Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 37

Latin	English
CAP. 37. DE REGULIS PER QUAS POTEST PROBARI ALIQUID ESSE AEQUIVOCUM.	Chapter 37. On the rules by which something may be proved to be equivalent.
Post haec videndum est de regulis quibus potest probari aliquid esse aequivocum. Et primo ponendae sunt regulae quas ponit Aristoteles I Topicorum. Est autem regula sua prima talis: quod contrariatur diversis, est aequivocum. Pro ista regula et aliis sequentibus est primo notandum in generali quod aequivocatio, cum non sit nisi nominis, --- quod est vox ad placitum significativa, et per consequens non est aliqua aequivocatio nisi ad placitum ---, non potest sciri quae vox est aequivoca et quae non, nisi coniciendo ex dictis auctorum an imposuerint vel utebantur una impositione nominis vel pluribus.	After this we must consider the rules by which it can be proved that something is equivocal. And first of all the rules which Aristotle sets forth in Topic 1 must be laid down. Now his first rule is this: that which is contrary to different things is equivocal. For this rule and the others that follow, it is first to be noted in general that, since the equivocation is only of the name, --- which is a word signifying by agreement, and consequently there is no equivocation except by agreement ---, it is not possible to know which word is equivocal and which is not, except by conjecturing from the statements of the authors whether they imposed or used one imposition of the name or several.
Hoc autem non potest sciri nisi per hoc quod in uno loco attribuebant aliquod praedicatum nomini et in alio loco attribuebant eidem aliquid aliud, repugnans primo.	Now this can only be known by the fact that in one place they attributed a certain predicate to the name and in another place they attributed to it something else, contradicting the first.
Et per hoc potest haberi aequivocatio. Et ideo quando aliquid contrariatur pluribus, ita quod invenitur in aliquibus locis unum contrariari illi universaliter sumpto et in aliis reliquum contrariari eidem universaliter sumpto, tunc manifestum est illud aequivoce accipi.	And by this means there may be an equivocation. And therefore when something is contrary to several, so that in some places it is found that one thing is contrary to it universally, and in others the rest is contrary to it universally, then it is clear that it is to be taken equivocally.
Et ideo si aliquando inveniatur ista propositio `omni acuto contrariatur grave' et aliquando ƿ ista `omni acuto contrariatur obtusum', manifestum est quod taliter utentes hac voce `acutum' aequivoce utebantur, quia si `acutum' esset univocum, manifestum est quod utraque propositionum praedictarum esset falsa.	And therefore, if sometimes we find the statement `everything acute (sharp) is opposed to grave' and sometimes that `everything sharp is opposed to dull', it is clear that those who thus used this word `sharp' were using it equivocally, because if `sharp' were unequivocal, it is clear that both of the aforesaid propositions would be false.
Si enim `acutum' esset univocum acuto in voce et acuto in magnitudine, haec esset falsa `omni acuto contrariatur grave' pro multis singularibus, sicut manifeste patet.	For if `sharp' were univocal for sharp in voice and sharp in size, this would be false `all sharp is opposed to heavy' for many singulars, as is clearly evident.
Et similiter patet manifeste quod alia esset falsa. Et ita ex hoc quod auctores tales universales concesserunt, oportuit eos vel mentiri vel uti aequivoce eadem voce.	And in the same way it is plainly clear that there were other falsehoods. And so from the fact that the authors agreed to such universals, it was necessary for them either to lie or to use the same word equivocally.
Si autem posuissent tantum indefinitas, quae non inferunt universales praedictas, non posset concludi illam vocem esse aequivocam. Aliud est etiam notandum quod Philosophus vult hic quod illud quod est aequivocum, habet contrarium.	But if they had posited only indefinites, which do not imply the aforesaid universals, it would not be possible to conclude that that word is equivocal. It is also another thing to note that the Philosopher wants here that what is equivocal has its opposite.
Ex quo patet quod cum sola vox sit aequivoca, ipsamet vox habet contrarium; et ex quo vox talis non contrariatur voci alteri tamquam sibi incompossibili in eodem subiecto, non plus quam alteri, oportet necessario quod Aristoteles aequivoce utatur hac voce `contrarium'.	From this it is clear that when the word alone is equivocal, the word itself has an opposite; and from the fact that such a word is not opposed to another word as incompatible with itself in the same subject, no more than the other, it is necessarily necessary that Aristotle equivocally uses this word 'contrary'.
Quod verum est.	Which is true.
Quomodo autem hoc nomen `contrarium' est aequivocum, dictum est alibi, scilicet in libro Praedicamentorum. Secunda regula est talis, et est regula Aristotelis: si nomini proposito sint plura contraria, quamvis contenta sub aliquo uno nomine, illud nomen erit aequivocum; sicut `album' est aequivocum, nam sibi contrariatur `nigrum', quod est aequivocum ad vocem et ad colorem.	Now how this word 'contrary' is equivocal, has been said elsewhere, namely in the book of Proclamations. The second rule is as follows, and it is Aristotle's rule: if there are several opposites to a given name, although they are contained under some one name, that name will be equivocal; just as `white' is equivocal, for it is opposed to `black,' which is equivocal to voice and color.
Quod autem ista sint aequivoca patet, quia sensibus diversis apprehenduntur. Notandum quod non ex hoc praecise quod aliqua apprehenduntur a diversis sensibus contingit inferre quod nomen commune eis est aequivocum; tunc enim `qualitas' esset nomen aequivocum, quod falsum est.	Now that these are equivocal is evident, because they are apprehended by different senses. It should be noted that it is not possible to infer from the fact that certain things are apprehended by different senses that the common name for them is equivocal; for then `quality' would be an equivocal word, which is false.
ƿ Sed quando aliqua apprehenduntur a diversis sensibus, tunc nomen commune eis, cui aliquando universaliter sumpto attribuitur apprehendi ab uno illorum sensuum et aliquando eidem universaliter sumpto attribuitur apprehendi ab alio sensu, est aequivocum eis.	But when certain things are apprehended by different senses, then a common name for them, which is sometimes universally taken and attributed to one of those senses, and sometimes the same name taken universally is attributed to another sense, is equivocal to them.
Ita est de exemplo Aristotelis. Nam aliquando auctores dicunt quod omne album est apprehensibile a visu, sicut naturales; aliquando autem dicunt quod omne nigrum est apprehensibile ab auditu, sicut musici. Et ita oportet quod aequivoce utantur hac voce `album' et hac voce `nigrum'. Non sic autem invenitur aliquando quod omnis qualitas apprehenditur a visu et aliquando quod omnis qualitas apprehenditur ab auditu vel alio sensu. Tertia regula est: si nomen propositum aliquando habeat contrarium et aliquando non, est aequivocum; sicut delectationi in potu est aliquid contrarium, delectationi secundum scientiam nihil est contrarium; similiter amare secundum animam est aliquid contrarium et amare secundum corpus nihil est contrarium; igitur tam `delectatio' quam `amare' est aequivocum. Notandum quod non ex hoc praecise quod unum contentum habet contrarium et non reliquum potest ostendi quod illud commune nomen est aequivocum; tunc enim `qualitas' esset nomen aequivocum; sed ex hoc quod aliqui attribuunt aliquando `habere contrarium' illi nomini universaliter sumpto et aliquando negant, sequitur quod aequivoce utantur hoc nomine.	This is the case with the example of Aristotle. For sometimes the authors say that all white is apprehensible by sight, like natural things; but sometimes they say that everything black is apprehensible by hearing, like musicians. And so it is necessary that they use this word `white' and this word `black' equivocally. But it is not so that sometimes it is found that every quality is apprehended by sight, and sometimes that every quality is apprehended by hearing or some other sense. The third rule is: if a noun sometimes has its opposite and sometimes does not, it is equivocal; As there is something contrary to pleasure in drink, there is nothing contrary to pleasure according to knowledge. Similarly, to love according to the soul (delight) has something contrary, and to love according to the body has nothing contrary. therefore both `delight' and `loving' are equivocal. It should be noted that it cannot be shown precisely from the fact that one content has its opposite and not the rest that that common name is equivocal; for then `quality' would be an equivocal word; but from the fact that some people sometimes attribute the opposite to that name taken universally, and sometimes deny it, it follows that they use this name equivocally.
Aliud notandum est quod illa quae dicit Aristoteles de delectatione et amare, dicit gratia exempli, et ideo non est multum curandum de eis. Quarta regula est: si aliqua contenta sub nomine communi habeant aliquod medium, et aliqua non habent medium, vel si habent medium non tamen idem medium, tunc illud nomen commune est aequivocum; sicut `album' et `nigrum' habent medium in colore, manifestum est, ƿ sed in voce vel non habent medium vel habent aliud medium, scilicet `raucum', ideo tam `album' quam `nigrum' est aequivocum.	Another thing to note is that what Aristotle says about pleasure and love, he says about grace for example, and therefore we do not need to worry much about them. The fourth rule is: if some contents under a common name have a middle, and some have no mean, or if they have a mean but not the same mean, then that common name is equivocal; just as `white' and `black' have a mean in color, it is clear, but in voice either they have no mean or they have another mean, namely `raucous', therefore both `white' and `black' are equivocal.
Ista regula est intelligenda sicut praecedentes, quando scilicet talibus universaliter sumptis attribuitur aliquod medium habere et aliquando negatur ab eis medium vel attribuitur aliud medium.	This rule is to be understood in the same way as the preceding ones, namely, when it is attributed to such universally taken terms to have some mean, and sometimes the mean is denied by them or another mean is attributed.
Quinta regula est: si aliqua contenta habeant plura media et aliqua non, tunc nomen commune est aequivocum; sicut `album' et `nigrum' in colore habent plura media, in voce non, ideo `album' et `nigrum' sunt aequivoca.	The fifth rule is: if some contents have several means and some do not, then the common name is equivocal; just as `white' and `black' have several means in color, but not in sound, therefore `white' and `black' are equivocal.
Notandum quod quando Philosophus dicit album colorem non loquitur proprie sed improprie, ponendo concretum pro abstracto, hoc est album pro albedine, quae est color. Sexta regula est: si unum contrariorum dicitur multipliciter, reliquum dicitur multipliciter; sicut `non videre' est aequivocum, scilicet ad non habere potentiam visivam et ad non uti potentia visiva, ideo `videre' est aequivocum.	It should be noted that when the Philosopher says the color white, he does not speak properly but improperly, using the concrete instead of the abstract, this is white for whiteness, which is a color. The sixth rule is: if one of the opposites is said in multiple ways, the other is said in multiple ways; just as ``not seeing is equivalent to not having the visual power and not using the visual power, so `to see' is equivocal.
Sciendum est quod ista regula, sicut quaelibet talis, `si unum contrariorum est aequivocum, reliquum est aequivocum'; `si unum privative oppositorum est aequivocum, reliquum est aequivocum', est intelligenda quando sibi opponuntur tali genere oppositionis in utroque sensu; si autem non, tunc non oportet quod si unum oppositorum est aequivocum quod reliquum sit aequivocum.	It must be known that this rule, like any such rule, `if one of the opposites is equivocal, the other is equivocal'; `if one of the privatively opposed is equivocal, the other is equivocal' is to be understood when they are opposed to each other by this kind of opposition in both senses; but if not, then it is not necessary that if one of the opposites is equivocal, the other must be equivocal.
Septima regula est una quae dicta est, scilicet: si unum privative oppositorum est aequivocum, reliquum est aequivocum; sicut si `sensibile' sit aequivocum, quia aliquid dicitur sensibile secundum animam, puta quod habet animam sensitivam, et aliquid dicitur sensibile secundum corpus, puta quod potest sentiri, oportet quod `insensibile' sit aequivocum.	The seventh rule is one which has been said, namely: if one of the privative opposites is equivocal, the other is equivocal; just as if `sensible' is equivocal, because something is said to be sensible according to the soul, for example because it has a sensitive soul, and something is said to be sensible according to the body, for example because it can be felt, it is necessary for `insensitive' to be equivocal.
Et qualiter ista regula intelligenda sit, dictum est prius.	And how this rule is to be understood has been said before.
Octava regula est: si casus est aequivocum, et coniugatum est aequivocum et e converso; sicut quia `iuste' dicitur aequivoce, etiam ƿ `iustum' dicitur aequivoce. Et similiter, si `sanativum' dicitur aequivoce, et `sanative' dicitur aequivoce. Qualiter autem debeat cognosci quod casus vel coniugatum dicitur aequivoce, non potest sciri nisi per auctores, quia aliquando attribuunt aliquid universaliter casui vel coniugato et aliquando dicunt contrarium. Nona regula est: quando aliqua contenta sunt in diversis praedicamentis, nomen commune eis est aequivocum.	The eighth rule is: if the case is equivocal, the conjugate is also equivocal, and vice versa; just as `justly' is said equivocally, so `just' is also said equivocally. And likewise, if `healing' is said equivocally, `healthy' is also said equivocally. But how it is to be known that a casual or a conjugate is said to be equivocal, cannot be known except by the authors, because sometimes they attribute something universally to a casual or a conjugate and sometimes they say the opposite. The ninth rule is: when some contents are in different categories, the common name for them is equivalent.
Sed est sciendum quod ista regula, sicut praecedentes, debet intelligi quando aliquando illi nomini sumpto universaliter diversa praedicamenta non ordinata attribuuntur. Sicut delicati dicunt quod omnis cibus bonus est effectivus voluptatis, medici dicunt quod omnis cibus bonus est effectivus sanitatis; et ideo cum aliquid sit effectivum voluptatis quod non est effectivum sanitatis et e converso, manifestum est quod isti et illi aequivoce utuntur hoc nomine `bonus'.	But it must be known that this rule, like the preceding ones, must be understood when sometimes universally different, unordered predicates are attributed to that name. As chefs say that all good food is productive of pleasure, physicians say that all good food is productive of health; and therefore when there is something productive of pleasure which is not productive of health and vice versa, it is clear that these and those use this name 'good' equivocally.
Similiter morales dicunt quod ille est bonus quia est iustus, castus vel fortis. Et ita patet quomodo hoc nomine `bonus' diversi utuntur aequivoce. Ita est de hoc nomine `album', et de hoc nomine `acutum', et sic de aliis. Decima regula est: si nomen propositum sit in diversis generibus non subalternis, erit aequivocum. Notandum quod istae duae regulae sunt intelligendae sicut praecedentes, et simul cum hoc sunt intelligendae quando illa genera non subalterna sic non subalternantur quod unum necessario removetur a reliquo universaliter sumpto. Si enim unum praedicetur de reliquo particulariter sumpto, non oportet. Et per hoc patet quod per istas regulas non potest probari quod idem non potest esse in diversis praedicamentis, cum aliquando unum praedicamentum praedicetur de reliquo. Nec potest probari quod idem non possit esse in diversis generibus non subalternis nisi unum removeatur universaliter a reliquo, et hoc necessario.	Likewise moralists say that he is good because he is just, chaste, or strong. And so it is clear how this name 'good' is used equivocally by different people. So it is with this name 'white', and with this name 'sharp', and so with others. The tenth rule is: if the noun is presented in different non-subordinate genera, it will be equivocal. It should be noted that these two rules are to be understood as the previous ones, and at the same time they are to be understood when those genera are not sobordinating so that they are not sobordinated because one is necessarily removed from the rest taken universally. For if one is predicated of the rest taken in particular, it is not necessary. And from this it is clear that by these rules it cannot be proved that the same thing cannot be in different predicates, since sometimes one predicate is predicated of the rest. Nor can it be proved that the same cannot exist in different non-subordinate genera unless one is universally removed from the rest, and this necessarily.
Undecima regula est: si unum contrariorum sit aequivocum, reliquum est aequivocum.	The eleventh rule is: if one of a pair of opposites is equivocal, the other is equivocal.
ƿ Duodecima regula est: quando aliquid attribuitur multis, definienda sunt composita ex illis multis et illo uno; et si illis multis ablatis non remanet idem nomen, illud erit aequivocum. Sicut `album' convenit et voci et corpori, et ista duo composita `album corpus' et `alba vox' sunt definienda, sic `album corpus est res informata tali colore', vox alba definitur sic `qualitas bene audibilis'; et manifestum est quod istae duae definitiones non sunt eaedem, et ideo `album' est aequivocum.	The twelfth rule is: when something is attributed to many, they must be defined as composed of those many and that one; and if the same name does not remain after many of them have been taken away, it will be equivocal. As `white' corresponds to both the voice and the body, and these two compounds `white body' and `white voice' are to be defined, so `a white body is a thing shaped by such a color', a white voice is defined as `the quality of being well heard'; and it is clear that these two definitions are not the same, and therefore 'white' is equivocal.
Aliter potest dici, et melius, quod illud commune est definiendum, ita tamen quod illa quibus convenit ponantur ibidem; et tunc, si illis ablatis quod remanet non est idem, illud nomen erit aequivocum.	It may be said in another way, and better, that it is common to define it, yet in such a way that those things to which it belongs should be put there; and then, if you take away from them what remains that is not the same, that name will be equivocal.
Sicut naturalis si definiat album, dicet sic `album est corpus habens talem colorem', musicus definiet sic `album est vox bene audibilis'. Et manifestum est quod ablatis istis duobus `corpus' et `vox', quod remanet non est idem, ideo `album' est aequivocum.	Just as a naturalist, if he were to define white, would say, `white is a body having such a color,' a musician would define it thus, `white is a well-heard voice.' And it is clear that when you remove these two, `body' and `voice,' what remains is not the same, therefore `white' is equivocal.
Decima tertia regula est: si contenta non sunt comparabilia secundum magis et minus nec secundum aeque, nomen commune eis est aequivocum.	The thirteenth rule is: if the contents are not comparable in terms of more and less, nor in terms of equality, the common name for them is equivocal.
Et intelligenda est ista regula sicut praedictae. Decima quarta regula est: illud nomen quod est differentia diversorum generum non subalternatim positorum, est aequivocum; sicut `acutum' est differentia vocis, quia dividit vocem, et est differentia magnitudinis, ideo `acutum' est aequivocum.	And this rule must be understood as aforesaid. The fourteenth rule is: that name which is the difference of different genera not placed subordinately, is equivocal; just as `acute' is a difference of voice, because it divides the voice, and there is a difference of magnitude, therefore `acute' is equivocal.
Sciendum est quod quamvis de eadem differentia possint praedicari diversa genera non subalternatim posita, non tamen idem potest esse differentia divisiva diversorum generum, sicut dicit hic Aristoteles.	It must be known that although different genera may be predicated of the same difference not placed subordinately, yet the divisive difference of different genera cannot be the same, as Aristotle says here.
Decima quinta regula est: illud quod dividitur per differentias diversas in diversis locis, est aequivocum; sicut `color' aliter dividitur in naturali philosophia et in musica et in rhetorica, ideo `color' est aequivocum.	The fifteenth rule is: that which is divided by different differences in different places is equivocal; just as `color' is divided differently in natural philosophy and in music and in rhetoric, so `color' is equivocal.
Intelligendum est quod non accipitur hic differentia praecise pro differentia essentiali, sed etiam pro differentia accidentali. ƿ Decima sexta regula est: si idem nomen aliquando ponitur species unius et aliquando differentia alterius, illud nomen est aequivocum.	It must be understood that the difference is not taken here precisely as an essential difference, but also as an accidental difference. The sixteenth rule is: if the same name is sometimes used as a species of one and sometimes as a difference of another, that name is equivocal.
Notandum est etiam quod, generaliter, quando aliquod nomen vel dictio quaecumque secundum usum recte loquentium et intelligentium attribuitur alicui universaliter sumpto, et alibi secundum usum recte loquentium et intelligentium, sive in illa scientia vel arte sive in alia, sive etiam in illo idiomate sive in alio, invenitur aliquid aliud secundum vocem sibi attribui, vel ipsum alteri, ex quo sequitur aliquid repugnans priori, illud est aequivocum vel saltem accipitur aequivoce.	It should also be noted that, in general, when any name or expression of any kind is attributed to something universally taken according to the usage of rightly speaking and intelligent people, and elsewhere according to the usage of rightly speaking and intelligent people, whether in one science or art or in another, or even in one idiom or in another, something else is found according to the voice attributed to it, or itself to another, from which follows something inconsistent with the first, that is equivocal or at least is taken equivocally.
Pro quo sciendum est quod aliud est `esse aequivocum' et aliud `sumi aequivoce'.	For which we must know that it is one thing to be equivocal and another to be taken equivocally.
Nam illud est aequivocum quod significat plura aequivoce, sed illud accipitur aequivoce quod vel significat plura aequivoce vel stat pro pluribus aequivoce. Sed ista distinctio declarabitur inferius, cum tractabitur de fallacia aequivocationis.	For that is equivocal which means several things equivocally, but that is taken equivocally which either means several things equivocally or stands for several things equivocally. But this distinction will be made clear below, when we will treat of the fallacy of equivocation.