Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 24

Latin	English
CAP. 24. DE OBIECTIONIBUS CONTRA PRAEDICTA.	Chapter 24. On objections to what has been said
Contra praedicta possunt fieri multae pueriles obiectiones, quas expedit solvere tam propter iuvenes quam propter protervos. Videtur enim primo quod non sunt tantum quatuor genera quaestionum: nam quaeritur quantus est Sortes et qualis est homo, et tamen tales quaestiones ad nullam illarum quatuor sunt pertinentes: Item, videtur quod non sunt eadem quaeribilia et vere scita, quia nihil vere scitur nisi quod per demonstrationem cognoscitur. Sed non omne quaeribile est demonstrabile, nam quaeritur propter quid luna eclipsatur, et tamen hoc demonstrari non potest: Item, ‘utrum omnis triangulus habeat tres’ etc. est quaeribile, et tamen ‘utrum omnis triangulus habet tres’ etc. non est scibile, quia non est verum: Ad primum istorum dicendum quod vel tales quaestiones non perƿtinent ad demonstrationem, vel si pertinent, habent reduci ad quaestionem quia est. Verbi gratia, si quaeratur qualis est luna, ista quaestio implicat multas quaestiones, videlicet utrum luna sit illuminata, utrum eclipsata, utrum sit perspicua, et sic de multis aliis, quae sunt quaestiones quia est, si pertineant ad demonstrationem; et ita illa quaestio quae implicat istas, ad quaestionem quia est reduci debet.	Many childish objections may be raised against the aforesaid, which it is expedient to answer both for the sake of the young and for the impudent. For it appears at first that there are not only four kinds of questions: for we ask how many Socrates there are, and what is the nature of man, and yet such questions do not belong to any of those four. But not everything that can be asked is demonstrable, for it is asked why the moon is eclipsed, and yet this cannot be demonstrated. It is questionable 'whether every triangle has three', etc., but 'whether every triangle has three' is not knowable, because it is not true. To the first of these we must say that either such questions do not pertain to the demonstration, or if they do, they must be brought back to the question why it is so. For example, if it is asked what the moon is like, that question involves many questions, namely, whether the moon is illuminated, whether it is eclipsed, whether it is transparent, and so on about many other things, which are questions why it is, if they belong to the demonstration; and so the question which involves these must be reduced to the question why it is.
Ad secundum dicendum est quod omne quaeribile est vere scibile; non accipiendo ‘vere scibile’ pro illo quod demonstrari potest, sed magis generaliter pro evidenter cognoscibili. Ad tertium dicendum est quod utraque istarum ‘utrum omnis triangulus habet tres etc. est quaeribile’ et ‘utrum omnis triangulus habet tres etc. est scibile’ distingui potest secundum amphiboliam. Unus sensus est iste ‘hoc totum est quaeribile et scibile: utrum omnis triangulus habet tres etc.’; et hic sensus falsus est, et hic sensus infert istam ‘utrum omnis triangulus habet tres angulos etc., est verum’. Alius sensus est iste ‘aliquis potest quaerere et scire utrum omnis triangulus etc., et quaerere isto modo: utrum omnis triangulus etc.’; et sic non infert aliam.	The second answer is that everything that can be asked is truly knowable; not taking 'truly knowable' as that which can be demonstrated, but more generally as clearly knowable. To the third must be answered that both of these 'Whether every triangle has three', etc. it is to be asked whether every triangle has three etc. It is known that it can be distinguished according to amphibolism. One sense is that 'all this is to be inquired and known: whether every triangle has three, etc.'; and this sense is false, and another sense that implies that 'whether every triangle has three angles, etc.', is true'. Another sense is that 'someone can ask and know whether every triangle is etc., and ask in this way: whether every triangle is etc.'; and thus does not imply another.
Si dicatur quod arguitur ab inferiori ad superius, igitur est consequentia bona, dicendum est quod quamvis sit bona consequentia ab inferiori ad superius quando non est aequivocatio vel amphibolia vel compositio vel divisio vel accentus, tamen quando aliqua dictarum fallaciarum potest assignari ibi, non oportet quod sit bona consequentia nisi in uno sensu non in alio. Et ita est in proposito, sicut est hic ‘homo est species, igitur aliquod animal est species’, nam hic semper arguitur ab inferiori ad superius; et tamen si ‘homo’ stet in antecedente simpliciter, consequentia non valet, quamvis si stet personaliter est bona consequentia, sed antecedens est falsum. Ita est in proposito, ƿ quia consequens non potest habere tales diversos sensus ex usu loquentium sicut potest antecedens, ideo consequentia est bona in uno sensu et non in alio.	If it is said that what is argued from the inferior to the superior is therefore a good inference, it must be said that although there is a good inference from the inferior to the superior when there is no equivocation, or amphibole, or composition, or division, or stress, yet when any of the said fallacies can be assigned there, it is not necessary that it be a good inference except in one sense and not in another. And so it is in the proposition, as it is here 'man is a species, therefore some animal is a species', for here it is always argued from the inferior to the superior; and yet if 'man' stands in the antecedent simply, the consequence is invalid, although if it stands personally the consequence is good, but the antecedent is false. It is so in the proposition, because the consequent cannot have such different senses from the use of the speakers as the antecedent can, therefore the consequence is good in one sense and not in another.