aequivalent 'ego promitto tibi equum' et 'ego sum promittens tibi equum'; et ita 'equum' est pars extremi. Et ideo sicut non oportet quod supponat, proprie loquendo, ita non oportet quod supponat determinate, et per consequens non oportet quod contingat descendere ad disiunctivam.	Thus it is clear that ‘I promise you a horse’ can be conceded, and yet ‘A horse is promised to you’ should in no way be conceded literally, the reason for which is that in ‘A horse is promised to you’, the word ‘horse’ is the subject and not a part of the subject. Therefore, it has to supposit determinately, since neither a sign nor a negation nor anything that includes something like that precedes [‘horse’], and so we have to be able to descend to singulars. But in ‘I promise you a horse’, ‘horse’ is not an extreme but a part of an extreme, for the whole ‘promising you a horse’ is the predicate, because ‘I promise you a horse’ and ‘I am promising you a horse’ are equivalent. So ‘horse’ is a part of an extreme, and therefore, just as it does not have to supposit, properly speaking, so it does not have to supposit determinately, and in consequence, we do not have to be able to descend to a disjunctive [proposition].
(26) Sed numquid contingit descendere sub parte extremi? Dicendum est quod quandoque contingit descendere. Sicut bene sequitur 'iste dat Sorti equum, igitur dat sibi istum equum vel dat sibi illum', et sic de singulis. Quandoque autem non contingit descendere propter aliquam rationem specialem, qualis dicta est in proposito. Et ita quamvis ista concedatur 'ego promitto tibi equum', ista tamen de virtute sermonis non est concedenda 'equus tibi promittitur'. Tamen ipsa conceditur, quia communiter accipitur pro ista 'aliquis tibi promittit equum'. Sed quare ista consequentia non valet 'aliquis tibi promittit equum, igitur equus tibi promittitur', dicetur in tractatu de propositione.	But can one descend under a part of an extreme? It should be said that sometimes one can descend. For example, ‘He gives Socrates a horse; therefore, he gives him this horse or he gives him that one,’ and so on, follows well. But sometimes one cannot descend, for some special reason like the one stated in the present case. And so, although ‘I promise you a horse’ may be conceded, yet ‘a horse to you is promised’ is not to be conceded. Yet it is conceded, because it is generally taken for ‘Someone promises you a horse’. But it will be explained in the treatise on the proposition why the consequence “Someone promises you a horse; therefore, a horse is promised to you” is not valid.
(27) Ad quartum dicendum est quod in talibus 'iste privatur visu' li visu, quod est pars extremi, non proprie supponit. Verumtamen isto modo quo potest supponere, supponit confuse et distributive, quia aequivalet isti 'iste nullum visum habet', ubi 'visus' negative confunditur confuse et distributive. Tamen non in qualibet propositione exponente illam unam supponit confuse et distributive, quia non in affirmativa, scilicet in ista 'iste est aptus natus habere visum', sed in ista supponit aliquo modo determinate, scilicet pro illis quae aliquando fuerunt possibilia, non tamen pro omnibus illis, sed pro illis quae potuerunt sibi infuisse.	To the fourth, it should be said that in such [propositions] as ‘he is deprived of sight’, the word ‘sight’, which is part of an extreme, does not properly supposit. Nevertheless, in the way in which it can supposit, it supposits confusedly and distributively, for it is equivalent to ‘He has no sight’, where ‘sight’ is confused negatively confusedly and distributively. But [the term ‘sight’] does not supposit confusedly and distributively in every proposition expounding ‘He is deprived of sight’, for [it does] not do so in the affirmative [analysis], namely, in ‘he is by nature suited to have sight’, but rather, in this analysis the term supposits in some way determinately, namely, for things that were sometime possible – although not for all of them, but rather for those were able to inhere in him.
(28) Ad quintum dicendum est quod de virtute sermonis haec est falsa 'genera et species sunt substantiae'. Sed haec potest concedi 'genera et species sunt secundae substantiae', et tunc li secundae substantiae supponit personaliter et determinate, quia hoc nomen 'secunda substantia' imponitur ad significandum intentiones secundas, importantes veras substantias.	To the fifth, it should be said that literally ‘genera and species are substances’ is false. But ‘genera and species are second substances’ can be conceded, and then ‘second substances’ supposits personally and determinately, because the name ‘second substance’ is imposed to signify second intentions that convey true substances.
(29) Et ideo falsa est opinio quae ponit quod 'substantia' potest habere suppositionem simplicem et tamen supponere pro speciebus et generibus. Sed si aliquando invenitur in aliquo auctore quod genera et species sunt substantiae, debet auctoritas exponi: vel quod per actum exercitum intelligit actum signatum, ut per istam 'genera et species sunt substantiae' intelligatur ista 'de generibus et speciebus praedicatur substantia', et debet sic exerceri 'homo est substantia', 'animal est substantia', et sic de aliis. Vel debet auctoritas exponi, quod 'substantia' est aequivocum. Aliquando enim significat veras res, quae sunt substantiae distinctae realiter ab omni accidente reali et ab omni intentione secunda, et tunc accipitur 'substantia' proprie. Aliquando significat ipsas intentiones importantes substantias primo modo dictas. Et tunc sub tali intellectu concederetur ista 'genera et species sunt substantiae', accipiendo praedicatum personaliter; sed tunc non acciperetur proprie sed improprie et transumptive.	Therefore, the opinion is false that posits that ‘substance’ can have simple supposition and yet supposit for species and genera. But if sometimes it is found in some author that genera and species are substances, that authority should be expounded either [so] that a signate act is understood by an exercised act, so that by ‘genera and species are substances’ there is understood ‘of genera and species there is predicated substance’, and it [the act] should be exercised as ‘A man is a substance’, ‘an animal is a substance’, and so on. Or the authority should be expounded [so] that ‘substance’ is equivocal. For sometimes it signifies true things that are substances really distinct from any real accident and from any second intention, and then ‘substance’ is taken properly. [But] sometimes it signifies the intentions that convey substances in the first sense. And then, under that understanding, ‘Genera and species are substances’ would be conceded, taking the predicate personally, but in that case [‘substance’] would not be taken properly, but rather improperly and transumptively.
(30) Ad sextum dicendum est quod diversi diversimode utuntur talibus abstractis, nam aliquando utuntur eis pro rebus, aliquando utuntur eis pro nominibus. Si primo modo, tunc debet dici quod supponunt pro illis pro quibus supponunt sua concreta, secundum opinionem Aristotelis. Et tunc istae aequipollent 'ignis est calefaciens' et 'ignis est calefactio', similiter 'homo est pater' et 'homo est paternitas'. Immo proprie loquendo talia concreta et abstracta, si abstracta imponalitur ad significandum praecise res, sunt nomina synonyma, secundum intentionem Aristotelis et multorum philosophorum.	To the sixth, it must be said that different [persons] use such abstract terms in different ways, for sometimes they use them for things, sometimes use them for names. If in the first way, then it ought be said that they supposit for those for which their concrete [terms] supposit, according to the view of Aristotle. In then ‘fire is calefactive’ and ‘Fire is calefaction’ are equipollent, similarly ‘a man is a father’ and ‘a man is paternity’. Indeed properly speaking such concrete and abstract [terms], if the abstract are imposed to signify precisely things, are synonymous names according to the intention of Aristotle and of many philosophers.
(31) Et quod hoc non sit ita mirabile, potest persuaderi. Nam accipio istam propositionem 'creatio est vera res', et quaero: aut 'creatio' supponit pro aliquo aut pro nullo. Si pro nullo, vel non erit propositio vel erit propositio falsa. Si supponit pro aliquo, aut pro re extra, aut pro re in anima, aut pro uno aggregato. Si pro re extra, quaero: pro qua? Et non potest dari nisi Deus; igitur 'creatio' ita supponit pro Deo sicut 'creans'. Et eadem facilitate poterit hoc dici de omni alio.	And that this is not so wonderful can be convincingly shown. For I take the proposition ‘creation is a true thing’, and I ask: does ‘creation’ supposit for something or for nothing? If for nothing, either [the sentence] will not be a proposition or else it will be a false proposition. If it does supposit for something, [then] either for an external thing, or for a thing in the soul, or for an aggregate. If for an external thing, I ask: for which thing? Only God can be given, therefore ‘creation’ supposits for God just as much as ‘creating’ does. And this can just as easily be said about any other [case].
(32) Si supponit pro aliquo in anima (sicut secundum aliquos supponit pro relatione rationis) hoc est impossibile, quia tunc haec esset falsa 'creatio est vera res'; et similiter, tunc numquam esset creatio nisi in anima, nec Deus esset creans nisi per actum animae formantis talem relationem rationis. Similiter, eadem facilitate posset dici quod 'calefactio' supponit pro tali ente sive relatione rationis; nec potest esse aliqua ratio ad probandum talem esse relationem in agente creato magis quam increato. Et ideo secundum intentionem Philosophi nulla est res quae poterit significari per tale concretum vel connotari quin eodem modo significetur vel connotetur per abstractum. Et ideo apud eum, si utrumque imponatur ad significandum rem, erunt nomina synonyma.	If it supposits for something in the soul (just as, for some, it supposits for a relation of reason), this is impossible, because then ‘creation is a true thing’ is impossible, and similarly there would never be creation except in the soul, nor would God be creating except by means of an act of a soul forming such a relation of reason. Similarly, it could as easily be said that ‘calefaction’ supposits for such a being or relation of reason, nor can there be any reasoning to prove such a thing is a relation in a created agent any more than in the uncreated one. Therefore, according to the Philosopher’s intention, there is no thing that could be signified or connoted by such a concrete [term] unless in the same way it is signified or connoted by the abstract term. And therefore, according to him, if both are imposed to signify a thing,they will be synonymous names.
(33) Nec valet dicere quod modus significandi impedit synonymitatem, quia diversitas modi significandi non impedit synonymitatem nisi quando propter diversum modum significandi aliquid significatur vel connotatur per unum quod non connotatur vel non significatur per reliquum eodem modo. Sicut patet in istis 'homo', 'hominis', 'homines'; similiter 'homo', 'risibilis'; similiter 'intellectus', 'voluntas' et 'anima'; similiter hic 'creans', 'gubernans', 'damnans', 'beatificans', et sic de omnibus talibus, quae verificantur de eodem, et tamen non sunt synonyma. Si enim solum diversitas modi significandi variaret synonymitatem, dicerem aeque faciliter quod 'tunica' et 'vestis' non sunt synononyma, quia 'tunica' terminatur in 'a' et non 'vestis'; et sic de multis talibus.	Nor is it valid to say that the mode of signifying prevents synonymy, for a diversity in the mode of signifying does not prevent synonymy except when on account of the diverse mode of signifying something is signified or connoted by the one [term] that is not connoted or not signified by the other, in the same way, as is clear in ‘man’, ‘man’s’, ‘men’, similarly ‘man’, ‘risible’, similarly ‘intellect’, ‘will’ and ‘soul’, similarly ‘creating’, ‘governing’, ‘damning’, ‘beatifying’, and so on for all such, which are verified of the same [thing], and yet they are not synonymous. For if a only a diversity in the mode of signifying affected synonymy, I would just as easily say that ‘tunic’ and ‘cloak’ are not synonyms because ‘tunic’ ends in ‘c’ and ‘cloak’ does not. So too for many other such cases.
(34) Et ita talis diversitas nec quantum ad terminationem nec quantum ad accidentia, cuiusmodi sunt genus et huiusmodi, nec quantum ad alia, cuiusmodi sunt adiectivum et substantivum vel huiusmodi, evacuant synonymitatem. Tamen quando est varius modus significandi proprie loquendo, tunc non est synonymitas. Sed hoc non contingit in proposito, sicut patet manifeste, quia eundem modum significandi omnino possunt habere concretum et abstractum quando non sunt talia concretum et abstractum cuiusmodi sunt illa de primo modo, sicut dictum est in principio istius tractatus.	And so such diversity does not cancel synonymy, whether in respect of the ending or with respect to accidents such as genus and the like, nor in respect of other things such as adjective and substantive and so on. Yet when there is a varying mode of signifying properly speaking, there is no synonymy. But this does not happen in the present case, as is manifestly clear, because a concrete term and the abstract term can have exactly the same mode of signifying when the concrete and the abstract are not like the ones that belong to the first mode, as was said in the beginning of this treatise.
(35) Sic igitur talia abstracta, quando accipiuntur significative pro rebus, sunt nomina synonyma cum concretis, secundum intentionem Aristotelis. Sed secundum theologos aliter forte oportet dicere de aliquibus, quamvis non de omnibus.	So, then, such abstract terms, when they are taken significatively for things, are names synonymous with their concrete forms, according to Aristotle’s meaning. But according to theologians, one perhaps has to say otherwise of certain cases, although not of all.
(36) Aliquando autem utuntur homines talibus abstractis, ut significent ipsamet concreta, sicut faciunt de istis 'privatio', 'negatio', 'contradictio' et huiusmodi. Et sic in ista 'homo est relatio', li relatio supponit significative et pro nominibus relativis. Et similiter 'similitudo' aliquando supponit pro nomine relativo, puta pro hoc nomine 'simile'; similiter 'creatio' pro hoc nomine 'creans'; et 'quantitas' pro hoc nomine 'quantum', et sic de multis talibus abstractis quae non habent concreta sibi correspondentia, supponentia pro rebus distinctis ab illis rebus quae significantur per abstracta, secundum intentionem Aristotelis.	But sometimes men use such abstract terms in the way that the concrete terms signify. For example, as they do for ‘privation’, ‘negation’, ‘contradiction’, and so on. And so in ‘A man is a relation’, ‘relation’ supposits significatively and for relative names. Similarly, ‘similitude’ sometimes supposits for a relative name, i.e. for the name ‘similar’. Likewise, ‘creation’ for the name ‘creating’, and ‘quantity’ for the name quantum, and so for many such abstract terms that do not have concrete terms corresponding to them, suppositing for things distinct from the things that are signified by the abstract terms, according to Aristotle’s meaning.
(37) Et ideo de omnibus talibus abstractis eodem modo quo conceditur de eis praedicari hoc praedicatum 'res extra animam' debet de eis concedi suum concretum et illud idem pro quo suum concretum supponit, quia, sicut frequenter est dictum, si talia abstracta sint praecise nomina primae intentionis, erunt nomina synonyma cum suis concretis, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, ut mihi videtur.	Therefore, for all such abstract terms, in the same way in which it is conceded that the predicate ‘thing outside the soul’ is predicated of them, it ought be conceded that their concrete term [is predicated of them?], and that same thing for which their concrete form supposits. For as has frequently been said, if such abstract terms are precisely names of first intention, they will be names synonymous with their concrete terms, according to Aristotle’s opinion, as it seems to me.
(38) Et ista est causa quare pauca talia abstracta inveniuntur ab Aristotele, quia omnia talia 'homo-humanitas', 'equus-equinitas', 'animal-animalitas', 'asinus-asinitas', 'bos-bovitas', 'quantum-quantitas', 'relativum-relatio', 'simile-similitudo', 'calefaciens-calefactio', 'pater-paternitas', 'ternarius-trinitas', 'duo-dualitas', et huiusmodi quando sunt nomina praecise primae intentionis synonyma reputavit.	And this is the reason why few such abstract terms are found by Aristotle. For he regarded all such as ‘man/humanity’, ‘horse/horsehood’, ‘animal/animality’, ‘donkey/donkey ness’, ‘cow/cowhood’, ‘quantum/quantity’, ‘relative/relation’, ‘similar/similitude’, ‘heating/heat’, ‘father/fatherhood’, ‘ternary/trinity’, ‘two/twoness’, and so on, as synonyms when they are names precisely of first intention.
(39) Sed secundum usum loquentium aliquando abstracta sunt nomina secundae intentionis vel secundae impositionis, et tunc non sunt synonyma.	But according to the speakers’ usage, abstract terms are sometimes names of second intention or of second imposition, and then they are not synonymous [with concrete terms].
(40) Alii autem dicunt quod omnia talia nomina abstracta significant res distinctas vel relationes rationis et pro illis supponunt.	But others say that all such abstract names signify distinct things, or relations of reason, and supposit for them.
(41) Ad septimum dubium dicendum est quod in ista 'Socrates bis fuit albus' ponitur una dictio aequivalenter includens negationem scilicet haec dictio 'bis'. Unde virtute istius dictionis ista 'Socrates bis fuit albus' habet unam negativam exponentem; aequivalet enim isti 'Socrates primo fuit albus, et aliquo tempore postea non erat albus, et postea fuit albus'. Et propter istam negativam aequivalenter inclusam non stat mere determinate, ut contingat descendere per disiunctivam ad pronomina vel nomina propria exprimentia illa pro quibus praedicatum supponit.	To the seventh, it should be said that in ‘Socrates twice was white’ there is given an expression that equivalently includes a negation, namely, the expression ‘twice’. Thus, in virtue of this expression, ‘Socrates twice was white’ has one negative exponent, for it is equivalent to ‘Socrates first was white, and at some time afterwards he was not white, and after that he was white’. And because of the negative equivalently included, it [‘white’?] does not stand merely determinately so that one can descend by a disjunctive proposition to pronouns or proper names expressing those for which the predicate supposits.
(42) Et consimiliter est de istis 'Socrates incipit esse albus', 'homo desinit esse grammaticus', et universaliter de talibus habentibus aliquam negativam exponentem.	And it is similarly the case for ‘Socrates begins to be white’, ‘A man ceases to be lettered’, and generally for such propositions that have a negative exponent.
(43) Per idem ad aliud: quod ista 'tantum animal est homo' habet dictionem exclusivam, propter quam habet unam negativam exponentem, et ideo nec subiectum nec praedicatum supponit determinate.	The same holds for the other [doubt]: ‘Only an animal is a man’ has an exclusive expression on account of which [the proposition] has a negative exponent, and therefore, neither the subject nor the predicate supposits determinately.
(44) Ad nonum dicendum quod si accipiatur de virtute vocis, termini eodem modo supponunt sicut in aliis; sed secundum usum loquentium improprie supponunt pro aliis.	To the ninth, it should be said that if it is taken literally, the terms supposit the same way they do in other [propositions], but according to the usage of speakers, they supposit improperly for other [things].