Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 8

Latin	English
CAP. 8. QUAE EST PROPOSITIO PRIMO VERA?.	What is a proposition that is 'true-primarily'?
Sicut tam principium quam conclusio demonstrationis potest esse per se vera, ita tam principium quam conclusio demonstrationis potest esse primo vera. Est autem illa propositio primo vera quando praedicatum nulli subiecto communiori illo subiecto nec alicui subiecto non praedicabili de illo subiecto prius competit quam illi subiecto. Et tale praedicatum respectu talis subiecti vocatur universale, et illud subiectum vocatur primum subiectum illius praedicati, saltem si sit praedicabile secundo modo dicendi per se.	Just as both a principle and conclusion of a demonstration can be per se true, so both a principle conclusion of a demonstration can be true-primarily [primo vera]. Now a proposition is true-primarily when the predicate belongs neither to any subject more general than its subject nor to any subject prior to its subject that is not predicable of that subject. And such a predicate in respect of such a subject is called universal, and that subject is called the primary subject of the predicate, at least if it is predicable per se in the second way of saying anything per se.
Per primam particulam excluditur a primo subiecto omne inferius. Unde, sicut docet Aristoteles, isto modo contingit tripliciter errare in assignatione universalis.	Everything lower than the primary subject is excluded by the first clause. Hence, just as Aristotle teaches, if it is taken in that way one can be in error in three ways in assigning a universal predicate.
Primo, si credatur aliquod praedicatum competere alicui primo quia non est aliquid actu praeter illud cui assignatur cui possit competere, sicut si passio solis assignetur primo competere isti soli quia non est alius sol ab isto.	First ,if it is believed that some predicate belongs to something primarily because there is nothing in actuality besides that to which it is assigned to which it can belong, for instance, if an attribute of the sun is assigned to belong primarily to this sun because there is no other sun than this one.
Secundo, si aliquod praedicatum ambiguum assignetur alicui determinato nomini propter hoc quod non est aliquod commune nomen omnibus illis de quibus praedicatur illud ambiguum.	Second, if some ambiguous predicate is assigned to some determinate name, because there is no name common to all those of which that ambiguous [predicate] is predicated.
Tertio, si non sit manifesta differentia inter genus et speciem, et propter illius differentiae latentiam assignetur passio generis illi speciei primo.	Third, if there is no obvious difference between genus and species, and because of the hiddenness of that difference, an attribute is assigned to the genus of that species primarily.
Istis modis peccatur attribuendo universale alicuius communioris minus communi. Per secundam partiƿculam excluditur concretum alicuius abstracti cui primo competit. Unde si nihil esset calefactivum nisi calor, tunc hoc praedicatum ‘calefactivum’ non competeret primo calido, quia haec non esset primo vera ‘omne calidum est calefactivum’, sed haec esset primo vera ‘omnis calor est calefactivus’, quia ista non posset esse vera ‘omne calidum est calefactivum’ nisi haec esset vera ‘omnis calor est calefactivus’.	By attributing a universal of something more general to something less general, one can be mistaken in these ways. The second clause excludes a concrete example of something abstract belonging primarily to it. Hence, if nothing except heat is able to heat, then the predicate "able to heat" does not belong primarily to a hot thing, for this would not be true-primarily, "Every hot thing is able to heat," but this would be true-primarily, "Every heat is able to heat," for "Every hot thing is able to heat" could not be true unless "Every heat is able to heat" were true.
Sed e converso bene posset; et ita illa est prior, et per consequens ‘calefactivum’ primo praedicaretur de calore. Et si dicatur quod quando aliquid praedicatur primo de aliquo, de nullo praedicatur nisi de quo praedicatur suum primum subiectum, sicut de nullo praedicatur ‘esse risibile’ nisi de quo praedicatur ‘homo’; sed ‘esse calefactivum’ praedicatur de calido, de quo tamen non praedicatur ‘calor’; igitur calor non est primum subiectum calefactivi: Dicendum est quod universale numquam praedicatur de aliquo nisi de quo praedicatur suum subiectum primum vel concretum sui primi subiecti.	But the converse could well be the case, and so that [proposition] is prior, and as a consequence ‘able to heat’ would be primarily predicated of heat. And if it is said that what something is predicated primarily of something, it is predicated of nothing except what its primary subject is predicated of, so that ‘being capable of laughter’ is predicated of nothing except what ‘man’ is predicated of, but "being able to heat" is predicated of a hot thing, although "heat" is not predicated of this, and therefore heat is not the primary subject of ‘being able to heat’? It must be said [in reply] that a universal is never predicated of something except that what its primary subject is predicated of, or a concrete example of its primary subject.
Unde de quocumque praedicatur ‘calefactivum’ de eodem praedicatur ‘calor’ vel ‘calidum’, si ‘calefactivum’ sit universale competens primo calori. Ex prioribus patet quae propositio affirmativa est primo vera.	Hence whatever "able to heat" is predicated of, "heat" or "hot thing" is predicated of the same thing, if "able to heat" is a universal belonging primarily in heat. From the aforesaid it is clear which affirmative propositions are true-primarily.
Quia tales sunt primo verae ‘omnis homo est animal’, ‘omne corpus est substantia’, ‘omnis calor est qualitas’, si non sit genus medium inter calorem et qualitatem; et tales ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, ‘omnis substantia intellectualis simplex est susceptibilis disciplinae’ et huiusmodi.	For such [propositions] as "Every man is an animal," "Every body is a substance," "Every heat is a quality," are true-primarily if there is no genus intermediate between heat and quality; and such [propositions ] as, "Every man is capable of laughter," "Every simple intellectual substance is susceptible of learning " and the like.
Ex praedictis etiam potest patere quid est subiectum primum alicuius passionis et quid non est subiectum primum eiusdem. Oportet autem scire quod sicut propositio affirmativa est primo vera, ita aliqua negativa est primo vera.	From the aforesaid it can also be clear what is the primary subject of an attribute and what is not.But you have to know that just as some affirmative propositions are true-primarily, so also some negative propositions are true-primarily.
Unde illa propositio negativa in qua praedicatum non potest vere negari ab aliquo communiori ƿ quam sit subiectum, nec aliquod praedicatum communius potest vere negari universaliter ab illo subiecto, est primo vera, et vocatur ‘negativa immediata’.	Hence a negative proposition is true-primarily when its predicate cannot be denied truly of something more general than the subject, nor can any predicate more general be denied universally and truly of that subject. And it is called an ‘immediate negative [proposition]’.
Huiusmodi est talis propositio ‘nulla substantia corporea est substantia incorporea’.	Of this sort is a proposition such as "No corporeal substance is an incorporeal substance."
Et ideo, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, haec non est primo vera nec immediata ‘nulla substantia est quantitas’, quia haec non est vera secundum principia sua. Et si inveniretur quod diceret talem esse immediatam, esset respondendum quod hoc diceret secundum opinionem aliorum vel gratia exempli.	And, therefore, according to Aristotle's opinion, "No substance is a quantity," is neither true-primarily nor immediate, for this is not true according to his principles. And if it were found that he said such a proposition were immediate, it would have to be replied that he says this in accordance with the opinion of others, or as an example.