Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 35

Latin	English
Cap. 35. De mixtione de inesse et possibilis in secunda figura	Chapter 35 On the mixture of assertoric and possible propositions in the second figure.
Ex propositione de possibili in sensu compositionis vel aequivalente ei, sive fuerit negativa sive affirmative, et alia de inesse nulla sequitur conclusio in secunda figura, Patet hoc, quia si negativa fuerit de possibili, reduceretur in primam figuram per conversionem illius negativae. Sed dictum est prius quod talis mixtio non valet in prima figura, et hoc universaliter; aliquando tamen valet, et tunc in illo casu valebit in secunda figura. Similiter si affirmativa fuerit de possibili, non valet, quia in prima figura minore exsistente de possibili non valet mixtio. Hoc etiam patet per instantiam: nam non sequitur ‘possibile est nullum Deum esse hominem; omnis persona divina est homo; igitur possibile est nullam personam divinam esse Deum’, quia si quaelibet persona divina esset incarnata, praemissae essent verae et conclusio falsa. Similiter non sequitur ‘possibile est omnem personam divinam esse incarnatam; nullus Deus est incarnatus; igitur possibile est nullum Deum esse personam divinam’, quia ante incarnationem fuerunt praemissae verae et conclusio falsa. Et sicut non valet mixtio talis in syllogismis universalibus, ita nec in particularibus.	From a proposition de possibili in the sense of composition or equivalent to it, whether it be negative or affirmative, and another assertoric, no conclusion follows in the second figure. This is clear, because if it were negative de possibiliy, it would be reduced to the first figure by the conversion of that negative. But it was said before that such a mixture is not valid in the first figure, and this universally; sometimes, however, it is valid, and then in that case it will be valid in the second figure. Similarly, if it were affirmative de possibili, it is not valid, because in the first figure, where de possibili is present, the mixture is not valid. This is also clear by the instance: for it does not follow that ‘it is possible for no God to be a man; every divine person is a man; therefore it is possible for no divine person to be God’, because if any divine person were incarnate, the premises would be true and the conclusion false. Similarly, it does not follow that ‘it is possible for every divine person to be incarnate; no God is incarnate; therefore it is possible for no God to be a divine person’, because before the incarnation the premises were true and the conclusion false. And just as such a mixture is not valid in universal syllogisms, so neither is it valid in particular ones.
Si autem illa de possibili sumatur in sensu divisionis vel aequivalens ei, non valet mixtio talis, quia non sequitur ‘omnis persona divina potest esse incarnata; nullus Deus est incarnatus; igitur quilibet Deus potest non esse persona divina’. Nec sequitur ‘omnis Deus potest non esse homo; omnis persona divina est homo; igitur omnis persona divina potest non esse Deus’. Nec potest reduci in primam figuram per conversionem, quia reduceretur per conversionem negativae; sed dictum est prius quod universalis negativa de possibili non convertitur nisi in particularem de inesse, quae tamen deberet esse maior in prima figura; quod non est possibile, cum sit particularis. ƿ	But if the proposition de possibili is taken in the sense of division or equivalent to it, such a mixture is not valid, because it does not follow that ‘every divine person can be incarnate; no God is incarnate; therefore It is possible for any God to not be a divine person’. Nor does it follow that ‘It is possible for every God to not be man; every divine person is a man; therefore it is possible for every divine person to not be God’. Nor can it be reduced to the first figure by conversion, because it would be reduced by the conversion of the negative; but it was said before that the universal negative de possibili is not converted except into a particular assertoric, which nevertheless should be major in the first figure; which is not possible, since it is particular.