Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 77

Latin	English
[CAP. 77. DE SUPPOSITIONE IMPROPRIA]	[Chapter 77. On improper supposition]
Oportet autem cognoscere quod sicut est suppositio propria, quando scilicet terminus supponit pro eo quod significat proprie, ita est suppositio impropria, quando terminus accipitur improprie. Multiplex autem est suppositio impropria , scilicet antonomastica, quando terminus supponit praecise pro illo cui maxime convenit, sicut in talibus 'Apostolus dicit hoc', 'Philosophus negat hoc', et similibus. Alia est synecdochica, quando pars supponit pro toto. Alia est metonymica, quando continens supponit pro contento vel quando abstractum accidentis supponit pro subiecto, et sic de aliis.	Now it has to be known that just as proper supposition is when a term supposits for that which it properly signifies, so improper supposition is when a term is taken improperly. Now improper supposition is manifold, namely antonomastic, when a term supposits precisely for that to which it maximally agrees, e.g. in ‘the Apostle says so’, ‘the Philosopher denies this’, and in similar cases. Another is synecdoche, when the part supposits for the whole. Another is metonymic, when the container supposits for the contained or when the abstract of an accident supposits for the subject, and so on.
Et ideo multum est considerandum quando terminus et propositio accipitur de virtute sermonis et quando secundum usum loquentium vel secundum intentionem auctorum, et hoc quia vix invenitur aliquod vocabulum quin in diversis locis librorum philosophorum et Sanctorum et auctorum aequivoce accipiatur; et hoc penes aliquem modum aequivocationis. Et ideo volentes accipere semper vocabulum univoce et uno modo frequenter errant circa intentiones auctorum et inquisitionem veritatis, cum fere omnia vocabula aequivoce accipiantur.	And therefore much is to be considered when a term and a proposition is taken literally, and when according to common usage, or according to the intentions of the authors, and this because there is hardly any word you come across, but that in diverse places of the books of philosophers and the saints it is taken equivocally, and [even] then in some mode of equivocation. And therefore those wishing to accept a word always univocally and in one way frequently are in error concerning the intentions of the authors, and concerning the search for truth, since almost all words are taken equivocally.
Ex praedictis potest patere de istis 'esse intelligibile creaturae fuit ab aeterno', 'esse album convenit Sorti', et de huiusmodi multis, quomodo termini in istis supponunt. Quia aut supponunt pro re aut pro voce aut pro aggregato aut pro intentione animae: et quodcumque istorum detur, faciliter potest iudicari de eis an sint verae vel falsae quando termini sumuntur in propria significatione. Nam si in ista 'esse inteligibile creaturae fuit ab aeterno' subiectum supponit pro re: vel pro re creata vel pro increata. Si pro re creata, manifestum est quod est falsa; si pro re increata, manifestum est quod est vera; si supponat pro aliquo aggregato ex utraque re, manifestum est quod est falsa; si supponat pro intentione animae vel pro voce vel pro aliquo alio, neganda est.	From this, it can be clear about ‘the intelligible being of a creature existed from eternity’, ‘being white belongs to Socrates’ and many similar, who the terms in these supposit. For they either supposit for a thing, or for an utterance, or for an aggregate, or for an intention of the soul. And whatsoever of those are given, it can easily be judged whether they are true or false, when the terms are taken in their proper signification. For if in ‘the intelligible being of a creature existed from eternity’ the subject supposits for a thing, then either for a created or uncreated thing. If for a created thing, it is manifest that it is false, if for an uncreated thing, it is manifest that it is true, if it supposits for some aggregate of both things, it is manifestly false, if it supposits for an intention of the soul or for an utterance or for something else, it is to be denied.
Si autem tales propositiones non accipiantur de virtute sermonis, tunc accipiendae sunt illae loco quarum ponuntur, et secundum quod illae sunt verae vel falsae secundum hoc iudicandum est de eis. Unde quia per istam 'esse intelligibile creaturae fuit ab aeterno' intelligitur ista 'Deus ab aeterno intellexit creaturam', et ista secunda est vera, ideo prima, per quam intelligitur ista secunda, potest concedi. Et ista iam dicta de terminis et suppositionibus sufficiant. - Et in hoc completur prima pars huius Summae.	But if such propositions are not taken literally, then the propositions which are put in their place must be taken, and judgment should be made according as these are are true or false. Hence, because by ‘the intelligible being of a creature existed from eternity’ is understood ‘God understood a creature from eternity’, and because the second is true, it follows that the first, by which that second is understood, can be conceded. And the things we have said about terms and supposition are already sufficient. And with that, the first part of the Summa is complete.