Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 18

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 18. DE REGULIS QUIBUS CONSTRUITUR VEL DESTRUITUR PROBLEMA DE GENERE.	Chapter 18. On the rules by which problems of genera are constructed or decomposed.
Post haec videndum est quomodo construitur vel destruitur problema de genere. Et quia Aristoteles istam materiam diffuse tractavit, ideo per suas regulas est discurrendum.	After this we must see how a problem of genera is constructed or destructed. And since Aristotle treated this matter extensively, we must therefore run through his rules.
Est igitur prima regula talis: si praedicatum non praedicatur de subiecto universaliter Sumpto, illud praedicatum non est genus illius subiecti; sicut si haec non sit vera `omnis homo est lapis', lapis non est genus hominis.	Therefore the first rule is this: if a predicate is not predicated of a universally taken subject, that predicate is not a genus of that subject; as if this were not true, `every man is a stone,' a stone is not a genus of man.
Notandum est quod de virtute sermonis loquendo, aliquando idem est genus alicuius et aliquando non est genus ipsius. Sicut animal, quando haec est vera `omnis homo est animal', est genus hominis, quando autem haec est falsa `omnis homo est animal', tunc animal non est genus hominis, quia ad hoc quod animal sit genus hominis, oportet quod animal praedicetur de homine universaliter sumpto.	It must be noted that speaking of the power of speech, sometimes it is the same genus of something and sometimes it is not the same genus. Just as an animal, when this is true, `every man is an animal,' it is the genus of man, but when this is false, `every man is an animal,' then animal is not a genus of man, because in order for animal to be a genus of man, it is necessary that an animal be predicated of man universally taken.
Alia regula est: quod non praedicatur de aliquo in quid, non est genus ipsius; sicut quia hic non est praedicatio in quid `omnis homo est coloratus', quamvis haec sit vera `omnis homo est coloratus', ideo `coloratum' non est genus hominis.	There is another rule: that which is not predicated of something in what (in quid), is not of its kind; just as there is no predication here as to what: `every man is colored,' although this is true, `every man is colored,' therefore `colored' is not a genus of man.
Notandum quod tunc praedicatur aliquid de aliquo in quid, quando omnia quae significant, omnino eodem modo significant; ita scilicet quod in definitione exprimente quid nominis utriusque vel omnia ponuntur in recto vel aliqua in obliquo et aliqua in recto, ita scilicet quod solum differunt in hoc quod unum significat plura et aliud non omnia illa sed aliqua de illis.	It is to be noted that when something is predicated of something in what (in quid), when all things that signify signify in the same way; so that in the definition expressing the meaning of the name of both, either all are placed directly, or some obliquely and some directly, thus, namely, that they differ only in this, that one means more things, and another, not all of them, but some of them.
Vel si utrumque significet aliqua et simiƿliter connotet aliqua, oportet quod unum significet multa et aliud non omnia illa multa sed aliqua, vel quod illud praedicatum connotet multa et aliud non connotet omnia illa sed aliqua tantum.	Or if both signify some things and likewise connote some things, it must be that the one signifies many things and the other not all those many things but some of them, or that the predicate connotes many things and the other does not connote all those things but only some of them.
Propter hoc nulla talis praedicatio est in quid `omnis homo est albus', quia `album' vel significat vel connotat omnes albedines, et praecise albedines, sed homo non significat nec connotat omnes albedines.	Because of this, there is no such predication in what (in quid) `every man is white,' because `white' either means or connotes all white people, and precisely white people, but man does not mean or connote all white people.
Similiter, ista praedicatio non est in quid `homo est rationalis', quia `rationale' significat in obliquo animam intellectivam, ita quod abstractum per se significans animam intellectivam debet poni in obliquo in definitione exprimente quid nominis ipsius rationalis, sed non sic ponitur in definitione exprimente quid nominis ipsius hominis, quamvis unum sequatur ex alio.	Similarly, this predicate is not in what (in quid): `man is rational,' because `rational' indirectly signifies the intellectual soul, so that the abstract, signifying the intellectual soul, must be placed obliquely in the definition expressing the meaning of the name rational itself, but it is not so placed in the definition expressing the meaning of the name man itself, although one thing follows from another.
Et propter ista nulla talis praedicatio est in quid ` omne ens est unum', `omnis homo est risibilis', et sic de aliis. Sed talis praedicatio est in quid `omnis homo est animal', quia homo et animal differunt in hoc quod animal significat omnia animalia, homo autem non significat omnia animalia sed aliqua tantum.	And for this reason there is no such predication in what (in quid) `every being is one,' `every man is laughable,' and so on. But such a predication is in what: 'every man is an animal', because man and animal differ in that animal means all animals, but man does not mean all animals but only some.
Similiter ista est in quid `album est coloratum', quia coloratum significat omnia subiecta potentia habere colorem, album autem significat omnia subiecta potentia habere albedinem; coloratum autem vel connotat vel significat principaliter omnes colores, sed album non significat omnes colores sed aliquos tantum.	In the same way, this is in what (in quid): `white is colored', because colored means that everything subject to it has the ability to have color, but white means that everything subject it has the ability to have whiteness; and colored either connotes or signifies principally all colors, but white does not signify all colors but only some.
Advertendum est tamen quod non semper requiritur quod illud quod praedicatur in quid de aliquo actualiter significet plura, quia tunc si nullum animal esset nisi homo, hic non esset praedicatio in quid `homo est animal', quod falsum est; sed sufficit quod possit significare plura per solam productionem novarum rerum.	It must be warned, however, that it is not always required that what is predicated in what (in quid) actually signifies more things, because then if there were no animal but man, there would not be a predication here in what `man is an animal, which is false; but it is sufficient that it can signify more by the mere production of new things.
ƿ Tertia regula est: illud quod contingit alicui inesse et non inesse, non est genus ipsius.	The third rule is: that which happens for a thing to exist and not exist, is not its genus.
Unde quia homo est aliquando albus et aliquando non est albus, ideo album non est genus hominis. Notandum est hic quod per `inesse' intelligitur `praedicari'. Unde regula est ista: quando aliquid praedicatur de aliquo contingenter, ita quod aliquando praedicatur et aliquando non praedicatur, ipso tamen quod importatur per subiectum manente actualiter, tunc non est genus ipsius. Unde quia homine exsistente potest haec esse vera `nullus homo est albus', ideo album non est genus hominis.	Therefore, since man is sometimes white and sometimes not white, therefore white is not a genus of man. It must be noted here that by 'being' is meant 'to be predicated'. Whence the rule is this: when something is predicated contingently of something, so that sometimes it is predicated and sometimes it is not predicated, yet that which is actually implied by the remaining subject, then it is not of its kind. Hence, since the following can be true of an existing man, `no man is white,' therefore white is not a genus of man.
Quod tamen aliquando aliquid praedicetur de aliquo et aliquando non, propter destructionem omnium rerum importatarum per subiectum, non impedit illud praedicatum esse genus illius; sicut quamvis haec possit esse vera `homo non est animal', quando scilicet nullus homo est, tamen cum hoc stat quod animal sit genus hominis.	However, the fact that sometimes something is predicated of a thing and sometimes not, because of the destruction of all the things implied by the subject, does not prevent that predicate from being its genus; just as although this may be true, `man is not an animal,' when, for example, there is no man, yet it stands that animal is the genus of man.
Quarta regula est: si aliqua non sint in eadem coordinatione, illa non se habent sicut genus et species, quia in quocumque praedicamento est genus, in eodem est species et e converso.	The fourth rule is: if some things are not in the same relationship, they are not like genus and species, because in whatever category there is a genus, there is a species in the same category, and vice versa.
Notandum quod quamvis de eodem possint praedicari diversa genera diversarum coordinationum et etiam diversa praedicamenta, sicut eadem res est substantia et quantitas, tamen idem non potest esse per se species diversorum generum diversarum coordinationum, hoc est diversorum praedicamentorum, et hoc, quia diversa praedicamenta numquam praedicantur de eodem in quid.	It should be noted that although different genera, different coordinates and even different predicates can be predicated of the same thing, just as substance and quantity are the same thing, yet the species of different genera in different coordinations, that is, of different predications, they cannot be the same per se, that is, of different predications, and this is because different predications are never predicated of the same thing in what (in quid).
Unde quamvis istae sint verae `homo est substantia', `homo est quantus vel quantitas', tamen una praedicatio est in quid et alia non est in quid, et ideo homo non est species quantitatis, sed est species substantiae.	Therefore, although these are true, `man is a substance', `man is a quantum or quantity', yet one predication is in what (in quid) and another is not in what, and therefore man is not a species of quantity, but is a species of substance.
Et ideo quod dicit Philosophus in Praedicamentis, quod nihil prohibet idem esse in diversis praedicamentis; et in diversis locis dicit quod species non est ad aliquid ƿ sed genus, debet intelligi quod nihil prohibet diversa praedicamenta praedicari de eodem et aliquando genus est ad aliquid et species non; non quidem per se species illius generis sed alterius generis, de qua tamen specie illud genus, quod est ad aliquid, praedicatur, et tamen illa species de qua praedicatur non est ad aliquid.	And therefore what the Philosopher says in the Predicates, that nothing prevents the same being in different predicates; and in different places he says that the species is not in relation to something except the genus, it must be understood that nothing prevents different predicates from being predicated of the same thing and sometimes the genus is for something and the species is not; not in itself the species of that genus, but of another genus, of which however that species is predicated, which is to something, and yet that species of which it is predicated is not to something.
Et per istum modum debent solvi omnes auctoritates quae videntur contrariari. Alia regula est: si aliquid participat aliud et rationem ipsius, illud participans non est genus illius quod participat; sicut quia homo participat animal et definitionem animalis, ideo homo non est genus animalis.	And by this means all the authorities that appear to be contrary must be resolved. There is another rule: if something partakes of something else and its aspect, that which partakes is not the genus of that of which it partakes; just as man shares the animal and the definition of an animal, therefore man is not a genus of animal.
Notandum quod aliquid participare aliud non est aliud nisi quod semper dum esse verificatur de illo, aliud praedicatur universaliter de illo; sicut homo participat rationem animalis, quia necessario dum homo est, haec est vera `omnis homo est animal'.	It is to be noted that to participate in something is not something other than that always while its existence is verified of it, something else is universally predicated of it; just as man partakes of the nature of an animal, because necessarily while he is a man, this is true: `every man is an animal.'
Et ita `participare' non accipitur hic pro capere partem vel includere illud essentialiter vel tamquam partem essentiae, sed pro vere subici cum signo universali respectu alterius, secundum modum praeexpositum.	And so `participating' is not understood here as taking a part or including it essentially or as a part of the essence, but as truly submitting with a universal sign in relation to another, according to the manner previously explained.
Ex praedictis patet quod quamvis haec possit esse vera `omne animal est homo' et ista similiter `omne animal est animal rationale', quia tamen utraque istarum poterit esse falsa dum haec est vera `animal est', ideo animal non participat hominem nec rationem, hoc est definitionem, hominis, et ideo poterit hoc non obstante animal esse genus hominis.	It is clear from what has been said that although this may be true, `every animal is a man,' and similarly, `every animal is a rational animal,' because both of these may be false while this is true, `an animal is,' therefore an animal does not participate in man or reason, that is, the definition of man, and therefore, despite this, an animal may be the genus of man.
Sexta regula est: quando species assignata praedicatur de aliquo, sive sicut de suo contento sive non, de quo non praedicatur genus assignatum, tunc illud non est genus illius; sicut `opinabile' praedicatur de non-ente et nec ens nec scibile praedicatur de non­ente, ideo nec ens nec scibile est genus opinabilis, quia de quocumque praedicatur species de eodem praedicatur genus.	The sixth rule is: when an assigned species is predicated of something, whether as to its content or not, of which the assigned genus is not predicated, then it is not its genus; just as `imaginable' is predicated of non-being, and neither being nor knowable is predicated of non-being, therefore neither being nor knowable is a conceivable genus, because whatever species is predicated of the same, genus is predicated of the same.
Quod est intelligendum quando in praedicatione exercita omnes termini supponunt personaliter et significative. Septima regula est: si species assignata non participat aliquam speƿcierum assignatarum contentarum sub genere assignato, illud non est genus ipsius; sicut si voluptas nec est generatio nec corruptio, et sic de aliis speciebus motus, motus non est genus voluptatis.	This is to be understood when in the practice of predication all the terms assume a personal and significant meaning. The seventh rule is: if the assigned species does not participate in any of the assigned species contained under the assigned genus, that is not its own genus; just as if pleasure is neither generation nor corruption, and so with other kinds of motion, motion is not a genus of pleasure.
Notandum quod ista regula habet intelligi quando species assignata non immediate continetur sub genere. Unde homo non participat aliquam speciem animalis, et tamen animal est genus hominis; et hoc, quia homo immediate continetur sub animali.	It should be noted that this rule has to be understood when the assigned species is not immediately contained under the genus. Hence man does not partake of any species of animal, and yet animal is the genus of man; and this, because man is immediately contained under the animal.
Notandum quod `participare' accipitur hic, sicut prius, pro subici cum signo universali respectu illius et non e converso, secundum modum ibi dictum. Octava regula est: si aliquid praedicetur de pluribus quam aliud, illud aliud non est genus illius; sicut quia opinabile praedicatur de pluribus quam ens, ideo ens non est genus opinabilis, quia semper genus praedicatur de pluribus quam sua species.	It should be noted that `participating' is taken here, as before, for a subject with a universal sign with respect to it and not the other way around, according to the manner stated there. The eighth rule is: if something is predicated of more than another, that other is not its genus; just as, since an imaginable is predicated of more than a being, therefore a being is not a genus of imaginable, because a genus is always predicated of more than its species.
Sciendum est quod non semper actualiter genus praedicatur de pluribus quam sua species, quia si nullum animal esset nisi homo, animal non praedicaretur actualiter de pluribus quam homo pro tunc.	It must be known that a genus is not always actually predicated of more than its species, because if there were no animal but man, the animal would not actually be predicated of more than man for that time.
Et ideo debet auctoritas Aristotelis intelligi, quod semper genus praedicatur de pluribus quam sua species, nisi omnia individua alicuius speciei vel specierum sint destructa vel non­exsistentia.	And therefore the authority of Aristotle must be understood, that a genus is always predicated of more than its species, unless all the individuals of one or more species are destroyed or non-existent.
Nona regula est: si genus et species praedicantur de aequalibus, non se habent sicut genus et species. Ista regula debet intelligi sicut prior; nam semper quando cuiuslibet speciei alicuius generis est aliquod individuum, genus praedicatur de pluribus quam quaecumque sua species.	The ninth rule is: if genus and species are predicated of equals, they are not predicated as genus and species. This rule must be understood like the previous one; for whenever there is an individual of any species of any genus, the genus is predicated of more than any of its species.
Et ideo quia semper ens et unum praedicantur de pluribus, ita quod ens non potest praedicari de pluribus quam unum nec e converso, ideo neutrum est genus respectu alterius.	And therefore, since being and one are always predicated of many things, so that being cannot be predicated of more than one, nor vice versa, therefore neither is a genus with respect to the other.
Similiter est de principio et primo: nam principium non potest praedicari de pluribus quam primum nec e converso, et ideo nec principium est genus primi nec e converso. Decima regula est: quod non est genus alicuius individui, non est ƿ genus aliquorum individuorum indifferentium specie; et quod est genus unius individui, est genus omnium individuorum eiusdem speciei cum illo, et ita idem est genus omnium quae non differunt specie vel nullius.	The same is true of the beginning and the first: for the beginning cannot be predicated of more than the first, nor vice versa, and therefore neither is the beginning a genus of the first nor vice versa. The tenth rule is: that which is not the genus of any individual, is not the genus of some individuals indifferent in species; and what is the genus of one individual, is the genus of all individuals of the same species with it, and so is the same genus of all that do not differ in species or of none.
Undecima regula est: nihil continetur sub diversis generibus nisi unum illorum contineatur sub altero; sicut homo non posset esse per se species animalis et corporis nisi animal contineretur sub corpore vel e converso.	The eleventh rule is: nothing is contained under different genera unless one of them (i.e., genus) is contained under another; just as man could not be in himself a species of animal and body unless the animal was contained under the body or vice versa.
Sed contra istam regulam instat Philosophus, IV Topicorum, quia prudentia continetur tam sub scientia quam sub virtute. Ideo istam regulam corrigit Philosophus, ibidem, per hoc quod oportet quod illa genera, sub quibus idem continetur, sint subalterna vel quod contineantur sub eodem genere; sicut scientia et virtus, quamvis non sint subalterna, tamen ambo ista genera continentur sub eodem genere, puta sub habitu.	But against this rule the Philosopher insists, Topics IV, that prudence is contained both under knowledge and under virtue. Therefore the Philosopher corrects this rule, ibid., by the fact that those genera under which the same thing is contained must be subordinate, or must be contained under the same genus; just as knowledge and virtue, although they are not subordinate, yet both these kinds are contained under the same kind, for example under habit.
Unde dicit Philosophus, ibidem, sic: ``Si neque subalterna genera sint neque sub eodem ambo, non erit quod assignatum est genus. Sed contra hoc videtur esse Philosophus in libro Praedicamentorum, ubi dicit quod ``diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diversae sunt species et differentiae.	Whence the Philosopher says, ibid., thus: `If there are neither subordinate genera nor both under the same genus, there will be no assigned genus'. But the Philosopher seems to be against this in the book of Predications, where he says that `different genera that are not placed subordinately have different species and differences.
Et si hoc, igitur idem non potest esse species talium generum diversorum et non subalternatim positorum: Praeterea, omne genus dividitur per differentias oppositas, quarum una removetur universaliter ab alia, igitur idem non potest contineri sub diversis generibus non subalternatis: Praeterea, ista regula videtur esse contra praedicta, quia dictum est prius quod diversa praedicamenta praedicantur de eodem, et tamen ista praedicamenta non continentur sub eodem genere nec sunt subalterna: Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod semper diversorum ƿ generum non subalternatim positorum diversae sunt species et differentiae, si sint genera habentia differentias; non tamen oportet quod omnes species talium generum sint diversae, et ita stat quod aliqua sit eadem species eorum.	And if this is so, therefore the same thing cannot be the species of such different genera and not placed subordinately: Further, every genus is divided by distinct differences, one of which is universally removed from the other, therefore the same cannot be contained under different genera that are not subordinate: Further, this rule seems to be contrary to what has been said, because it was said before that different predicates are predicated of the same thing, and yet these predicates are not contained under the same genus and are not subordinate: To the first of these we must say that different genera not placed subordinately always have different species and differences, if there are genera having differences; yet it is not necessary that all the species of such genera be different, and so it stands that some of them are the same species.
Et si dicatur quod aliquae sunt species sic diversae diversorum generum subalternatorum, sicut multae sunt species corporis quae non sunt species animalis, igitur in hoc non differunt genera subalterna et non subalterna, dicendum quod quamvis unum genus subalternum habeat aliquam speciem quae non sit species alterius, tamen e converso est impossibile.	And if it be said that there are some species of different subordinate genera, such as there are many species of body that are not animal species, then in this respect the subordinate and non-subordinate genera do not differ, it must be said that although one subordinate genus has some species which is not the species of another, yet the reverse is impossible.
Sed quando sunt genera non subalterna, utrumque illorum habet aliquam speciem quae non est species alterius. Et hoc sufficit ad intentionem Aristotelis.	But when there are non-subordinate genera, each of them has some species which is not the species of the other. And this is sufficient for Aristotle's intention.
Ad secundum dicendum quod non omne genus dividitur per differentias oppositas. Quando tamen genus habet differentias, potest dividi per differentias oppositas, et tamen una illarum removetur universaliter ab alia, sed non oportet quod removeatur universaliter ab omni alia differentia.	To the second Objection it must be said that: Not every genus is divided by opposed differences. However, when a genus has differences, it can be divided by opposed differences, and yet one of them is universally removed from the other, but it is not necessary that it be universally removed from every other difference.
Verbi gratia animal dividitur per rationale et irrationale, et una illarum removetur universaliter ab alia; postea est aliquod genus quod est praecise commune equo et asino. Sit ita quod forte habent aliquam convenientiam inter se, qualem neutrum illorum habet cum quocumque alio animali, et ideo ab eis potest abstrahi unum genus praecise commune illis, et vocetur illud genus a.	For example, animal is divided into rational and irrational, and one of these is universally removed from the other; subsequently there is a certain genus that is precisely common to the horse and the ass. Let it be so that perhaps they have some compatibility with each other, such as none of them has with any other animal, and therefore one genus can be abstracted from them precisely common to them, and that genus may be called a.
Similiter, forte bos et equus habent aliquam specialem convenientiam, qualem neutrum illorum habet cum quocumque alio animali; et tunc poterit ab eis abstrahi unum genus praecise commune illis, et vocetur b.	Similarly, perhaps the cow and the horse have some special compatibility, such as neither of them has with any other animal; and then it will be possible to abstract from them one genus precisely common to them, and it will be called b.
Tunc, quamvis differentiae a removeantur a se invicem et similiter b, tamen una differentia a est eadem cum differentia b, et ita eadem poterit esse species diversorum generum talium non subalternorum.	Then, although the differences a are removed from each other and likewise b, yet one difference a is the same as the difference b, and thus the species of different genera of such non-subordinates may be the same.
ƿ Ad tertium dictum est prius quod nulla species per se continetur sub diversis praedicamentis, quia numquam diversa praedicamenta praedicantur in quid de eadem specie.	As to the third objection, it was said before that no species per se is contained under different predicates, because different predicates are never predicated of something of the same species.
Et ideo numquam est idem per se species diversorum generum nisi illa genera sint subalterna vel ambo contineantur sub eodem, sicut dicit Philosophus hic. Non tamen huic obstat quin de eadem specie possint praedicari diversa praedicamenta non in quid sed aliter.	And therefore the species of different genera are never the same in themselves, unless those genera are subordinate, or both are contained under the same thing, as the Philosopher says here. However, this does not prevent that different predicates can be predicated of the same species, not in what (in quid) but in a different way.
Duodecima regula est quod quando non omnia genera ad genus assignatum praedicantur in quid de assignata specie, non est genus ipsius; sicut si corpus non praedicatur in quid de albo, animal non est genus albi.	The twelfth rule is that when all the genera assigned to the genus are predicated of what (in quid) to the species, it is not the genus itself; just as if the body is not predicated of what of a white thing, animal is not a genus of white.
Alia regula est: si assignatum genus, vel genus aliquod ipsius, participat speciem, non est genus ipsius. Sciendum quod `participare' accipitur hic, sicut prius, non quia capiat partem realem ipsius, nec quia est pars ipsius, nec quia importat partem ipsius, sed quia ipsum participans subicitur universaliter respectu alterius et aliud universaliter sumptum non subicitur respectu illius sed tantum particulariter sumptum.	Another rule is: if the assigned genus, or any genus thereof, participates in a species, it is not its genus. It should be known that `to participate' is understood here, as before, not because it takes a real part of it, nor because it is a part of it, nor because it implies a part of it, but because the participant itself is universally submitted in relation to the other, and another universally taken is not submitted in relation to that but only taken in particular.
Sicut homo participat animal, quia homo universaliter sumptus subicitur respectu animalis, sic dicendo `omnis homo est animal' et animal universaliter sumptum non subicitur respectu hominis, sic dicendo `omne animal est homo', sed particulariter tantum, sic dicendo `aliquod animal est homo'; quamvis aliquando haec possit esse vera `omne animal est homo', non tamen oportet quod sit vera, quamvis animal sit.	Just as man participates in the animal, because man is universally subsumed in relation to the animal, thus saying 'every man is an animal', and the animal is not universally subsumed in relation to man, thus saying 'every animal is a man', but only in a particular way, thus saying 'some animal is a man'; Although sometimes this may be true, `every animal is a man,' it does not necessarily have to be true, even though a man is an animal.
Et sub ista significatione accipit Philosophus semper `participare' in logica. Decima quarta regula est: quando aliquid vere praedicatur de aliqua specie, si aliquid superius ad ipsum praedicatur in quid de illa specie, ipsum praedicabitur in quid de eadem specie et erit genus eius; quia omnia quae ordinantur secundum superius et inferius quorum unum praedicatur de altero in quid, vel omnia praedicantur de illo, de quo ƿ praedicantur, in quid vel nullum. Sed si dubitetur illud assignatum praedicari de specie, non sufficit ostendere quod aliquod genus eius praedicatur in quid de illa specie, sed simul cum hoc oportet probare quod nullum aliud contentum sub illo praedicatur in quid de illa specie. Alia regula est: si species praedicatur de aliquo in quid, de quo genus non praedicatur in quid, illud non est genus illius speciei; sicut si corpus animatum praedicatur in quid de aliquo de quo non praedicatur in quid animal, manifestum est quod animal non est genus corporis.	And under this meaning the Philosopher always takes 'to participate' in logic. The fourteenth rule is: when something is truly predicated of a species, if something superior to it is predicated of something of that species, it will itself be predicated of something of the same species and will be its genus; because everything that is ordered according to the superior and the inferior, one of which is predicated of the other in quid, or all things are predicated of that, of which they are predicated, in quid or nothing. But if it is doubted that the thing assigned is predicated of a species, it is not sufficient to show that some genus of it is predicated of something of that species, but at the same time it is necessary to prove that no other content under it is predicated in quid of that species. Another rule is: if a species is predicated of something in quid, of which the genus is not predicated in quid, it is not the genus of that species; just as if an animate body is predicated in quid of something of which animal is not predicated in quid, it is clear that animal is not a genus of body.
Si autem corpus praedicatur in quid de omnibus de quibus praedicatur animal, et de pluribus, corpus erit genus animalis. Decima sexta regula est: illud non est genus alicuius, de quo definitio generis non vere praedicatur; sicut quia haec est falsa `planta est substantia animata sensibilis', ideo animal non est genus plantae.	But if the body is predicated of all things of which animal is predicated, and of many more, the body will be a genus of animal. The sixteenth rule is: that is not the genus of something, of which the definition of genus is not truly predicated; just as this is false, `a plant is an animated sensible substance,' therefore an animal is not a genus of plant.
Decima septima regula est: quod est differentia alicuius, non est genus ipsius nec e converso; sicut quia `congregativum' est differentia coloris, ideo non est genus ipsius nec e converso.	The seventeenth rule is: that which is the difference of something is not its genus, nor vice versa; just as 'collective' is a difference of color, therefore it is not a genus of it (color), nor vice versa.
Decima octava regula est: differentia nullius est genus; sicut `immortale', quia est differentia animalis, ideo nullius est genus.	The eighteenth rule is: a difference is the genus of nothing; as `immortal,' because it is the difference of animal, therefore it the genus of nothing.
Sciendum quod ista exempla non ponuntur ut ita sint, sed ut sentiant qui addiscunt. Decima nona regula est: quod est species alicuius, non est genus ipsius; sicut quia continuitas est species contiguitatis, ideo non est genus contiguitatis.	It should be known that these examples are not set to be so, but so that those who learn may comprehend. The nineteenth rule is: that which is the species of something, is not its genus; just as continuity is a species of contiguity, therefore it is not a genus of contiguity.
Vigesima regula est quod differentia convertibilis cum specie, non est genus ipsius; sicut	The twentieth rule is that a difference that is convertible with a species is not its (the species') genus; like
'rationale', quia est differentia hominis, non est genus hominis. Notandum quod differentia alicuius non est aliquid intrinsecum speciei, sed est unum praedicabile in quale de specie.	'rational', because it is the difference of man, is not the genus of man. It should be noted that the difference of something is not something intrinsic to the species, but is something predicable in quale of the species.
Praedicatur autem in quale, quia semper differentia essentialis connotat aliquid vel significat quod non connotatur nec significatur per speciem, nec species aliquid illo modo significat, differentia autem accidentalis semper connotat aliquid extrinsecum.	But it is predicated in quale, because an essential difference always connotes something or signifies that which is not connoted nor signified by a species, nor does a species signify anything in that mode, but an accidental difference always connotes something external.
ƿ Vigesima prima regula est quod genus non continetur sub differentia nec e converso. Et hoc est verum de differentia constitutiva. Aliquando autem genus continetur sub differentia, sic quod de paucioribus praedicatur; non tamen per se continetur sub ea, nec e converso. Vigesima secunda regula est quod cuius generis nulla differentia praedicatur de specie, illud non est genus illius speciei; sicut si nulla differentia animalis praedicatur de lapide, animal non est genus lapidis. Ista regula habet veritatem quando genus habet differentias, et ideo quia aliquod genus non habet differentias essentiales, sicut alibi probatum est, ideo poterit aliquid esse genus alicuius speciei, quamvis nulla differentia essentialis praedicetur de illa specie; et hoc, quia illud genus nullam differentiam essentialem habet.	The twenty-first rule is that genus is not contained under difference, nor vice versa. And this is the truth about constitutive difference. Sometimes, however, genus is contained under difference, so that it is predicated of fewer; however, it is not contained under it per se, nor vice versa. The twenty-second rule is that the genus of which no difference is predicated of the species is not the genus of that species; just as if no animal difference is predicated of a stone, an animal is not a genus of stone. This rule has truth when a genus has differences, and therefore because a genus has no essential differences, as has been proved elsewhere, therefore something may be a genus of a species, although no essential difference is predicated of that species. and this, because that kind has no essential difference.
Vigesima tertia regula est quod species, quae est prior natura aliquo et ad cuius interemptionem sequitur interemptio illius, non est species illius generis; sicut quia animal est prius natura homine et interempto animali interimitur homo, ideo animal non est species hominis.	The twenty-third rule is that a species, which is a prior by nature to something, and to the destruction of which follows the destruction of that, is not a species of that genus; just as the nature of an animal is prior to man, and when an animal is killed, a man is killed, therefore the animal is not a species of man.
Notandum est quod `prius natura' non vocatur hic illud quod potest esse sine alio et non e converso, quia isto modo genus non est prius natura quam species.	It must be noted that `prior by nature' is not called here that which can exist without another and not vice versa, because in this way a genus is not a prior by nature than a species.
Ita enim potest species esse sine genere sicut e converso. Nec plus dependet species a genere quam e converso, quia species et genus non sunt nisi quaedam intentiones in anima, distinctae totaliter, quarum utraque potest esse in mente sine altera.	For thus it is possible for a species to exist without a genus, and vice versa. Nor does species depend more on genus than on the contrary, because species and genus are nothing but certain intentions in the soul, completely distinct, both of which can exist in the mind without the other.
Sed `prius natura' vocatur hic quando esse exsistere potest vere praedicari de aliquo supponente pro re, quamvis non praedicetur vere, immo falso, de altero supponente pro re, sed non e converso.	But `prior by nature' is here called when existence can be truly predicated of something suppositing for a thing, although it is not truly predicated, or rather falsely, of another suppositing for the thing, but not the other way around.
Et isto modo genus est prius natura quam species, nam esse exsistere potest vere praedicari de genere supponente pro re, quamvis falso praedicetur de specie supponente pro re; sicut haec poterit esse vera `animal est', quamvis haec esset falsa `homo ƿ est', sed e converso est impossibile.	And in this way the genus is by nature prior to the species, for existence can be truly predicated of the genus suppositing for the thing, although it is falsely predicated of the species suppositing for the thing; just as this may be true, `an animal exists,' although this would be false, `a man exists', but the reverse is impossible.
Impossibile enim est quod haec sit vera `homo est', hac exsistente falsa `animal est'. Et propter hoc genus dicitur esse prius natura quam species. Similiter notandum quod interemptio speciei non interimit realiter genus nec e converso, quia posset genus exsistere modo convenienti, specie non exsistente.	For it is impossible for this to be true, `he is a man,' if the falsehood of `he is an animal' exists. And for this reason it is said that nature is prior to species. Similarly, it should be noted that the destruction of a species does not really destroy the genus, nor vice versa, because the genus could exist in a convenient way, without the species existing.
Hoc enim est verum, nam ista intentio animae quae est genus, posset esse in anima etsi nulla intentio quae est species esset ibi. Sed sic interemptio speciei non interimit genus sed e converso, quia ad negationem generis supponentis pro re sequitur negatio speciei supponentis pro re; sicut ista consequentia est bona `a non est animal, igitur a non est homo', sed e converso non valet.	For this is true, for that intention of the soul, which is the genus, could be in the soul, even if no intention, which is the species, were there. But in this way the annihilation of the species does not annihilate the genus, but the converse is true, because to the negation of the species suppositing for the thing follows the negation of the species suppositing for the thing; just as this conclusion is good, `a is not an animal, therefore a is not a man', but the converse is not valid.
Et sic debent intelligi omnes auctoritates Philosophi et aliorum, qui dicunt quod genus est prius natura quam species et quod interempto genere interimitur species et non e converso et huiusmodi.	And thus must be understood all the statements of the Philosopher and others who say that the genus is nature prior to the species, and that when the genus is destroyed the species is destroyed and not the other way around, etc.
Vigesima quarta regula est quod illud quod potest amitti a specie non est genus vel differentia illius; sicut quia `moveri' potest amitti ab anima, ideo ` moveri ` non est genus animae nec differentia.	The twenty-fourth rule is that what can be lost from a species is not its genus or its difference; just as 'moved' can be lost from the soul, therefore 'moved' is neither a genus of soul nor a difference.
Similiter, quia veritas et falsitas possunt amitti ab opinione, ideo neutrum est genus vel differentia opinionis. Intelligendum est quod non vocatur hic `amitti' pro illo quod realiter perditur a re, sed vocatur hic `amitti' quando aliquid non vere praedicatur de aliquo, sicut prius.	Similarly, since truth and falsity can be lost from belief, therefore neither is a genus or difference of belief. It must be understood that it is not called `lost' here for what is really lost from the thing, but it is called `lost' when something is not really predicated of something, as before.
Sicut materia, quando de non-formata fit formata dicitur amittere potentiam, non quia aliquam rem amittat realiter, --- nam nullam rem amittit, sed aliquid adquirit ---, sed dicitur amittere potentiam, quia non amplius est haec vera `materia est in potentia ad formam', quae tamen prius fuit vera.	Just as matter, when it becomes formed from the unformed, it is said to lose potential, not because it really loses any thing, --- for it loses no thing, but acquires something ---, but it is said to lose potential, because this is no longer true, `matter is in the potential to form, which was nevertheless true before.
Et hoc non est propter amissionem realem alicuius rei, sed propter realem adquisitioƿnem alicuius rei, puta formae.	And this is not because of the real loss of something, but because of the real acquisition of something, such as a form.
Similiter intelligenda est regula `re importata per subiectum non destructa'. Vigesima quinta regula est: si aliquid participat vel participare potest contrarium generis, non est species illius; sicut quia homo potest participare album, ideo nigrum non est genus hominis.	In the same way, the rule is to be understood as `really implied by the subject that is not destroyed'. The twenty-fifth rule is: if something participates, or can participate, with the opposite kind, it is not a species of it; just as man can partake of white, therefore black is not the genus of man.
Notandum quod `participare' accipitur hic pro `recipere praedicationem alterius', quo modo dicitur quod semper subiectum participat praedicatum, quod non est aliud quam subiectum vere subici respectu praedicati.	It should be noted that `participating' is taken here to mean `receiving the predication of another', in which way it is said that the subject always participates in the predicate, which is nothing else than the subject truly subjected to the predicate.
Vigesima sexta regula est: quando aliquid potest competere speciei quod non potest competere alicui contento sub genere, non est species ipsius; sicut quia anima potest vivere et nullus numerus potest vivere, ideo numerus non est genus animae.	The twenty-sixth rule is: when something can belong to a species which cannot belong to any content under the genus, it is not its species; just as the soul can live and no number can live, therefore number is not a genus of soul.
Vigesima septima regula est quod si assignatum sit aequivocum, non est genus, quia tam species quam genus debet esse univocum. Notandum quod aliquando accipit Philosophus genus et speciem non tantum pro intentione animae sed etiam pro ipsa voce.	The twenty-seventh rule is that if an assignment is equivocal, it is not a genus, because both species and genus must be unambiguous. It should be noted that sometimes the Philosopher takes genus and species not only for the intention of the soul but also for the word itself.
Unde haec vox `animal' vocatur genus. Sed hoc non est nisi ex voluntaria institutione, quia scilicet sponte instituitur ad significandum omnia illa quae intentio animae, quae est genus, aliquando significat.	Hence this word 'animal' is called a genus. But this is only from a voluntary arrangement, because it is spontaneously arranged to signify all those things which the intention of the soul, which is the genus, sometimes signifies.
Alia regula est: si assignatum non potest habere plures species, non est genus, quia semper omne genus vel praedicatur vel praedicari potest in quid de pluribus speciebus. Alia regula est: illud quod non praedicatur de aliquo proprie sed translative, non est genus ipsius; sicut quia consonantia non praedicatur proprie sed translative de temperantia, ideo non est genus temperantiae.	Another rule is: if what is assigned cannot have several species, it is not a genus, because every genus is always either predicated or can be predicated into something of several species. There is another rule: that which is not predicated of something properly but translatively, is not of its genus; just as consonance is not properly predicated but translationally of temperance, therefore it is not a genus of temperance.
Notandum quod nulla potest esse translativa praedicatio nisi ex actu voluntatis et per institutionem, et ideo talis praedicatio translativa non potest esse nisi in vocibus vel scriptis vel aliis signis ad placitum institutis.	It should be noted that there can be no translational predication except by an act of the will and by institution, and therefore such a translational predication can only be in words or writings or other signs established by convention.
ƿ Et propter hoc vox aliquando genus vocatur, quando scilicet non translative sed proprie et in quid praedicatur de specie. Trigesima regula est: quando species habet contrarium et genus non habet contrarium, si contrarium speciei non sit in illo genere, nec ipsa species erit species illius generis.	And for this reason the word is sometimes called genus, when, of course, it is not translative but taken properly and in what is predicated of the species. The thirtieth rule is: when a species has an opposite and a genus does not have an opposite, if the opposite of the species does not exist in that genus, the species itself will not be the species of that genus.
Sicut quia albedo habet contrarium, scilicet nigredinem, et sonus non habet contrarium, ideo si nigredo non sit species soni, nec albedo est species soni. Trigesima prima regula est: quando tam genus quam species habent contrarium, si contrarium speciei sit sub contrario generis, ipsa species erit species illius generis.	Just as whiteness has its opposite, namely blackness, and sound has no opposite, therefore if blackness is not a species of sound, neither is albedo a species of sound. The thirty-first rule is: when both genus and species have an opposite, if the opposite of the species is under the opposite of the genus, the species itself will be the species of that genus.
Intelligendum est quod ista regula habet veritatem quando alterum contrariorum immediate continetur sub genere contrario et quando neutra contrarietas habet medium. Unde si una contrarietas habet medium et altera non, regula non habet locum; et ideo non sequitur `prodigalitas est species vitii, igitur illiberalitas est species virtutis', et hoc, quia virtus et vitium non habent medium; vel si habeant, saltem prodigalitas et illiberalitas	It must be understood that this rule is true when one of the opposites is immediately contained under the opposite genus, and when neither opposite has a mean. Hence if one contrariety has a mean and the other does not, the rule has no place; and therefore it does not follow that `prodigality is a species of vice, therefore illiberality is a species of virtue', and this because virtue and vice have no middle ground; or if they have, at least prodigality and illiberality
<non> habent medium.	have <no> middle ground,
Notandum etiam quod nullae species tales habent contrarietatem, stricte accipiendo contrarietatem, quando scilicet alterum contrariorum expellit reliquum et non compatitur ipsum, nam tales species non sunt nisi quaedam intentiones animae, quae ita compatiuntur se in anima sicut quaecumque aliae intentiones.	It should also be noted that no such species have a contrariety, taking the contrariety strictly, namely, when one of the opposites drives out the rest and is incompatible with it, for such species are nothing but certain intentions of the soul, which coexist with themselves in the soul just as any other intentions.
Sed tales species et similiter genera dicuntur contraria, quia sunt genera et species contrariorum. Unde intentio quae est species omnium albedinum et intentio quae est species omnium nigredinum non dicuntur contrariae nisi quia sunt signa et intentiones importantes qualitates singulares contrarias.	But such species and likewise genera are called opposites, because they are genera and species of opposites. Hence the intention which is the species of all whites and the intention which is the species of all blacks are not said to be opposites except because they are signs and intentions of important singular qualities that are contrary to each other.
Et ita istud vocabulum `contrarium' aequivoce accipitur in diversis locis librorum	And so this term 'contrary' is taken equivocally in different places of the books
Philosophorum et Sanctorum. Trigesima secunda regula est: si unum contrariorum non est species ƿ sed genus, reliquum non erit species sed genus; sicut quia bonum non est species sed genus, ideo malum non est species sed genus.	of the Philosophers and Saints. The thirty-second rule is: if one of the opposites is not a species but a genus, the other will not be a species but a genus; just as good is not a species but a genus, therefore evil is not a species but a genus.
Sciendum quod istud de bono non dicitur nisi gratia exempli, et ideo non oportet curare sive `bonum' sit genus sive non. Trigesima tertia regula: si generum contrariorum sit aliquod medium, et specierum contrariarum erit aliquod medium et e converso.	It should be known that this is not said of good except by way of example, and therefore it is not necessary to care whether 'good' is a genus or not. The thirty-third rule: if there is some mean of opposite genera, then of opposite species there will be some mean, and vice versa.
Ista regula habet instantiam, sicut patet, quando plures species continentur sub uno genere quam sub alio, et ideo intelligenda est quando utrumque genus habet species aequales.	This rule has an instance, as is clear, when more species are contained under one genus than under another, and therefore it must be understood when both genera have equal species.
Similiter intelligenda est quando species unius generis non est medium inter duas species alterius generis. Trigesima quarta regula est: quando tam genus quam species sunt contraria, si habent medium debent habere medium eodem modo, ut scilicet quod si inter species sit medium positivum, inter genera debet esse medium positivum et e converso; et si inter species sit medium per abnegationem, inter genera debet esse medium per abnegationem et e converso.	It must be understood similarly when a species of one genus is not intermediate between two species of another genus. The thirty-fourth rule is: when both genus and species are opposites, if they have a mean, they must have a mean in the same way, namely that if there is a positive mean between species, there must be a positive mean between genera, and vice versa; and if between species there is a mean by negation, there must be a mean between genera by negation and vice versa.
Trigesima quinta regula est: si extrema contraria sint in aliquo genere non habente contrarium, medium inter illa extrema erit in eodem genere. Trigesima sexta regula est: si genus habet contrarium, species habet contrarium.	The thirty-fifth rule is: if the opposite extremes are in any genus that has no opposite, the mean between those extremes will be in the same genus. The thirty-sixth rule is: if the genus has its opposite, the species has its opposite.
Sciendum quod istae tres ultimae regulae intelligendae sunt sicut quarta praecedens. Trigesima septima regula: si species habens contrarium sit in aliquo genere non habente contrarium, species opposita erit in eodem genere.	It should be known that these three last rules are to be understood as the fourth preceding. The thirty-seventh rule: if a species having its opposite is in a genus not having its opposite, the opposite species will be in the same genus.
Trigesima octava regula est: si medium inter extrema sit in aliquo genere non habente contrarium, extrema contraria sunt in eodem genere. Trigesima nona regula est: si species contraria est in contrario genere, et species opposita est in opposito genere; sicut si iustitia est species virtutis, iniustitia est species vitii.	The thirty-eighth rule is: if the mean between the extremes is in a genus not having its opposite, the opposite extremes are in the same genus. The thirty-ninth rule is: if the opposite species is in the opposite genus, then the opposed species is in the opposed genus; just as if justice is a species of virtue, injustice is a species of vice.
ƿ Istae tres regulae intelligendae sunt sicut praecedentes. Quadragesima regula est: si principale sit species principalis, et coniugatum erit species coniugati, et casus casus; sicut si iustitia sit species disciplinae, iustus erit species disciplinati et iuste species disciplinate. Sciendum est quod hic accipitur `species' large pro omni illo quod est per se superius sive secundum praedicationem sive secundum consequentiam. Et isto modo `virtuose' est superius et genus ad `iuste', quia quamvis haec non sit vera	These three rules are to be understood as the previous ones. The fourtieth rule is: if the principal is the species of the principal, then the conjugated will be the species of the conjugated species, and the case will be the case; just as if justice is a species of virtue, the just will be the species of the virtuous and justly the species of virtously. It must be known that here 'species' is taken broadly for everything that is superior in itself, either by predication or by consequence. And in this way 'virtuously' is superior and genus to 'justly', because although this is not true
'iuste est disciplinate', tamen ista consequentia est bona `iste iuste agit, igitur virtuose agit' et non e converso; et pro tanto dicitur `disciplinate' esse superius ad `iuste'. Et ideo regulae prius datae de praedicatione generis de specie et consimiles, intelligendae sunt quando genus natum est praedicari, quia videlicet est nomen, sive in conceptu sive in voce; quando autem non est nomen, non sunt regulae intelligendae de tali genere.	'justly is virtously', yet this consequence is good: 'he acts justly, therefore he acts virtuously' and not the other way around; and for this reason it is said that `virtuous' is superior to `just'. And therefore the rules previously given concerning the predication of a genus, of a species, and the like, are to be understood when a genus is made to be predicated, because it is clearly a name, whether in concept or verbally; but when there is no name, there are no rules to be understood about such a genus.
Quadragesima prima regula est: demonstratis quatuor, et primo se habente ad secundum sicut tertium se habet ad quartum, si secundum sit genus primi, quartum erit genus tertii; sicut si homo se habet ad animal sicut albedo ad colorem, si animal sit genus hominis, color erit genus albedinis.	The fourty-first rule is: of four things demonstrated, and the first being related to the second as the third is related to the fourth, if the second is the genus of the first, the fourth will be the genus of the third; just as if man is to an animal as whiteness is to color, if an animal is the type of man, color will be the type of whiteness.
Ista regula est intelligenda quando similiter se habent secundum praedicationem et ordinem consequentiae, vel quando illa similitudo est causa quare unum illorum est genus alterius.	This rule is to be understood when they are alike according to predication and order of consequence, or when that similarity is the reason why one of them is the genus of the other.
Quadragesima secunda regula est quod in nominibus et verbis corruptivis et generativis, et aliis similitudinem aliquam secundum derivationem vel inflexionem seu declinationem habentibus, si unum est genus unius, et reliquum erit genus alterius; sicut ista habent similituƿdinem secundum derivationem `dissolvi', `dissolutio' et similiter ista `corrumpi', `corruptio', et ideo si `dissolvi' est species `corrumpi', `dissolutio' est species `corruptionis'.	The fourty-second rule is that in corruptive and generative nouns and verbs, and others having some resemblance according to derivation, inflection, or declension, if one is the genus of one, and the rest shall be the genus of another; just as these have a similarity according to the derivation of `dissolved', `dissolution' and similarly those `corrupt', `corruption', and therefore if `dissolved' is a species of `corrupted', ``dissolution' is a species of `corruption'.
Similiter, sicut se habent secundum talem similitudinem `aedificare' et `aedificatum esse', ita se habent `operari' et `operatum esse'; et ideo si `aedificare' sit species `operari', `aedificatum esse' erit species `operati esse'.	Similarly, just as `to build' and `to be built' are related according to such similarity, so `to work' and `to be worked' are related. and therefore if `to build' is a species of `to work', `to be built' will be a species of `to be worked'.
Et sicut est de istis, ita est de aliis talem similitudinem habentibus. Ex istis omnibus patet quod talis ordo ita potest reperiri in nominibus sicut in verbis. Quadragesima tertia regula est quod privatio et habitus non sunt in eodem genere proximo. Quadragesima quarta regula est quod si habente tam genere quam specie privative oppositum, si oppositum non est in opposito nec propositum in proposito. Quadragesima quinta regula est: si oppositum in opposito et propositum in proposito. Notandum quod `genus' quadrupliciter accipitur, scilicet strictissime pro aliquo communi praedicabili in quid de multis rebus vel de pronominibus demonstrantibus plures res, quarum nulla nata est esse forma vel materia essentialis alterius rei specie differentis. Et isto modo non invenitur aliquod genus secundum intentionem Aristotelis, quidquid sit de veritate, nisi in praedicamento substantiae et qualitatis; quia secundum intentionem Aristotelis nullum aliud genus praedicatur in quid de pronomine demonstrante quamcumque rem per se exsistentem in genere.	And as it is with these, so it is with others having such a likeness. From all these it is clear that such an order can be found in nouns as well as in words. The fourty-third rule is that privation and habit are not in the same category. The forty-fourth rule is that if having tuch a genus with an opposite in both genus and species, if the opposite is not in the opposite, nor the proposition in the proposition. The fourty-fifth rule is: if the opposite is in the opposite then the proposition isin the proposition. It is to be noted that 'genus' is taken fourfold, namely, strictly as something common that can be predicated of many things or of pronouns denoting several things, none of which is made to be the essential form or matter of another thing different in kind. And in this way no genus is found according to Aristotle's intention, whatever it may be about truth, except in the predication of substance and quality; because, according to Aristotle's intention, no other genus is predicated of any thing of the pronoun showing any thing existing by itself in the genus.
Secundo modo accipitur genus strictius pro praedicabili in quid de pluribus rebus quae non sunt eiusdem rationis, sive aliqua illarum rerum sit nata esse pars essentialis alicuius alterius rei sive non.	In the second mode, a genus is taken more strictly as being predicable of several things which are not of the same reason, whether any one of those things is made to be an essential part of some other thing or not.
Et isto modo hoc commune `forma' est genus omnium formarum et hoc commune `anima' est genus ad animam vegetativam, sensitivam et intellectivam. Tertio modo accipitur genus stricte pro aliquo ƿ positivo praedicabili in quid de pluribus positivis; et sic quantitas, relatio et huiusmodi sunt genera.	And in this way this common 'form' is the genus of all forms, and this common 'soul' is the genus for the vegetative, sensitive and intellectual soul. In the third way, a genus is taken strictly for some positive predicable into something out of several positives; and thus quantity, relation, and the like are genera.
Quarto accipitur large pro omni praedicabili in quid de pluribus praedicabilibus, sive sit positivum sive negativum.	Fourthly, it is taken broadly for every predicable in quid of several predicables, whether it be positive or negative.
Et sic accipit Philosophus hic genus. Illud autem dicitur praedicari in quid per quod contingit respondere ad quaestionem factam per quid.	And so the Philosopher takes this genus. But that is said to be predicated in quid by which it happens to answer the question made by what.
Nunc autem si quaeratur, quid est caecitas, potest responderi quod est privatio, et ita, large, aliquod privativum est genus. Alia regula est: si affirmatio est genus affirmationis, et negatio speciei erit genus negationis generis; sicut si animal sit genus hominis, non-homo erit genus non-animalis.	Now if it is asked, what is blindness, it can be answered that it is privation, and thus, broadly speaking, it is a kind of privation. Another rule is: if an affirmation is the genus of affirmation, and the negation of the species will be the genus of negation of the genus; just as if animal is the genus of man, non-human will be the genus of the non-animal.
Alia regula est: si negatio est genus negationis, affirmatio opposita negationi, quae est species, erit genus alterius; sicut si non-suave sit genus non-boni, bonum erit genus suavis. Sciendum est quod hic accipitur genus largissime, sicut prius.	Another rule is: if negation is the genus of negation, an affirmative opposite to a negative, which is a species, will be of another genus; just as if non-sweet is the genus of non-good, good will be the gebus of sweet. It must be known that here the genus is taken very broadly, as before.
Alia regula est: si species est ad aliquid, et genus est ad aliquid et e converso. Sciendum quod hoc est verum quando genus praedicatur in quid de specie; quando autem genus praedicatur de specie et non in quid, non oportet quod si species sit ad aliquid, quod genus sit ad aliquid, nec e converso.	Another rule is: if there is a species for something, then there is a genus for something, and vice versa. It must be known that this is true when the genus is predicated in quid of the species; But when the genus is predicated of the species and not in quid, it is not necessary that if the species is to something, for which the genus is to something, nor vice versa.
Et sic solvendae sunt instantiae quas ponit Aristoteles circa istam regulam.	And thus must be resolved the instances which Aristotle sets forth concerning this rule.
Alia regula est: si tam genere quam specie exsistente ad aliquid species non dicitur ad idem secundum se et secundum idem genus, non est species illius generis. Alia regula est: si non dicitur ad idem secundum se et secundum genus et secundum omnia superiora ad illud genus, non est species ipsius. Istae regulae intelligendae sunt quando genus praedicatur in quid de specie. Alia regula est quod species et genus, quando sunt ad aliquid, dicuntur ad tertium secundum eundem casum, scilicet vel secundum casum ƿ genitivum vel dativum et huiusmodi.	Another rule is: if something existing both in genus and species is not called a species for the same thing according to itself and according to the same genus, it is not a species of that genus. There is another rule: if it is not called the same thing according to itself and according to the genus and according to everything superior to that genus, it is not a species of it. These rules are to be understood when the genus is predicated of what the species is. Another rule is that the species and genus, when they are predicated to something, are said to be to the third according to the same case, that is, according to the genitive or dative case and the like.
Aliquando tamen est instantia, sicut patet de `contrario' quod est species `diversi'. Alia regula est: si tam species quam genus est ad aliquid et dicuntur secundum eosdem casus, si similiter non convertuntur secundum eosdem casus, tunc non est unum genus alterius.	Sometimes, however, there is an instance, as is clear from the `opposite' which is a specoes of `different'. Another rule is: if there is both a species and a genus for something and they are said according to the same cases, if they are not similarly converted according to the same cases, then one is not a genus of the other.
Alia regula est quod si species dicitur ad suum correlativum secundum plures casus quam genus vel e converso, non est species ipsius.	Another rule is that if a species is referenced to its correlative in more cases than the genus or vice versa, it is not its species.
Ista regula non est generaliter vera, sicut nec priores. Alia regula est: si oppositum correlative non est genus oppositi correlative, nec propositum propositi.	This rule is not generally true, just like the previous ones. Another rule is: if the opposite of the correlative is not the genus of the opposed to the correlative, neither is the proposition (the genus) of the proposition.
Alia regula est: si quibusdam relativis necessario exsistentibus in illis ad quae dicuntur, quibusdam non necessario exsistentibus in illis, possunt tamen in illis exsistere, et quibusdam nullo modo valentibus exsistere in illis ad quae dicuntur, si species contineatur sub uno istorum membrorum et genus sub reliquo, non est species ipsius.	Another rule is: if some relatives necessarily existing in the things to which they are referred, some not necessarily existing in them, they can nevertheless exist in them, and some that cannot exist in any way in the things to which they are referred, if the species is contained under one of these members and the genus under the others, it is not a species of the genus.
Alia regula est quod si species est actus, genus non est habitus; et similiter e converso: si genus est habitus, species non est actus.	Another rule is that if species is an action, its genus is not a state; and likewise vice versa: if the genus is a state, the species is not an action.
Alia regula, quod posterius non est genus prioris. Notandum quod frequenter loco nominum primae intentionis ponuntur nomina secundae intentionis et e converso; similiter loco nominum primae impositionis ponuntur nomina secundae impositionis et e converso.	Another rule is that the latter is not the genus of the former. It should be noted that frequently instead of nouns of the first intention, nouns of the second intention are posited, and vice versa; in the same way, instead of the names of the first imposition, the names of the second imposition are posited, and vice versa.
Et ideo quod dicitur hic quod `si species est actus, genus non est habitus', et similiter de alia regula, debet sic intelligi quod illud nomen vel illa intentio quae est praecise communis actibus non est genus illius nominis vel intentionis quae est praecise communis habitibus, nec e converso.	And therefore what is said here that `if the species is an action, the genus is not a state', and similarly about another rule, must be understood in this way that that name or that intention which is precisely common to actions is not the genus of that name or intention which is precisely common to states, nor vice versa.
Et sic de regula sequente. Alia est regula quod species et genus sunt in eodem, sicut albedo et color. Notandum quod hic ponuntur nomina secundae intentionis pro nominibus primae intentionis; vel hic ponitur actus exercitus loco actus signati.	And so on the following rule. Another rule is that given the species and genus of something, as whiteness and color. It should be noted that here nouns of the second intention are put instead of nouns of the first intention; or here the action of the army is used in place of the action of the seal.
Unde debet sic intelligi quod de specie et de genere vere praeƿdicatur esse in eodem, non tamen pro se sed pro re importata. Et ideo actus exerciti correspondentes sunt isti `albedo et color sunt in eodem'; `scientia et musica sunt in eodem' et huiusmodi. Sciendum quod Philosophus, IV Topicorum, exemplificat de verecundia et timore, amicitia et voluptate et huiusmodi, quae non se habent sicut genus et species, quia non sunt in eodem.	Whence it must be understood that species and genus are truly predicated to be in the same thing, yet not for themselves but for the thing implied. And therefore the corresponding actions of the exercise are these, `whiteness and color are in the same'; `science and music are in the same' and the like. It should be known that the Philosopher, in Topics IV, exemplifies shame and fear, friendship and pleasure, and the like, which are not like genus and species, because they are not in the same.
Sed hoc non ponit ut ita sit, sed ut sentiant qui addiscunt, vel secundum opinionem aliorum, sicut frequenter facit in libris suis. Alia regula est quod illud quod primo competit alicui secundum partem ipsius, non est genus illius; sicut quia homo vel animal non est visibile nisi quia corpus suum est visibile, ideo `visibile' non est genus animalis.	But he does not state that this should be so, but that those who learn should comprehend, or according to the opinion of others, as he frequently does in his books. Another rule is that what first belongs to someone according to his part is not his genus; just as a man or an animal is not visible except because its body is visible, therefore ``visible is not a genus of animal.
Alia regula est: illud quod praedicatur de parte solum, non est genus totius; sicut si corpus praedicetur praecise de parte animalis, non est genus animalis. Ex istis patet quod genus non importat partem praecise nec est pars speciei; quia si esset pars speciei, non posset vere praedicari de specie, cum pars non praedicetur de toto, secundum Philosophum, IV Topicorum.	There is another rule: that which is predicated of a part only, is not the genus of the whole; just as if the body is predicated precisely of the part of an animal, it is not a species of animal. From these it is clear that the genus does not precisely imply a part, nor is it a part of the species; for if it were a part of a species, it could not really be predicated of the species, since a part is not predicated of the whole, according to the Philosopher, in Topics 4.
Alia regula est quod nulla potentia est genus vituperabilium vel fugiendorum, quia potestas est eligenda. Intelligendum quod nullum nomen importans praecise rem quae potest male agere, est genus alicuius vituperabilis, quia res quae potest male agere, non est mala; sicut secundum opinionem aliquorum Deus potest male agere, et tamen non est malus.	Another rule is that there is no power to be blamed or to be shunned, because power is to be chosen. It is to be understood that a thing, carrying no name precisely, that can do evil is a type of something blameworthy, because a thing that can do evil is not evil; just as, according to the opinion of some, God can act badly, and yet is not evil.
Alia regula est quod nihil praecise commune eligibilibus propter se ƿ est genus alicuius potentiae vel effectivi boni, quia unumquodque tale est eligendum propter aliud.	Another rule is that nothing precisely common to those that are chosen propter se (because of itself) is a genus of a potential or productive good, because each such thing is to be chosen for the sake of another.
Alia regula est quod illud quod importat plura genera non est in uno genere collocandum. Alia regula est quod passio alicuius non est genus ipsius; sicut immortalitas non est genus vitae.	Another rule is that what implies several genera is not to be placed in one genus. Another rule is that the effect of something is not its own genus; just as immortality is not a kind of life.
Alia regula est quod illud quod importat accidens primo, non est genus illius cui accidens importat; sicut album non est genus nivis. Alia regula est: quod dicitur de omnibus, non est genus; et propter hoc ens non est genus, et propter idem non est differentia.	Another rule is that that which first conveys an accident is not the genus of that to which an accident occurs; just as white is not a genus of snow. There is another rule: what is said of all is not a genus; and for this reason being is not a genus, and for the same reason neither is difference.
Alia regula est quod quando tam genus quam species habent contrarium, melior species est in meliori genere.	Another rule is that when both genus and species have opposites, the better species is in the better genus.
Notandum quod ista regula habet veritatem de specie optima et non de alia. Unde bene contingit quod uno genere exsistente meliori alio genere, aliqua species peioris generis est melior aliqua specie melioris generis, sed nulla est melior optima specie melioris generis.	It should be noted that this rule is true of the best species and not of others. Hence it well happens that when one genus exists that is better than another genus, some species of the worse genus are better than some species of the better genus, but there is no better species than the best species of the better genus.
Sicut si scientia speculativa et practica sint duo genera scientiarum et scientia speculativa sit melius genus quam scientia practica, non est possibile quod optima species scientiae practicae sit melior optima specie scientiae speculativae.	Just as if speculative and practical science are two kinds of science, and speculative science is a better kind than practical science, it is not possible that the best kind of practical science is better than the best kind of speculative science.
Tamen possibile est quod aliqua species scientiae practicae sit melior aliqua specie scientiae speculativae; sicut scientia practica de Deo est melior quam speculativa de triangulo.	However, it is possible that some kind of practical science is better than some kind of speculative science; just as practical knowledge of God is better than speculative knowledge of the triangle.
Sciendum quod unum genus non est proprie melius alio, sed dicitur melius, quia est genus nobilioris subiecti.	It should be known that one genus is not strictly better than another, but is said to be better because it is the genus of a nobler subject.
Alia regula est: aliqua specie aequaliter se habente ad duo genera, si collocetur sub genere peiori, male assignatur. Notandum quod quando aliquid aequaliter se habet ad duo genera, vel sub utroque est vel sub neutro; et si sit sub neutro, plus erratur ƿ collocando eam sub peiori quam sub meliori.	There is another rule: if a species belonging equally to two genera is placed under the worse genus, it is wrongly assigned. It should be noted that when something is equally related to two genera, it is either under both or under neither; and if it is under neither, he errs more in placing it under the worse than under the better.
Et hoc est verum de specie nobili. Alia regula est quod si genus suscipit magis et minus, et species suscipit magis et minus. Alia regula est: si illud quod magis videtur esse genus alicuius speciei non est genus ipsius, nec illud quod minus videtur esse genus erit genus illius. Sciendum quod ista regula valet ad arguendum et opponendum et disputandum contra respondentem, non autem multum valet ad rem, quia aliquando illud quod minus videtur multis esse genus, est genus, et tamen illud quod magis videtur esse genus eiusdem, non est genus. Et similiter de specie est dicendum, quod si illud quod magis videtur esse species alicuius non est species illius, nec illud quod minus videtur erit species.	And this is the truth of noble species. Another rule is that if the genus receives more and less then the species receives more and less. Another rule is: if that which seems more to be the genus of a species is not its genus, neither will that which seems to be less to be its genus. It should be known that this rule is valid for arguing and opposing and debating against the respondent, but it is not very valid for the matter, because sometimes that which seems to many to be less of a genus is a genus, and yet that which seems more to be a genus of the same is not a genus. And likewise it must be said of species, that if that which appears to be more the species of something is not its species, neither will that which is seen to be less.