Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book I/Chapter 76

 

Latin	English
[CAP. 76. DE SUPPOSITIONE TERMINORUM RELATIVORUM, ACCIPIENDO RELATIVUM SICUT ACCIPIT GRAMMATICUS ET NON SICUT LOGICUS]	[c. 76 On the supposition of relative terms, taking ‘relative’ as the grammarian understands it, not as the logician does]
Istis visis de suppositione terminorum absolutorum, videndum est de suppositione relativorum, non accipiendo 'relativum' illo modo quo logicus accipit, sed illo modo quo grammaticus accipit, secundum quod dicit quod 'relativum est ante latae rei recordativum' Est autem primo sciendum quod 'relativum', secundum quod grammatici utuntur relativo, quoddam vocatur relativum substantiae, quoddam vocatur relativum accidentis. Relativum substantiae vocatur sicut 'iste', 'ille', 'idem'. Relativa accidentis vocantur illa quae imponuntur aliquo modo vel derivantur a pluribus accidentibus, sicut 'talis', 'tantus', 'tot' et huiusmodi.	Having examined at the subject of the supposition of absolute terms, we must look at the supposition of relative terms – not taking ‘relative’ in the way that the logician understands it, but in the way that the grammarian understands it, according as he says that "the relative is reminiscent of something previously mentioned" . Now it should first be known that [concerning] ‘relative’ (as the grammarians use the term ‘relative’), that one is called ‘relative of substance’, another is called ‘relative of accident’. What is called a relative of substance is e.g. ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘the same’. What are called ‘relatives of accident’ are those which are imposed in some way, or are derived from several accidents, e.g. ‘such’, ‘as much’, ‘as many’ and so on.
Relativa substantiae quaedam sunt relativa identitatis, quaedam diversitatis. Relativorum identitatis quaedam sunt non reciproca, quaedam sunt reciproca.	Some relatives of substance are relatives ‘of identity’, some are ‘of diversity’. Of relatives of identity, some are not reciprocal, some are reciprocal.
Non reciproca sunt sicut 'ille', 'idem' et sic de aliis. Et de istis dantur regulae: quod semper supponunt pro illo pro quo supponunt sua antecedentia, ita quod pro eodem verificantur, si verificentur. Sicut patet hic 'Socrates currit et ille disputat': ad hoc quod ista copulativa sit vera requiritur quod secunda pars verificetur pro illo eodem pro quo prima pars verificatur. Similiter hic 'homo est species et ille praedicatur de pluribus'.	Non reciprocals are e.g. ‘that’, ‘the same’ and so on. And the rules given about these are, that they always supposit for what their antecedents supposit for, so that they are verified for the same thing, if they are verified. As is clear from ‘Socrates runs and he argues’ - in order for that conjunction to be true it is required that the second part is verified for the same thing for which the first is verified. Similarly for ‘man is a species and that [species] is predicated of many [men].
Unde sciendum est quod tale relativum numquam debet poni in eadem categorica cum suo antecedente, sic dicendo 'Socrates est ille', nam hic li ille est pronomen demonstrativum et non relativum. Similiter sciendum quod numquam, quando antecedens relativi est terminus communis supponens personaliter, est licitum ponere antecedens loco relativi ad habendum propositionem convertibilem et aequivalentem. Sicut istae non aequipollent 'homo currit et ille disputat', 'homo currit et homo disputat'. In aliis casibus contingit, nam istae aequipollent 'Socrates currit et ille disputat', 'Socrates currit et Socrates disputat'.	Hence it should be known that such a relative should never be put in the same category as its antecedent, in saying ‘Socrates is that’, for here the word ‘that’ is a demonstrative pronoun, not a relative. Similarly, it should be known that when the antecedent of the relative is a common term suppositing personally it is never allowed to put the antecedent in the place of the relative, for having a proposition that is convertible and equivalent. E.g. ‘a man runs and he argues’ and ‘a man runs and a man argues’ are not equipollent. In other cases it is possible, for ‘Socrates runs and he argues’ and runs Socrates runs and Socrates argues’ are equipollent.
Similiter est sciendum quod negatio numquam facit relativum stare confuse et distributive, sed semper supponit pro illo praecise pro quo verificatur suum antecedens, vel denotatur verificari. Unde haec est vera 'aliquis homo est Plato et Socrates non est ille', et tamen non sequitur 'igitur Socrates non est homo', sed sufficit quod haec sit vera 'Socrates non est Plato'. Et ita de virtute sermonis ista duo stant simul 'aliquis homo currit et Socrates non est ille' et 'aliquis homo currit et Socrates est ille', quia si Socrates et Plato currant utraque istarum copulativarum est vera.	Similarly it should be known that negation never causes a relative to stand [for something] confusedly and distributively, but rather it always supposits precisely for what its antecedent is verified. Hence ‘some man is Plato, and Socrates is not that man’ is true, and yet it does not follow ‘therefore Socrates is not a man’, but it is sufficient that ‘Socrates is not Plato’ is true. And so, taken literally, ‘some man runs and Socrates is not that man’ and ‘some man runs and Socrates is not that man’ are consistent, for if Socrates and Plato run, both of those conjunctions are true.
Circa relativa identitatis reciproca sciendum quod differunt in hoc ab aliis quod possunt indifferenter poni in eadem categorica cum suo antecedente et in alia. Sicut patet de istis relativis 'se', 'suus'; nam bene dicitur 'Socrates disputat et videt se'; similiter bene dicitur 'Socrates videt se'; similiter bene dicitur 'Socrates videt suum asinum'; et bene dicitur 'Socrates currit et suus asinus ambulat'.	Concerning reciprocal relatives of identity it should be known that they differ from others in that they indifferently be put in the same category with their antecedent, and in another [category]. As is clear from the relatives ‘itself’, ‘its’; for it is correctly said ‘Socrates argues and sees himself’, and similarly ‘Socrates sees himself’, similarly ‘Socrates sees his donkey’, and similarly ‘Socrates sees and his donkey walks’.
Et est sciendum quod aliquando relativum est pars extremi et aliquando est extremum. Quando est extremum, ita scilicet quod sequitur vel praecedit immediate verbum, tunc supponit pro illo pro quo supponit suum antecedens; sicut in istis 'Socrates videt se', 'omnis homo videt se'. Sed quando est pars extremi tunc non supponit pro illo pro quo supponit suum antecedens, sed supponit pro aliquo importato per illud cui additur. Sicut patet hic 'Socrates disputat et suus asinus currit'. Hic li suus non supponit pro Sorte, sed supponit pro asino Sortis et non pro alio asino.	And it should be known that sometimes a relative is part of the extreme, and sometimes the extreme. When it is the extreme, i.e. so that it immediately follows or precedes the verb, then it supposits for what its antecedent supposits for, e.g. in ‘Socrates sees himself’, ‘every man sees himself’. But when it is part of the extreme then it does not supposit for what its antecedent supposits for, but rather supposits for that to which it is added. Just as is clear in ‘Socrates argues and his donkey runs’. Here the word ‘his’ does not supposit for Socrates, but supposits for the donkey of Socrates (and not another donkey).
Est etiam sciendum quod semper tale relativum habet talem suppositionem et pro eisdem supponit pro quibus supponit suum antecedens. Sed quando suum antecedens supponit confuse et distributive vel determinate, habet consimilem suppositionem sed singillatim, reddendo scilicet singula singulis. Et ideo non contingit descendere nec copulative nec disiunctive, nec alio modo, nisi respectu alicuius contenti sub antecedente.	It should also be known that such a relative has such a supposition and supposits for the same things for which its antecedent supposits. But when its antecedent supposits confusedly and distributively or determinately, it has a similar supposition but singly, i.e. by returning singular to singulars. And therefore it is not possible to descend either copulatively or disjunctively, or any other way, except in respect of something contained under the antecedent.
Verbi gratia in ista 'omnis homo videt se' li se supponit pro omni homine confuse et distributive immobiliter et singillatim, quia non contingit descendere non variando aliud extremum; sicut non sequitur 'omnis homo videt se, igitur omnis homo videt Sortem', et tamen contingit descendere ad Sortem respectu Sortis, sic dicendo 'omnis homo videt se, igitur Socrates videt Sortem'. Ita non est hic 'homo est animal'.	For example, in ‘every man sees himself’, the word ‘himself’ supposits for every man confusedly and distributively, immobiliter and singly, because it is not possible to descend by not varying the other extremum. For example ‘every man sees himself, therefore every man sees Socrates’ does not follow, and yet it is possible to descend to Socrates in respect of Socrates, in saying ‘every man sees himself, therefore Socrates sees Socrates’. This is not the case in ‘a man is an animal’.
Similiter in ista 'homo videt se' li se supponit determinate singillatim, quia contingit sic descendere 'homo videt se, igitur Socrates videt Sortem' vel 'Plato videt Platonem', et sic de singulis. Similiter contingit ascendere: non sic 'homo videt Platonem, igitur homo videt se', sed sic 'Socrates videt Sortem, igitur homo videt se'.	Similarly in ‘a man sees himself’ the word ‘himself’ supposits determinately-singly, because it is possible to descend thus: ‘a man sees himself, therefore Socrates sees Socrates or Plato sees Plato ...’ and so on for the singulars. Similarly it is possible to ascend not thus: ‘a man sees Plato, therefore a man sees himself’ but thus: ‘Socrates sees Socrates, therefore a man sees himself’
Ex istis patet quod tale relativum, sequens signum universale mediate, habet suppositionem confusam et distributivam, singillatim tamen. Similiter relativum in aliqua categorica, sive sit relativum reciprocum sive non, habet suppositionem confusam et distributivam propter additionem signi universalis ad suum antecedens. Eodem modo talis terminus habet suppositionem confusam tantum, quamvis in illa categorica nullum signum universale ponatur, propter hoc quod in categorica praecedenti praecedit mediate signum universale suum antecedens; sicut patet hic 'omnis homo est animal et quilibet asinus videt illud'.	From this it is clear that such a relative – following the universal [quantifier] sign mediately, has a confused and distributive supposition, yet singly. Similarly, a relative in some category, whether it is a relative reciprocal or not, has a confused and distributive supposition because of the addition of the universal sign to its antecedent. In the same way, such a term has confused supposition only, even though in that category no universal sign is given, because of the fact that in the preceding category the universal sign mediately precedes its antecedent, as is clear in ‘every man is an animal and every donkey sees that [man]’
Circa relativum diversitatis sciendum est quod relativum diversitatis ideo dicitur quia non verificatur pro eodem pro quo suum antecedens sicut patet hic: demonstratis duobus contradictoriis haec est vera 'alterum istorum est verum et reliquum est falsum'. Hic li reliquum verificatur pro illo pro quo non verificatur hoc antecedens ‘alterum istorum est verum’.	Concerning a relative of diversity, it should be known that a relative of diversity is so-called because it is not verified for the same thing its antecedent supposits for, as is clear here: with two contradictories demonstrated ‘one of them is true and the other is false’ is true. Here the word ‘the other’ is verified for that which the antecedent ‘one of them is true’ is not verified.
Circa relativa accidentium, cuiusmodi sunt 'tantus', 'talis', 'tot' et huiusmodi, quae non ideo dicuntur relativa accidentium quia supponunt pro accidentibus, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, sed quia supponunt pro aliquo, connotando aliquod praedicabile non in quid.	Concerning relatives of accident, of which sort are ‘as much’, ‘as such’, ‘as many’ and so on, which are not so-called because they supposit for accidents, according to the view of Aristotle, but because they supposit for something by connoting something predicable but not essentially.
Et est sciendum quod tale relativum non supponit nec verificatur pro illo pro quo suum antecedens sed pro alio, illi pro quo supponit suum antecedens simili vel aequali: sicut patet in ista 'Socrates est albus et talis est Plato'; li talis non supponit pro Sorte sed pro alio, simili Sorti. Similiter hic 'Socrates et Plato currunt et tot disputant'; li tot non necessario supponit pro Sorte et Platone, nec supponit necessario pro illis pro quibus supponit li currunt, sed potest supponere pro aliis. Similiter est hic 'Socrates est bicubitus et tantus est Plato'.	And it should be known that such a relative does not supposit, and is not verified for what its antecedent supposits for, but for another, similar or equal to what its antecedent supposits for. This is clear in ‘Socrates is white and so is Plato’. The word ‘so’ does not supposit for Socrates but for another, similar to Socrates. Similarly in ‘Socrates and Plato run and as many argue’, the word ‘as many’ does not necessarily supposit for Socrates and Plato, nor does it supposit necessarily for those who ‘run’ supposit for, but it can supposit for others. Similarly in ‘Socrates is two cubits [tall?] and Plato is as tall’.
'Unde sciendum est quod aliquando potest tale relativum supponere pro eodem, sed hoc non oportet. Similiter sciendum est quod suum antecedens, frequenter vel semper, est aliquod nomen in genere quantitatis vel qualitatis vel in alio praedicamento accidentali.	Hence it should be known that sometimes such a relative can supposit for the same thing, but this does not have to be the case. Similarly it should be known that its antecedent frequently or always is some name in the genus of quantity or quality or in another accidental category.