Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 24

Latin	English
CAP. 24. DE REGULIS DESERVIENTIBUS CONSEQUENTIIS QUIBUS INFERTUR ALIQUID ESSE DEFINITIONEM ALICUIUS.	Chapter 24. On the rules that govern the consequences by which something is inferred to be the definition of another.
His visis ponendae sunt quaedam regulae deservientes consequentiis quibus infertur aliquid esse definitionem alicuius vel non esse.	Seeing these things, certain rules must be laid down that govern the consequences by which it is inferred that something is the definition of another thing or that it is not.
Et primo, quibus infertur aliquid esse definitionem alicuius indicantem quid rei, datam per genus et differentias essentiales, vel non esse. Est igitur una regula talis: si definitum sit commune alicui rei simplici per carentiam compositionis ex materia et forma, non definitur tali definitione.	And in the first place, by which it is inferred that something is a definition of something indicating the nature of the thing, given by genus and essential differences, or that it is not. There is therefore one rule: if the common of a simple thing is defined by the lack of composition from matter and form, it is not defined by such a definition.
Unde sequitur: angelus est simplex, `igitur animal rationale' ƿ non est talis definitio angeli. Et hoc est, quia nullum simplex habet differentiam essentialem, cum semper differentia essentialis indicet partem essentialem illius cuius est.	Hence it follows: an angel is simple, 'therefore a rational animal' is not such a definition of an angel. And this is because the simple has no essential difference, since the essential difference always indicates the essential part of that to which it belongs.
Ex isto sequitur quod nullum accidens definitur tali definitione, sicut probat Philosophus, VII Metaphysicae, et ideo sola species communis praecise substantiis compositis ex materia et forma definitur tali definitione.	From this it follows that no accident is defined by such a definition, as the Philosopher proves (Metaphysics 7), and therefore only a common species is precisely defined by substances composed of matter and form.
Alia regula est: illud in quo ponitur pro genere aliquid commune omnibus, vel etiam pro differentia aliquid commune omnibus eiusdem generis, non est definitio. Et ideo sequitur `ens ponitur in ista oratione: ens sensibile rationale; igitur ens sensibile rationale non est definitio hominis', eo quod ens est commune omnibus et ponitur loco generis.	There is another rule: that in which something common to all is posited as a genus, or even as a difference something common to all of the same genus, is not a definition. And therefore it follows that 'a being is used in the following statement: a sensible, rational being; Therefore, a sensible, rational being is not the definition of man', in that being is common to all and is placed in the place of a genus.
Similiter sequitur `unum ponitur in ista oratione: animal unum rationale; igitur animal unum rationale non est definitio hominis', quia unum, quod est commune omnibus substantiis, ponitur loco differentiae.	In the same way it follows that 'one thing is posited in the following statement: one rational animal; Therefore, a single rational animal is not the definition of man', because one, which is common to all substances, is put in the place of difference.
Ratio primae partis istius regulae est, quia omne positum in definitione tali debet separare definitum ab aliquo; hoc est, debet esse medium concludendi negationem alicuius de definito, tale autem non potest esse aliquid commune omnibus.	The reason for the first part of this rule is that everything put in such a definition must separate the defined from something; that is, it must be a means of concluding the negation of something defined, but such cannot be something common to all.
Ratio secundae partis est, quia nihil commune omnibus eiusdem generis potest esse differentia essentialis alicuius, quia nullum genus praedicamentale est in quo omnia sint composita ex materia et forma.	The reason for the second part is that nothing common to all of the same kind can be the essential difference of something, because there is no predicate class in which everything is composed of matter and form.
Tertia regula est ista: oratio cuius pars indicat totam essentiam rei, non est definitio ipsius, quia in tali ponitur aliquid superfluum quod non debet poni in definitione. Sciendum quod quaedam definitio data per genus et differentiam indicat explicite et complete essentiam rei; ita scilicet quod nihil est pars essentialis rei quin distincte exprimatur per aliquam partem, scilicet per aliquam differentiam positam in definitione.	The third rule is this: a statement whose part indicates the whole essence of a thing is not a definition of it, because in such a sentence something superfluous is placed which should not be placed in the definition. It should be known that a certain definition given by genus and difference indicates explicitly and completely the essence of a thing; so, of course, that nothing is an essential part of a thing unless it is distinctly expressed by some part, that is, by some difference placed in the definition.
Et talis definitio debet componi ex genere et tot differentiis essentialibus quot sunt partes esƿsentiales rei; ita scilicet quod si sint duae partes essentiales, puta materia et forma, debent poni duae differentiae cum genere; si sint plures formae et materiae, debent poni tot differentiae quot sunt formae cum una differentia exprimente materiam, et ista est completissima definitio.	And such a definition must be composed of the genus and of as many essential differences as there are essential parts of the thing; namely, that if there are two essential parts, for example matter and form, two differences must be posited with the genus; if there are several forms and materials, as many differences must be posited as there are forms with one difference expressing the matter, and this is the most complete definition.
Et quando est aliqua oratio cuius aliqua pars sic indicat essentiam rei, non est illa oratio definitio. Et talis definitio hominis, si in homine sit materia et duae formae substantiales, scilicet sensitiva et intellectiva, est ista `substantia materialis, sensibilis, rationalis'.	And when there is a statement of which some part thus indicates the essence of a thing, that speech is not a definition. And such a definition of man, if in man there is matter and two substantial forms, namely the sensitive and the intellectual, is this: 'material, sensible, rational substance'.
'Substantia' enim est genus, `materiale' exprimit materiam, `sensibile' autem exprimit animam sensitivam et `rationale' animam intellectivam. Alia est definitio quae non distincte et explicite indicat essentiam rei sed imperfecte, qualis est ista definitio hominis `corpus rationale'; et similiter ista `animal rationale'.	For 'substance' is a genus, 'materially' expresses matter, 'sensitive' expresses the sensitive soul and 'rational' the intellectual soul. There is another definition which does not clearly and explicitly indicate the essence of a thing but imperfectly, such as this definition of man: 'rational body'; and similarly this 'rational animal'.
Nam per neutram istarum habetur explicite an in homine sint plures formae vel non. Et quando est aliqua oratio cuius aliqua pars isto secundo modo accipiendo `indicare essentiam rei' indicat essentiam rei, bene poterit esse definitio.	For by neither of these is it explicitly stated whether there are several forms in man or not. And when there is any sentence of which any part, taken in this second mode, 'to indicate the essence of a thing,' indicates the essence of a thing, it may well be a definition.
Et ideo primo modo accipit Philosophus `in dicare essentiam rei' et non secundo modo.	And therefore the Philosopher accepts 'in saying the essence of a thing' in the first mode, and not in the second mode.
Aliqua autem dicta Aristotelis, quae videntur esse contra ista VII Metaphysicae, solventur ibidem. Quarta regula est quod convertibile, non indicans essentiam rei, non est definitio ipsius, isto modo accepta definitione.	But some of Aristotle's statements, which seem to be contrary to those of the Metaphysics 7, will be resolved there. The fourth rule is that the convertible, since it does not indicate the essence of a thing, is not the definition of it, accepted in this mode by definition.
Quinta regula est quod illa oratio in qua ponitur aliquid importans aliquid extrinsecum rei, non est definitio ipsius, isto modo accepta definitione. Sexta regula est quod si differentia praeponatur generi, non est definitio ipsius. Septima regula est: si definitio non convertitur cum definito, non ƿ est definitio ipsius, poterit tamen esse definitio alicuius inferioris vel superioris.	The fifth rule is that that a statement in which something is placed, importing something external to the thing, is not a definition of the thing itself, accepted in this mode by definition. The sixth rule is that if a difference is placed before a genus, it is not a definition of it. The seventh rule is: if the definition is not converted with the defined, it is not its definition, but it may still be the definition of something lower or higher.
Notandum quod secunda regula et tertia et quinta et septima valent ad destruendum quamcumque definitionem, quocumque modo accipiatur. Ex praedictis potest elici descriptio definitionis isto modo dictae, quia definitio isto modo dicta est `oratio composita ex genere diviso per differentiam indicantem materiam cum differentia vel differentiis indicante vel indicantibus formam vel formas'. Aliae autem definitiones quae componuntur ex genere proximo et differentia ultima, non sunt ita completae definitiones.	It should be noted that the second and third and fifth and seventh rules are sufficient to destroy any definition, in any way it is taken. From the aforesaid it is possible to draw a description of a definition said in this way, because a definition said in this way is 'a speech composed of a genus divided by a difference indicating the matter with a difference or differences indicating or indicating the form or forms'. Other definitions, however, which are composed of the nearest genus and the ultimate difference, are not so complete definitions.
Praeter istam definitionem est alia definitio, non importans aliquid extrinsecum rei, quae non differt ab ista definitione nisi in hoc quod in definitione, de qua dictum est, ponuntur differentiae in concreto, quae in recto sunt de definito praedicabiles.	Besides this definition there is another definition, not importing anything external to the thing, which does not differ from this definition except in that in the definition of which it has been said, differences are posited in the concrete, which are in truth predicable of the defined.
In alia autem definitione ponuntur abstracta in obliquo, correspondentia differentiis essentialibus.	But in another definition abstracts are placed obliquely, corresponding to essential differences.
Et talis est definitio ista `substantia composita ex materia et anima sensitiva et intellectiva'. Ista enim est definitio hominis, in qua ponuntur abstracta correspondentia istis concretis `materiale', `sensibile', `rationale'.	And such is the definition 'a substance composed of matter and a sensitive and intellectual soul'. For this is the definition of man, in which the abstract correspondences to these: concrete 'material', 'sensible', and 'rational' are posited.
Sciendum est tamen quod ista abstracta non correspondent secundum vocem illis concretis, nec hoc requiritur, sed sic correspondent quod sunt synonyma cum abstractis eorum, vel essent synonyma si abstracta secundum vocem correspondentia illis concretis essent imposita.	It must be known, however, that these abstracts do not correspond in terms of voice to those concrete ones, nor is this required, but they correspond in such a way that they are synonymous with their abstracts, or would be synonymous if the abstracts were superimposed on those concretes in terms of their correspondence in voice.
Et utrumque istorum sufficit ad definitionem illo modo dictam.	And both of these are sufficient for a definition stated in that way.
Ex isto sequitur quod ex praedictis patere potest quid sentiendum est de definitione isto modo dicta per ea quae dicta sunt de prima definitione. Est autem notandum quod quamvis per differentias essentiales exprimantur omnes partes rei quoad primam definitionem, et per abstracta in obliquo exprimantur etiam omnes partes rei quoad secundam definitionem, tamen praeter differentias et praeter talia abstracta oportet ponere genus, quia de ratione definitionis est quod per eam convenienter ƿ respondeatur ad quaestionem factam per quid de definito; hoc autem non potest fieri convenienter sine genere, cum nulla differentia, nec aliquod tale abstractum, praedicetur in quid de aliquo tali definito.	From this it follows that from what has been said it can be made clear what is to be thought of a definition said in this way by what has been said about the first definition. Now it must be noted that although all parts of a thing are expressed by essential differences in the first definition, and all parts of a thing are indirectly expressed by abstracts in the second definition, yet apart from differences and apart from such abstracts we must posit the genus, because it is of the nature of definition that by it the question posed by what is defined is appropriately answered. But this cannot be done conveniently without a genus, since no difference, nor any such abstract thing, can be predicated of anything by such a definition.
Notandum etiam quod eiusdem possunt esse plures definitiones tales, quando scilicet omnino idem significant, quamvis diverso modo, quia scilicet una pars unius definitionis significat aliquid in recto et alia pars alterius definitionis significat idem in obliquo.	It should also be noted that there can be several such definitions of the same thing, when they mean exactly the same thing, although in a different mode, because one part of one definition means something directly and another part of another definition means the same thing in an oblique way.
Similiter, quod eiusdem sunt plures definitiones, quarum una sit completissima et alia non completissima, non est inconveniens; sed quod eiusdem sint plures definitiones completissimae, habentes partes quae habent eundem modum significandi, puta quod omnes partes utriusque definitionis sumantur in recto vel utriusque aliquae in recto, aliquae in obliquo, est inconveniens.	Similarly, the fact that there are several definitions of the same thing, one of which is the most complete and the other not the most complete, is not inappropriate; but that several very complete definitions are the same, having parts which have the same way of signifying, for example that all the parts of both definitions are taken in the nominative case, or some of both in the nominative, and some in an oblique case, is irrelevant.
Et isto modo et non alio negat Philosophus eiusdem rei esse plures definitiones.	And in this way and in no other way does the Philosopher deny that there are several definitions of the same thing.
Praeter istas definitiones est alia definitio quae componitur ex nominibus exprimentibus partes integrales. Et definitio isto modo dicta datur communiter in mathematica. Et est sciendum quod numquam talis definitio datur nisi quando nomen convenit toti et non cuilibet parti, cuiusmodi est hoc nomen `triangulus'; nam tres lineae sunt partes integrales trianguli, et tamen totum vocatur triangulus et nulla pars, scilicet nulla linea, est triangulus.	In addition to these definitions, there is another definition that is composed of names expressing integral parts. And the definition said in this way is commonly given in mathematics. And it must be known that such a definition is never given except when the name applies to the whole and not to any part, of which this name 'triangle' is; for three lines are the integral parts of a triangle, and yet the whole is called a triangle, and no part, that is, no single line, is a triangle.
Et propter istam rationem ista definitio magis indicat quid nominis quam quid rei; nam definitio quae proprie indicat quid rei non potest competere alicui nisi conveniat omnibus quae sunt eiusdem speciei specialissimae, dictae in quid de eis; talis autem definitio non sic competit omnibus eiusdem speciei specialissimae, dictae in quid de eis.	And for this reason this definition indicates more what the name is than what the thing is; for a definition which properly indicates the nature of a thing cannot belong to any one thing unless it belongs to all things which are of the same special kind, said in quid about them; but such a definition does not thus apply to all of the same very special species, said in quid about them.
Verbi ƿ gratia si definiatur mare sic `mare est congregatio aquarum', ista definitio non competit omnibus eiusdem speciei specialissimae cum illa re quae est mare; nam `aqua', quae est species specialissima, dicitur in quid de illa re quae est mare, et similiter de qualibet sui parte, et tamen `mare' non competit illis omnibus.	For example, if the sea is defined as 'the sea is a gathering of waters', this definition does not apply to all of the same special species as that which is the sea; for 'water,' which is a very special kind, is said of that thing which is the sea, and similarly of every part of itself, and yet 'sea' does not belong to all of them.
Et propter hoc ista definitio non ita proprie indicat quid rei sicut praedictae definitiones.	And for this reason, this definition does not indicate the meaning of the matter in the same way as the aforementioned definitions.