Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 28

Latin	English
CAP. 28. DE REGULIS PER QUAS PROBARI POTEST ALIQUID ESSE DIFFERENTIA ALICUIUS.	Chapter 28. On the rules by which it can be proved that womething is different from another thing.
693}} `anima intellectiva praedicatur in quid de animabus intellectivis, ergo anima intellectiva non est differentia'. Intelligendum est quod ista regula est intelligenda de illo quod praedicatur in quid de aliquo pronomine denotante rem unam; sicut haec est in quid `haec est anima intellectiva'; et haec similiter `haec est forma', denotando formam. Sed non est intelligenda regula de illo quod praedicatur in quid de pronomine sumpto cum eodem communi; unde haec est praedicatio in quid `hoc rationale est rationale', sicut haec est in quid `hoc quantum est quantum'. Alia regula est: illud quod non importat partem rei essentialem, videlicet materiam vel formam, non est differentia alicuius.	Some rules are given about difference. One thing is this: that which is predicated in something of something, is not a difference of that. And therefore it follows `the intellectual soul is predicated of what is intellectual souls, therefore the intellectual soul is not a difference'. It must be understood that this rule is to be understood of that which is predicated in quid of some pronoun denoting one thing; such as `this is the intellectual soul'; and these likewise `this is form,' denoting form. But the rule concerning that which is predicated is not to be understood as something taken from a pronoun taken with the same common object; whence this is a predication in quid `this rational is rational,' just as this is in quid `this quantity is a quantity.' There is another rule: that which does not convey an essential part of a thing, that is to say matter or form, is not a difference of something.
Et ideo sequitur `disgregativum visus non importat partem rei talem, igitur non est differentia'. Intelligendum quod ista regula est intelligenda de differentia essentiali et non de differentia accidentali, nam aliquid poterit esse differentia accidentalis, quamvis non importet partem essentialem rei, sed sufficit quod importet accidens vel causam vel effectum vel aliquid huiusmodi.	And therefore it follows that `the disaggregative view does not imply such a part of the thing, therefore there is no difference'. It must be understood that this rule is to be understood in terms of an essential difference and not of an accidental difference, for something may be an accidental difference, although it does not import an essential part of the thing, but it is sufficient that it imports an accident or a cause or an effect or something like that.
Alia regula est quod illud quod non dividit aliquod genus, non est differentia alicuius, nam omnis differentia est alicuius generis divisiva.	Another rule is that that which does not divide any genus is not a difference of any genus, for every difference is divisive of some genus.
Et hoc est verum tam de differentia essentiali quam de differentia accidentali. Et ideo sequitur `creativum non dividit aliquod genus, ergo creativum non est differentia Dei'.	And this is true both of essential difference and of accidental difference. And therefore it follows that `the creative does not divide any kind, therefore the creative is not a difference of God'.
Ex isto sequitur quod aliquae passiones sunt differentiae accidentales suorum subiectorum et aliquae non. Illae enim passiones quae sunt propriae aliquibus speciebus contentis sub genere, sunt differentiae accidentales earum, sicut `disgregativum visus' est tam passio quam differentia accidentalis albedinis.	From this it follows that some attributes are accidental differences of their subjects and some are not. For those attributes which are proper to some of the species contained under the genus, are their accidental differences, just as `disintegrating sight' is both an attribute and an accidental difference of whiteness.
Aliae autem, cuiusmodi sunt passiones Dei et entis et huiusmodi, non sunt differentiae sed passiones tantum; et si aliquando in auctoribus vocentur passiones differentiae, multum extensive loquuntur de differentia.	But others, such as the attributes of God and beings and the like, are not differences but only attributes; and if sometimes the attributes of difference are mentioned in the authors, they speak very broadly of difference.
ƿ Alia regula est quod illud quod non habet differentiam condividentem, non est differentia, et ideo sequitur `unum non habet differentiam condividentem, ergo unum non est differentia entis'.	Another rule is that that which does not have a dividing difference is not a difference, and therefore it follows that 'one does not have a dividing difference, therefore one is not a difference of being'.
Notandum quod ista regula non est intelligenda de differentia essentiali. Aliquando enim contingit quod differentia essentialis non habet differentiam essentialem condividentem; sicut `materiale' est differentia essentialis corporis, et tamen non habet differentiam essentialem condividentem, quia species opposita, pro eo quod est communis rebus simplicibus carentibus compositione ex materia et forma, non habet differentiam essentialem. Et ideo intelligenda est regula sic, quod illud quod non habet differentiam condividentem, nec essentialem nec accidentalem, non est differentia. Alia regula est quod negatio non est differentia alicuius. Ista regula intelligenda est de differentia essentiali, quia nulla negatio nec aliquid negativum est differentia alicuius essentialis.	It should be noted that this rule is not to be understood as an essential difference. For sometimes it happens that an essential difference has no dividing essential difference; just as 'material' is the essential difference of the body, and yet it has no dividing essential difference, because opposite species, for what is common to simple things lacking composition from matter and form, has no essential difference. And therefore the rule must be understood in this way, that what has no dividing difference, neither essential nor accidental, is not a difference. Another rule is that negation is not the difference of something. This rule must be understood in terms of essential difference, because there is no negation, nor is anything negative a difference of something essential.
Poterit tamen esse differentia accidentalis alicuius. Alia regula est: illud quod contingenter praedicatur de aliquo, non est differentia ipsius; et ideo sequitur `ridere contingenter praedicatur de homine, igitur ridere non est differentia hominis'. Notandum quod illud quod contingenter praedicatur de aliquo, ipso exsistente, hoc est dum esse exsistere verificatur de illo, non est differentia ipsius; sicut dum haec est vera `homo est' haec poterit esse vera `homo non ridet', et ideo ridere non est differentia hominis.	It may, however, be an accidental difference of some kind. There is another rule: that which is contingently predicated of something is not a difference of it; and therefore it follows that `to laugh is contingently predicated of man, therefore to laugh is not a difference of man.' It is to be noted that what is contingently predicated of something that exists itself, that is, as long as its existence is verified of that thing, that is not a difference of it; as long as this is true, `he is a man,' this may also be true, `man does not laugh,' and therefore to laugh is not the difference of man.
Verumtamen illud quod contingenter praedicatur de aliquo, quia scilicet potest ab eo negari vere dum de illo negatur esse exsistere, bene poterit esse differentia illius; sicut `rationale' est differentia hominis, et tamen contingenter praedicatur de homine.	Nevertheless, that which is contingently predicated of something, namely, because it can be truly denied of it while it is denied of that to exist, may well be a difference of that; just as `rational' is the difference of man, and yet it is contingently predicated of man.
Haec enim est contingens `homo est rationalis', nam quando haec est falsa `homo est', haec etiam est falsa `homo est rationalis'.	For this is the contingent `man is rational', for when this is false `man exists', this is also false `man is rational'.
Sed impossibile est quod haec sit falsa `homo est rationalis' dum haec est vera `homo est'. Alia regula est quod illud quod non constituit speciem aliquam, ƿ non est differentia alicuius; sicut album non constituit speciem hominis, ideo album non est differentia hominis.	But it is impossible for this to be false, `man is rational,' while this is true, `man exists.' Another rule is that that which does not constitute a species is not a difference of anything; just as whiteness does not constitute the species of man, so whiteness is not the difference of man.
Intelligendum est quod differentia, proprie loquendo, non constituit speciem aliquam, quia differentia non est pars nec de essentia alicuius speciei, sed quando dicitur `differentia constituit speciem' accipitur `constituere' improprie pro illo quod definit speciem.	It must be understood that difference, properly speaking, does not constitute any species, because difference is not a part or of the essence of any species, but when it is said that `difference constitutes a species' to `constitute' is taken improperly for that which defines a species.
Et sic verum est quod illud quod non constituit speciem, hoc est quod non definit speciem, non est differentia illius. Et istud est verum tam de differentia essentiali quam de differentia accidentali, sed diversimode.	And so it is true that that which does not constitute a species, that is, that which does not define a species, is not its difference. And this is true both of essential difference and of accidental difference, but in different ways.
Nam illud quod non constituit speciem, id est non definit speciem definitione proprie dicta, non est differentia essentialis, sicut illud quod non constituit speciem, hoc est non definit speciem definitione data per additamentum, non est differentia accidentalis.	For that which does not constitute a species, that is, does not define a species by definition properly so called, is not an essential difference, just as that which does not constitute a species, that is, does not define a species by a definition given by addition, is not an accidental difference.