Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 18

Latin	English
CAP. 18. DE OBIECTIONIBUS CONTRA IAM DICTA.	Chapter 18. On the objections to what has been said.
Sed istis repugnare videtur quod dictum est prius, quod scilicet definitio exprimens quid nominis non potest esse medium demonstrandi, eo quod in tali illatione est petitio principii.	But what was said before seems to be inconsistent with these, namely, that a definition expressing what a name is cannot be a means of demonstrating, because in such an inference there is a petition to a principle.
Non videtur etiam veritatem habere quod demonstratio significat ƿ scientiam natam adquiri per praemissas demonstrationis; quia si sic esset, demonstratio non esset per se inferius ad syllogismum. Numquam enim significatur aliquid per inferius, nec in recto nec in obliquo, nisi idem eodem modo significetur per superius per se.	It also does not seem to be true that demonstration means acquired knowledge born of the acquisition of the premises of demonstration; for if it were so, the demonstration would not be in itself inferior to the syllogism. For nothing is ever signified by the lower, neither directly nor in the oblique, unless the same thing is signified in the same way by the higher in itself.
In hoc enim distinguitur per se inferius ab inferiori per accidens. Cum igitur syllogismus nec in recto nec in obliquo significet scientiam, nec demonstratio significabit scientiam; et per consequens ista oratio ‘syllogismus faciens scire’ non erit definitio exprimens quid nominis demonstrationis.	For in this the inferior is distinguished by itself from the inferior by accident. Since, therefore, syllogism does not mean knowledge directly or in an oblique way, neither will demonstration mean knowledge; and as a result, this sentence 'a syllogism making to know' will not be a definition expressing what is called a demonstration.
Sed istis non obstantibus dicendum est, sicut prius, quod haec oratio est medium notificandi alias definitiones de demonstratione, et quod haec est oratio exprimens quid nominis demonstrationis.	But notwithstanding these, it must be said, as before, that this phrase is a means of noting other definitions of demonstration, and that this is a phrase expressing what the term demonstration is.
Unde sciendum est quod quamvis haec oratio ‘syllogismus faciens scire’ non possit esse medium demonstrandi aliam definitionem de hoc nomine ‘demonstratio’, pro eo quod significatum vocabuli est praesupponendum demonstrationi et ita una praemissarum non est magis nota quam conclusio, tamen ista oratio est medium notificandi quod illud, quod est demonstratio, est tale quale denotatur esse per definitionem aliam, et est medium demonstrandi illam aliam definitionem de nomine quod praecise significat illos syllogismos qui sunt demonstrationes, non connotando scientiam.	Wherefore it must be known that although this phrase 'making a syllogism to know' cannot be a means of demonstrating another definition of this term 'demonstration', because the meaning of the term is presupposed to the demonstration and thus one of the premises is no more known than the conclusion, yet this speech is a means of noting that that which is a demonstration is such as is denoted to be by another definition, and it is a means of demonstrating that other definition of the term which precisely signifies those syllogisms which are demonstrations, not connoting knowledge.
Et quia tale nomen non habemus, sed frequenter utimur hoc nomine ‘demonstratio’ ac si praecise significaret syllogismos illos qui sunt demonstrationes, non connotando aliquid aliud, ideo dicit Lincolniensis quod definitio materialis demonstrationis demonstratur de demonstratione per definitionem sumptam a causa finali tamquam per medium.	And since we do not have such a term, but we frequently use this word 'demonstration' as if it meant precisely those syllogisms which are demonstrations, not connoting something else, therefore Lincoln says that the definition of a material demonstration is demonstrated by a definition taken from a final cause as through a means.
Pro secunda autem obiectione dico quod nisi hoc nomen ‘demonstratio’ aequivoce accipiatur, ut aliquando sit nomen connotativum et aliquando non sit nomen connotativum sed praecise nomen absolutum, ƿ demonstratio non est per se inferius ad syllogismum.	For the second objection, I say that unless this word 'demonstration' is taken equivocally, so that sometimes it is a connotative noun and sometimes it is not a connotative noun but precisely an absolute noun, a demonstration is not in itself inferior to a syllogism.
Et hoc quia significat aliquid in obliquo quod nec in recto nec in obliquo significatur per syllogismum; sed non est inconveniens hoc nomen aequivoce accipi, cum fere omnia nomina in diversis locis aequivoce accipiantur.	And this because it signifies something obliquely which is neither directly nor obliquely signified by the syllogism; but it is not inconvenient for this word to be taken equivocally, since almost all names are taken equivocally in different places.
Dico ergo quod haec est definitio exprimens quid nominis demonstrationis ‘syllogismus faciens scire’. Propter quod, quamvis aliquis arguat ex praemissis ad conclusionem, non oportet quod demonstret, quia non adquirit scientiam conclusionis per praemissas.	I say, then, that this is the definition expressing what the term demonstration is, 'making a syllogism to know'. Because of this, although someone argues from the premises to the conclusion, it is not necessary that he demonstrate, because he does not acquire the knowledge of the conclusion through the premises.
Et si unus ex eisdem praemissis evidenter notis adquirat scientiam conclusionis et alius tantum apprehendat praemissas et conclusionem sed per praemissas non devenit in notitiam conclusionis, unus demonstrat et alius non demonstrat.	And if one acquires the knowledge of the conclusion from the same premisses which are clearly known, and another only grasps the premisses and the conclusion but does not arrive at the knowledge of the conclusion through the premisses, one demonstrates and the other does not demonstrate.
Et ita idem syllogismus est uni demonstratio et alii non est demonstratio.	And so the same syllogism is a demonstration to one and is not a demonstration to another.