Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 27

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 27. UTRUM ESSE REI ET ESSENTIA REI SINT DUO EXTRA ANIMAM DISTINCTA INTER SE.	Chapter 27. Whether the being of a thing and the essence of a thing are two things outside the soul distinct from each other
Et quia tactum est de esse exsistere, aliquantulum disgrediendo considerandum est qualiter esse exsistere se habet ad rem: utrum scilicet essentia rei et esse rei sint duo extra animam, distincta inter se.	And since we have touched upon the matter of being and existence, we must digress a little to consider how the existence of being has to do with matter: namely, whether the essence of a thing and the being of a thing are two things outside the soul, distinct from each other.
Et mihi videtur quod non sunt talia duo, nec esse exsistere significat aliquid distinctum a re: quia si sic, aut esset substantia aut accidens. Non accidens, quia tunc esse exsistere hominis esset qualitas vel quantitas; quod est manifeste falsum, sicut inductive patet.	And it seems to me that there are no such two, nor does existence mean something distinct from matter: for if it were so, it would either be a substance or an accident. It is not an accident, because then the existence of a man would be a quality or a quantity; which is manifestly false, as is clear inductively.
Nec potest dici quod est substantia, quia omnis substantia vel est materia vel forma vel compositum vel substantia abstracta.	Nor can it be said that it is a substance, because every substance is either matter or form or compound or abstract substance.
Sed manifestum est quod nullum istorum potest dici ‘esse’, si ‘esse’ sit alia res ab entitate rei.	But it is clear that none of these can be called 'being', if 'being' is something other than the entity of the thing.
Item, si essent duae res, aut facerent per se unum aut non. Si sic, oporteret quod unum esset actus et reliquum potentia; et per consequens unum esset materia et aliud forma, quod est absurdum.	Likewise, if there were two things, they would either make one thing or not. If so, it would be necessary that one should be act and the other power; and consequently matter would be one thing and form another, which is absurd.
Si non facerent unum per se, igitur essent unum aggregatione tantum vel facerent unum tantum per accidens, ex quo sequeretur quod unum esset accidens alterius. Item, si essent duae res, non esset contradictio quin Deus conservaret entitatem rei in rerum natura sine exsistentia vel e converso exsistentiam sine entitate, quorum utrumque est impossibile.	If they did not make one by themselves, then they would be one only by aggregation, or they would make one only by accident, from which it would follow that one was the accident of another. Also, if there were two things, it would not be a contradiction for God to maintain the entity of a thing in the nature of the world without existence, or conversely, existence without entity, both of which are impossible
ƿ Ideo dicendum est quod entitas et exsistentia non sunt duae res, sed ista duo vocabula ‘res’ et ‘esse’ idem et eadem significant sed unum nominaliter et aliud verbaliter; propter quod unum non potest convenienter poni loco alterius, quia non habent eadem officia.	Therefore it must be said that entity and existence are not two things, but these two terms 'thing' and 'being' mean the same thing, but one nominally and the other verbally; for which reason the one cannot be conveniently placed in the place of the other, because they do not have the same duties.
Unde ‘esse’ potest poni inter duos terminos, sic dicendo ‘homo est animal’, non sic est de hoc nomine ‘res’ vel ‘entitas’. Unde ‘esse’ significat ipsam rem, sed significat causam primam simplicem quando dicitur de ea, non significando ipsam ab alio dependere; quando autem praedicatur de aliis, significat ipsas res dependentes et ordinatas ad causam primam.	Wherefore 'being' can be placed between two terms, thus saying 'man is an animal', not so with this name 'thing' or 'entity'. Wherefore 'to be' signifies the thing itself, but it signifies the first simple cause when it is said of it, not signifying that it depends on another; but when it is predicated of others, it signifies the things themselves dependent and ordered to the first cause.
Et hoc, quia illae res non sunt res nisi sint sic dependentes et ordinatae ad causam primam, sicut non sunt aliter.	And this, because those things are not things unless they are so dependent and ordered to the first cause, as they are not otherwise.
Unde quando homo non dependet ad Deum, sicut tunc non est, ita tunc non est homo. Et ideo non est plus imaginandum quod essentia est indifferens ad esse et non esse quam quod est indifferens ad essentiam et non essentiam, quia sicut essentia potest esse et non esse, ita essentia potest esse essentia et potest non esse essentia.	Hence, when a man does not depend on God, as then he is not, so then he is not a man. And therefore it is no more to be imagined that essence is indifferent to being and not being than that it is indifferent to essence and not essence, because just as essence can be and not be, so essence can be essence and can not be essence.
Et ideo talia argumenta ‘essentia potest esse et non esse, igitur esse distinguitur ab essentia’, ‘essentia potest esse sub opposito esse, igitur essentia differt ab esse ’ non valent; sicut nec talia valent ‘essentia potest non esse essentia et potest esse essentia, igitur essentia differt ab essentia’, ‘essentia potest esse sub opposito essentiae, igitur essentia differt ab essentia’.	And therefore such arguments as 'essence can be and not be, therefore being is distinguished from essence', 'essence can be under the opposite of being, therefore essence differs from being' are not valid; just as such things as 'an essence can not be essence and can be essence, therefore essence differs from essence', 'essence can be under the opposite of essence, therefore essence differs from essence'.
Et ideo non plus sunt essentia et esse duae res quam essentia et essentia sunt duae res, et ita esse non est alia res ab entitate rei.	And therefore essence and being are no more two things than essence and essence are two things, and thus being is not a different thing from the entity of a thing.
Et haec est sententia Lincolniensis, quando dicit II Posteriorum: ‘‘Esse dictum de causa prima non praedicat nisi ipsam essentiam causae primae omnino simplicem; esse dictum vero de aliis non praedicat nisi ordinem et dependentiam eorum ab ente primo quod est ƿ per se. Et haec ordinatio vel dependentia nihil multiplicat in essentia dependente.	And this is Lincoln's opinion, when he says in II Posteriors: 'Being said of the first cause does not predicate except the very simple essence of the first cause; but to be said of others does not predicate except their order and dependence on the first being, which is by itself. And this arrangement or dependence does not multiply anything in the dependent essence.'
Propter hoc sive quaeratur de ente primo sive de re dependente ab ente primo an sit, haec quaestio non ponit in numerum. Causa autem quare Sancti et alii dicunt Deum esse ipsum esse et non creaturam, est quia Deus sic est esse quod non potest non esse, immo necesse est esse, nec ab aliquo alio est; creatura autem sic est esse quod non est necessario esse, sicut nec necessario est res, et ab alio est, sicut ab alio est res effective.	Because of this, whether it is asked about the first being or about the thing dependent on the first being, this question does not include the number. Now the reason why the saints and others say that God is himself and not a creature, is because God is such that he cannot not be, nay, it is necessary to be, and he does not come from someone else. But the creature is such that it is not necessarily being, just as it is not necessarily a thing, and it is from another, just as a thing is effectively from another.
Et ideo non differunt in Deo ‘quod est’ et ‘quo est’, quia non est aliquid aliud a Deo quo Deus est; sed in creatura differunt, quia illud quod est creatura et quo est creatura sunt distincta simpliciter, sicut Deus et creatura differunt.	And therefore 'what is' and 'how is do not differ in God,' because there is nothing other than God in whom God is; but in the creature they differ, because what the creature is and how the creature is are distinct simply, just as God and the creature differ.