Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 7

 

Latin	English
[Cap. 7 Quomodo solvuntur multa argumenta quae videntur facere contra praedicta]	[Chapter 7.  How many arguments, which seem to go against what was previously said, are resolved]
Per praedicta possunt solvi multa argumenta quae videntur contra praedicta. Et sunt talia: non videtur quod iste syllogismus sit bonus 'omne animal, si est sensibile, est corpus animatum; lapis est animal, si est sensibile; igitur lapis est corpus animatum'. Nec iste 'omnis homo vel asinus est rationalis; iste asinus est homo vel asinus; igitur iste asinus est rationalis'; et alii tales non videntur valere.	Through what was said, there can be resolved many arguments which seem to go against what was said. And they are such: it does not seem that the syllogism "every animal, if it is sensible, is an animated body, a stone is an animal, if it is sensible, therefore a stone is an animated body" is a good one.  Nor do "every man or donkey is rational, this donkey is a man or donkey, therefore this donkey is rational", and many other such syllogisms seem to be valid.
Et est dicendum, breviter, quod maior utriusque syllogismi est distinguenda secundum compositionem et divisionem vel secundum amphiboliam, sicut in tractatu praecedenti est declaratum. Unde maior primi syllogismi est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse conditionalis, et tunc est vera, sed tunc discursus non valet, quia maior non est categorica. Si sit de conditionato subiecto, tunc est maior falsa, et syllogismus bonus et regulatus per dici de omni. Consimiliter est dicendum de secundo discursu: quia si maior sit disiunctiva, tunc est maior vera, sed discursus non valet, eo quod maior non est categorica. Si sit de disiuncto subiecto, tunc est maior falsa; denotatur enim quod omne illud de quo dicitur hoc totum disiunctum 'homo vel asinus' quod sit rationale; quod est simpliciter falsum.	And it should be said, briefly, that the major of both syllogisms should be distinguished according to composition and division, or according to amphiboly, just as was made clear in the preceding treatise.  Hence the major of the first syllogism should be distinguished, in that it can be conditional - and then it is true, but the discourse is not valid, because the major is not categorical.  If it is of a conditioned subject, then the major is false, and the syllogism is governed by the dici de omni.  Similarly it must be said of the second discourse, for if the major is disjunctive, then the major is true, but the discourse is not valid, in that the major is not categorical.  If it is a disjunctive subject, then the major is false, for it is denoted of everything of which the whole disjunct 'man or donkey' is said, that it is rational, which is absolutely false.
Et sicut dictum est de talibus, ita, proportionaliter, dicendum est de propositionibus quae possunt esse de copulato extremo vel copulativae, vel de temporali extremo vel temporales, vel de causali extremo vel causales. Consimiliter est dicendum quando subiectum est compositum ex duobus terminis mediante hoc toto 'qui est' vel 'quod est'. Sicut si arguatur sic 'omnis homo, qui est albus, potest disgregare visum; Sortes est homo; igitur Sortes, qui est albus, potest disgregare visum'. Sit Sortes niger. Nam si hoc totum sit distributum 'homo, qui est albus', tunc ƿsyllogismos non valet, cum non reguletur per dici de omni, sicut manifeste patet. Si autem 'homo' tantum sit distributus, tunc aequivalet copulativae tali 'omnis homo est albus et ille potest disgregare visum'; et tunc iste discursus est bonus, quamvis non sit syllogismos categoricus, sed potest reduci in syllogismos categoricos.	And just as it was said of such things, so, in proportion, it should be said of propositions which can be de copulato extremo vel copulativae, vel de temporali extremo vel temporales, vel de causali extremo vel causales.  Similarly it should be said of the case when the subject is composed from two terms with the intermediary whole expression 'who is' or 'which is'.  For example, suppose it is argued "every man who is white can dazzle vision, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates, who is white, can dazzle vision".  Let Socrates be black. For if the whole expression "man, who is white" is distributed, then the syllogism is not valid, since it is not governed by dici de omni, as is manifestly clear. But if only 'man' is distributed, then it is equivalent to the copulative "every man is white and he can dazzle vision", and then the discourse is good, although it is not a categorical syllogism, but can be reduced into categorical syllogisms.