Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 26

Latin	English
CAP. 26. DE DEFINITIONE EXPRIMENTE QUID NOMINIS.	Chapter 26. On the definition expressing what a term means.
Sequitur videre aliqua pauca de definitione exprimente quid nominis. Et est primo sciendum, sicut tactum est, quod omnia quae ponuntur in alio praedicamento quam in praedicamento substantiae vel qualitatis, solum talem habent definitionem secundum principia Aristotelis.	It follows to look into the definition that expresses what a term means. And it must first be known, as has been touched upon, that all things that are placed in a category other than that of substance or quality, only have this type of definition, according to Aristotle's principles.
Et ideo quantitas, relatio et cetera praedicamenta, ac etiam per se contenta in eis, non habent nisi definitionem exprimentem quid nominis. ƿ Nomina etiam connotativa non habent aliam definitionem; et ideo talia `album', `nigrum', et universaliter omnes passiones praedicabiles secundo modo dicendi per se de suis subiectis, talem definitionem habent.	And therefore quantity, relation, and the other predicates, and also what is contained in them per se (by itself), only have a definition expressing what the name means. Even connotative nouns have no other definition; and therefore, such things as 'white', 'black', and universally all predicable attributes in the second mode of speaking per se of their subjects, have such a definition.
Omnes etiam privationes et negationes habent tales definitiones et non alias. Nomina etiam quae non significant aliquid per se unum, habent tales definitiones. Et similiter nomina de quibus impossibiliter praedicatur esse; cuiusmodi sunt talia `vacuum',	All privations and negations have such definitions and no others. Even nouns that do not mean something by themselves have such definitions. And in like manner the names of which it is impossible to be predicated; such as 'vacuum',
'infinitum', `chimaera' et huiusmodi. Hoc supposito videndum est de diversis definitis in speciali, et primo de relativis. Et est sciendum quod relativum potest definiri vel complete vel incomplete. Incomplete potest definiri sine suo correlativo; sicut si definiatur pater incomplete, debet sic definiri `pater est substantia sensibilis quae aliam substantiam genuit', vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sed complete non potest definiri sine suo correlativo; ut definiatur sic `pater est substantia sensibilis habens filium' vel `est animal habens filium'.	'infinite', 'chimera' and the like. Based on this supposition, we must look at different definitions in particular, and first of all about relatives. And it must be known that the relative can be defined either completely or incompletely. The incomplete can be defined without its correlative; just as if the father is defined incompletely, it must be defined thus: 'the father is a sensible substance which gave birth to another substance', or something like that. But it cannot be defined completely without its correlative; to be defined thus, 'a father is a sensible substance having a child' or 'an animal having a child'.
Et tali definitione relativa mutuo se definiunt.	And with such definition, relatives define each other.
Nec est hoc inconveniens, quia sicut relativa sunt simul in intellectu, ita simul imponuntur, et propter hoc non est inconveniens si mutuo definiant se. Unde sciendum est quod ista definitio non est per notiora, sed sufficit quod sit per aeque nota. Et ideo loquendo de definitione quae est per notiora, --- quae est magis proprie definitio, quamvis non sit semper ita completa ---, numquam relativum definitur per suum correlativum, sed definitur per suum subiectum in recto et per subiectum sui correlativi sumptum in obliquo; sicut simile debet sic definiri `simile est quale, correspondens alteri quali, habenti qualitatem eiusdem speciei specialissimae'. Et ideo si esset aliquod nomen relativum speciale impositum albo, ita quod non praedicaretur de aliquo nisi de albo, sicut de nullo praedicatur simile nisi de quali, illud deberet sic definiri `album simul exsistens cum alio albo'. ƿ Et sic definitur causa, quia `causa est res ad cuius esse sequitur aliud ens'.	Nor is this objectionable, because as they are relative together in the understanding, so they are placed together, and for this reason it is not objectionable if they mutually define themselves. Hence it must be known that this definition is not by better known, but it is sufficient that it is by equally known. And therefore speaking of a definition which is more familiar, --- which is a more proper definition, although it is not always so complete ---, the relative is never defined by its correlative, but is defined by its subject in the nominative and by the subject of its correlative taken in the oblique; as 'similar' must be defined in this way, 'similar is a type of a thing, corresponding to another type, having the quality of the same very special species'. And therefore, if there were any special relative name imposed on white, so that it could not be predicated of anything but white, just as something similar is predicated of nothing but of its kind, it would have to be defined as `a white thing existing together with another white.' And this is how a cause is defined, because a cause is a thing from whose existence another thing follows.
Et sic de aliis. Et ista definitio, et quaelibet talis, est magis proprie definitio, quamvis non sit ita completa sicut illa quae datur per sua correlativa.	And so about others. And this definition, and every such definition, is more properly a definition, although it is not so complete as that which is given by its correlative.
Connotativa definiuntur per sua subiecta sumpta in recto et per nomina connotatorum sumpta in obliquo, vel per verba; sicut quantitas definitur sic `quantitas est res habens partes'.	Connotatives are defined by their subjects taken in the nominative and by the names of the connotates taken in the oblique, or by words; just as quantity is defined thus, 'quantity is a thing having parts'.
Continua quantitas et permanens potest sic definiri `quantitas permanens continua est res una habens partem extra partem'. Album autem definitur sic `album est corpus habens albedinem'.	Continuous and permanent quantity can be defined as 'a continuous quantity is a continuous thing having one part separate from another'. And white is defined thus: 'a white thing is a body having whiteness'.
Et sic de aliis. Privationes et negationes definiuntur per positiva eis opposita; sicut caecitas definitur per visum, non-homo per hominem, sic `res quae non est homo'.	And so about others. Deprivations and negations are defined by their positive opposites; just as blindness is defined by sight, non-man by man, so: 'a thing that is not a man.'
Et ista ad praesens de definitione sufficiant.	And these are enough for the present about definition.