Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 17

Latin	English
CAP. 17. DE REGULIS DESERVIENTIBUS CONSEQUENTIIS IN QUIBUS ALIQUIS TERMINUS SUPPONIT SIMPLICITER VEL MATERIALITER. ET PRIMO DE REGULIS QUIBUS CONSTRUITUR VEL DESTRUITUR PROBLEMA DE ACCIDENTE.	Chapter 17. On the rules that govern consequences in which some terms supposit simply or materially. And first on the rules by which the problem of accident is constructed or destroyed.
Postquam visum est de aliquibus regulis deservientibus consequentiis ex propositionibus in quibus omnes termini supponunt personaliter et ƿ significative, nunc videndum est de consequentiis compositis ex propositionibus in quibus aliquis terminus supponit simpliciter vel materialiter. Et sunt consequentiae inferentes tales conclusiones `album est accidens Sortis', `homo est species talis generis', `risibile est passio hominis', `substantia animata sensibilis est definitio animalis', `canis est aequivocum' et huiusmodi. Primo autem dicendum est de regulis quibus construitur vel destruitur problema de accidente.	Having seen some rules governing consequences from propositions in which all terms supposit personally and significatively, we must now see consequences composed from propositions in which some term supposits simply or materially. And there are consequences inferring such conclusions as `white is an accident of Socrates', `man is a species of such a genus', `laughable is an experience of man', `sensible animate substance is the definition of animal', `dog is equivocal' and the like. First, however, we must speak of the rules by which the problem of accident is constructed or destroyed.
Et quia fere tota ista materia patere potest ex praedictis, ideo est brevius transeundum. Est igitur regula generalis talis: illud verificatur contingenter de aliquo, igitur est accidens illius; sicut sequitur `album contingenter verificatur de homine, igitur album est accidens hominis'. Intelligendum est quod ista regula tenet quando talis propositio potest esse vera et falsa, stante propositione vera in qua enuntiatur esse de eodem subiecto. Oportet etiam scire quod hic non accipitur accidens pro illo quod realiter inhaeret alteri et informat ipsum, sed accipitur pro praedicabili de aliquo, cui tamen non inhaeret nec informat ipsum. Et sic accipiendo accidens, potest concedi quod `creans' est accidens Dei; sicut consimile concedit Anselmus, Monologion, 25. Et similiter `ridens' est accidens hominis. Alia regula est: hoc verificatur de hoc, et non est proprium ipsius, nec genus, nec differentia, nec species, nec definitio, nec aliquid commune omnibus, igitur est accidens eius. Alia quae necessaria sunt sciri de accidente, elici possunt ex prioribus et praecipue ex illis quae dicta sunt in primo tractatu de accidente, ideo ista ad praesens sufficiant.	And because almost all of this matter can be understood from the foregoing, it must therefore be briefly discussed. Therefore, there is a general rule of this kind: that which is verified contingently of something, is therefore an accident of that; as it follows that `white is verified contingently of man, therefore white is an accident of man'. It must be understood that this rule holds when such a proposition can be true and false, provided there is a true proposition in which it is stated to be of the same subject. It is also necessary to know that here accident is not taken for that which really inheres in another and informs it, but is taken for a predicable thing of something, to which however it does not inhere nor inform it. And thus taking accident, it can be conceded that `creating' is an accident of God; as Anselm concedes in a similar way, in Monologion, 25. And similarly `laughing' is an accident of man. Another rule is: this is verified of this, and is not proper to it, nor genus, nor difference, nor species, nor definition, nor anything common to all, therefore it is an accident of it. Other things that are necessary to know about accident can be elicited from the previous ones and especially from what was said in the first treatise on accident, so these will suffice for the present.