Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 42

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 42. QUID EST POSITIO IMPOSSIBILIS?.	Chapter 42. What is a position of the impossible?
Positio impossibilis est quando ponitur aliqua propositio impossibilis. Et sciendum est quod multum refert ponere unam propositionem impossibilem et accipere unam consequentiam in qua unum impossibile infertur ex alio impossibili.	A position of the impossible is when some impossible proposition is proposed. And it must be known that it matters a great deal to posit one impossible proposition and to accept one conclusion in which one impossible is deduced from another impossible.
Sicut multum refert ponere istam propositionem `homo est rudibilis' et inferre istam consequentiam `si homo est asinus, homo est rudibilis'. Similiter multum refert ponere istam propositionem `Deus non est Deus' et inferre istam consequentiam `si Deus non est, Deus non est Deus'; propter quod ista condicionalis sive consequentia concedenda est et positio non est recipienda, et quandoque positio est recipienda tamquam impossibilis et sustinenda est in positione impossibili.	Just as it makes a lot of sense to put the proposition `man is tamable' and to draw the conclusion `if man is a donkey, man is tamable'. Similarly, it is very important to state the proposition `God is not God' and to draw the conclusion `if God does not exist, God is not God'; for which reason this conditional or consequence must be granted and the position must not be accepted, and sometimes a position must be accepted as impossible and must be supported in an impossible position.
Et tamen consequentia seu condicionalis bona est; sicut ista consequentia bona est `Deus non est tres personae, igitur Deus non est Deus'; et tamen antecedens potest recipi in positione impossibili et debet negari consequens.	And yet the consequent or conditional is good; just as this conclusion is good, `God is not three persons, therefore God is not God'; and yet the antecedent may be received in an impossible position, and the consequent must be denied.
Similiter ista consequentia est bona `Spiritus Sanctus non procedit a Filio, igitur Spiritus Sanctus non distinguitur a Filio', et tamen in positione impossibili debet recipi antecedens et negari consequens.	Similarly, this conclusion is good: `The Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, therefore the Holy Spirit is not distinguished from the Son', and yet in an impossible position the antecedent must be accepted and the consequent denied.
Ex quo patet quod multae consequentiae seu condicionales verae sunt et tam antecedens quam consequens est impossibile, et tamen antecedens potest recipi et sustineri et consequens negari.	From this it is evident that many consequents or conditionals are true, and both the antecedent and the consequent are impossible, and yet the antecedent may be received and sustained, and the consequent denied
Unde circa istam .positionem impossibilem est sciendum quod non quaelibet propositio impossibilis est admittenda, quia illa propositio impossibilis quae manifeste apud omnem intellectum infert contradictoria non est admittenda.	Wherefore with regard to this position of the impossible, it is to be known that not every impossible proposition is to be admitted, because that impossible proposition which manifestly implies contradictions to all understanding is not to be admitted.
Unde illa sola propositio impossibilis ex qua per regulas et propositiones per se notas, de quibus nullus intellectus dubitare potest, non possunt inferri contradictoria, est recipienda in positione impossibili.	Hence only that position of the impossible from which, by means of rules and propositions known by themselves, of which no intellect can doubt, contradictory inferences cannot be made, is to be received in a position of the impossible.
Unde tales propositiones `Deus non est Deus', `Deus non est sapiens'; `homo non est risibilis' et huiusmodi possunt recipi in positione impossibili. ƿ Ex isto patet quod regulae datae de positione possibili, scilicet quod omne sequens est concedendum et omne repugnans est negandum, non sunt generaliter servandae in positione impossibili, sed sunt magis restringendae.	Hence such statements as `God is not God', `God is not wise'; `man is not able to laugh' and the like can be received in an impossible position. From this it is clear that the rules given about the possible position, namely that everything that follows must be granted and everything that is contradictory must be denied, are not generally observed in the impossible position, but are rather restricted.
Unde ista regula potest dari: omne sequens ex posito consequentia naturali et simplici, tenente virtute propositionis vel regulae per se notae, est concedendum. Ex quo sequitur quod in positione impossibili quod sequitur ex positis vel bene concessis syllogistice, est concedendum.	Whence this rule can be given: everything that follows from a postulated natural and simple consequence, holding by virtue of a proposition or a rule known in itself (per se), must be granted. From this it follows that in an impossible position what follows from what is posited or well-conceived syllogistically, must be granted.
Similiter quod sequitur virtute talium regularum debite circumstantionatarum `ab universali ad exclusivam de terminis transpositis est bona consequentia', `ab affirmativa de praedicato infinito ad negativam de praedicato finito est bona consequentia' et huiusmodi, est concedendum.	Similarly, what follows by virtue of such properly circumstantial rules, `from the universal to the exclusive is a good consequence of transposed terms', `from the affirmative of an infinite predicate to the negative of a finite predicate is a good consequence,' and the like, must be granted.
Si enim tales consequentiae negarentur, nulla posset esse disputatio.	For if such consequences were denied, there could be no disputation.
Illud autem quod sequitur consequentia ut nunc vel consequentia materiali vel alia consequentia quam tali, potest negari, quantumcumque veraciter sequeretur ex posito. Et similiter, proportionaliter, dicendum est de negatione repugnantis. Ex isto patet, sicut tactum est prius, quod quandoque aliqua consequentia vel condicionalis est concedenda et tamen potest antecedens sustineri sine consequente, etiam quando antecedens includit contradictionem. Unde si quaeratur sic `utrum Spiritus Sanctus non distingueretur a Filio si non procederet ab eo', respondendum est quod sic, quia per istam quaestionem non quaeritur nisi de veritate istius condicionalis `si Spiritus Sanctus non procedit a Filio, Spiritus Sanctus non distinguitur a Filio', quae vera est, quamvis non sit evidenter vera.	But that which follows from consequences, as now either material consequences or other consequences than such, can be denied, however truthfully it follows from the premise. And the same, proportionally, must be said about the negation of the contradictory. From this it is clear, as was touched on before, that sometimes some consequent or conditional must be granted, and yet the antecedent can be sustained without the consequent, even when the antecedent includes a contradiction. Hence, if it is asked, `Whether the Holy Spirit would not be distinguished from the Son if He did not proceed from Him,' the answer must be yes, because by this question we are only asking about the truth of the conditional, `If the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, the Holy Spirit is not distinguished from the Son,' which is true, although it is not evidently true.
Unde multae consequentiae bonae sunt et multae condicionales verae, quamvis non sint evidentes nobis. ƿ Similiter, si quaeratur `an si Deus sit, Deus sit trinus et unus', respondendum est quod sic, quamvis infidelis errans aliter responderet, quia illa condicionalis vera est, quamvis non sit evidens.	Hence many inferences are good and many conditionals are true, although they are not evident to us. Similarly, if it is asked, `If there is a God, then God is triune and one,' the answer must be yes, although an erring unbeliever would answer otherwise, because it is a conditional truth, even though it is not evident.
Si autem quaeratur, an posito tamquam impossibili quod Spiritus Sanctus non procedat a Filio, concedendum sit tamquam sequens quod Spiritus Sanctus non distinguitur a Filio, dicendum est quod non.	Now if it is asked whether, assuming that it is impossible that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, it should be granted as a consequence that the Holy Spirit is not distinguished from the Son, it must be said that it is not.
Quia enim ista condicionalis non est evidens nec potest evidenter sciri `si Spiritus Sanctus non procedat a Filio, non distinguitur a Filio', ideo quamvis ista ponatur tamquam impossibilis `Spiritus Sanctus non procedit a Filio', non est ista concedenda `Spiritus Sanctus non distinguitur a Filio'.	For since this conditional is not evident, nor can it be clearly known, `If the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, he is not distinguished from the Son,' therefore although this condition is posited as impossible, `The Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son,' it is not granted that the `Holy Spirit is not distinguished from the Son.'
Ex istis patet quod multae propositiones includentes contradictionem, hoc est inferentes contradictoria, possunt poni positione impossibili, nec propter hoc sunt contradictoria concedenda, quia facta positione tali non omne sequens ex posito est concedendum, sed multa sequentia sunt neganda vel non concedenda.	From these it is clear that many propositions including a contradiction, that is, inferring contradictions, can be put in an impossible position, and for this reason contradictory statements are not to be granted, because the facts from such a position are not all that follows from the proposition to be granted, but many that follow are to be denied or not granted.
Omnia enim quae non sequuntur evidenter, ita quod consequentia talis non potest fieri evidens ex naturalibus, non sunt concedenda propter positum; et hoc sive positum sit una propositio categorica sive sit copulativa ex multis categoricis.	For all things which do not follow evidently, so that such a consequence cannot be made evident from natural things, are not to be admitted for the sake of the posited; and this whether a single categorical proposition is posited or whether it is a composite of many categorical propositions.
Quandoque enim una propositione impossibili posita et non alia, aliqua propositio est neganda; et si alia esset posita cum prima, illa esset concedenda. Sed numquid talis positio impossibilis est utilis? Dicendum quod quandoque talis positio est utilis.	For when one proposition is posited as impossible and not another, some proposition must be denied; and if another were placed with the first, that would be granted. But is such an impossible position useful? It must be said that sometimes such a position is useful.
Per talem enim positionem aperitur via ad sciendum quae consequentiae sunt bonae et evidentes et quae non sunt evidentes, ex quibus potest cognosci distinctio terminorum et ordo eorum, et quandoque potest per talem modum investigari aliquarum rerum distinctio.	For through such a position the way is opened to know which consequences are good and evident and which are not evident, from which the distinction of terms and their order can be known, and sometimes the distinction of certain things can be investigated in this way.