Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 52

Latin	English
Cap. 52. De mixtione ex propositionibus de necessario et aliis modalibus in secunda figura	Chapter 52 On the mixture of necessary propositions and of other modals in the second figure.
In secunda figura, quando utraque propositio sumitur in sensu composittonis, raro vel numquam valet mixtio, nisi modus sit inferior ad necessarium. Unde non sequitur 'nullum hominem esse asinum est necessarium; omne album esse asinum est scitum a me; igitur nullum album esse hominem est scitum a me, vel nullum album esse hominem est necessarium'. Sicut non sequitur 'nullum hominem esse asinum est necessarium; Brunellum esse asinum est primo verum; igitur Brunellum non esse hominem est primo verum'; nec etiam sequitur 'igitur Brunellum non esse hominem est necessarium'. Sicut non sequitur 'nullum lapidem esse corpus animatum est necessarium; omne animal esse corpus animatum est primo verum; igitur nullum animal esse lapidem est primo verum, quia praemissae sunt verae et conclusio falsa. Nec sequitur omnem Deum esse tres personas est necessarium; nullum immortale is esse tres personas est creditum a te; igitur nullum immortale esse Deum est creditum a te, vel nullum immortale esse Deum est necessarium’.	In the second figure, when both propositions are taken in the sense of a composite, the mixture is rarely or never valid, unless the mode is inferior to necessary. Hence it does not follow that 'it is necessary for no man to be a donkey; it is known by me that every white man is a donkey; therefore it is known by me that no white man is a man, or it is necessary for no white man to be a man'. Just as it does not follow that 'it is necessary for no man to be a donkey; it is primarily true that Brunellus is a donkey; therefore it is primarily true that Brunellus is not a man'; nor does it also follow that 'it is necessary for Brunellus not to be a man'. Just as it does not follow that 'it is necessary for no stone to be an animate body; it is primarily true that every animal is an animate body; therefore it is primarily true that no animal is a stone', because the premises are true and the conclusion false. Nor does it follow that: 'it is necessary for every God to be three persons; it is believed by you that no immortal is God; therefore it is believed by you that no immortal is God, or it is necessary for no immortal to be God.'
Similiter si illa de necessario sumatur in sensu divisionis, non valet, ƿ sicut per terminos eosdem patet. Similiter si utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, non valet generaliter, sicut non sequitur ‘omnis Deus de necessitate est tres; nullum immortale scitur esse tres; igitur nullum immortale scitur esse Deus, vel nullum immortale de necessitate est Deus. An valeat cum aliquo alio modo, discutiant studiosi.	Similarly, if the latter is taken of necessity in the sense of division, it is not valid, as is clear from the same terms. Similarly, if both are taken in the sense of division, it is not valid generally, as it does not follow that ‘every God is necessarily three; no immortal is known to be three; therefore no immortal is known to be God, or no immortal is necessarily God'. Whether it is valid in some other way, let the learned discuss.