Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 40

Latin	English
CAP. 40. DE PASSIONIBUS QUAE SIGNIFICANT IN OBLIQUO PARTEM ILLIUS QUOD SIGNIFICATUR PER SUBIECTUM.	Chapter 40. On attributes that signify obliquely part of what is signified by the subject
Dicto de passionibus importantibus praecise illud quod significatur per subiectum in recto et alias res inhaerentes in obliquo, videndum est ƿ de aliis passionibus quae significant in obliquo partes illius quod significatur per subiectum.	Having spoken of the attributes that convey precisely that which is signified directly by the subject, and other inherent things in the oblique, we must see about other attributes which signify in the oblique the parts of that which is signified by the subject.
De quibus dicendum est quod saltem multae illarum, vel forte omnes, possunt de subiectis suis primis demonstrari, et hoc per definitionem subiecti tamquam per medium, nam tales passiones possunt de subiectis suis dubitari, sicut inductive patet.	Of which it must be said that at least many of them, or perhaps all, can be demonstrated from their first subjects, and this by the definition of the subject as through a medium, for such attributes can be doubted from their subjects, as is clear inductively.
Et quamvis sic dubitentur, tamen si natura rei importatae per subiectum perfecte et distincte cognoscatur una cum aliis requisitis, possunt tales passiones de suis subiectis notificari.	And although they may be so doubted, yet if the nature of the thing conveyed by the subject is perfectly and distinctly known together with the other requisites, such attributes can be known about their subjects.
Tales autem passiones sunt huiusmodi ‘corruptibile’, ‘generabile’, ‘habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis’, et fere omnes passiones mathematicae sunt huiusmodi, propter quod fere omnes passiones mathematicae possunt de subiectis suis primis demonstrari.	But such attributes are of this kind, 'corruptible', 'generable', 'having three angles equal to two right angles', and almost all mathematical attributes are of this kind, for which reason almost all mathematical attributes can be demonstrated from their first subjects.
Et multae etiam passiones naturales sunt huiusmodi.	And there are also many natural attributes of this kind.
Unde haec passio ‘corruptibile’, si debeat definiri definitione exprimente quid nominis, talis definitio debet ei assignari ‘aliquid cuius una pars potest ab alia separari’. Et patet quod per istam definitionem exprimitur pars in obliquo. Et potest talis passio demonstrari, nam possibile est quod nesciatur de primo subiecto passionis quod significat aliquod compositum ex pluribus partibus: propter quod potest dubitari an talis passio praedicetur de subiecto illo, quamvis sciatur evidenter talis condicionalis ‘si aliquid est compositum ex pluribus partibus, una pars potest ab alia separari et per consequens est corruptibile’; et postea sciatur evidenter, vel per experientiam vel per alium modum, definitio de definito, et ex illis potest evidenter inferri et sciri quod omne tale est corruptibile.	Hence this 'corruptible' attribute, if it is to be defined by a definition expressing the meaning of the name, such a definition must be assigned to it as 'something of which one part can be separated from another'. And it is clear that by this definition the part is expressed obliquely. And such an attribute can be demonstrated, for it is possible that one does not know about the first subject of the attribute, which signifies something composed of several parts: for which reason it can be doubted whether such an attribute is predicated of that subject, although such a conditional is clearly known 'if something is composed of several parts, one part can be separated from another and consequently it is corruptible'; and afterwards the definition of the defined may be clearly known, either by experience or by some other means, and from these it may be clearly inferred and known that every such thing is corruptible.
Et ista demonstratio est potissima demonstratio: quando scilicet ignota propositione in qua praedicatur passio de subiecto suo primo, per hoc quod perfecte et distincte cognoscitur natura et essentia rei importatae per subiectum scitur illa propositio et ex propositionibus evidenter notis infertur.	And this demonstration is the most important demonstration: namely, when an unknown proposition in which an attribute is predicated of its first subject, by the fact that the nature and essence of the thing implied by the subject is perfectly and distinctly known, that proposition is known and is inferred from clearly known propositions.
Et in tali processu ita contingit concludere definitionem exprimentem quid nominis passionis per definitionem subiecti tamquam per medium sicut ipsam passionem. ƿ Ex quo patet quod si ‘risibile’ sit passio hominis, significans labia hominis tali motu posse moveri ab aliqua passione hominis interiori, potest demonstrari de homine per definitionem hominis tamquam per medium.	And in such a process it is thus possible to conclude a definition expressing what the name of an attribute is through the definition of the subject as through a medium like the attribute itself. From this it is clear that if man's attribute is 'laughable', signifying that a man's lips can be moved by such a movement from some inner man's experience, it can be demonstrated about man by the definition of man as through a medium.
Illa tamen definitio non erit medium in illa demonstratione, sed erit medium in demonstratione per quam aliqua praemissa demonstratur.	However, that definition will not be a means in that demonstration, but will be a means in the demonstration by which some premise is shown.
Verumtamen una definitio exprimens partes rei erit medium in ultima demonstratione; sed illa non erit definitio exprimens essentiam unius rei per se, sed unius aggregati per accidens vel unius habentis concretum loco unius abstracti.	Nevertheless, one definition expressing the parts of the matter will be the medium in the final demonstration; but that will not be a definition expressing the essence of one thing per se, but of one aggregated by accident, or of one having a concrete form instead of an abstract one.
Nec concludetur passio de nomine illius totius sed de nomine partis; et medium tunc non erit definitio subiecti proprie dicta, sed erit descriptio data per accidentalia et substantialia. Et si sint tales definitiones exprimentes in obliquo aliquam formam inhaerentem et simul cum hoc causam efficientem illius in eodem subiecto, talis passio poterit demonstrari de subiecto primo per descriptionem indicantem partem cui inhaeret illa forma et simul causam eiusdem.	Nor should the attribute be concluded from the name of that whole, but from the name of a part; and the medium then will not be the definition of the subject properly so called, but will be a description given by accidentals and substantials. And if there are such definitions which indirectly express some inherent form and at the same time the efficient cause of it in the same subject, such an attribute may be shown of the subject first by a description indicating the part to which that form is inherent and at the same time the cause of the same.
Tamen illa non erit demonstratio potissima, sed illa quae demonstrat passionem de subiecto primo per definitionem subiecti. Verumtamen sciendum quod talis definitio subiecti non semper est propriissima definitio, qualis est praecise substantiarum, sed frequenter est definitio indicans partes integrales rei, quales sunt definitiones mathematicorum.	However, that will not be the most important demonstration, but that which demonstrates the attribute of the subject first through the definition of the subject. Nevertheless, it should be known that such a definition of the subject is not always the most proper definition, such as is precisely the case for substances, but is frequently a definition indicating the integral parts of a thing, such as are the definitions of mathematics.
Et de tali demonstratione potissima, per quam demonstratur passio sive definitio exprimens quid nominis passionis de suo subiecto primo per definitionem subiecti tamquam per medium, intelliguntur multae auctoritates Aristotelis in libro Posteriorum.	And about such an extremely important demonstration, by which the attribute or definition is shown, expressing what the name of the attribute is about its subject first by the definition of the subject as through the medium, many statements of Aristotle in the book of Posteriors pertain.
Nam ad talem demonstrationem non sufficit quod syllogismus sit ex necessariis et indemonstrabilibus, quia non omnis syllogismus ex necessariis et indemonstrabilibus est talis demonstratio, quamvis omnis syllogismus ex necessariis et indemonstrabilibus faciens scire conclusionem prius ignotam sit demonstratio magis large sumendo demonstrationem.	For it is not sufficient for such a demonstration that the syllogism is from the necessary and indemonstrable, because not every syllogism from the necessary and indemonstrable is such a demonstration, although every syllogism from the necessary and indemonstrable making one to know a previously unknown conclusion is a demonstration, taking the word demonstration more broadly.
Tali etiam deƿmonstratione non potest una conclusio nisi unica demonstratione demonstrari, quamvis aliis demonstrationibus possit unica conclusio multis demonstrationibus demonstrari.	Even with such a demonstration, one conclusion cannot be demonstrated except by a single demonstration, although with other demonstrations a single conclusion can be demonstrated by many demonstrations.
Et ita tale medium non potest esse nisi unicum respectu unius conclusionis, et extendendo nomen causae, respectu unius effectus non potest esse nisi unica causa. Et per istas distinctiones et consimiles debent solvi multa quae praedictis et etiam dictis Aristotelis, in diversis locis, repugnare videntur.	And so such a means can only be unique with respect to one conclusion, and applying the name of a cause, with respect to one effect, it can only be a single cause. And by means of these distinctions and similer ones must be resolved many things which seem to contradict what has been said and also what Aristotle has said, in different places.