Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 27

Latin	English
Cap. 27. De uniformi de contingenti in secunda figura	Chapter 27. On the uniform syllogism of contingency in the second figure.
In secunda figura uniformis de contingenti non valet et hoc qualitercumque combinentur propositiones. Et potest hoc consimiliter probari sicut probatum est prius s quod uniformis de possibili non valet in secunda figura, quia universalis negativa de contingenti non est con vertibilis in aliquam universalem sed tantum in particularem, illo modo quo potest converti; quae tamen deberet esse maior in prima figura, quod est impossibile.	In the second figure the uniform de contingent is not valid and this no matter how the propositions are combined. And this can be proven in a similar way as it was proven before that the uniform of possibility is not valid in the second figure, because the negative universal of contingency is not convertible into some universal but only into a particular, in the way in which it can be converted; which however should be the major in the first figure, which is impossible.
Quod autem talis universalis negativa de contingenti non convertatur, patet manifeste: nam non sequitur ‘contingit omnem hominem non esse album, igitur contingit omne album non esse hominem’, nam antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Quod autem antecedens sit verum, est manifestum, nam omnis homo potest esse albus et potest non esse albus. Falsitas consequentis patet, nam aliquod album de necessitate non est homo, puta cygnus.	But that such a universal negative is not converted from a contingent is clearly evident: for it does not follow that ‘it is contingent that every man is not white, therefore it is contingent that every white thing is not a man’, for the antecedent is true and the consequent false. But that the antecedent is true is evident, for every man can be white and can not be white. The falsity of the consequent is evident, for something white is not necessarily a man, for example a swan.
Quod etiam talis uniformis de contingenti non valeat, patet per instantiam in terminis: nam non sequitur ‘contingit omnem hominem esse album; contingit nullum equum esse album; igitur contingit nullum equum esse hominem’. Et per eosdem terminos potest probari quod talis uniformis non valet in aliquo modo. Nec etiam valet ‘contingit omnem hominem esse album; contingit nullum risibile esse album; igitur contingit nullum risibile esse hominem’. Nec etiam sequitur ‘contingit quamlibet personam divinam esse creantem; contingit Patrem non esse creantem; igitur contingit Patrem non esse personam divinam', quia praemissae sunt verae et conclusio falsa.	That such a uniform statement is also not valid of contingency is clear from the instance in the terms: for it does not follow that ‘it happens that every man is white; it happens that no horse is white; therefore it happens that no horse is a man’. And by the same terms it can be proven that such a uniform statement is not valid in some way. Nor does it also hold that ‘it happens that every man is white; it happens that nothing that is able to laugh is white; therefore it happens that nothing that is able to laugh is a man’. Nor does it also follow that ‘it happens that any divine person is creating; it happens that the Father is not creating; therefore it happens that the Father is not a divine person’, because the premises are true and the conclusion false.
Et per istos terminos patet quod nulla conclusio sequitur ex talibus praemissis, scilicet nec illa de contingenti nec illa de possibili nec illa de inesse. Patet etiam quod qualitercumque praemissae accipiantur, sive in sensu compositionis sive in sensu divisionis, sive una in sensu compositionis et alia in sensu divisionis, qualitercumque etiam subiecta supponant, talis uniformis non valet, quia in praedicto exemplo praemissae sunt verae et conclusio falsa. ƿ	And by these terms it is clear that no conclusion follows from such premises, namely neither that of contingency nor that of possibility nor that of inherence. It is also clear that no matter how the premises are taken, whether in the sense of composition or in the sense of division, or one in the sense of composition and the other in the sense of division, no matter how the subjects supposit, such a uniform conclusion is not valid, because in the aforementioned example the premises are true and the conclusion false.