Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 37

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Latin English
Cap. 37. De mixtione de inesse et contingentis non-necessarii in prima figura On the mixture of assertoric and contingent, non-necessary propositions in the first figure.
Viso quomodo valet mixtio de inesse et possibilis, videndum est quomodo valet mixtio de inesse et contingentis non-necessarii[1]. Et primo in prima figura. ƿ Having seen how the mixture of the assertoric and the possible is valid, we must see how the mixture of the assertoric and non-necessary contingency is valid.[2]. And first in the first figure.
Et est primo sciendum quod si illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu compositionis, sive fuerit minor sive maior, non sequitur conclusio de contingenti. Sicut non sequitur 'contingit omnem hominem esse album; omnis homo niger est homo; igitur contingit omnem hominem nigrum esse album'. Nec sequitur conclusio de contingenti in sensu divisionis; non enim sequitur 'contingit omnem hominem esse Deum; Verbum est homo; igitur contingit Verbum esse Deum'. Sed bene sequitur conclusio de possibili, et hoc quia semper illa de contingenti infert illam de possibili, ex qua et illa de inesse sequitur conclusio talis de possibili, sicut dictum est prius[3]. Similiter non sequitur 'omnis homo est Deus; contingit omnem naturam humanam esse hominem; igitur contingit naturam humanam esse Deum'. Nec sequitur conclusio de possibili. And it must first be known that if the de contingenti premise is taken in the sense of composition, whether it be minor or major, the conclusion de contingentiy does not follow. Just as it does not follow: 'it happens that every man is white; every black man is a man; therefore it happens that every black man is white'. Nor does the conclusion de contingenti follow in the sense of division; for it does not follow 'it happens that every man is God; the Word is a man; therefore it happens that the Word is God'. But the conclusion de possibili follows well, and this because the premise de contingenti always infers that de possibili, from which also that assertoric follows such a conclusion from the possible, as was said before[4]. Similarly it does not follow: 'every man is God; it happens that every human nature is a man; therefore it happens that human nature is God'. Nor does the conclusion de possibili follow.
Est autem sciendum quod quamvis maiore exsistente negativa de possibili et sumpto in minore aliquo inferiore sub medio termino, sequitur conclusio de possibili, non tamen ista regula est vera si maior at de contingenti; non enim sequitur 'contingit nullum album esse asinum; omnis homo albus est albus; igitur contingit nullum hominem album esse asinum'. But it should be known that although the major exists in a negative de possibili and if some lower term is taken in the minor under the middle term, the conclusion de possibili follows, yet this rule is not true if the major is de contingenti; for it does not follow that 'it is contingent that no white thing is a donkey; every white man is white; therefore it is contingent that no white man is a donkey'.
Si autem illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu divisionis: si sit maior, aut subiectum accipitur praecise pro his quae sunt aut praecise pro his quae contingunt aut tam pro his quae sunt quam pro his quae contingunt. Si primo modo, semper est syllogismus regulatus per dici de omni vel de nullo, dummodo minor sit affirmativa; sicut sic arguendo 'contingit omnem hominem esse album; Sortes est homo; igitur contingit Sortem esse album'. Nam per istam maiorem denotatur quod de quocumque dicitur subiectum per verbum de praesenti quod de eodem dicitur praedicatum cum hoc verbo 'contingit', et per minorem denotatur quod illud quod fuit subiectum propositionis primae vere sic dicitur de subiecto minoris. Igitur ille syllogismus regulatur per dici de omni. Et eodem modo regulatur per dici de nullo, si maior fuerit negativa. Si autem subiectum maioris praecise supponat pro his quae contingunt, non valet mixtio, nec regulatur per dici de omni vel de nullo. ƿ But if the premise de contingenti is taken in the sense of division, if it is the major, either the subject is taken precisely for those things that are or precisely for those that happen or both for those things that are and for those that happen. If in the first way, there is always a syllogism governed by 'dici de omni vel de nullo', provided that the minor is affirmative; as in arguing thus: 'it happens that every man is white; Socrates is a man; therefore it happens that Socrates is white'. For by that major it is denoted that of whatever the subject is said by a verb at present which is said of the same predicate with this verb 'is contingent', and by the minor it is denoted that that which was the subject of the first proposition is truly thus said of the subject of the minor. Therefore that syllogism is governed by 'dici de omni'. And in the same way it is governed by 'dici de nullo', if the major is negative. But if the subject of the major precisely supposits for those things that happen, the mixture is not valid, nor is it regulated by 'dici de omni vel de nullo'.
Unde iste syllogismus non valet 'omne ens contingit creari; Deus est ens; igitur Deum contingit creari', si sensus maioris sit iste 'omne quod contingit esse ens, contingit creari', quia per minorem non denotatur quod contingit Deum esse ens, et per consequens non regulatur per dici de omni. Hence this syllogism is not valid: 'every being is contingently created; God is a being; therefore God is contingently created', if the sense of the major is this 'everything that is contingently a being is contingently created', because the minor does not denote that God is contingently a being, and consequently it is not governed by 'dici de omni'.
Si autem subiectum maioris supponat tam pro his quae sunt quam pro his quae contingunt, sic est mixtio bona, regulata per dici de omni vel de nullo, quia talis de contingenti infert illam de contingenti in qua subiectum supponit praecise pro his quae sunt. But if the subject of the major predicate supposits both for things that are and for things that are contingent, then it is a good mixture, governed by 'dici de omni vel de nullo', because such a proposition de contingenti infers that proposition de contingenti in which the subject supposits precisely for things that are.
Si autem minor sit de contingenti, non sequitur universaliter conclusio, quia non sequitur 'omne album est homo; contingit omnem equum esse album; igitur contingit omnem equum esse hominem'. Similiter non sequitur nullus homo est Deus; contingit omnem humanitatem esse hominem; igitur contingit nullam humanitatem esse Deum'. But if the minor is de contingenti, the conclusion does not follow universally, because it does not follow that 'every white person is a man; it is contingent that every horse is white; therefore it is contingent that every horse is a man'. Similarly, it does not follow that 'no man is God; it is contingent that every human is a man; therefore it is contingent that no human is God'.
Sciendum est tamen quod si maior sit de inesse simpliciter, sequitur conclusio de contingenti, et hoc sive minor sit sumpta in sensu compositionis sive in sensu divisionis. Hoc tamen interest, quia si maior sit affirmativa, sequitur conclusio de contingenti, si autem maior sit negativa, sequitur conclusio de possibili. Quod enim non sequatur conclusio de contingenti si maior sit negativa, patet, nam non sequitur nullus asinus est intelligens; contingit omne rudibile esse asinum; igitur contingit nullum rudibile esse intelligens', quia praemissae sunt verae et conclusio felsa. Sed ista conclusio sequitur 'omne rudibile potest non esse intelligens'. It should be known, however, that if the major is assertoric simply, the conclusion de contingenti follows, and this whether the minor is taken in the sense of composition or in the sense of division. However, this makes a difference, because if the major is affirmative, the conclusion de contingenti follows, but if the major is negative, the conclusion de possibili follows. For it is clear that the conclusion de contingenti does not follow if the major is negative, for it does not follow that 'no donkey is intelligent; it is possible for every tamable thing to be a donkey; therefore it is possible for no tamable thing to be intelligent,' because the premises are true and the conclusion false. But the conclusion follows that 'every tamable thing can not be intelligent.'
Est autem sciendum quod quando minor est de inesse, non refert an maior sit negativa vel affirmativa, dummodo tamen minor sit affirmativa. Sed quando minor est de contingenti, non refert an minor sit affirmativa vel negativa, et hoc quia illa de contingenti convertitur per oppositas qualitates. It should be noted that when the minor is assertoric, it does not matter whether the major is negative or affirmative, provided that the minor is affirmative. But when the minor is de contingenti, it does not matter whether the minor is affirmative or negative, and this is because the latter de contingenti is converted by opposite qualities.
Sciendum est etiam quod eaedem regulae quae dictae sunt de universalibus, dicendae sunt de syllogismis particularibus in tali mixtione contingentis et inesse. ƿ It should also be known that the same rules that were said about universals must be said about particular syllogisms in such a mixture of contingent and assertoric.

Notes

  1. ↑ Cf. Aristot, Anal. Priora, I, c. 15 (33b 25 - 35b 22).
  2. ↑ Cf. Aristotle, Anal. Priora, I, c. 15 (33b 25 - 35b 22).
  3. ↑ Supra, cap. 34, lin. 36-37.
  4. ↑ Supra, chap. 34, lines 36-37.
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