Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 39

Latin	English
CAP. 39. DE REGULIS PERTINENTIBUS AD ARTEM OBLIGATORIAM. ET PRIMO DE INSTITUTIONE.	Chapter 39. On the rules that pertain to the obligatory art. And first about institution.
Quoniam logici circa obligationes et insolubilia speciales faciunt difficultates, ideo ad istius	Since logicians make special difficulties about obligations and insolubles, therefore to this one
Summae completionem, quae de omni modo arguendi generalem tradit notitiam, sunt aliqua brevia perscrutanda.	To complete the summaries, which convey a general notice of every mode of reasoning, there are some brief passages to be perused.
Et primo disserendum est de obligationibus. Est autem primo sciendum quod obligatio sic definitur a mulƿtis: ``Obligatio est praefixio enuntiabilis secundum aliquem statum.	And first we must discuss the obligations. But it must first be known that obligation is thus defined by many: `An obligation is a prefix that can be expressed according to a certain state.'
Quando enim aliquis ex consensu proprio obligatur ab opponente ad aliquid in disputatione ad quod prius non erat obligatus, tunc fit sibi obligatio. Obligationis autem multae species assignantur, scilicet institutio, petitio, positio, depositio, dubitatio et `sit verum'.	For when a person is obliged by his own consent to do something in a discussion to which he was not previously bound by his opponent, then he becomes bound. Many kinds of obligation are assigned, namely, institution, petition, position, deposition, doubt, and `let it be true.'
Institutio est nova alicuius vocabuli impositio pro tempore disputationis et non ultra duratura.	The establishment is the imposition of a new term for the time of the discussion and will not last longer.
Et potest ex tali institutione accidere utilitas, quia per talem institutionem quandoque fit brevior disputatio et locutio; quandoque debet fieri disputatio de re innominata, et tunc utile est disputantibus pro tempore disputationis sibi certum nomen imponere; quandoque autem fit talis institutio a sophistis ad decipiendum respondentem.	And advantage may arise from such an institution, because through such an institution sometimes discussion and speech are shorter; sometimes a discussion must take place about an unnamed matter, and then it is useful for the disputants to impose a certain name on themselves for the time of the discussion; and sometimes such an arrangement is made by the sophists in order to deceive the respondent.
Et ad obviandum eis, rationabiliter respondendo, de ista specie dantur aliquae regulae. Una est quod numquam pars potest significare totum cuius est pars. Sed ista regula capit instantiam, nam in ista propositione `omnis propositio est vera' subiectum significat totam propositionem. Similiter, idem potest significare se; igitur pars, eadem ratione, potest significare totum. Antecedens patet, nam hoc nomen `vox' significat omnem vocem, et per consequens se ipsam; similiter hoc nomen `nomen' significat omnia nomina, quia omni nomini competit definitio nominis, igitur significat se ipsum. Ideo dicendum est quod quamvis pars possit significare totum cuius est pars, tamen talis institutio non est semper admittenda.	And in order to meet them, by giving a reasonable answer, some rules are given about this species. One thing is that a part can never signify the whole of which it is a part. But this rule takes precedence, for in this proposition, `every proposition is true,' the subject signifies the whole proposition. Similarly, the same thing can mean itself; therefore, a part, by the same reasoning, can signify the whole. The antecedent is clear, for this word 'voice' signifies every voice, and consequently itself; similarly, this word `name' signifies all names, because the definition of a name belongs to every name, therefore it signifies itself. Therefore it must be said that although a part may signify the whole of which it is a part, yet such an arrangement is not always admissible.
Quando enim per unicam institutionem partis, habentis eandem suppositionem, totum significatum mutaretur a veritate in falsitatem et e converso, tunc non est talis institutio admittenda.	For when, by a single institution of a part, having the same supposition, the whole signified would be changed from truth to falsity and vice versa, then such an institution is not admissible.
ƿ Et per hoc solvitur hoc sophisma: significet a praecise istud totum `a significat falsum'; et tunc quaeratur an a significet verum vel falsum. Si verum, igitur cum a non sit aequivocum, haec est falsa `a significat falsum'; et institutum est quod a significet hoc totum `a significat falsum'; ergo a significat falsum.	And by this means this sophistry is resolved: it signifies precisely that this whole `a signifies falsity'; and then it is asked whether a signifies truth or falsity. If true, then since a is not equivocal, this is falsity: `a signifies falsity'; and it is established that a signifies this whole, `a signifies falsity'; therefore a means false.
Si autem a significat falsum, ergo haec est vera `a significat falsum'; et a significat hoc; igitur a significat verum. Respondendum est quod ista institutio non est admittenda, pro eo quod haec oratio `a significat falsum', quae est falsa quando a nihil significat, mutaretur in veritatem si praecise imponeretur a ad significandum hoc totum et nihil aliud.	But if a signifies falsity, then this is true: `a signifies falsity'; and a signifies this; therefore a signifies truth. The answer must be that this arrangement is not admissible, on account of the fact that this sentence `a signifies falsity,' which is false when a signifies nothing, would be changed into truth if a were precisely imposed to signify all this and nothing else.
Et si dicatur quod hoc est possibile quod a significet hoc totum; sed omne possibile est ponibile; igitur potest poni. Ponatur igitur, et redit argumentum: Dicendum est quod differentia est inter institutionem et positionem.	And if it is said that this is possible because a signifies all this; but everything possible is possible; therefore it can be posited. It is therefore assumed, and the argument returns: It must be said that there is a difference between an institution and a position.
Unde quia possibile est quod a significet hoc totum `a significat falsum', ideo est ponibile, et ipso posito in esse nullum accidit impossibile. Unde quando accipis `aut a significat verum aut falsum', respondendum est quod neque significat verum neque falsum.	Hence, since it is possible that a signifies the whole of this, `a signifies falsity,' it is therefore positable, and by the very positing of being, nothing happens to be impossible. Hence, when you take `either a to mean true or false', the answer must be that it means neither true nor false.
Et potest responderi quod significat tam verum quam falsum, quia isto posito stante potest utrumque esse verum.	And it can be answered that it signifies both truth and falsity, because standing on this premise both can be true.
Nam isto posito stante poterit a significare praecise homines, et tunc dico quod a neque significat verum neque falsum, sed tunc a habebit suppositionem personalem et supponet praecise pro hominibus.	For standing in this position, a will be able to signify precisely men, and then I say that a signifies neither truth nor falsity, but then a will have a personal supposition and will supposit precisely for men.
Poterit etiam a significare idem quod `propositio', et tunc dicendum est quod a significat tam verum quam falsum.	A may also mean the same thing as `proposition', and then it must be said that a means both true and false.
Quod non est inconveniens. Et si dicatur: omnia ista stant simul `a significat hoc totum: a significat falsum', et `a nihil aliud significat quam hoc totum'; et omnia compossibilia possunt simul esse vera; igitur possunt poni si possunt simul esse vera: Potest dici quod ista stant simul, et ideo possunt poni; sed ipsis positis negandum est omne repugnans eis.	That is not inappropriate. And if it is said: all these things stand together, `a signifies all this: a signifies falsity,' and `a signifies nothing else than all this'; and all possible things can be true at the same time; Therefore, they can be posited if they can be truths at the same time. but everything that is contrary to them must be denied to them.
ƿ Et ideo istis positis si arguatur `aut a significat verum aut falsum' respondendum est nec concedendo nec negando nec dubitando, sed respondendum est quod propositum nec est verum nec falsum.	And therefore, with these posited, if it is argued that `either a signifies truth or falsity,' we must answer neither by conceding, nor denying, nor doubting, but we must answer that what is proposed is neither true nor false.
Sicut aliquo posito, si proponatur `homo --- asinus', et petatur responsio, respondendum est quod non est respondendum nec concedendo nec negando nec aliquo alio modo, proprie accipiendo responsionem.	As with any proposition, if it is proposed that ``man --- ass is proposed, and an answer is sought, the answer must be that it is not to be answered either by granting or denying, or in any other way, by properly accepting the answer.
Et si dicas quod istis positis haec est vera `a significat verum vel falsum', igitur ipsa propositio est concedenda, et per consequens altera pars est concedenda: Dicendum est quod ista `a significat verum vel falsum' nec est vera nec falsa, istis positis.	And if you say that, given these posits, this is true, `a signifies truth or falsity,' then the proposition itself must be granted, and consequently the second part must be granted: It must be said that this `a signifies truth or falsity,' is neither true nor false, given these posits.
Unde in isto casu ad quamlibet talem orationem respondendum est ac si non esset propositio vel oratio significativa. Et per consimilem modum posset responderi ad multa alia sophismata quae difficilia sunt, nisi exercitatis multum in arte obligatoria; quae, quia non sunt multum usitata in theologia, pertranseo.	Therefore, in this case, we must respond to any such speech as if it were not a meaningful proposal or speech. And in a similar manner it might be answered to many other sophistries which are difficult, unless you have been much trained in the obligatory art; which, because they are not much used in theology, I pass over.