Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 10

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 10. DE REGULIS DESERVIENTIBUS CONSEQUENTIIS EX PROPOSITIONIBUS DE MODO; ET PRIMO QUANDO TAM ANTECEDENS QUAM CONSEQUENS SUNT DE EODEM MODO.	Chapter 9. On the rules governing consequences following from modal propositions; and first when both the antecedent and the consequence are in the same mode.
Visum est de regulis deservientibus consequentiis ex propositionibus de inesse, nunc videndum est de quibusdam regulis deservientibus consequentiis ex propositionibus de modo. Et primo, quando tam antecedens quam consequens sunt de eodem modo; secundo, quando altera propositionum est de modo et altera de inesse; tertio, quando una est de uno modo et alia de alio modo.	It has been seen about the rules governing the consequences from propositions about being, now we must see about certain rules governing the consequences from modal propositions. And first, when both the antecedent and the consequent are of the same mode; secondly, when one of the propositions is of mode and the other of existence; thirdly, when one is of one mode and another of another way.mode
Circa primum primo dicendum est de consequentiis ex propositionibus de necessario, circa quas est una regula talis: ab inferiori ad superius sine distributione tam a parte subiecti quam a parte praedicati affirmative est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `Sortes de necessitate est animal, igitur Sortes de necessitate est substantia'; `homo de necessitate est substantia, igitur animal de necessitate est substantia'.	Regarding the first, the first thing to be said is about the consequences from propositions of necessity, about which there is one rule: from the lower to the higher, without distribution both on the part of the subject and on the part of the predicate, a positive conclusion is good; as it follows, `Socrates is necessarily an animal, therefore Socrates is necessarily a substance'; `a man is of necessity a substance, therefore an animal is of necessity a substance'.
Sciendum quod fere omnes regulae praedictae et prius positae sunt intelligendae circa propositiones de necessario quando sumuntur in sensu divisionis. Veritatem etiam habent circa propositiones de necessario quando sumuntur in sensu compositionis, si sint consequentiae simplices ex illis de inesse.	It should be known that almost all the rules mentioned and previously laid down are to be understood in connection with propositions of necessity when they are taken in the sense of division. They also have truth about propositions of necessity when they are taken in the sense of composition, if there are simple consequences from them about being.
Si autem sint consequentiae ut nunc, non oportet quod teneant. Et ideo quamvis sequatur `omne ens est in actu, igitur omnis homo est in actu', non tamen sequitur `omne ens esse in actu est necessarium, ergo omnem hominem esse in actu est necessarium'; ita quod consequentia ex illis de inesse est bona ut nunc, illa vero ex necessariis correspondentibus nec est simplex nec ut nunc.	But if there are consequences as now, it is not necessary that they hold. And therefore, although it follows that `every being is in action, therefore every man is in action', it does not follow that `it is necessary for every being to be in action, therefore it is necessary for every man to be in action'; so that the inference from them concerning existence is good as now, but that from corresponding necessities is neither simple nor as now.
Sciendum est etiam quod quamvis a superiori sine distributione ad inferiora sub disiunctione sit bona consequentia arguendo a parte subiecti, non tenet tamen talis consequentia arguendo a parte praedicati.	It must also be known that although there is a good consequence from the superior without distribution to the inferior under dissociation, arguing on the part of the subject, such a consequence does not hold when arguing on the part of the predicate.
Unde bene sequitur `corpus de necessitate est coloratum, igitur hoc corpus de necessitate est coloratum vel illud corpus vel illud' et sic de singulis. Non tamen sequitur formaliter `corpus de necessitate est coloƿratum, igitur corpus de necessitate est album vel corpus de necessitate est nigrum', et sic de singulis.	From which it follows well that `a body is necessarily colored, therefore this body is necessarily colored, or that body or that' and so on about individuals. However, it does not follow formally that `the body is necessarily colored, therefore the body is necessarily white or the body is necessarily black', and so on about individuals.
Sicut, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, non sequitur `materia de necessitate est sub forma, ergo materia de necessitate est sub hac forma vel materia de necessitate est sub illa forma', et sic de singulis.	Just as, according to Aristotle's opinion, it does not follow that `matter is necessarily under a form, therefore matter is necessarily under this form or matter is necessarily under that form', and so on about individuals.
Verumtamen talis consequentia semper vel frequenter bona est secundum veritatem, nisi praedicatum aequivaleat in significando duobus contradictoriis. Et ex isto patet quod praedicatum in tali particulari de necessario supponit confuse tantum, quia scilicet non contingit descendere ad inferiora nec per disiunctivam nec per copulativam.	Nevertheless, such a conclusion is always or frequently good according to truth, unless the predicate is equivalent in signifying two contradictory things. And from this it is clear that the predicate in such a particular presupposes the necessity only confusedly, because of course it does not happen to descend to lower things either by the disjunctive or by the copulative.
Circa consequentias ex una de necessario, sumpta in sensu compositionis vel ei aequivalente, et alia de necessario, sumpta in sensu divisionis vel ei aequivalente, est sciendum quod semper ab illa de necessario in sensu compositionis vel aequivalente ei ad aliam de necessario in sensu divisionis vel ei aequivalente est bona consequentia et e converso, si tam antecedens quam consequens sit singulare de subiecto quod sit nomen proprium, vel de subiecto quod sit praecise pronomen demonstrativum.	Regarding the consequences from one necessity, taken in the sense of composition or its equivalent, and another necessity, taken in the sense of division or its equivalent, it is to be known that always from that necessity in the sense of composition or its equivalent to another necessity in the sense of division or its equivalent is a good consequence, and vice versa, if both the antecedent and consequent are singular from the subject which is a proper noun, or from the subject which is precisely a demonstrative pronoun.
Sicut bene sequitur `Sortes de necessitate est homo, ergo haec est necessaria: Sortes est homo' et e converso; similiter bene sequitur `hoc de necessitate est animal, --- quocumque demonstrato ---, igitur haec est necessaria: hoc est animal' et e converso.	As it well follows, `Socrates is of necessity a man, therefore this is necessary: ​​Socrates is a man,' and vice versa; Similarly, it follows well that `this is of necessity an animal,' whatever is shown, therefore this is necessary: ​​this is an animal, and vice versa.
Sed si antecedens sit universale vel particulare vel de subiecto composito ex pronomine demonstrativo et termino communi, non valet consequentia; sicut non sequitur `omnis homo de necessitate est Deus, igitur haec est necessaria: omnis homo est Deus'; nec sequitur `haec est necessaria: omne verum est verum, igitur omne verum de necessitate est verum'.	But if the antecedent be universal or particular, or of a subject composed of a demonstrative pronoun and a common term, the consequence is invalid; just as it does not follow that `every man is necessarily God', therefore this is necessary: ​​every man is God'; nor does it follow that this is necessary: ​​all truth is truth, therefore all truth is necessarily truth.
Ita etiam ex particularibus non sequitur; sicut non sequitur `iste creans de necessitate est Deus, ergo haec est necessaria: iste creans est Deus'.	Even so it does not follow from particulars; just as it does not follow that 'this creator is necessarily God, therefore this is necessary: ​​this creator is God'.
Tamen in isto ultimo casu bene sequitur e converso. Bene enim sequitur `ista est necessaria: iste creans est Deus, igitur iste creans de necessitate est Deus'.	However, in this last case, the opposite is true. For it follows well that 'this is necessary: ​​this creator is God, therefore this creator is of necessity God'.
ƿ Et hoc semper est verum, arguendo ex affirmativis. Si enim argueretur ex negativis, non valeret consequentia. Non enim sequitur `haec est necessaria: hoc album non est nigrum, igitur hoc album de necessitate non est nigrum'.	And this is always true, arguing from the affirmative. For if it were argued from the negatives, the conclusion would not be valid. For it does not follow that 'this is necessary: ​​this white thing is not black, therefore this white thing is of necessity not black'.
Circa illas de possibili est sciendum quod singularis de subiecto quod est nomen proprium vel praecise pronomen demonstrativum, sumpta in sensu divisionis infert illam de possibili sumptam in sensu compositionis et e converso; sicut bene sequitur `haec est possibilis: Sortes est albus, igitur Sortes potest esse albus', et e converso. Similiter sequitur `hoc potest esse nigrum, igitur haec est possibilis: hoc est nigrum', et e converso.	With regard to those of the possible, it must be known that the singular of the subject, which is a proper noun, or precisely a demonstrative pronoun, taken in the sense of division, implies that of the possible taken in the sense of composition, and vice versa; as it follows well that this is possible: Socrates is white, therefore Socrates can be white, and vice versa. Similarly, it follows that `this can be black, therefore this is possible: this is black', and vice versa.
Sed si subiectum illarum propositionum fuerit terminus communis vel pronomen demonstrativum cum termino communi, tunc subiectum in illa de possibili, sumpta in sensu divisionis vel aequivalente sibi, vel stat pro eo quod est vel pro eo quod potest esse.	But if the subject of those propositions was a common term or a demonstrative pronoun with a common term, then the subject in that of the possible, taken in the sense of division or equivalent to itself, either stands for what is or for what can be.
Si pro eo quod est, tunc praedicatum vel est terminus communis, vel pronomen demonstrativum solum, vel nomen proprium, vel pronomen demonstrativum cum termino communi.	If for what it is, then the predicate is either a common term, or a demonstrative pronoun alone, or a proper noun, or a demonstrative pronoun with a common term.
Si praedicatum sit terminus communis vel pronomen demonstrativum cum termino communi sive nomen proprium, non valet consequentia ab una ad aliam; sicut non sequitur `hoc album potest esse nigrum, igitur haec est possibilis: hoc album est nigrum'.	If the predicate is a common term or a demonstrative pronoun with a common term or a proper noun, the inference from one to the other is invalid; just as it does not follow that `this white thing can be black,' therefore this is possible: this white thing is black.
Nec sequitur `haec est possibilis: hoc album est Sortes, igitur hoc album potest esse Sortes', propter falsam implicationem in consequente. Multo magis si praedicatum esset terminus communis vel sumptus cum termino communi, non valeret consequentia.	Nor does it follow that 'this is possible: this white thing is Socrates, therefore this white thing can be Socrates', because of a false implication in the consequent. Much more, if the predicate were a common term or a cost with a common term, the consequence would not be valid.
Si autem stet pro eo quod potest esse, ab illa in sensu divisionis ad aliam in sensu compositionis non valet consequentia; sicut non sequitur `album potest esse nigrum, igitur haec est possibilis: album est nigrum'.	But if it stands for what can be, the consequence from one in the sense of division to another in the sense of composition is invalid; just as it does not follow that 'a white thing can be black, then this is possible: a white thing is black'.
Sed e converso, ex indefinita sequitur indefinita et ex singulari sequitur singularis, sed ex universali non sequitur universalis; bene enim sequitur `haec est possibilis: album est dulce, ergo aliquid quod potest esse album, potest esse dulce'.	But on the contrary, the indefinite follows the indefinite, and the singular follows the singular, but the universal does not follow the universal; for it follows well that this is possible: 'a white thing is sweet, therefore something that can be white can be sweet'.
Ista consequentia patet; nam sequitur `haec est possibilis: album est dulce', ergo duae propositiones sunt possibiles in quibus de pronomine demonstrante idem praedicantur ista duo `album' et ƿ `dulce'; et ultra: igitur duae de possibili habentes idem subiectum, scilicet idem pronomen demonstrans idem pro subiecto, sumpto in sensu divisionis, sunt verae, puta tales duae `hoc potest esse dulce', `hoc potest esse album'.	This consequence is clear; for it follows that `this is possible: a white thing is sweet', therefore two propositions are possible in which the two `white' and `sweet' are predicated of the same demonstrative pronoun; and further: therefore two of the possible having the same subject, that is, the same pronoun showing the same thing as the subject, taken in the sense of division, are true, for example two such as `this can be sweet' and `this can be white'.
Quia sicut dictum est, illa de possibili habens pro subiecto pronomen demonstrativum praecise, sumpta in sensu compositionis, infert illam de possibili in sensu divisionis; igitur istae duae `haec est possibilis: hoc est dulce', `haec est possibilis: hoc est album' inferunt istas duas `hoc potest esse dulce', `hoc potest esse album'.	Because, as has been said, that of the possible having as its subject a demonstrative pronoun precisely, taken in the sense of composition, implies that of the possible in the sense of division; therefore these two words `this is possible: this is sweet', `this is possible: this is white' imply these two words `this can be sweet', `this can be white'.
Nunc autem sequitur `hoc potest esse dulce, hoc potest esse album, igitur album potest esse dulce', sumpto subiecto pro eo quod potest esse; igitur a primo ad ultimum sequitur `haec est possibilis: album est dulce, igitur album potest esse dulce'.	But now it follows, `this can be sweet, this can be white, therefore a white thing can be sweet', taking the subject for what it can be; therefore, from the first to the last, 'this is possible: a white thing is sweet, therefore a white thing can be sweet'.
Sed universalis non infert universalem; non enim sequitur `haec est possibilis: omne album est homo, ergo omne quod potest esse album potest esse homo'. Nec potest talis consequentia probari, sicut praecedens, eo quod per syllogismum expositorium quamvis inferatur indefinita particularis vel singularis, non tamen universalis.	But the universal does not imply the universal; for it does not follow that 'this is possible: every white thing is a man, therefore everything that can be white can be a man'. Nor can such a consequence be proved, like the preceding one, by the fact that, although the indefinite of the particular or singular is inferred by the expository syllogism, it is not yet universal.
Circa propositiones de contingenti sciendum est quod illa de contingenti sumpta in sensu compositionis et illa sumpta in sensu divisionis convertuntur si subiectum sit pronomen demonstrativum vel nomen proprium; sicut istae convertuntur `hoc contingit esse album' et `haec est contingens: hoc est album'.	Regarding contingent propositions, it must be known that those taken from the contingent in the sense of composition and those taken in the sense of division are converted if the subject is a demonstrative pronoun or a proper noun; just as these are converted into `this happens to be white' and `this is contingent: this is white'.
Sed si subiectum sit terminus communis vel includens terminum communem vel participium, non oportet; non enim sequitur `haec est contingens: hic creans est Deus; igitur hunc creantem contingit esse Deum'.	But if the subject is a common term or includes a common term or a participle, it is not necessary; for it does not follow that `this is contingent: this is God who creates; therefore this creator happens to be God'.
Nec sequitur e converso `hoc album contingit esse nigrum, igitur haec est contingens: hoc album est nigrum'. Ex quo patet quod differentia est inter illas de contingenti et illas de possibili quantum ad consequentias inter eas.	Nor does it follow on the contrary that 'this white thing happens to be black, therefore this is contingent: this white thing is black'. From this it is clear that there is a difference between those of the contingent and those of the possible as regards the consequences between them.
Nam illa de possibili habens pro subiecto terminum communem vel includens terminum communem vel participium, sumpta in sensu compositionis, infert illam de possibili in sensu divisionis.	For that of the possible having for its subject a common term or including a common term or participle, taken in the sense of composition, implies that of the possible in the sense of division.
Sed sic non contingit in illis de contingenti. Non enim sequitur `haec est contingens: Deus est creans; igitur quod contingit esse Deum contingit esse creantem'; nec etiam sequitur `ergo quod est Deus, contingit esse creans'.	But this is not the case with those concerning the contingent. For it does not follow that this is contingent: God is the creator; therefore what happens to be God happens to be the creator; nor does it follow that `therefore, because God is, it happens to be the creator.'
ƿ Circa illas de impossibili est sciendum quod quando subiectum est pronomen demonstrativum vel nomen proprium, illa in sensu compositionis et <illa> in sensu divisionis aequipollent; sicut istae aequipollent `haec est impossibilis: hoc est album' et `hoc non potest esse album'.	Concerning those of impossibility it must be known that when the subject is a demonstrative pronoun or a proper noun, they are equivalent in the sense of composition and <they> in the sense of division; just as these are equivalent to `this is impossible: this is white' and `this cannot be white'.
Sed si subiectum sit terminus communis vel includens terminum communem vel participium, non aequipollent; unde non sequitur `haec est impossibilis: album est nigrum, ergo album non potest esse nigrum'.	But if the subject is a common term or includes a common term or a participle, they are not equivalent; whence it does not follow that 'this is impossible: white is black, therefore a white thing cannot be black'.
Nec sequitur `album non potest esse homo, igitur haec est impossibilis: album est homo'. Tamen sciendum quod quando accipitur aliqua de impossibili in qua negatur modus possibilitatis, sicut hic `album non potest esse nigrum', si sumatur in sensu divisionis, si subiectum suum non sit pronomen demonstrativum tantum nec proprium nomen, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod subiectum potest accipi pro eo quod est vel pro eo quod potest esse. Si primo modo, sic nec universalis infert universalem nec particularis particularem nec singularis singularem; si secundo modo, particularis non infert particularem, sed universalis infert universalem. Unde non sequitur `aliquid, quod potest esse album, non potest esse homo, igitur haec est impossibilis: album est homo; sed bene sequitur `omne, quod potest esse album, non potest esse homo, igitur haec est impossibilis: omne album est homo'.	Nor does it follow that `a white thing cannot be a man, therefore this is impossible: a white thing is a man'. However, it should be known that when something is taken as impossible in which the mode of possibility is denied, as here `a white thing cannot be black', if it is taken in the sense of division, if its subject is not only a demonstrative pronoun nor a proper noun, that proposition is to be distinguished by the fact that the subject can be taken for what it is or for what it can be. If in the first mode, then neither the universal implies the universal, nor the particular the particular, nor the singular the singular; if, in the second way, the particular does not imply the particular, but the universal implies the universal. Whence it does not follow that `something that can be white cannot be a man, therefore this is impossible: a white thing is a man'; but it follows well that 'everything that can be white cannot be a man, therefore this is impossible: every white thing is a man'.
Circa alias modales est sciendum quod quando subiectum est pronomen demonstrativum vel nomen proprium, illa in sensu compositionis et illa in sensu divisionis convertuntur; sicut istae convertuntur `hoc est per se animal' et `haec est per se: hoc est animal'; et istae `hoc scitur esse album' et `haec est scita: hoc est album'; et istae `hoc creditur esse asinus' et `haec est credita: hoc est asinus'.	With regard to other modals, it must be known that when the subject is a demonstrative pronoun or a proper noun, the former are converted in the sense of composition and the latter in the sense of division; just as these are turned into `this is by itself an animal' and `this is by itself: this is an animal'; and these `this is known to be white' and `this is known: this is white'; and these `this is believed to be an ass' and ``this is believed: this is an ass'.
Sed si subiectum sit terminus communis vel includens terminum communem tamquam partem vel participium, non convertuntur. Unde istae non convertuntur `album scitur esse homo' et `haec est scita: album est homo'; nec istae `album per se aedificat' et `haec est per se: album aedificat'; nec istae `album creditur esse homo vel Sortes' et `haec est credita: album est homo vel Sorƿtes'.	But if the subject is a common term or includes a common term as part or participle, they are not converted. Hence these are not converted: `a white thing is known to be a man' and `this is known: a white thing is a man'; nor are these `a white thing builds by itself' and `this is by itself: a white thing builds'; nor these `a white thing is believed to be man or Socrates' and `this is what is believed: a white thing is a man or Socrates'.
Similiter istae non convertuntur `creans scitur esse Deus' et `haec est scita: creans est Deus', nam semper de istis una est vera et altera falsa.	In the same way, these are not converted, `it is known that God is the creator' and `this is known: God is the creator', for one of these is always true and the other false.
Et ratio omnium istorum dicta est prius, videlicet quod per propositionem de modo sumptam in sensu divisionis et per sibi aequivalentem non denotatur quod ille modus verificetur de sua praeiacente, sed quod verificetur de alia propositione in qua praedicatum praedicatur et pronomen demonstrativum vel nomen proprium subicitur et hoc verbum `est' sit tertio adiacens.	And the reason of all these has been said before, namely, that by a proposition taken from a mode in the sense of division and by its equivalent, it is not denoted that that mode is verified from its preceding one, but that it is verified from another proposition in which the predicate is predicated and a demonstrative pronoun or proper noun is submitted, and this word 'is' is adjacent to the third.
Sicut per istam `creans de necessitate est Deus', --- sumpta in sensu divisionis ---, non denotatur quod sua praeiacens, scilicet ista `creans est Deus', sit necessaria, sed denotatur quod haec sit necessaria `hoc est Deus', denotando illud pro quo `creans' supponit in ista `creans de necessitate est Deus'. Et similiter per istam `album per se aedificat' non denotatur quod sua de inesse, scilicet ista `album aedificat' sit per se, sed quod aliqua talis sit per se `hoc aedificat', denotando aliquid pro quo `album' supponit in ista `album per se aedificat'.	Just as by this `God is the creator of necessity,' --- taken in the sense of division ---, it is not denoted that what precedes itself, that is, `the creator is God,' is necessary, but it is denoted that the latter is necessary, `this is God,' by denoting that for which `creating' supposits in these `a creating thing of necessity is God.' And likewise by this: `a white thing builds by itself', it is not denoted that it is of its own being, that is, that `a white thing builds' is by itself, but that something such as this `this builds' by itself, denoting something for which `white' stands in that `a white thing builds by itself'.
Ex istis et praedictis patet quod tales sunt concedendae, secundum principia Aristotelis, `homo de necessitate est Deus', `album per se aedificat', `creans scitur esse Deus' et huiusmodi, si tales sint verae `Filius Dei de necessitate est Deus', `aedificator per se aedificat', `Deus scitur esse Deus'; et hoc quia subiecta istarum et illarum supponunt pro eisdem, et ideo dum supponunt pro eisdem, si istae sunt verae, illae erunt verae et e converso.	From these and the aforesaid, it is clear that such things must be granted, according to Aristotle's principles, `a man is necessarily God,' `he builds by himself,' `the creator is known to be God,' and the like, if such are true, `the Son of God is necessarily God,' 'a builder builds by himself,' `God is known to be God.' and this because they supposit the subjects of these and those to be the same, and therefore while they supposit to be the same, if these are true, they will be true and vice versa.
Et hoc quia de tota propositione in qua praedicatur praedicatum unius et alterius de pronomine demonstrante illud pro quo subiectum supponit, verificatur talis modus, quia eadem est illa propositio, quamvis aliae sint diversae.	And this, because of the whole proposition in which the predicate of one and the other is predicated of the pronoun showing that for which the subject stands, such a manner is verified, because that proposition is the same, although the others are different.
Dicunt tamen aliqui quod ista est falsa `homo de necessitate est Deus', quia per talem de necessario implicatur quod aliquid sit necessario homo; et hoc est falsum, et ideo ista est falsa. Similiter per istam `album scitur esse homo' implicatur quod aliquid scitur esse album.	Some say, however, that this is false: `a man is necessarily God,' because by such a necessity it is implied that something is necessarily man; and this is false, and therefore that is false. Similarly, by this `a white thing is known to be a man,' it is implied that something is known to be white.
Sed illud non est bene dictum, quia tales modi, eo quod ƿ sequuntur subiecta, non implicant subiecta dici de aliquo cum tali modo, sicut nec iste modus `contingenter' nec iste modus `per accidens', et sic de aliis.	But that is not well said, because such modes, by the fact that they are subjects, do not imply that the subjects are said of someone with such a mode, just as neither is this mode `contingently' nor is this mode `accidentally', and so on.
Et ideo sicut per istam `Deus contingenter creat' non implicatur quod aliquid sit contingenter Deus et quod illud creat, nec per istam `Deus per accidens creat' implicatur quod aliquid sit per accidens Deus et quod ille per accidens creat, sed praecise ponitur quod aliquid sit Deus et ille contingenter vel per accidens creat; ita per istam `homo de necessitate est Deus' non denotatur nisi quod aliquis sit homo et quod ille de necessitate est Deus. Et hoc verum est.	And therefore, just as by this `God creates contingently' it is not implied that something is contingently God and that he creates, nor by this `God creates by accident' is it implied that something is accidentally God and that he creates by accident, but it is precisely stated that something is God and he creates contingently or by accident; Thus, by this `a man is necessarily God,' nothing is denoted except that someone is a man and that he is necessarily God. And this is true.
Similiter per istam `album scitur esse homo' non denotatur nisi quod aliquid sit album et quod illud sciatur esse homo, quod poterit esse verum, quamvis nesciatur illud esse album. Et sub isto sensu concessum est prius quod tales sunt verae `tres personae sciuntur esse Deus', quia scilicet aliquid, puta Deus, est tres personae, et illud scitur esse Deus, quamvis nesciatur illud esse `tres personae'. Eodem modo est de ista `Pater scitur esse immortalis', quia scilicet hoc est Pater, demonstrando Deum, et hoc scitur esse immortale.	Similarly, by this `a white thing is known to be a man,' nothing is denoted except that something is white and that it is known to be a man, which may be true, although it is not known that it is white. And in this sense it was previously granted that there are such truths as `three persons are known to be God,' because of course something, say God, is three persons, and it is known to be God, although it is not known that it is `three persons.' In the same way it is about this, `The Father is known to be immortal,' because of course this is the Father, showing God, and this is known to be immortal.