Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 41

Latin	English
CAP. 41. DE TERTIA SPECIE OBLIGATIONIS, QUAE DICITUR POSITIO. QUOMODO DIFFERT A CASU?.	Chapter 41. On the third type of obligation, which is called position. How is it different from case?
Tertia species obligationis vocatur positio. Circa quam est primo sciendum quod positio differt a casu, quia casus non obligat ad sustinendum aliquid tamquam verum.	The third type of obligation is called position. Concerning which it is first to be known that position differs from case, because case does not oblige one to support something as true.
Unde et quandoque casus et positio sunt respectu oppositorum. Sicut sit Sortes in rei veritate albus, et ponatur ista `Sortes est niger'. Tunc enim est casus quod Sortes est albus, et positum est quod Sortes est niger; et ita positio obligat ad sustinendum istam tamquam veram `Sortes est niger', et casus tunc non obligat ad sustinendum istam tamquam veram `Sortes est albus'. Item, casus semper debet esse de re, et de re particulari, positio autem potest esse unius propositionis indefinitae vel particularis.	Hence sometimes case and position are in respect of opposites. Just as when Socrates is in fact white, and it is posited that `Socrates is black.' For then it is the case that Socrates is white, and it is posited that Socrates is black; and thus the position obliges us to support this as true, `Socrates is black,' and the case then does not oblige us to support this as true, `Socrates is white.' Likewise, the case must always be about a subject, and about a particular subject, but a position can be a single indefinite or particular proposition.
Sicut si velim tibi ponere casum, non debeo dicere `ponatur quod homo currit', sed oportet certificare, puta quod iste homo currit vel ille, ita quod a currat. Sit a nomen proprium illius. Sed in positione possum tibi ponere istam `homo currit' vel istam `aliquis homo currit'.	For example, if I wanted to put a case to you, I should not say `it is supposed that a man runs', but it is necessary to confirm, suppose that this man runs or that, so that A runs. Let A be his proper name. But in a position I can posit to you that `a man is running' or that `someone is running'.
Circa casum igitur sunt aliquae regulae. Una est quod casus numquam est recipiendus ad sustinendum nisi fiat certificatio de aliquo particulari.	So there are some rules about a case. One thing is that a case is never accepted for support unless there is a certification of something particular.
Alia est quod numquam casus est recipiendus ad sustinendum nisi possibile.	Another thing is that there is never an opportunity to receive support unless it is possible.
Alia regula est quod numquam est casus recipiendus ad sustinendum ƿ qui repugnat actui responsionis. Unde si aliquis velit tibi ponere istum casum quod tu sis mortuus et velit quod tu sustineas istum casum, non debes eum recipere, quia repugnat actui responsionis.	Another rule is that there is never a case to be accepted for support that is inconsistent with the response action. Therefore, if someone wants to posit to you this case that you are dead and wants you to support this case, you should not accept it, because it is contrary to the act of response.
Non enim stant simul quod tu sis mortuus et quod tu sibi respondeas, et ideo talis casus non est admittendus, tamen tale ponibile est admittendum. Positio igitur obligat ad sustinendum aliquam propositionem eo modo quo propositio vera debet sustineri a respondente. Et consistit ars ista in hoc quod in principio debet aliqua propositio poni, deinde debent propositiones proponi secundum quod placet opponenti, ad quas debet respondens respondere concedendo vel negando vel dubitando vel distinguendo.	For the fact that you are dead and that you answer to him do not stand true at the same time, and therefore such a case is not to be admitted, yet such a position is to be admitted. A position therefore obliges one to support a proposition in the way that a true proposition must be supported by the respondent. And this technique consists in the fact that at the beginning some proposition must be put forward, then propositions must be put forward according to what pleases the opponent, to which the respondent must respond by granting or denying or doubting or distinguishing.
Quibus responsionibus datis debet opponens, quando sibi placet, dicere: cedat tempus. Hoc est, cesset tempus obligationis. Et tunc videndum est an respondens bene responderit vel non. Sicut pono tibi istam propositionem `animal currit', deinde propono `homo currit'; si eam concedas, dico: cedat tempus.	With these answers given, the opponent must, when it pleases him, say: let time yield. That is, the period of obligation will cease. And then it must be seen whether the answerer answered well or not. Just as I posit to you the statement `an animal runs', then I put forward `a man runs'; if you grant it, I say: let time yield.
Et probo quod male respondisti, quia concessisti falsum et impertinens, --- sit ita quod nullus homo currat ---, ergo male respondisti. Sed iste modus opponendi et respondendi non servatur quando ponitur casus, propter quod differt casus a positione. Scito tamen quomodo respondendum est facta aliqua positione, potest leviter sciri quomodo respondendum est posito aliquo casu, et ideo sufficiat pro nunc de positione tractare. Circa quam sciendum est quod positio quaedam est possibilis et quaedam impossibilis. Positio possibilis est quando ponitur propositio falsa contingens vel propositio contingens dubia.	And I prove that you have answered wrongly, because you have conceded a false and irrelevant fact, --- let it be so that no man runs ---, therefore you have answered wrongly. But this mode of opposing and answering is not observed when a case is put, for which reason the case differs from the position. However, if you know how to respond to the facts of a certain position, it is possible to slightly know how to respond to a given case, and therefore it is sufficient for now to treat of the position. About which it is necessary to know that some positions are possible and some impossible. A position is possible when a false contingent proposition or a doubtful contingent proposition is put forward.
Et circa istam positionem dantur multae regulae. Una est quod omne positum in tempore positionis propositum, sciƿtum esse tale, est concedendum absolute si ipso proposito non habeat plures sensus quam quando per se profertur. Et per hoc solvitur hoc sophisma: ponatur ista `alterum istorum est verum', demonstratis istis duobus `Ioannes est episcopus', `Ioannes sedet'. Deinde proponatur ista `unum istorum est verum'; haec est concedenda, quia sequens. Deinde proponatur ista copulativa `unum istorum est verum et alterum istorum est verum'. Si neges istam et concessisti istam partem `unum istorum est verum', igitur oportet te negare alteram partem, et ita negas positum. Si concedas, concedis tibi dubium. Dicendum est quod ista copulativa non est concedenda, sed est distinguenda, eo quod in secunda parte li alterum potest esse nomen infinitum, et tunc est copulativa vera et concedenda; vel potest esse relativum, et tunc est neganda. Et est hic tertius modus amphiboliae, quia oratio per se posita non est multiplex et posita cum alia est multiplex.	And many rules are given about this position. One thing is that every proposition in the time of a proposition of a position, known to be such, must be admitted absolutely, if by the proposition itself it has no more meaning than when it is uttered by itself. And by this means this sophistry is solved: it is assumed that this is the truth of the others, when you show to these two that John is the bishop, John is sitting. Then it is proposed that one of these is true'; this must be granted, because it follows. Then put forward the conjunction `one of these is true and the other of these is true'. If you deny this and admit this part, `one of these is true,' then you must deny the other part, and so you deny the proposition. If you agree, you allow yourself to doubt. It must be said that this copulative is not to be granted, but is to be distinguished, because in the second part either the other can be an infinitive noun, and then the copulative is true and to be granted; or it may be relative, and then it must be denied. And this is the third mode of amphibolism, because a statement posited by itself is not complex, and when posited with another it is complex.
Alia regula est: omne sequens ad positum vel bene concessum vel bene concessa, vel oppositum vel opposita bene negatorum, scitum esse tale, est concedendum si proponatur. Verumtamen ista propositio `omne sequens ex posito est concedendum' non est semper concedenda; sicut si ponatur ista `nihil est tibi positum' et proponatur ista `omne sequens ex posito est concedendum', neganda est tamquam repugnans posito.	There is another rule: everything that follows a thing that is posited, either well granted or well granted (plural), or the opposite or opposites of something well denied, known to be such, must be granted if it is proposed. However, this proposition, `everything that follows from the premise must be granted,' is not always granted; just as if it is posited that `nothing is posited for you' and it is posited that `everything that follows from what is posited must be granted', it must be denied as a contradictory posit.
Alia regula est: omne repugnans posito vel bene concesso vel bene concessis, vel opposito bene negati vel bene negatorum, in tempore positionis propositum est negandum, si non sit multiplex quando proponitur.	Another rule is: every contradictory proposition, either well-granted or well-granted (plural), or the opposite of well-denied or well-denied (plural), is to be denied at the time of the proposed position, if it is not multiple when it is proposed.
Alia regula est: ad omnem propositionem impertinentem, hoc est quae nec est sequens nec repugnans posito vel alicui bene concesso vel ƿ bene negato, respondendum est secundum sui qualitatem.	There is another rule: to every proposition which is irrelevant, that is, which is neither subsequent to, nor inconsistent with, a proposition, either well granted or well denied, we must answer according to its own quality.
Hoc est, si sit vera, concedenda est; si falsa, neganda; si dubia, respondendum est dubie; si sit multiplex, distinguenda est. Ex praedictis regulis sequitur quod idem uno loco propositum est concedendum et si alio loco proponeretur esset negandum; sicut posita ista propositione `Sortes currit', et proponatur ista `tantum ista propositio est tibi posita', haec est concedenda, quia vera est et impertinens.	This, if it be true, must be granted; if false, to be denied; if in doubt, it must be answered in doubt; if it is multiple, it must be distinguished. From the aforesaid rules it follows that the same proposition is to be granted in one place, and if it were proposed in another place it would be denied; just as the proposition `Socrates runs' is proposed, and the proposition `only this proposition is posited to you', this must be granted, because it is true and irrelevant.
Si autem primo proponeretur ista `aliqua propositio falsa est tibi posita', ista esset concedenda, quia vera est et impertinens. Et si postea proponeretur ista `tantum ista propositio est tibi posita', esset neganda, quia repugnat posito et bene concesso.	If, however, it were first proposed that `some false proposition has been posited to you', this would have to be granted, because it is true and irrelevant. And if it were afterwards proposed that `only that proposition has been put to you,' it would have to be denied, because it contradicts what has been posited and well granted.
Et ita ordo propositionum propositarum in arte obligatoria est necessario attendendus.	And so the order of propositions proposed in the art is necessarily to be attended to.
Ex praedictis etiam patet quod concessa una indefinita, non oportet concedere aliquam singularem primo loco propositam. Sicut posita ista `homo currit', non oportet aliquam singularem concedere primo loco propositam; immo omnes ordinate propositae negari possunt praeter unam, scilicet praeter ultimam, quia illa concedenda est, eo quod sequitur ex posito et oppositis bene negatorum. Sic etiam disiunctiva est concedenda, et tamen neutra pars eius primo loco proposita est concedenda.	From the aforesaid it is also clear that, having granted an indefinite one, it is not necessary to grant any particular proposed in the first place. As these words, `a man runs,' it is not necessary to grant any particular proposed in the first place; nay, all the proposed propositions in order can be denied except one, that is, except the last, because that must be granted, by what follows from the proposition and the opposites of the well-negated. Thus also the disjunctive is to be conceded, and yet neither part of it is proposed to be conceded in the first place.
Alia regula est quod posito possibili numquam est necessarium negandum nec impossibile concedendum. Quae intelligenda est de necessario quod semper fuit necessarium ante tempus obligationis et de impossibili quod fuit impossibile ante tempus obligationis et non de illo quod devenit necessarium vel impossibile infra tempus obligationis, quia tale necessarium potest negari et impossibile concedi, eo quod durante tempore obligationis est uniformiter respondendum ad eandem propositionem postquam semel est responsum ad eam.	Another rule is that, assuming the possible, it is never necessary to deny, nor to admit the impossible. What is to be understood about the necessary that was always necessary before the time of obligation and about the impossible that was impossible before the time of obligation and not about that which becomes necessary or impossible after the time of obligation, because such necessity can be denied and the impossible granted, because during the time of obligation one must uniformly respond to the same proposition after it has been answered once.