Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 12

Latin	English
CAP. 12. DE REGULIS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE FACTAE EX PROPOSITIONIBUS DIVERSORUM MODORUM.	Chapter 12. On the rules by which the consequences hold that are made from propositions of different modes.
Post haec videndum est de consequentiis ex propositionibus diversorum modorum. Unde sciendum est primo quod illa de necessario semper infert illam de possibili, ita scilicet quod ambae sumantur in sensu compositionis vel ambae in sensu divisionis vel aequivalentes talibus.	After this we must consider the consequences of propositions of different modes. Wherefore it must first be known that the one of the necessary always implies the one of the possible, that is to say, that both are taken in the sense of composition, or both in the sense of division, or equivalent to such.
Unde bene sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium, ergo omnem hominem esse animal est possibile'. Similiter bene sequitur `omnis homo de necessitate est animal, igitur omnis homo potest esse animal'; sed e converso non sequitur, sicut non sequitur `omnis homo potest esse albus, igitur omnis homo de necessitate est albus'.	From which it follows well that 'it is necessary for every man to be an animal, therefore it is possible for every man to be an animal'. Similarly, it follows well that 'every man is of necessity an animal, therefore every man can be an animal'; but it does not follow on the contrary, just as it does not follow that 'every man can be white, therefore every man is necessarily white'.
Secundo sciendum quod illa de necessario non infert illam de contingenti, modo contingentiae remanente affirmato, nec e converso, sed infert contradictoriam illius de contingenti; sicut bene sequitur `omnis homo de necessitate est animal, igitur non contingit omnem hominem esse animal'.	Secondly, it must be known that that of the necessary does not infer that of the contingent, just as the remainder of the contingency is affirmed, nor vice versa, but it infers the contradictory of that of the contingent; as it follows well that 'every man is of necessity an animal, therefore it does not happen that every man is an animal'.
Similiter bene sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium, igitur omnem hominem esse animal non est contingens'. ƿ Sed non sequitur e converso; non enim sequitur `omnem hominem esse asinum non est contingens, igitur omnem hominem esse asinum est necessarium'; nec sequitur `non contingit Deum esse albedinem, igitur Deus de necessitate est albedo'.	Similarly, it follows well that 'it is necessary for every man to be an animal, therefore it is not contingent that every man is an animal'. But it does not follow the other way around; for it does not follow that 'it is not contingent that every man be an ass, therefore it is necessary that every man be an ass'; nor does it follow that `it does not happen that God is white, therefore God is necessarily white'.
Tertio sciendum quod illa de necessario infert contradictoriam illius de impossibili; sicut sequitur `omnis homo de necessitate est animal, igitur omnis homo non impossibiliter est animal'. Similiter bene sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium, ergo non est impossibile omnem hominem esse animal'; sed e converso non sequitur.	Thirdly, it must be known that the one of the necessary implies the contradictory of that of the impossible; as it follows that 'every man is necessarily an animal, therefore every man is not impossibly an animal'. Similarly, it follows well that 'it is necessary for every man to be an animal, therefore it is not impossible for every man to be an animal'; but the reverse does not follow.
Quarto sciendum quod multae propositiones de aliis modis inferunt illas de necessario et non e converso; sicut sequitur `omnem hominem esse risibilem est demonstrabile, igitur omnem hominem esse risibilem est necessarium'.	Fourthly, it must be known that many propositions about other modes infer them necessarily and not the other way around; as it follows, `it is demonstrable that every man is laughable, therefore it is necessary that every man be laughable.'
Aliquae autem inferuntur ex illis de necessario et non e converso; sicut sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium, igitur omnem hominem esse animal est scibile', large accipiendo `scibile'.	Some, however, are inferred from them of necessity and not the other way around; as it follows, `it is necessary for every man to be an animal, therefore it is knowable that every man is an animal', taking `knowable' broadly.
Aliquae autem non inferuntur ex illis de necessario nec inferunt eas; sicut non sequitur omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium, igitur omnem hominem esse animal est evidenter notum a te', nec etiam sequitur e converso, ut patet.	Some, however, are not necessarily inferred from them, nor do they infer them; Just as it does not follow that 'every man is an animal is necessary, so it is evidently known to you that every man is an animal', nor does it follow the other way around, as is clear.
Circa propositiones de possibili est notandum quod illa de possibili non infert illam de contingenti sed e converso. Bene enim sequitur `contingit Sortem esse album, igitur Sortes potest esse albus', et non e converso, quia non sequitur `possibile est Deum esse, igitur contingit Deum esse'.	Regarding propositions about the possible, it should be noted that those about the possible do not imply those about the contingent, but vice versa. For it follows well that `it happens that Socrates is white, therefore Socrates can be white', and not the other way around, because it does not follow that `it is possible that there is a God, therefore it happens that there is a God'.
Et non solum illa de contingenti infert unam de possibili sed etiam duas, scilicet affirmativam et negativam. Sed e converso non sequitur: non enim sequitur `homo potest esse Deus, igitur contingit hominem esse Deum'.	And not only that of the contingent brings one of the possible, but also two, namely the affirmative and the negative. But it does not follow the other way around: for it does not follow that 'A man can be God, therefore it happens that a man is God'.
Secundo notandum quod illa de possibili infert oppositum illius de impossibili; sicut sequitur `hominem currere est possibile, igitur hominem currere non est impossibile'; et e converso etiam sequitur ƿ `hominem currere non est impossibile, igitur hominem currere est possibile'.	Secondly, it is to be noted that the proposition of the possible implies the opposite of the proposition of the impossible; as it follows, `it is possible for a man to run, therefore it is not impossible for a man to run; and on the contrary it also follows `it is not impossible for a man to run, therefore it is possible for a man to run'.
Tertio notandum quod omnis propositio in qua ponitur aliquis modus qui non potest competere nisi propositioni verae, infert illam de possibili; sicut sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est scitum, igitur omnem hominem esse animal est possibile'. Sed e converso non sequitur, nisi aliquando gratia materiae.	Thirdly, it is to be noted that every proposition in which some mode is placed which can only belong to a true proposition, implies that it is possible; as it follows that ``every man is known to be an animal, therefore it is possible for every man to be an animal. But the reverse does not follow, except sometimes by thanks to the matter.
Si autem talis modus possit competere propositioni falsae, tunc non infert illam de possibili, quamvis aliquando sequatur e converso. Unde non sequitur `intellectum non esse animam intellectivam est opinabile, igitur intellectum non esse animam intellectivam est possibile'; sed e converso bene sequitur, quia omne possibile est opinabile.	Now, if such a mode can correspond to a false proposition, then it does not infer it from the possible, although sometimes it follows on the contrary. Hence it does not follow that 'it is conceivable that the intellect is not the intellectual soul, therefore it is possible that the intellect is not the intellectual soul'; but the converse follows well, because everything that is possible is conceivable.
Ad videndum autem quando tales consequentiae sunt bonae et quando non, videndum est quo modo tales modi se habent ad invicem secundum praedicationem: utrum videlicet tales propositiones sint verae vel falsae `omne necessarium est possibile'; `omnis propositio scita est propositio possibilis'; `omnis propositio demonstrata est propositio possibilis'; `omnis propositio credita est propositio possibilis'; `nulla propositio impossibilis est propositio possibilis'; `nulla propositio per se nota est propositio demonstrabilis'; `nulla propositio per se est propositio per accidens'; et sic de consimilibus.	In order to see when such consequences are good and when they are not, we must see how such modes relate to each other according to predication: namely, whether such propositions are true or false, `everything necessary is possible'; `every known proposition is a possible proposition'; `every demonstrated proposition is a possible proposition'; `every proposition believed is a possible proposition'; `no impossible proposition is a possible proposition'; `no proposition in itself is known as a demonstrable proposition'; `no proposition in itself is a proposition by accident'; and so on the like.
Unde regulariter a propositione de uno modo ad propositionem de alio est semper bona consequentia quando modus consequentis praedicatur de modo antecedentis universaliter sumpto.	Hence, as a rule, from a statement of one mode to a statement of another, there is always a good consequence when the mode of the consequent is predicated of the mode of the antecedent taken universally.
Similiter, numquam talis consequentia valet quando modus consequentis non praedicatur universaliter de modo antecedentis. Similiter, semper a propositione de uno modo ad propositionem de alio modo negato est bona consequentia quando modus consequentis universaliter removetur a modo antecedentis.	Similarly, such a conclusion is never valid when the mode of the consequent is not universally predicated of the mode of the antecedent. Similarly, a good consequence is always denied from a proposition about one mode to a proposition about another mode when the mode of the consequent is universally removed from the mode of the antecedent.
Unde ista consequentia est bona `omnem hominem currere est necessarium, igitur omnem hominem currere non est contingens', quia ista propositio est vera `nulla propositio necessaria est propositio contingens'.	Whence this conclusion is good, `It is necessary for every man to run, therefore it is not contingent that every man run', because this proposition is true, `no necessary proposition is a contingent proposition'.
ƿ Hic tamen advertendum est quod semper oportet quod ambae propositiones ex talibus propositionibus modalibus sint sumptae in sensu compositionis vel eis aequivalentes, vel quod ambae sumantur in sensu divisionis vel eis aequivalentes.	Here, however, it must be noted that both propositions must always be taken from such modal propositions in the sense of composition or equivalent to them, or that both be taken in the sense of division or equivalent to them.
Et ex istis potest elici quid dicendum est de consequentiis ex talibus propositionibus modalibus. Notandum quod omnes regulae supra positae de modalibus intelligendae sunt quando omnes termini supponunt personaliter et significative, quia si acciperentur materialiter vel simpliciter non tenerent praedictae regulae.	And from these it is possible to elicit what is to be said about the consequences of such modal propositions. It should be noted that all the rules set forth above concerning modals are to be understood when all the terms assume a personal and significant meaning, because if they were taken materially or simply the aforesaid rules would not hold.
Ut autem habeatur completus tractatus de istis modalibus, dicendum est aliquid de aequipollentiis earum.	But in order to have a complete discussion of these modes, something must be said about their equivalences.