Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book II/Chapter 27

Latin	English
[2.27 DE CONVERSIONE PROPOSITIONUM DE CONTINGENTI]	Chapter 27. On the Conversion of Propositions contingency.
Post praedicta videndum est de conversione propositionum de contingenti. Et est primo sciendum quod in isto capitulo accipiendum est semper 'contingens' pro contingenti ad utrumlibet, ut illa sola propositio dicatur contingens quae nec est necessaria nec impossibilis. Et quia talis propositio habet duas conversiones, unam in terminis et aliam per oppositas qualitates, ideo primo dicendum est de prima conversione, secundo de secunda.	After the above, we must see about the conversion of propositions of contingency. And it must first be known that in this chapter 'contingent' is always to be taken for contingent to either, so that only that proposition is called contingent which is neither necessary nor impossible. And because such a proposition has two conversions, one in terms and the other through opposite qualities, therefore we must first speak of the first conversion, and secondly of the second.
Est autem primo sciendum quod propositiones de contingenti, sumptae in sensu compositionis, et eis aequivalentes convertuntur sicut suae de inesse, quando suae de inesse convertuntur simpliciter. Et hoc quia talis conversio tenet per hanc regulam 'si unum convertibilium est contingens, reliquum est contingens'; quae semper est vera. Et ideo bene sequitur 'hominem esse album est contingens, igitur album esse hominem est contingens'. Similiter bene sequitur 'Deum creare est contingens, igitur creantem esse Deum est contingens'. Et ita particularis affirmativa et universalis negativa de contingenti, sumptae in sensu compositionis, convertuntur simpliciter. Similiter bene sequitur 'haec est contingens: nullus homo est albus; igitur haec est contingens: nullum album est homo'. Et ita est de aliis.	But it must first be known that propositions of contingency, taken in the sense of composition, and equivalent to them, are converted as their propositions of inherence, when their propositions of inherence are converted simply. And this because such a conversion holds by this rule 'if one of the convertibles is contingent, the rest is contingent'; which is always true. And therefore, it follows well 'that a man is white is contingent, therefore that a white thing is a man is contingent'. Similarly, it follows well 'that God creates is contingent, therefore that a creating thing is God is contingent'. And thus the particular affirmative and the universal negative about the contingent, taken in the sense of composition, are converted simply. Similarly, it follows well 'this is contingent: no man is white; therefore this is contingent: no white thing is a man'. And so it is with the others.
Sed quando illa de inesse non convertitur simpliciter sed per accidens tantum, tunc illa de contingenti in sensu compositionis non convertitur in terminis, quia talis conversio non potest tenere nisi per hoc medium 'si antecedens est contingens, consequens est contingens'; quod est simpliciter falsum, cum ex contingenti sequatur necessarium. Et ideo non sequitur 'omnem hominem esse album est contingens, ergo aliquod album esse hominem est contingens'; sicut non sequitur 'omnem substantiam exsistentem in actu esse Deum est contingens, igitur Deum esse substantiam exsistentem in actu est contingens', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Haec enim est contingens 'omnis substantia exsistens in actu est Deus', quia potest esse vera et falsa, et tamen haec est necessaria 'Deus est substantia exsistens in actu'.	But when that of inherence is not converted simply but only accidentally, then that of contingency in the sense of composition is not converted in terms, because such conversion cannot hold except through this means: 'if the antecedent is contingent, the consequent is contingent'; which is simply false, since from the contingent the necessary follows. And therefore it does not follow 'that every man is white is contingent, therefore some white thing being man is contingent'; just as it does not follow 'that every substance actually existing is God is contingent, therefore God being a substance actually existing is contingent', because the antecedent is true and the consequent false. For this is contingent 'every substance actually existing is God', because it can be true and false, and yet this is necessary 'God is a substance actually existing'.
Si autem illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu divisionis vel alia aequivalens ei, tunc si illa propositio habeat pro subiecto terminum communem vel aliquid includens terminum communem, cuiusmodi sunt talia 'hoc album', 'iste homo', 'iste asinus', vel etiam habeat pro subiecto aliquod participium vel aequivalens ei, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod subiectum potest supponere pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae contingunt. Si subiectum talis propositionis accipiatur primo modo, sive etiam subiectum sit nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrativum, sic non convertitur in idem genus contingentis, sed convertitur in illam de inesse et in illam de possibili, sumpto subiecto consequentis cum ista additione 'quod contingit esse'.	But if that proposition is taken in the sense of division or something equivalent to it, then if that proposition has for its subject a common term or something including a common term, such as 'this white thing', 'this man', 'this donkey', or even has for its subject some participle or equivalent to it, that proposition is to be distinguished, because the subject can supposit for things that are or for things that happen. If the subject of such a proposition is taken in the first way, whether or not the subject is a proper name or a demonstrative pronoun, then it is not converted into the same genus of contingent, but is converted into that of inherence and that of possibility, taking the subject of the consequent with this addition 'what happens to be'.
Primum patet, scilicet quod non convertitur in idem genus contingentis, nam non sequitur 'contingit Deum esse creantem, igitur creantem contingit esse Deum'; nec etiam sequitur 'quod contingit esse creantem, contingit esse Deum', nam sua repugnans est vera, ista scilicet 'quod contingenter creat, necessario est Deus', et per consequens non est contingenter Deus.	The first is clear, namely that it is not converted into the same genus of contingent, for it does not follow that 'it is contingent that God is creating, therefore it is contingent that the creator is God'; nor does it follow that 'what is contingently creating, is contingently God', for its contradictory is true, namely 'what is contingently creating is necessarily God', and consequently is not contingently God.
Secundum, scilicet quod convertitur in illam de inesse, praedicto modo, patet: nam bene sequitur 'Deus contingenter est creans, igitur aliquid, quod contingenter est creans, est Deus'.	The second, namely that it is converted into that of inherence, in the aforementioned way, is clear: for it follows well that 'God is contingently creating, therefore something that is contingently creating is God'.
Ista conversio potest probari: quia si haec sit vera 'Deus contingenter est creans', manifestum est quod utraque istarum est vera 'hoc' - demonstrando illud pro quo subiectum supponit - 'est Deus' et 'hoc est contingenter creans'. Nunc autem sequitur per syllogismum expositorium 'hoc est Deus; hoc est contingenter creans; igitur aliquid, quod est contingenter creans, est Deus'. Et per consequens cum ista 'Deus est contingenter creans' non stat opposita istius 'aliquid, quod est contingenter creans, est Deus', et per consequens ipsa sequitur ad primam. Et ita conversio ista probatur per syllogismum expositorium. Et sicut ista probatur per syllogismum expositorium, ita aliae multae priores, quarum probationes sunt dimissae, eodem modo probantur.	This conversion can be proven: because if this is true 'God is contingently creating', it is clear that both of these are true 'this' - demonstrating that for which the subject supposits - 'is ​​God' and 'this is contingently creating'. Now, however, it follows by an expository syllogism 'this is God; this is contingently creating; therefore something that is contingently creating is God'. And consequently, since this 'God is contingently creating' does not stand in opposition to this 'something that is contingently creating is God', and consequently it itself follows to the first. And thus this conversion is proven by an expository syllogism. And just as this is proven by an expository syllogism, so many other prior ones, the proofs of which have been omitted, are proven in the same way.
Est autem probatio sufficiens, quia syllogismus expositorius est ex se evidens, nec indiget ulteriori probatione. Et ideo multum errant qui negant talem syllogismum in quacumque materia, nisi possint ibi ostendere fallaciam aequivocationis vel amphiboliae vel compositionis et divisionis vel accentus vel figurae dictionis vel fallaciam secundum quid et simpliciter vel ignorantiam elenchi vel petitionis principii. Nec potest ibi esse fallacia accidentis, sicut multi dicunt.	But the proof is sufficient, because an expository syllogism is self-evident and does not need further proof. And therefore, they greatly err who deny such a syllogism in any matter, unless they can show there a fallacy of equivocation or amphiboly or composition and division or accent or figure of speech or a fallacy of accordingly and simply or ignorance of the list or petition to principle. Nor can there be a fallacy of accident there, as many say.
Et quia syllogismi expositorii, qui sunt ex se evidentes, frequenter negantur a modernis theologis, et ideo contra tales non est disputandum, cum negent per se nota, ideo -- aliqualiter disgrediendo a proposito -- ponam exempla in quibus non est syllogismus expositorius, quamvis videatur.	And because expository syllogisms, which are self-evident, are frequently denied by modern theologians, and therefore there is no need to argue against such, since they deny what is known in itself, therefore -- somewhat departing from the purpose -- I will give examples in which there is no expository syllogism, although it may seem so.
Unde hic non est syllogismus expositorius 'hoc animal est canis; hoc animal non est caeleste sidus; igitur caeleste sidus non est canis'. Et hoc quia tam maior quam conclusio est distinguenda penes aequivocationem.	Hence, this is not an expository syllogism, 'This animal is a dog; this animal is not a celestial star; therefore, a celestial star is not a dog.' And this is because both the major and the conclusion are to be distinguished in terms of equivocation.
Similiter hic non est syllogismus expositorius 'iste vellet se accipere pugnantes; iste vellet vincere; igitur qui vellet vincere, vellet se accipere pugnantes', nam maior est distinguenda penes amphiboliam, sicut alibi patet.	Similarly, here is not an expository syllogism 'This one would want to accept himself fighting; this one would want to win; therefore he who wanted to win would want to accept himself fighting', for the major is to be distinguished by an amphiboly, as is clear elsewhere.
Similiter hic non est syllogismus expositorius 'haec: tu es asinus, est falsa; haec: tu es asinus, est vera si est necessaria; igitur aliquod verum, si est necessarium, est falsum', nam tam minor quam conclusio est distinguenda secundum compositionem et divisionem.	Similarly, this is not an expository syllogism 'This: you are a donkey, is false; this: you are a donkey, is true if it is necessary; therefore something true, if it is necessary, is false', for both the minor and the conclusion are to be distinguished according to composition and division.
Similiter hic non est syllogismus expositorius 'iste vult pendere; iste non vult pendere; igitur qui vult pendere, non vult pendere', nam propositiones sunt distinguendae penes accentum.	Similarly, this is not an expository syllogism, 'Tuis one wants to hang (pendere); that one does not want to be hanged (pendere); therefore, he who wants to hang, does not want to be hanged', for propositions are to be distinguished according to accent.
Similiter hic non est syllogismus expositorius 'Sortes est albus; Sortes est animal; igitur animal est albus', sed hic est fallacia figurae dictionis. Similiter nec hic 'iste homo est sanus; iste homo est substantia; igitur aliqua substantia est sanus'.	Similarly, here is not an expository syllogism 'Socrates is white; Socrates is an animal; therefore, an animal is white', but here is a fallacy of the figure of speech. Similarly, here is not 'This man is healthy; this man is a substance; therefore some substance is healthy'.
Similiter nec hic 'Sortes non est filius Platonis; Sortes est pater; igitur aliquis pater non est filius', sed est ignorantia elenchi.	Similarly, here 'Socrates is not the son of Plato; Socrates is a father; therefore, a father is not a son' is not the case, but there is ignorance of the list.
Similiter nec hic 'Sortes est albus secundum dentes; Sortes est niger; igitur aliquod nigrum est album', sed est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.	Similarly, neither here: 'Socrates is white according to his teeth; Socrates is black; therefore something black is white', but it is a fallacy accordingly and simply.
Nec hic est syllogismus expositorius probativus 'Sortes est calidus; Sortes est productivus caloris; igitur productivum caloris est calidum', quia est ibi petitio principii, et ideo non probat, quamvis illatio sit bona.	Nor is this a probative expository syllogism 'Socrates is hot; Socrates is productive of heat; therefore what is productive of heat is hot', because there is a petition to a principle there, and therefore it does not prove, although the inference is good.
Et sicut est de istis, qui videntur esse syllogismi expositorii et non sunt, quod est in eis manifestus defectus praeter fallaciam accidentis, ita est de aliis.	And just as it is with those who seem to be expository syllogisms and are not, which is a manifest defect in them besides the fallacy of accident, so it is with others.
Unde sciendum quod regula generalis est quod quando propositiones sunt mere de inesse et de praesenti et disponuntur in figura sine omni additione vel diminutione ad subiectum et praedicatum quod numquam est in tali discursu fallacia accidentis, sicut nec in discursu disposito in primo modo primae figurae potest esse fallacia accidentis, sicut inferius ostendetur. Eodem modo quando aliquis discursus potest reduci ad talem syllogismum expositorium, vel per conversionem vel per impossibile vel per propositiones aequivalentes assumptas, non est fallacia accidentis.	Hence it should be known that the general rule is that when propositions are merely of inherence and the present and are arranged in a figure without any addition or diminution to the subject and predicate, there is never in such a discourse a fallacy of accident, just as there can be no fallacy of accident in a discourse arranged in the first mode of the first figure, as will be shown below. In the same way, when any discourse can be reduced to such an expository syllogism, either by conversion or by impossibility or by equivalent propositions assumed, there is no fallacy of accident.
Est tamen advertendum quod ad syllogismum expositorium non sufficit arguere ponendo pro medio pronomen demonstrativum vel nomen proprium alicuius rei singularis, sed cum hoc oportet quod illa res demonstrata vel importata per tale nomen proprium non sit realiter plures res distinctae. Et propter hoc hic non est syllogismus expositorius 'haec essentia' -- demonstrando divinam essentiam -- 'est Pater; haec essentia est Filius; igitur Filius est Pater', et hoc quia haec essentia est plures personae distinctae. Et ideo in tali paralogismo magis est fallacia consequentis quam accidentis, quamvis etiam sit ibi fallacia accidentis.	However, it should be noted that for an expository syllogism it is not enough to argue by placing as the middle a demonstrative pronoun or the proper name of some singular thing, but with this it is necessary that the thing demonstrated or implied by such a proper name is not really several distinct things. And for this reason here is not an expository syllogism 'this essence' -- demonstrating the divine essence -- 'is ​​the Father; this essence is the Son; therefore the Son is the Father', and this because this essence is several distinct persons. And therefore in such a paralogism there is more of a fallacy of consequence than of accident, although there is also a fallacy of accident there.
Cum igitur in isto syllogismo 'hoc est Deus; hoc est contingenter creans; igitur aliquid quod est contingenter creans est Deus' non possit ostendi aliquis defectus, manifestum est ipsum esse evidentem syllogismum expositorium; et per consequens probatum est sufficienter quod ista 'Deus contingenter creat' convertitur in istam 'quod contingenter creat, est Deus'. Ex quo etiam patet quod convertitur in istam de possibili 'aliquid, quod contingenter creat, potest esse Deus', quia semper illa de inesse formaliter infert illam de possibili.	Since, therefore, no defect can be shown in this syllogism 'this is God; this is contingently creating; therefore, something that is contingently creating is God', it is clear that it is an evident expository syllogism; and consequently, it is sufficiently proven that this 'God creates contingently' is converted into this 'what creates contingently is God'. From which it is also clear that this proposition of possibility 'something that creates contingently can be God' is converted into that one of possibility, because the latter always formally infers the former of inherence.
Si autem subiectum talis propositionis de contingenti sit pronomen demonstrativum vel nomen proprium, tunc convertitur sicut prior, scilicet in illam de inesse et de possibili. Sed si subiectum talis propositionis de contingenti sumatur pro his quae contingunt esse, sic convertitur in idem genus contingentis, sumpto subiecto consequentis pro eo quod contingit. Unde bene sequitur 'contingit aliquem hominem currere, igitur contingit aliquod currens esse hominem', si subiectum utriusque sumatur pro eo quod contingit, ut iste sit sensus 'aliquid, quod contingenter est currens, contingenter est homo'. Nam oppositum consequentis non stat cum antecedente, scilicet 'nihil quod contingenter est currens, contingenter est homo'. Nam si haec sit vera 'aliquid quod contingenter est homo, contingenter currit', sit illud a: tunc utraque istarum est vera 'a contingenter est homo' et similiter ista 'a contingenter currit'.	But if the subject of such a proposition of contingency is a demonstrative pronoun or a proper noun, then it is converted as before, namely into that of inherence and of possibility. But if the subject of such a proposition of contingency is taken for those things that happen to be, then it is converted into the same genus of contingency, taking the subject of the consequent for that which happens. Whence it follows well that 'it happens that some man runs, therefore it happens that some running man is a man', if the subject of both is taken for that which happens, so that this is the sense 'something that is contingently running is contingently a man'. For the opposite of the consequent does not hold with the antecedent, namely 'nothing that is contingently running is contingently a man'. For if this is true 'something that is contingently a man, is contingently running', let that be a: then both of these are true 'a contingently is a man' and similarly that 'a contingently runs'.
Ex istis arguo sic 'a contingenter est homo; a contingenter currit; igitur aliquid quod contingenter currit, contingenter est homo', quae est contradictoria prioris, igitur prior non stat. Et ita evidenter sequitur 'aliquid quod contingenter est homo, contingenter currit, igitur aliquid quod contingenter currit, contingenter est homo'. Et ita ista consequentia est bona 'aliquis homo contingenter currit, igitur aliquod currens contingenter est homo', subiecto utriusque accepto pro eo quod contingit.	From these I argue thus 'a is contingently a man; a runs contingently; therefore something that runs contingently is a man', which is contradictory to the prior, therefore the prior does not hold. And thus it clearly follows 'something that is contingently a man runs contingently, therefore something that runs contingently is a man'. And thus this consequence is good 'some man runs contingently, therefore something running contingently is a man', the subject of both being taken for that which is contingent.
Et si dicatur quod tunc sequeretur 'Deus contingenter creat, igitur aliquod creans contingenter est Deus', quia sequitur 'a contingenter est Deus; a contingenter creat; igitur aliquid quod contingenter creat, contingenter est Deus', sicut argutum est in priori exemplo:	And if it is said that then it would follow 'God creates contingently, therefore something that creates is contingently God', because it follows 'A contingently is God; A contingently creates; therefore something that creates contingently is contingently God', as was argued in the previous example:
Dicendum est quod iste ultimus syllogismus est bonus, non tamen probat istam conversionem. Et hoc quia per istam 'Deus contingenter creat' non habentur aliquae tales propositiones 'a contingenter est Deus', 'a contingenter creat', quia ad veritatem istius non requiruntur aliquae tales duae, sicut ad veritatem istius 'aliquis homo contingenter currit' requiruntur tales duae, si subiectum sumatur pro his quae contingunt. Et ideo per unum syllogismum expositorium probatur una conversio sufficienter et per alium non probatur alia. Unde si subiectum illius de contingenti est pronomen demonstrativum vel nomen proprium, non convertitur in idem genus contingentis, nec subiectum potest habere talem acceptionem, scilicet pro eo quod contingit.	It must be said that this last syllogism is good, but it does not prove the conversion. And this is because through this 'God creates contingently' there are not any such propositions as 'a contingently is God', 'a contingently creates', because for the truth of this one no such two are required, just as for the truth of this 'a certain man runs contingently' such two are required, if the subject is taken for those things that are contingent. And therefore, by one expository syllogism one conversion is sufficiently proven and by another the other is not proven. Hence if the subject of that contingent is a demonstrative pronoun or a proper name, it is not converted into the same genus of contingency, nor can the subject have such a meaning, namely for that which is contingent.
Sciendum est tamen quod praedicta distinctio de propositionibus de contingenti, de possibili, de praeterito et de futuro debet sic intelligi quod subiectum accipiatur pro eo quod est etc., vel denotetur accipi pro eo quod est tale, vel contingit esse tale, vel fuit etc. Unde si nihil sit album, in ista 'album potest esse homo' subiectum non potest accipi pro eo quod est album, cum nihil sit album; potest tamen denotari accipi pro eo quod est album. Et ideo si nihil sit album, ipsa est falsa, cum per ipsam denotetur falsum, quia per ipsam in illo sensu denotatur aliquid esse album, cum tamen nihil sit album.	It should be noted, however, that the aforementioned distinction between propositions of contingency, possibility, the past and the future must be understood in such a way that the subject is taken for what it is etc., or is denoted to be taken for what it is such, or happens to be such, or was, etc. Hence, if nothing is white, in the statement 'a man can be white' the subject cannot be taken for that which is white, since nothing is white; it can nevertheless be denoted to be taken for what is white. And therefore, if nothing is white, it is false, since falsehood is denoted by it, because in that sense something is denoted by it to be white, although nothing is white.