Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 25

Latin	English
CAP. 25. QUOMODO DIVERSAE QUAESTIONES DIVERSIMODE POSSUNT TERMINARI?.	Chapter 25. How different questions may be settled in different ways
Viso numero quaestionum videndum est quomodo diversae quaestiones diversimode terminari possunt et quomodo illa quae per diversas quaestiones quaeruntur diversimode possunt fieri nota. Et quia, sicut patet ex praecedentibus, quaestio si est est prima quaestio, ideo videndum est prius de quaestione si est. Est autem primo sciendum quod quaestio si est terminatur per hoc quod evidenter cognoscitur quod res est.	By looking at the number of questions it is necessary to see how different questions can be concluded in different ways and how what is asked by different questions can be known in different ways. And since, as is clear from what has gone before, the question, if there is, is the first question, therefore we must first look at the question, if there is. But it must first be known that the question, if there is one, is terminated by the fact that it is clearly known what the matter is.
Quod fit si sciatur propositio in qua esse exsistere per propositionem de inesse vel de possibili praedicatur de subiecto, ideo videndum est quomodo talis propositio evidenter cognosci potest.	This happens if it is known that a proposition in which being exists is predicated of the subject by a proposition of being or of being possible.
Et oportet scire quod talis propositio dubitabilis vel habet pro subiecto nomen mere absolutum affirmativum vel habet aliud nomen pro subiecto, puta nomen negativum vel connotativum vel respectivum.	And it is necessary to know that such a doubtful proposition either has for its subject a merely absolute positive noun or has another noun for its subject, for example a negative or connotative or relative noun.
Et propositio mentalis, vel vocalis tali mentali correspondens, in qua subicitur nomen mere absolutum affirmativum, nullo modo cognosci potest evidenter nisi res importata per subiectum intuitive et in se cognoscatur, puta nisi aliquo sensu particulari sentiatur, vel nisi sit intelligibile et non sensibile et ab intellectu videatur illo modo, proportionaliter, quo potentia visiva exterior videt visibile.	And a mental proposition, or a vocal proposition corresponding to such a mental one, in which a merely absolute affirmative noun is submitted, can in no way be clearly known unless the thing implied by the subject is known intuitively and in itself, for example unless it is felt by some particular sense, or unless it is intelligible and not sensible and is seen by the intellect in that way, proportionally, in which the external visual power sees the visible.
Unde nullus potest evidenter cognoscere quod albedo est vel esse potest nisi viderit aliquam albedinem, et sic de aliis. Et propter hoc, quamvis credere possim narrantibus quod leo est vel quod struthio est, et sic de aliis, tamen talia evidenter non cognosco.	Hence no one can clearly know that he is white or can be unless he sees some whiteness, and so on of others. And for this reason, although I may believe those who tell me that it is a lion or that it is an ostrich, and so on about others, I do not clearly know such things.
ƿ Verumtamen ad sciendum evidenter tales propositiones, non oportet sic apprehendere omnia significata per subiectum, sed quandoque sufficit unum solum apprehendere et quandoque plura; et ita talis quaestio si est non poterit terminari nisi per experientiam, hoc est nisi per notitiam visivam, quae est principium experientiae.	Nevertheless, in order to clearly know such propositions, it is not necessary to grasp everything signified by the subject, but sometimes it is sufficient to grasp only one, and sometimes several; and so, if such a question exists, it cannot be resolved except through experience, that is, except through visual knowledge, which is the principle of experience.
Et de tali loquitur Philosophus quando dicit: ‘‘Quemadmodum habemus quia est, sic habemus et quid est.	And the Philosopher speaks of such when he says: "As we have why it is, so we also have what it is."
Unde quantum aliquis scit de aliquo tali quid est, tantum scit si est et e converso. Verbi gratia si sit aliquod compositum ex pluribus partibus et per notitiam intuitivam seu visivam in particulari sciatur quod una pars est et non alia, tantum scitur quod illa pars est pars quidditatis et essentiae rei et non alia; quando autem sentiuntur omnes partes rei, tunc scitur perfecte quod res illa est et quid est res illa.	Hence, in so far as someone knows what something is like, he only knows if it is, and vice versa. For example, if something is composed of several parts, and through intuitive or visual knowledge it is known in particular that there is one part and not another, it is only known that that part is part of the reality and essence of the thing and not another. but when all the parts of a thing are felt, then it is perfectly known that the thing is and what that thing is.
Et si dicatur quod de Deo scimus quod est et tamen nescimus quid est, dicendum est quod nullam propositionem mentalem in qua subicitur terminus omnino simplex et mere absolutus conveniens Deo vel supponens pro Deo possumus pro statu isto habere; quod si possemus, sciremus de Deo quid est si sciremus si est.	And if it is said that we know of God that he exists and yet we do not know what he is, it must be said that we cannot have any mental proposition in which a completely simple and merely absolute term appropriate to God or supposing it to be for God is supposited to this state; that if we could, we should know what God is if we knew if he exists.
Possumus tamen habere propositionem mentalem in qua subicitur terminus communis Deo et aliis, et ideo de aliquo contento possumus scire si est et quid est, et quantum scimus si est tantum scimus quid est et e converso.	We can, however, have a mental proposition in which a common term is assigned to God and to others, and therefore we can know about some content if it is and what it is, and as much as we know if it is, we know what it is and vice versa.
Ex quibus patet quod talis propositio nullo modo demonstrari potest, nec a priori nec a posteriori; nisi forte dicatur quod propositio particularis, large sumendo demonstrationem, dicatur posse demonstrari.	From which it is clear that such a proposition cannot be demonstrated in any way, neither a priori nor a posteriori; unless perhaps it is said that a particular proposition, taking a large demonstration, can be said to be demonstrable.
Sicut si haec sit nota praedicto modo ‘omnis albedo est vel esse potest’ et arguatur sic ‘omnis albedo est vel esse potest; aliquis color est albedo; igitur aliquis color est vel esse potest’.	Just as if this is known in the aforementioned way, 'everything is white or can be', and it is argued thus that 'everything is white or can be; white is some color; therefore there is, or can be, a color.