Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 74

 

Latin	English
[CAP. 74. DE SUPPOSITIONE CONFUSA ET DISTRIBUTIVA ET DE REGULIS EIUS]	[Chapter 74.  Of confused and distributive supposition and its rules]
Circa suppositionem confusam et distributivam dantur diversae regulae. Et primo de suppositione confusa et distributiva mobili. Et sunt istae : Una est quod in omni propositione universali affirmativa et negativa, quae non est exclusiva nec exceptiva, stat subiectum confuse et distributive mobiliter, sicut patet in istis 'omnis homo currit', 'nullus homo currit'.	Concerning confused and distributive supposition, diverse rules are given.  And first, about 'mobile' confused and distributive supposition.  And they are as follows.  One is that in every universal affirmative or negative proposition, which is neither exclusive nor exceptive, the subject stands confusedly and distributively mobile, as is clear in 'every man runs', 'no man runs'.
Secunda regula: quod in omni tali universali negativa praedicatum stat confuse et distributive.	Second rule: that in every such universal negative the predicate stands confusedly and distributively.
Tertia regula est quod quando negatio determinans compositionem principalem praecedit, praedicatum stat confuse et distributive, sicut in ista 'homo non est animal' li animal stat confuse et distributive, sed 'homo' stat determinate.	The third rule is that when negation determining principal composition precedes, the predicate stands confusedly and distributively, for example in 'a man is not an animal', the word 'animal' stands confusedly and distributively, but 'man' stands determinately.
Quarta regula est quod illud quod immediate sequitur hoc verbum 'distinguitur' vel 'differt', vel participia eis correspondentia, vel hoc nomen 'aliud', vel aequivalens illis, stat confuse et distributive. Sicut bene sequitur 'Socrates distinguitur ab homine, igitur Socrates distinguitur ab hoc homine', quocumque homine demonstrato; similiter in ista 'Socrates differt ab homine' vel 'Socrates est differens ab homine'; et similiter in ista 'Socrates est alius ab homine'.	The fourth rule is that what immediately follows the verb 'is distinguished' or 'differs', or the participles corresponding to them, or the name 'other', or one equivalent to it, stands confusedly and distributively.  For example, 'Socrates is distinguished from a man, therefore Socrates is distinguished from this man' follows well, whatever man is pointed to.  Similarly, in 'Socrates differs from a man' or 'Socrates is different from a man', and similarly in 'Socrates is other than a man'.
Verumtamen sciendum est quod praedictae regulae verae sunt quando sine negatione, vel tali verbo vel nomine dempto, praedictus terminus non staret confuse et distributive, quia si aliquo praedictorum dempto terminus staret confuse et distributive, tunc per adventum talis dictionis idem terminus staret determinate. Sicut patet in ista 'Socrates est omnis homo', hoc praedicatum 'homo' stat confuse et distributive. Ideo si praecedat negatio, stabit determinate, sicut patet sic dicendo 'Socrates non est omnis homo'; nam sequitur 'Socrates non est iste homo', quocumque homine demonstrato, 'igitur Socrates non est omnis homo'. Et eodem modo dicendum est de aliis.	Nevertheless, it should be known that the previous rules are true when there is no negation, or with such a verb or name removed, the previous term would not stand confusedly and distributively, for if with one of the predicates removed the term were to stand confusedly and distributively, then by the application of such an expression the same term would stand determinately.  For example, it is clear in 'Socrates is every man' that the predicate 'man' stands confusedly and distributively.  Therefore if negation precedes, it will stand determinately, as is clear in saying 'Socrates is not every man', for 'Socrates is not that man, therefore Socrates is not every man', whatever man is pointed to.  And it should be said in the same way in respect of the other cases.
Et ideo ista regula est vera 'quidquid mobilitat immobilitatum, immobilitat mobilitatum'. Hoc est, quidquid additum termino stanti immobibiter facit ipsum stare mobiliter postquam additur sibi, illud idem additum termino stanti primo mobiliter facit ipsum stare immobiliter postquam sibi additur. Sicut in ista propositione 'Socrates est homo', stat 'homo' immobiliter; et si addatur negatio, sic dicendo 'Socrates non est homo', negatio facit li homo stare mobiliter.
Et ideo si primo stet terminus mobiliter sine negatione, postquam additur sibi negatio stabit immobiliter. Sicut in ista 'Socrates est omnis homo': quia in ista 'Socrates est omnis homo' stat li homo mobiliter, ideo in ista 'Socrates non est omnis homo' stat li homo immobiliter. Et eodem modo dicendum est de istis 'Socrates differt ab omni homine', 'Socrates est alius ab omni homine'.
Hoc igitur universaliter est dicendum quod quidquid facit terminum stare confuse et distributive vel est signum universale vel negatio vel aliquid aequivalens negationi. Non tamen semper quando aliquid includit negationem facit ipsum stare mobiliter, sicut patet de dictione exclusiva in propositione affirmativa, quia subiectum non supponit confuse et distributive sed praedicatum. In exclusiva autem negativa, in qua dictio exclusiva additur subiecto, tam subiectum quam praedicatum supponit confuse et distributive.
Circa suppositionem confusam et distributivam immobilem est sciendum quod semper subiectum talem habet suppositionem in propositione exceptiva, sicut patet in ista 'omnis homo praeter Sortem currit'. Nam li homo supponit confuse et distributive, non tamen mobiliter, quia non contingit descendere nihil variando, nisi per solam positionem singularis loco termini communis et signi. Nam non sequitur 'omnis homo praeter Sortem currit, igitur iste homo praeter Sortem currit', nam consequens est improprium, sicut post patebit.	Concerning confused and distributive immobile supposition it should be known that the subject always has such supposition in an exceptive proposition, as is clear in 'every man apart from Socrates runs'.  For the word 'man' supposits confusedly and distributively, yet not with mobility, for it is not possible to descend without variation, unless by putting a singular term in place of the common term and sign.  For 'every man apart from Socrates runs, therefore that man apart from Socrates runs' does not follow, for the consequence is improper, as will become clear later.
Hic tamen sciendum est quod aliquo modo contingit descendere ad omnia singularia sed non eodem modo, sed ad unum negative et ad omnia alia affirmative. Nam bene sequitur 'omnis homo praeter Sortem currit, igitur Socrates non currit', et de omnibus aliis sequitur affirmative 'igitur iste homo currit, et ille homo currit', et sic de singulis, excepto solo Sorte. Et hoc facit dictio exceptiva addita.	Yet here it should be known that in some manner it is possible to descend to all singulars but not in the same way, but to one negatively and to all the others affirmatively.  For 'every man apart from Socrates runs, therefore Socrates does not run' follows well, and of all others it follows affirmatively 'therefore this man runs, and that man runs' and so on for the singulars, with the sole exception of Socrates.  And the added exceptive expression causes this.