Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 3

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 3. DE REGULIS PER QUAS INFERTUR UNIVERSALIS AFFIRMATIVA RESPECTU DETERMINATORUM PRAEDICATORUM.	Chapter 3. On the Rules by which the Universal Affirmative is inferred with respect to determined Predicates.
Dicto de regulis per quas contingit inferre universalem affirmativam conclusionem respectu cuiuscumque praedicati, dicendum est de regulis per quas infertur universalis affirmativa non respectu omnium praedicatorum sed respectu aliquorum praedicatorum.	Having spoken of the rules by which it is possible to infer a universal affirmative conclusion with respect to any predicate, we must speak of the rules by which a universal affirmative conclusion is inferred not with respect to all predicates but with respect to some predicates.
Et una regula est talis quod ab uno relativorum, quae sunt simul natura, cum distributione ad reliquum distributum respectu istius verbi `est' est bona consequentia, non respectu aliorum praedicatorum.	And one rule is such that from one of the relatives, which are at the same time by nature, with distribution to the remaining distributed with respect to the word 'is' is a good consequence, not with respect to other predicates.
Unde bene sequitur `omnis pater est, igitur omnis filius est', sed non sequitur `omnis pater est hic intus, igitur omnis filius est hic intus'; nec sequitur `omne duplum est pedalis quantitatis, igitur omne dimidium est pedalis quantitatis'.	Whence it well follows that `everything is the Father, therefore everything is the Son', but it does not follow that `everything is the father within this, therefore everything is the Son within this; nor does it follow that `everything is a double of a quantity in feet, therefore everything is a half of a quantity in feet'.
Tamen aliquando tenet consequentia tam respectu aliquorum aliorum praedicatorum quam respectu huius verbi `est'; sicut sequitur `omnis pater est homo, igitur omnis filius est homo'.	However, sometimes the consequences hold both with respect to some other predicates and with respect to this word 'is'; as it follows, `every father is a man, therefore every son is a man.'
Sed quando tenet respectu aliquorum aliorum praedicatorum et quando non, oportet videre naturam illorum relativorum, quod nimis longum foret hic enarrare. Sciendum est etiam quod ista regula non est generalis, sicut non est universaliter verum quod omnia relativa sunt simul natura, sicut declarat Philosophus in libro Praedicamentorum.	But when it holds with respect to some other predicates and when it does not, we must see the nature of those relations, which it would take too long to explain here. It must also be known that this rule is not general, just as it is not universally true that all things are relative at the same time in nature, as the Philosopher declares in the book of Predications.
Unde non sequitur `calefactivum est, igitur calefactibile est'. Quid autem est relativa esse simul natura, declaratum est in libro Praedicamentorum. Alia regula est quod a toto integrali distributo ad partem distributam respectu istius verbi	Hence it does not follow that `it is heating, therefore it is heatable'. Now what it is to be relative at the same time by nature is declared in the book of Predications. Another rule is that from the integral whole distributed to the distributed part with respect to the word
'est' est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `omnis domus est, igitur omnis paries est'. Sed respectu omnium aliorum praedicatorum non valet; non enim sequitur `omnis domus componitur ex fundamento, parietibus et tecto, igitur omnis paries componitur ex talibus'.	'is' is a good consequence; as it follows, `everything is a house, therefore everything is a wall'. But with respect to all the other predicates it is not valid; for it does not follow that every house is composed of a foundation, walls, and a roof; therefore every wall is composed of such.
ƿ Intelligendum est quod proprie loquendo non arguitur in talibus a toto distributo ad partem distributam, sed arguitur a nomine totius vel a conceptu totius distributo ad nomen vel conceptum partis distributum. Et sic intelligunt auctores multas tales propositiones. Et si aliquando dicam tales propositiones conformando me dictis aliorum, nihilominus sic intelligo eas. Intelligendum est etiam quod aliquando pars est talis, quod sine ea totum esse non potest; sicut impossibile est quod homo sit, et quod anima intellectiva non sit.	It must be understood that properly speaking it is not argued in such cases from the distributed whole to the distributed part, but it is argued from the name of the whole or from the concept of the whole distributed to the name or concept of the distributed part. And so the authors understand many such propositions. And if sometimes I say such propositions conforming myself to the sayings of others, I nevertheless understand them thus. It must also be understood that sometimes a part is such that without it the whole cannot exist; just as it is impossible that there should be a man, and that there should not be an intellectual soul.
Et de tali parte et toto debet intelligi quod a nomine totius distributo ad nomen partis distributum respectu huius verbi `est' est bona consequentia. Aliquando autem potest esse totum sine parte; sicut aliquis potest esse homo, quamvis non habeat manum.	And with respect to such a part and whole, it must be understood that from the name of the distributed whole to the name of the distributed part with respect to this word 'is' is a good consequence. But sometimes the whole may be without a part; just as one can be a man, although he has no hand.
Et de tali toto non intelligitur regula, quia non sequitur `omnis homo est, igitur omnis manus est'. Eadem regula quae intelligitur de toto integrali et parte, debet intelligi de toto essentiali et parte, et eodem modo.	And of such a whole the rule is not understood, because it does not follow that 'everything is a man, therefore everything is a hand'. The same rule which is understood of the integral whole and part, must be understood of the essential whole and part, and in the same way.
Intelligendum est etiam quod quamvis non respectu omnium praedicatorum a nomine totius ad nomen partis sit bona consequentia, tamen respectu aliquorum tenet. Unde quando omnes partes sunt eiusdem rationis, sicut in homogeneis, a toto respectu praedicabilis in quid vel per se secundo modo est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `albedo est qualitas, igitur pars albedinis est qualitas'.	It is also to be understood that although it is not a good consequence with respect to all the predicates from the name of the whole to the name of the part, it nevertheless holds with respect to some. Hence, when all the parts are of the same class, as in the case of homogeneities, a good consequence is predicable from the whole in quid or per se in the second mode; as it follows, `whiteness is a quality,' therefore a part of whiteness is a quality.
Similiter sequitur `albedo est disgregativa visus, igitur pars albedinis est disgregativa visus'.	Similarly, it follows that `whiteness is disintegrative of sight, therefore part of whiteness is disintegrative of sight'.
Quando autem talis consequentia tenet et quando non, non potest sciri nisi sciatur in speciali tam natura totius quam partis. Alia regula est quod si concretum praedicatur de concreto distributo, et abstractum praedicabitur de abstracto distributo; sicut sequitur `omne iustum est bonum, igitur omnis iustitia est bona'. Notandum quod ista regula habet intelligi quando concreta et abstracta ordinantur secundum superius et inferius, et non quando sunt disparata.	But when such a consequence holds and when it does not, it cannot be known unless the nature of the whole as well as of the part is known in particular. Another rule is that if the concrete is predicated of the distributed concrete, and the abstract shall be predicated of the distributed abstract; as it follows, `all that is just is good, therefore all justice is good'. It should be noted that this rule is to be understood when the concrete and the abstract are ordered according to the superior and inferior, and not when they are disparate.
Et ideo bene sequitur `omne album est coloratum, igitur ƿ omnis albedo est color', sed non sequitur `omne album est calidum, igitur omnis albedo est calor'.	And therefore it follows well that `all white is colored, therefore all white is color', but it does not follow that `all white is warm, therefore all white is heat'.