Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 8
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[Cap. 8 Quod maior in prima figura possit convenienter esse singularis et sequetur eadem conclusio quae sequeretur si esset universalis] | [Chapter 8. That the major in the first figure can appropriately be singular, and the same conclusion follows which would follow if it were universal] |
Sciendum est etiam quod sicut arguitur evidenter ponendo talem universalem affirmativam vel negativam pro maiori in prima figura, ita etiam sequitur evidenter si maior sit singularis affirmativa vel negativa. Bene enim sequitur 'Sortes est albus; omnis homo est Sortes; igitur omnis homo est albus'. Similiter bene sequitur 'Sortes non currit; omnis homo est Sortes; igitur nullus homo currit'. Et ita sequitur 'Sortes non currit; aliquod album est Sortes; igitur aliquod album non currit'. Et ratio istorum est, quia quando propositio singularis est vera, si sit affirmativa, subiectum non potest dici de aliquo nisi de eo dicatur praedicatum; si sit negativa, non potest removeri ab aliquo nisi ab eo removeatur praedicatum. Et ideo talis syllogismus est bonus sicut ille qui regulatur per dici de omni vel de nullo et hoc quia sicut subiectum universalis supponit actualiter pro omni suo significato, ita etiam subiectum singularis supponit actualiter pro omni suo significato, cum non habeat nisi unum. | It should be known also that just as it is argued evidently by putting such an affirmative or negative universal for the major in the first figure, so also it follows evidently if the major is an affirmative or negative singular. For "Socrates is white, every man is Socrates, therefore every man is white" follows well. Similarly "Socrates does not run, every man is Socrates, therefore no man runs" follows well. And so follows "Socrates does not run, some white thing is Socrates, therefore something white does not run". And the reason of this is that when a singular proposition is true, if it is affirmative, the subject cannot be said of anything unless the predicate is said of it. If it is negative, it cannot be removed of anything unless the predicate is removed from it. And therefore such a syllogism is good, just as one which is governed by dici de omni, and this is because just as the universal subject supposits actually for all its significate, so also the singular subject supposits actually for all its significate, since it only has one. |
Et regulae, quae dictae sunt prius[1], quando maior est universalis, sunt etiam servandae quando maior est singularis. Et propter hoc talis discursus non valet 'Sortes est animal, tantum homo est Sortes; ƿ igitur tantum homo est animal'; 'Pater distinguitur a Filio; essentia est Pater; igitur essentia distinguitur a Filio'. Et hoc quia per istam 'Pater distinguitur a Filio' non denotatur quod omne illud quod est Pater distinguitur a Filio. Et sicut est de istis, ita est de aliis, proportionaliter, sicut declaratum est ibidem. | And the rules which were given before, when the major is universal, are also applicable when the major is singular. And because of this, such discourses as "Socrates is an animal, only a man is Socrates, therefore only a man is an animal", "the Father is distinguished from the Son, an essence is the Father, therefore an essence is distinguished from the Son" are not valid. And this is because by "the Father is distinguished from the Son" it is not denoted that everything which is the Father is distinguished from the Son. And as it is with these cases, so it is with others, proportionately, as was made clear in the same place. |
Ultimo notandum est quod ea quae dicta sunt in istis capitulis de uniformi ex propositiones de inesse et de praesenti, sunt intelligenda quando omnes propositiones sunt in recto, non in obliquo, nam illae quae sunt in obliquo specialem habent difficultatem, de quibus dicendum est in sequenti capitulo. | Finally, it should be noted that the things said in those chapters about uniform syllogisms from assertoric and present tense propositions, are to be understood when all the propositions are in a direct [i.e. nominative] case, not in an oblique case, for those in an oblique case have a specific difficulty, which we will discuss in the following chapter. |