Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 21

Latin	English
CAP. 21. DE ALIA DIFFERENTIA INTER DEMONSTRATIONEM QUIA ET PROPTER QUID.	Chapter 21. Of another difference between a posteriori (because) and a priori (because of what) emonstration
Alio modo differt demonstratio quia a demonstratione propter quid sicut scientia quia differt a scientia propter quid: per hoc quod scientia quia habetur in una scientia et scientia propter quid habetur per aliam scientiam, quo modo se habent ad invicem scientia subalternans et scientia subalternata.	Demonstration because (a posteriori) differs in another way from demonstration because of what (a priori), just as knowledge because differs from knowledge because of what: in that knowledge because is held in one science and knowledge for the sake of what is held in another science, in the same way that subordinating knowledge and subordinated knowledge are related to each other.
Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod non ideo dicuntur aliquae scientiae ‘subalternans’ et ‘subalternata’ quia eandem conclusionem una scientia scit quia vera est et alia eandem scit propter quid.	For the evidence of which we must know that some sciences are not called 'subalternating' and 'subalternate' because one science knows the same conclusion because it is true and another knows the same for some reason.
Numquam enim, nisi forte per accidens, eadem conclusio est scita in scientia subalternante et subalternata, non plus quam eadem conclusio est scita in distinctis scientiis. Et ideo sicut eadem conclusio potest esse scita in scientiis disparatis, ita eadem conclusio potest sciri in scientia subalternante et subalternata, licet hoc non sit quia una est subalternans et alia subalternata.	For never, except perhaps by accident, is the same conclusion known in the subalternating and subalternate science, no more than the same conclusion is known in the distinct sciences. And therefore, just as the same conclusion can be known in disparate sciences, so the same conclusion can be known in subalternating and subalternate science, although this is not because one is subalternating and the other is subalternate.
Non igitur propter hoc dicitur una scientia subalternans et alia subalternata quia una scit unam conclusionem quia et alia propter quid, sed ideo dicitur una scientia subalternans et alia subalternata quia scientia subalternata cognoscit conclusionem, scientia subalternans scit principium universale illius conclusionis.	Therefore, it is not for this reason that one science is said to be subalternating and another subalternated, because one knows one conclusion because (a posteriori) and another because of what (a priori), but for this reason it is said that one science is subalternating and another subalternated because the subalternated knowledge knows the conclusion, the subalternating science knows the universal principle of that conclusion.
Unde, universaliter, quando per aliquam scientiam evidenter cognoscitur aliqua conclusio et non princiƿpium et per aliam scientiam evidenter scitur principium et non conclusio, tunc est una subalternans et alia subalternata.	Hence, universally, when by some science a conclusion is evidently known and not a principle and by another science a principle and not a conclusion is evidently known, then there is one subalternated and another subalternating.
Sicut nauta multas conclusiones scit et nescit principia, e converso astrologus novit principia et nescit conclusiones, quia ad eum non pertinent. Et si quaeratur, quomodo unum est principium et reliquum conclusio, ex quo idem non potest cognoscere utrumque, cum omnis conclusio possit per sua principia demonstrari, dicendum est quod talis conclusio potest per tale principium demonstrari, sed nec per illum qui solum habet scientiam subalternantem nec per illum qui solum habet scientiam subalternatam, sed per illum qui habet utramque scientiam.	Just as the sailor knows many conclusions and does not know the principles, on the contrary, the astrologer knows the principles and does not know the conclusions, because they do not belong to him. And if it is asked how there is one principle and the other a conclusion, from which the same cannot know both, since every conclusion can be demonstrated by its principles, it must be said that such a conclusion can be demonstrated by such a principle, but not by him who has only subordinating knowledge, nor by him who has only subordinate knowledge, but by him who has both knowledge.
Oportet autem scire quod cum scientia subalternans et etiam scientia subalternata sit quaedam collectio multorum habituum, ordinem determinatum habentium, non est impossibile quin aliqua scientia secundum unam partem subalternetur uni scientiae et non secundum aliam partem, sicut perspectiva secundum aliquam sui partem subalternatur geometriae et non secundum omnem.	Now it is necessary to know that since science is subalternating and even science has subalternated a kind of collection of many attitudes, having a determined order, it is not impossible that some science is subordinated according to one part of science and not according to another part, just as perspective is subordinated according to some part of itself to geometry and not according to all.
Similiter etiam possibile est quod una scientia secundum eandem partem diversis scientiis subalternetur, quando scilicet una scientia scit unum principium respectu unius conclusionis et alia scientia scit aliud principium respectu eiusdem conclusionis.	Similarly, it is also possible for one science to be subordinated to different sciences according to the same aspect, namely, when one science knows one principle with respect to one conclusion and another science knows another principle with respect to the same conclusion.
Et est advertendum quod semper vel frequenter principium cognitum in scientia subalternante est ex terminis universalioribus. Et si ex illo debeat quis demonstrare conclusionem scitam in scientia subalternata, si velit propriissimam demonstrationem facere, non accipiet illud principium in sua communitate, sed addet alicui termino alium terminum, ut compositum ex illis duobus sit in minus quam prius.	And it must be noticed that always or frequently the principle known in science is subalternating from more universal terms. And if from it one should demonstrate a known conclusion in a subalternated science, if he wishes to make a very proper demonstration, he will not accept that principle in his community, but will add another term to one term, so that the combination of those two may be less than before.
Et hoc est quod vult Aristoteles et Lincolniensis quod principia talia debent appropriari quando ex eis demonstratur talis conclusio. ƿ Sciendum est etiam quod una pars unius scientiae potest subalternari uni scientiae et altera alteri, sicut una pars scientiae naturalis potest subalternari geometriae et alia arithmeticae.	And this is what Aristotle and Lincoln want, that such principles should be appropriated when such a conclusion is demonstrated from them. It must also be known that one part of one science can be subordinated to one science and another to another, just as one part of natural science can be subordinated to geometry and another to arithmetic.
Verumtamen una talis scientia non dicitur subalternata respectu alterius propter unam conclusionem vel paucas, nisi tota scientia vel pro maiori parte sit sibi subalternata.	Nevertheless, one such science is not said to be subordinate to another because of one or a few conclusions, unless the whole science, or for the greater part, is subordinate to it.
Propter quod una et eadem scientia non est subalternans et subalternata respectu eiusdem, quamvis non sit impossibile quod una pars unius totalis scientiae sit subalternans sibi aliquam partem alterius scientiae totalis et alia pars eiusdem scientiae totalis sit subalternata alteri parti alterius scientiae.	For this reason one and the same knowledge is not subalternating and subalternate with respect to the same, although it is not impossible that one part of one total knowledge is subalternate to itself some part of another total knowledge and another part of the same total knowledge is subalternate to another part of another knowledge.
Et est sciendum quod hoc nomen ‘scientia subalternans’ et similiter hoc nomen ‘scientia subalternata’ dupliciter accipi potest, scilicet large et stricte. Large potest dici scientia subalternans vel secundum se vel secundum aliquam partem sui quandocumque aliqua scientia totalis cognoscit principium universale alicuius conclusionis vel proprium et alia scientia totalis cognoscit conclusionem, ita tamen quod istae scientiae non constituunt unam totalem scientiam.	And it must be known that this term 'subalternate science' and likewise this term 'subalternate science' can be understood in two ways, namely broadly and narrowly. Broadly speaking, science can be said to be subalternating, either according to itself or according to some part of itself, whenever some total knowledge knows the universal principle of a conclusion or its own and another total knowledge knows the conclusion, even so that these sciences do not constitute one total knowledge.
Per quod excluduntur scientiae de per se superiori et per se inferiori. Et sic locutus sum prius de scientia subalternante et scientia subalternata. Et sic vult Philosophus quod medicina quantum ad aliquam sui partem subalternatur geometriae, quia medicina cognoscit hanc conclusionem ‘vulnera circularia tardius sanantur’ et geometer cognoscit principium universale respectu istius conclusionis, scilicet quod ‘circulus est figura cuius latera secundum omnem dimensionem maxime distant’.	By which the knowledge of what is intrinsically superior and what is intrinsically inferior is excluded. And so I spoke before about subalternative science and subalternatee science. And so the Philosopher wants medicine to be subalternate to geometry to some extent, because medicine knows this conclusion that 'circular wounds heal more slowly' and the geometer knows the universal principle with respect to this conclusion, namely that 'a circle is a figure whose sides are the most distant in every dimension'.
Et isto modo non est inconveniens quod logica et metaphysica secundum aliquas partes subalternent sibi aliquas partes particularium scientiarum. ƿ Scientia subalternans stricte accipitur quando principium scitur per unam scientiam et conclusio per aliam et simul cum hoc subiectum unius est per accidens inferius ad subiectum alterius vel aliquod subiectum unius importat partem significati per subiectum alterius.	And in this way it is not inconvenient that logic and metaphysics, according to some parts, subordinate to themselves some parts of the particular sciences. Subalternate knowledge is strictly understood when the principle is known by one science and the conclusion by another, and at the same time when the subject of one is accidentally inferior to the subject of the other, or some subject of the one conveys a part of the meaning through the subject of the other.
Et sic accipit Lincolniensis scientiam subalternantem et scientiam subalternatam, et sic forte logica nullam scientiam aliam sibi subalternat nec forte etiam metaphysica.	And so Lincoln accepts subalternating science and subalternate science, and thus perhaps logic does not subalternate any other science to itself, and perhaps not even metaphysics.