Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 49

Latin	English
Cap. 49. De mixtione necessarii et contingentis in tertia figura	Chapter 49. On the mixture of necessary and contingent propositions in the third figure.
Circa mixtionem contingentis et necessarii in tertia figura, quando utraque sumitur in sensu compositionis, est primo sciendum quod ƿ semper sequitur conclusio de possibili, sed non sequitur conclusio de contingenti. Sicut non sequitur ‘omne producens esse Deum est contingens; omne producens esse ens actu est necessarium, igitur aliquod ens actu esse Deum est contingens'; nec sequitur 'omne producens esse ens actu est contingens; omne producens esse Deum est necessarium; igitur Deum esse ens actu est contingens'. Similiter non sequitur 'nullam humanitatem esse Deum est necessarium; omnem humanitatem esse animalitatem est contingens; igitur aliquam animalitatem non esse Deum est contingens'.	Regarding the mixture of contingent and necessary in the third figure, when both are taken in the sense of composition, it must first be known that a conclusion of possibility always follows, but a conclusion of contingency does not follow. Just as it does not follow ‘for everything that produces to be God is contingent; it is necessary that every being that produces is actual, therefore, for something actual to be God is contingent’; nor does it follow ‘For everything that produces to be actual is contingent; For every being that produces to be God is necessary; therefore for God to be an actual being is contingent’. Similarly it does not follow ‘It is necessary that no human be God; for all humanity to be animality is contingent; therefore, for some animality not to be God is contingent’.
Secundo videndum est quando illa de necessario sumitur in sensu cmpositionis et illa de contingenti in sensu divisionis. Et est sciendum quod si illa de necessario fuerit maior et minor de ocontingenti, si subiectum minoris supponat pro eo quod est, non sequitur conclusio de contingenti sed de possibili, sumpto subiecto conclusionis pro eo quod potest esse. Si autem subiectum minoris sumatur pro eo quod contingit solum, non sequitur conclusio de contingenti sed de possibili. Si autem maior fuerit de contingenti et minor de necessario, si subiectum maioris sumatur pro eo quod est, vel tam pro eo quod est quam pro eo quod contingit, sequitur conclusio de contingenti, subiecto habente consimilem acceptionem. Si autem subiectum maioris sumatur praecise pro eo quod contingit, non sequitur.	Secondly, we must see when the proposition of necessity is taken in the sense of composition and the proposition of contingency is taken in the sense of division. And it must be known that if the one of necessity is major and the one of contingency is minor, if the subject of the minor supposits for what is, the conclusion does not follow of contingency but of possibility, taking the subject of the conclusion for what can be. But if the subject of the minor is taken for what is contingent only, the conclusion does not follow of contingency but of possibility. But if the major is of contingency and the minor of necessity, if the subject of the major is taken for what is, or both for what is and for what is contingent, the conclusion follows of contingency, with the subject having a similar meaning. But if the subject of the major is taken precisely for what is contingent, it does not follow.
Tertio videndum est de ista mixtione quando illa de contingenti sumitur in sensu compositionis et illa de necessario in sensu divisionis. Et est sciendum, quod talis mixtio non valet respectu conclusionis de contingenti, quamvis valeat respectu conclusionis de possibili.	Thirdly, we must see about this mixture when it is taken of contingency in the sense of composition and of necessity in the sense of division. And it must be known that such a mixture is not valid with respect to a conclusion of contingency, although it is valid with respect to a conclusion of possibility.
Quarto videndum est de ista mixtione quando utraque sumitur in sensu divisionis. Et est sciendum quod si maior fuerit de necessario et minor de contingenti, non sequitur conclusio de contingenti. Sicut non sequitur 'omne producens de necessitate est Deus; contingit omne producens esse creans; igitur contingit creans esse Deum; sed sequitur conclusio de possibili, sumpto subiecto conclusionis pro eo quod potest esse. Si autem maior fuerit de contingenti et minor de necessario, si subiectum maioris sumatur pro eo quod est, vel tam pro eo quod est ƿ quam pro eo quod contingit, sequitur conclusio de contingenti. Sed si subiectum maioris sumatur praecise pro his quae contingunt, non sequitur conclusio de contingenti. Non enim sequitur omne quod contingit esse producens contingit esse in actu; omne producens de necessitate est Deus; igitur contingit Deum esse in actu'.	Fourthly, we must see about this mixture when both are taken in the sense of division. And it should be known that if the major is of necessity and the minor of contingency, the conclusion of contingency does not follow. Just as it does not follow that 'every producing thing is of necessity God; it is contingent that every producing thing is creating; therefore, it is contingent that a creating thing is God;' but a conclusion of possibility follows, taking the subject of the conclusion for that which can be. But if the major is of contingency and the minor of necessity, if the subject of the major is taken for that which is, or both for that which is and for that which is contingent, the conclusion of contingency follows. But if the subject of the major is taken precisely for those things that are contingent, the conclusion of contingency does not follow. For it does not follow that 'everything that is contingently producing is contingently actual; everything producing is of necessity God; therefore it is contingent that God is actual'.