Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 22

Latin	English
CAP. 22. QUAE CONCLUSIONES AD QUAM SCIENTIAM PERTINEANT.	Chapter 22. W hich conclusisons pertain to which science.
Iuxta praedicta poterit aliqualiter apparere quid dicendum est de conclusionibus habentibus tam intentiones primas quam secundas pro terminis: ad quam scientiam debeant pertinere?	According to what has been said, it will be somewhat clear what is to be said about conclusions having both primary and secondary intentions as terms: to what science should they belong?
Cuiusmodi sunt tales ‘animal est genus’, ‘homo est species’, ‘rationale est differentia hominis’, ‘album est accidens corporis’ et huiusmodi. Videtur enim quod tales non ad logicam pertineant, quia si tales ad logicam pertinerent, cum sciri non possunt nisi perfecte sciatur natura significati per subiecta.	In this way are such as 'animal is a genus', 'man is a species', 'man's difference is rational', 'whiteness is an accident of the body' and the like. For it seems that such things do not belong to logic, because if such things did belong to logic, they cannot be known unless the nature of what is signified by its subjects is perfectly known.
Impossibile est enim quod sciatur ista propositio ‘rationale est differentia hominis’ nisi sciatur quod anima intellectiva est pars hominis, et per consequens nisi sciatur quod homo componitur ex anima intellectiva et alio.	For it is impossible to know that the proposition 'Rationality is the differentiator of man' unless it is known that the intellectual soul is a part of man, and consequently unless it is known that man is composed of the intellectual soul and something else.
Similiter impossibile est quod ista sciatur ‘sensibile est differentia essentialis hominis’ nisi sciatur quod anima sensitiva est pars hominis. Et sic de aliis. Et per consequens tales sciri non possunt nisi sciatur perfecte natura hominis.	Similarly, it is impossible for it to be known that 'sensitivity is the essential difference of man' unless it is known that the sensitive soul is a part of man. And so about others. And consequently such cannot be known unless the nature of man is perfectly known.
Et sic est de consimilibus. Sequeretur etiam, si tales propositiones per se pertinerent ad logicam, ƿ quod logicus non posset perfecte scire logicam nisi cognosceret naturas omnium rerum; immo etiam nisi cognosceret omnes conclusiones et omnia principia omnium scientiarum, quia impossibile est aliquam conclusionem vel principium in aliqua scientia reperiri quin ex ea dependeat notitia alicuius propositionis compositae ex illa intentione prima et secunda. Propter quod dicendum est quod de talibus propositionibus non habet se logicus intromittere nisi forte gratia exempli.	And so it is with the like. It would also follow, if such propositions per se belonged to logic, that a logician could not fully know logic unless he knew the natures of all things; nay, even unless he knew all the conclusions and all the principles of all sciences, because it is impossible to find any conclusion or principle in any science without the knowledge of some proposition composed of that first and second intention depending on it. Because of this, it must be said that the logician does not have to enter into such propositions except perhaps for the sake of example.
Bene enim potest logicus de talibus exemplificare in tradendo notitiam logicae, sed non pertinent ad logicum scire eas. Sicut autem non per se pertinent ad logicam, ita non per se pertinent ad aliam scientiam particularem, quia aliter scientiae particulares non solum dependerent a logica sicut ab instrumento tantum usitato in aliis scientiis particularibus, sed etiam aliae scientiae particulares procederent tamquam ex principiis ex propositionibus determinatis in logica.	For a logician may well exemplify such things in imparting knowledge of logic, but they do not belong to the logician to know them. But just as they do not per se belong to logic, so they do not per se pertain to another particular science, because otherwise particular sciences would not only depend on logic as an instrument used only in other particular sciences, but also other particular sciences would proceed as if from principles determined by propositions in logic.
Quod negat Commentator VII Metaphysicae et a Physicorum. Ideo dicendum est quod tales propositiones vel pertinent ad metaphysicam, sub cuius consideratione cadunt tam intentiones primae quam secundae, et quae utitur logica dupliciter: secundum quod logica est modus sciendi et etiam accipiendo propositiones consideratas in logica; vel tales pertinent ad aliquam scientiam specialem, ita quod aliquae pertinent ad unam scientiam specialem et aliae ad aliam, quae quodammodo subalternantur tam logicae quam aliis scientiis particularibus, quae tamen scientiae in distinctis tractatibus non sunt traditae a philosophis, sed sine omni difficultate, nota logica et notis aliis scientiis, tales propositiones sunt notae. Scita enim logica et cognita perfecte natura hominis statim, sine difficultate, supposita significatione vocabulorum scitur an ‘rationale’ sit differentia hominis vel non.	This is denied by Commentator VII of the Metaphysics and of the Physics. Therefore it must be said that such propositions either belong to metaphysics, under whose consideration both the first and the second intentions fall, and which uses logic in two ways: according as logic is a way of knowing and also accepting the propositions considered in logic; or such belong to some special science, in such a way that some belong to one special science and others to another, which in a way are subordinate both to logic and to other particular sciences, which sciences, however, have not been handed down by philosophers in distinct treatises, but without any difficulty, known logic and known other sciences, such propositions are known. For when the logic is known and the nature of man is known perfectly, it is immediately known, without difficulty, from the supposed meaning of the terms, whether rationality is the difference of man or not.
Et sic de omnibus propositionibus consimilibus; propter quod non est multum necesse de talibus fieri distinctos tractatus.	And so with all similar propositions; for which reason it is not much necessary to make separate treatises on such matters.