Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 46

Latin	English
Cap. 46. De mixtione necessarii et possibilis in tertia figura	Chapter 46. On the mixture of necessary and possible propositions in the third figure.
In tertia figura, si illa de necessario sumatur in sensu compositionis et illa de possibili similiter, sequitur conclusio de possibili. Sicut sequitur 'nullum hominem esse asinum est necesarium; omnem hominem esse album est possibile; igitur aliquod album non esse asinum est possibile'. Similiter sequitur 'omnem hominem esse album est possibile; omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium; igitur aliquod animal esse album est possibile'.	In the third figure, if the proposition of necessity is taken in the sense of composition and the proposition of possibility similarly, the conclusion of possibility follows. As it follows: 'it is necessary that no man be a donkey; it is possible that every man be white; therefore, it is possible that something white is not a donkey'. Similarly, it follows 'it is possible that every man is white; it is necessary that every man be an animal; therefore, it is possible that some animal is white'.
Si autem utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, si maior fuerit de ƿ necessario et minor de possibili, non sequitur conclusio de possibili, nisi subiectum conclusionis sumatur pro eo quod potest esse. Sicut non sequitur 'quaelibet persona divina de necessitate est Deus; quaelibet persona divina potest esse homo; igitur aliquis, qui est homo, potest esse Deus'; sed sequitur 'ergo aliquid, quod potest esse homo, potest esse Deus’. Si autem maior fuerit de possibili, semper sequitur conclusio de possibili, sumpto subiecto conclusionis pro eo quod est. Sicut sequitur 'quaelibet persona divina potest esse homo; quaelibet persona divina de necessitate est Deus; igitur aliquis Deus potest esse homo'.	But if both are taken in the sense of division, if the major is of necessity and the minor of possibility, the conclusion of possibility does not follow unless the subject of the conclusion is taken for that which can be. For example, it does not follow that 'every divine person is of necessity God; every divine person can be man; therefore, someone who is man can be God'; but it follows that 'therefore something that can be man can be God'. But if the major is of possibility, the conclusion of possibility always follows, taking the subject of the conclusion for that which is. For example, it follows that 'every divine person can be man; every divine person is of necessity God; therefore, some God can be man'.
Similiter, si illa de necessario sumatur in sensu compositionis et similiter minor, sequitur conclusio de possibili, sicut in priori. Si autem illa de necessario fuerit maior et illa de possibili minor, sequitur conclusio de possibili in sensu divisionis, sumpto subiecto pro eo quod potest esse. Si autem illa de possibili sumatur in sensu divisionis et illa de necessario in sensu compositionis: si illa de necessario fuerit maior, sequitur conclusio de possibili, sumpto subiecto pro eo quod potest esse; si autem illa de necessario fuerit minor, sequitur conclusio de possibili.	Similarly, if the proposition of necessity is taken in the sense of composition and similarly the minor, the conclusion of possibility follows, as in the previous one. But if the proposition of necessity is major and the proposition of possibility is minor, the conclusion of possibility follows in the sense of division, taking the subject for that which can be. But if the proposition of possibility is taken in the sense of division and the proposition of necessity in the sense of composition: if the proposition of necessity is major, the conclusion of possibility follows, taking the subject for that which can be; but if the proposition of necessity is minor, the conclusion of possibility follows.