Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 40

Latin	English
CAP. 40. DE SECUNDA SPECIE OBLIGATIONIS, QUAE DICITUR PETITIO.	Chapter 40. On the second type of obligation, which is called petition.
Alia species obligationis assignatur petitio, quae obligat ad aliquem actum pertinentem ad officium respondentis exercendum ab eodem. Sicut si opponens dicat `peto quod concedas primam propositionem proponendam a me esse veram'; quae petitio recipienda est, quia non obligat ad impossibile respondentem. Et potest esse regula in ista specie obligationis quod nulla petitio est admittenda nisi cui respondens satisfacere potest durante petitione, et quaelibet talis est admittenda.	Another type of obligation is assigned a request (petition), which obliges one to perform some act related to the duty of the respondent. Just as if the objector says, `I ask that you grant that the first proposition proposed by me is true'; which request must be accepted, because it does not bind the answerer to the impossible. And there may be a rule in this type of obligation that no request is admissible unless the respondent can satisfy it during the request, and any such request is admissible.
Unde in ista specie potest concedi falsum impossibile, etiam bene respondendo; sicut si petas quod conceƿdam hominem esse bovem et proponas istam `homo est irrationalis', in tempore obligationis est concedenda, quia petita est, consequenter saltem.	Whence in this type, an impossible falsity can be granted, even by answering well; just as if you request that a given man be an ox, and you propose that `man is irrational', at the time of the obligation it must be granted, because it was requested, at least in consequence.
Et hoc sufficiat de ista petitione, pro eo quod non habet magnum locum in scientiis particularibus.	And let this be enough of this petition, for it has no great place in the particular sciences.