Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 45

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 45. DE SEXTA SPECIE OBLIGATIONIS, QUAE PONITUR `SIT VERUM'.	Chapter 45. Of the sixth type of obligation, in which it is posited 'let it be true'.
Sexta species obligationis ponitur `sit verum'. Et est qua obligatur aliquis ad respondendum ad aliquam propositionem eo modo quo responderet si haberet determinatum actum circa illam propositionem; puta, illo modo quo responderet si sciret eam esse veram, vel eo modo quo responderet si sciret eam esse falsam, vel eo modo quo responderet si dubitaret eam.	The sixth type of obligation is `let it be true'. And it is by which someone is obliged to respond to a proposition in the manner in which he would respond if he had a determined act regarding that proposition; for example, in the manner in which he would answer if he knew it to be true, or in the manner in which he would answer if he knew it to be false, or in the manner in which he would answer if he doubted it.
Sicut si dicat opponens sic `sit verum te scire Sortem currere', hoc est, respondeas ad istam eo modo quo responderes si scires istam `Sortes currit'. Et mihi videtur quod ista obligatio non potest multum differre tam a positione quam a petitione.	For example, if the opponent says that `it is true that you know that Socrates runs', that is, you should answer him in the same way as you would answer if you knew that `Socrates runs'. And it seems to me that this obligation cannot be much different both from the position and from the request.
Aut enim per talem obligationem ponitur ista `tu scis Sortem currere', vel `scis Sortem non currere', vel `dubitas Sortem currere'. Vel per talem obligationem petitur quod eodem modo respondeas ad istam quo modo responderes si scires eam esse veram, vel scires eam esse falsam, vel dubitares eam.	For either by such an obligation it is put that `you know that Socrates runs', or `you know that Socrates does not run', or `you doubt whether Socrates runs'. Or by such an obligation it is required that you answer in the same way as you would if you knew it to be true, or if you knew it to be false, or if you doubted it.
Et si isto secundo modo intelligatur ista obligatio, dico quod aut obligat ad istam propositionem expressam tantum, aut ad omnia antecedentia, sequentia, repugnantia et impertinentia.	And if this obligation is understood in this second way, I say that either it binds only to this proposition expressed, or to all that precedes, follows, contradicts and is irrelevant.
Si primo modo, est obligatio recipienda.	If in the first way, there is an obligation to accept.
Si secundo modo, non est universaliter recipienda, maxime quando cadit super propositionem contingentem, quia non est in potestate respondentis satisfacere petitioni. Si enim aliquis nesciat Sortem currere et petatur ab eo quod respondeat eodem modo ad omnia ac si sciret eam, uno tempore responderet uno modo; puta, si sciret eam quando Sortes est Romae responderet uno modo, et si sciret eam quando Sortes est Londinii ƿ responderet alio modo ad multa impertinentia.	If in the second way, it is not universally accepted, especially when it falls on a contingent proposition, because it is not in the power of the respondent to satisfy the request. For if someone does not know that Socrates runs and is asked to answer everything in the same way as if he knew it, he would answer in one way at a time. for example, if he knew that Socrates is in Rome he would answer in one way, and if he knew that Socrates is in London he would answer in another way to many impertinences.
Nec est in potestate sua --- ex quo nescit eam --- respondere eodem modo ad omnia quae possent proponi quo responderet si sciret eam.	Nor is it in his power---since he does not know it---to answer in the same way to all that might be proposed to him as he would if he knew it.