Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 27

Latin	English
CAP. 27. DE REGULIS PER QUAS POTEST PROBARI ALIQUID ESSE SPECIES ALICUIUS.	Chapter 27. On the rules by which something can be proved to be a species of something else.
Post regulas per quas probari potest aliquid esse genus vel definitio vel proprium alicuius, videndum est de regulis per quas potest probari aliquid esse species alicuius. Et est una regula talis: quod non praedicatur in quid de aliquo, non est species illius. Et ideo sequitur `album non praedicatur in quid de homine, igitur album non est species hominis'. Notandum est quod multae sunt species quae non praedicantur in quid de quibuscumque nominibus propriis rerum quarumcumque, nec de pronominibus demonstrantibus res quascumque; sicut quantitas non praedicatur in quid de quibuscumque nominibus, nec de pronomine ƿ demonstrante quamcumque rem. Unde quacumque re demonstrata haec non est in quid `haec est quantitas'. Et ita est de multis, quia de omnibus speciebus connotativis et relativis.	After the rules by which it can be proved that something is a genus or definition or property of something, we must see the rules by which it can be proven that something is a species of something else. And there is one such rule: that which is not predicated in quid of something, is not a species of it. And therefore it follows that `whiteness is not predicated of anything about man, therefore whiteness is not a species of man.' It must be noted that there are many species which are not predicated of any proper names of any things, nor of pronouns denoting any things; just as quantity is not predicated of any nouns, nor of the pronoun denoting any thing whatsoever. Hence, in whatever matter is demonstrated, this is not in quid: 'this is quantity.' And so it is of many things, because of all connotative and relative species.
Alia regula est: quod praedicatur de omnibus, non est species alicuius. Et ideo ens et unum et huiusmodi non sunt species alicuius. Alia regula est: illud de quo non praedicatur in quid aliquod praedicamentum, non est species alicuius. Intelligendum est quod sicut genus multipliciter dicitur, ita et species multipliciter accipitur. Et ideo ista regula non est intelligenda de omni specie, sed de illa quae non est per se communis partibus essentialibus aliarum rerum; sicut unum commune omnibus formis ignis non recipit praedicationem in quid alicuius praedicamenti, et tamen potest vocari species, eo quod est praedicabile in quid respectu omnium formarum particularium.	There is another rule: that which is predicated of all, is not the species of any. And therefore being and one and such are not species of anything. There is another rule: that of which no predicate is predicated in quid, is not a species of anything. It must be understood that just as the genus is stated in many ways, so also the species is understood in many ways. And therefore this rule is not to be understood of every species, but of that which is not in itself common to the essential parts of other things; just as the one thing common to all forms of fire does not receive the predication in quid of any category, and yet it can be called a species, inasmuch as it is predicated in quid with respect to all the particular forms.
Species igitur, ad praesens, accipitur dupliciter: uno modo pro omni praedicabili in quid de pluribus differentibus numero, et hoc sive significata per ista differentia numero sint nata esse Partes essentiales alicuius sive non.	Species, therefore, for the present time, is taken in two ways: in one way, for everything that can be predicated in quid of several different enumerations, and this, whether signified by that difference in enumeration, that the essential parts of something are innate or not.
Et isto modo materia est species et similiter anima intellectiva, et ita de multis aliis.	And in this mode matter is a species, and likewise the intellectual soul, and so with many other things.
Alio modo accipitur pro illo quod est praedicabile de pluribus talibus in quid, et importata non sunt nata esse partes essentiales alicuius. Et ita anima intellectiva non est species.	In another mode it is taken for that which is predicable of several such things in quid, and it is implied that the essential parts of something are not innate. And so the intellectual soul is not a species.