Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 38

Latin	English
Cap. 38, De mixtione contingentis et inesse in secunda figura	Chapter 38. On the mixture of contingent and assertoric propositions in the second figure.
Si illa de contingenti fuerit negativa in secunda figura et sumatur in sensu compositionis, licet illa de inesse sic de inesse simpliciter, non sequitur conclusio de contingenti. Non enim sequitur, secundum opinionem Philosophi, 'omne album est homo; contingit nullum nigrum esse hominem; igitur contingit nullum nigrum esse album'. Similiter non sequitur 'omnis homo est albus; contingit nullum equum esse album; igitur contingit nullum equum esse hominem'. Similiter, si affirmativa fuerit de contingenti, non sequitur conclusio de contingenti sumpta in sensu compositionis. Similiter etiam, quamvis affirmativa fuerit de inesse simpliciter, non sequitur conclusio de contingenti in sensu compositionis. Non enim sequitur 'contingit nullum hominem esse album; omnis cygnus est albus; igitur contingit nullum cygnum esse hominem'. Et tamen minor, secundum intentionem Philosophi, est de inesse simpliciter. Nec sequitur secundum veritatem 'contingit nullam humanitatem esse in actu; quaelibet persona divina est in actu; igitur contingit nullam personam divinam esse humanitatem', et tamen minor est de inesse simpliciter. Tamen conclusio de possibili bene sequitur.	If the premise de contingenti is negative in the second figure and is taken in the sense of composition, although that assertoric is thus assertoric simply, the conclusion de contingenti does not follow. For it does not follow, according to the Philosopher's opinion, 'every white thing is a man; it is possible that no black thing is a man; therefore it is possible that no black thing is a white thing'. Similarly, it does not follow 'every man is white; it is possible that no horse is white; therefore it is possible that no horse is a man'. Similarly, if it were affirmative de contingenti, the conclusion de contingenti taken in the sense of composition does not follow. Similarly, although it was affirmative assertoric simply, the conclusion de contingenti does not follow in the sense of composition. For it does not follow 'it is possible that no man is white; every swan is white; therefore it is possible that no swan is a man'. And yet the minor, according to the Philosopher's intention, is assertoric simply. Nor does it follow according to truth 'it happens that no human is actual; every divine person is actual; therefore it happens that no divine person is human', and yet the minor is assertoric simply. Nevertheless the conclusion de possibili follows well.
Si autem negativa fuerit de inesse et affirmativa de contingenti, non sequitur conclusio de contingenti. Non enim sequitur 'nullus equus est homo; contingit omnem scientem esse hominem; igitur contingit nullum scientem esse equum', nam praemissae sunt verae et conclusio falsa, vocando scientem illum solum qui habet scientiam creatam; per quod excluditur Deus.	But if the negative is assertoriv and the affirmative is de contingenti, the conclusion de contingenti does not follow. For it does not follow that 'no horse is a man; it is contingent that every knowing person is a man; therefore, it is contingent that no knowing person is a horse', for the premises are true and the conclusion false, calling only the one who has created knowledge a knower; thereby God is excluded.
Si vero illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu divisionis: si negativa fuerit de contingenti et affirmativa de inesse, non sequitur conclusio de contingenti. Non enim sequitur, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, 'contingit nullum hominem esse album; omnis cygnus est albus; igitur contingit nullum cygnum esse hominem'. Nec etiam sequitur ƿ 'contingit nullum Deum esse incarnatum; quaelibet persona divina est incarnata; igitur contingit nullum personam divinam esse Deum'. Sed si illa affirmativa fuerit de inesse simpliciter, sequitur conclusio de possibili.	But if that de contingenti premise is taken in the sense of division, if it is negative de contingenti and affirmative assertoric, the conclusion de contingenti does not follow. For it does not follow, according to Aristotle's opinion, 'it happens that no man is white; every swan is white; therefore it happens that no man is a swan'. Nor does it follow 'it happens that no God is incarnate; any divine person is incarnate; therefore it happens that no divine person is God'. But if that affirmative proposition is assertoric simply, the conclusion de possibili follows.
Si autem affirmativa fuerit de contingenti et negativa de inesse simpliciter, sequitur conclusio de possibili, sic 'nullus asinus est intelligens; contingit omnem hominem esse intelligentem; igitur omnis homo potest non esse asinus'. Et sic exponendus est Aristoteles in libro Priorum quando dicit quod si affirmativa fuerit de contingenti [et negativa de inesse simpliciter], sequitur conclusio, supple: de possibili. Si autem negativa sit de contingenti, quamvis altera de inesse fuerit de inesse simpliciter, non sequitur conclusio de possibili, et hoc si subiectum illius de contingenti sumatur praecise pro his quae contingunt. Non enim sequitur 'contingit nullum ens esse in actu; omnis Deus est in actu; igitur contingit nullum Deum esse ens'. Minor est de inesse simpliciter et maior est vera sub illo sensu; haec enim est vera 'omne quod contingit esse ens, contingit non esse in actu'. Et sic loquitur Philosophus in libro Priorum. Et per istam distinctionem, et alias quae positae sunt et ponentur, solvendae sunt contrarietates quae videntur esse inter dicta hic et dicenda et illa quae dicit Aristoteles in libro Priorum, quarum solutionem propter brevitatem temporis dimitto studiosis.	But if the affirmative is de contingenti and the negative assertoric simply, the conclusion de possibili follows, thus: 'no donkey is intelligent; it is contingent that every man is intelligent; therefore it is possible that every man is not a donkey'. And thus Aristotle is to be explained in the book of Prior Analytics When he says that if the affirmative is de contingenti [and the negative assertoric simply], the conclusion follows (supply: de possibili). But if the negative is de contingenti, although the other assertoric is assertoric simply, the conclusion de possibili does not follow, and this if the subject de contingenti is taken precisely for those things that are contingent. For it does not follow 'it is contingent that no being is actual; every God is actual; therefore it is contingent that no God is a being'. The minor is assertoric simply and the major is true in that sense; For this is true, 'everything that happens to be a being happens not to be actual'. And so the Philosopher speaks in the book Prior Analytics. And by this distinction, and others that have been and will be posited, the contrariety that seems to exist between what is said here and what is to be said and that which Aristotle says in the book Prior Analytics, the solution of which I leave to the studious because of the brevity of time.