Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 6

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 6. DE REGULIS QUAE DESERVIUNT CONSEQUENTIIS INTER PARTICULARES SIVE INDEFINITAS.	Chapter 6, On the rules that govern the consequences between particulars or indefinites.
Post haec restaret dicere quomodo universalis affirmativa infertur ex negativa et e converso; sed quia ista, sicut aliqua praedicta, possunt patere ex dicendis, ideo dicendum est de consequentiis inter particulares et indefinitas.	After this it remains to say how the universal positive is inferred from the negative and vice versa; but since these things, like some of the foregoing, may be evident from what has been said, the consequences between particulars and indefinites must therefore be told.
Et quia, sicut dictum est prius, particularis et indefinita convertuntur semper quando termini supponunt personaliter et significative, et quia omnes fere regulae quae deserviunt enthymematibus ex particularibus et indefinitis deserviunt etiam consequentiis ex singularibus, ideo dicendum est de eis communiter; et aliquando ponuntur exempla de istis, aliquando de illis.	And since, as was said before, the particular and the indefinite are always converted when the terms assume a personal and significant meaning, and since nearly all the rules which serve enthymemes from particulars and indefinites also serve consequences from singulars, I must therefore discuss them in general; and sometimes examples are set of these, sometimes of those.
Est autem primo dicendum de illis quae tenent per medium intrinsecum.	Now the first thing to be said is about those things which hold through an intrinsic medium.
Et est prima regula talis, quod a definitione ad definitum est consequentia bona tam a parte subiecti quam a parte praedicati affirmative, et e converso; sicut sequitur `Sortes est homo, igitur Sortes est animal rationale'. Et est talis consequentia simplex.	And the first rule is this, that from the definition to the defined there is a positive consequence both on the part of the subject and on the part of the predicate, and vice versa; as it follows, `Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is a rational animal.' And it is such a simple consequence.
Alia regula est: a descriptione ad descriptum est consequentia bona et e converso.	Another rule is: from the description to the described is a good consequence and vice versa.
Alia regula est: a nominis interpretatione ad interpretatum est bona consequentia et e converso.	Another rule is: from the interpretation of the name to the interpreted is a good consequence and vice versa.
Alia regula est: ab inferiori ad superius sine distributione et affirmative est bona consequentia et simplex.	Another rule is: from the inferior to the superior without distribution and affirmatively is a good and simple consequence.
Alia regula: ab inferiori ad superius postposita negatione est bona consequentia, sed non simplex, nisi quando praedicatio superioris de inferiori est necessaria. Unde ista consequentia est simplex `homo albus currit, igitur homo currit'; sed ista consequentia solum est ut nunc `homo non currit, igitur animal non currit', quia dum homo est animal, consequentia est bona, quando autem homo non est animal, consequentia non valet.	Another rule: from the inferior to the superior by postponing negation is a good consequence, but not a simple one, except when the predication of the superior from the inferior is necessary. Whence this conclusion is simple, `a white man runs, therefore a man runs'; but the following consequence is only that now 'man does not run, therefore an animal does not run', because when man is an animal, the consequence is good, but when man is not an animal, the consequence is invalid.
ƿ Ex isto patet quod omnes tales sunt falsae `homo albus est aggregatum per accidens'; `asinus intellectus est ens diminutum'; `materia privata caret forma'; `homo albus differt ab homine'; `intellectio creaturarum divina est posterior persona'; `essentia divina in Filio est posterior Patre'; `homo intellectus fuit ab aeterno'; `lapis intellectus est Deus', et huiusmodi, quia istae inferunt istas falsas `homo est aggregatum per accidens'; `asinus est ens diminutum'; `materia caret forma'; `homo differt ab homine'; `intellectio divina est posterior persona'; `essentia divina est posterior Patre'; `homo fuit ab aeterno'; `lapis est Deus', per istam regulam, quae numquam deficit: ab inferiori ad superius sine distributione est bona consequentia si termini supponant personaliter et significative. Si autem aliqua praedictarum propositionum, vel aliqua consimilis, inveniatur in aliquo auctore, exponendus est: quod non loquitur de virtute sermonis sed aliter, vel quod terminus talis non accipitur personaliter sed simpliciter vel materialiter.	From this it is clear that all such are false: `the white man is an aggregate by accident'; `the donkey's intellect is a diminished being'; `private matter lacks form'; `the white man differs from man'; `the divine understanding of creatures is a posterior person'; `the divine essence in the Son is posterior to the Father'; `Man was the intellect from eternity'; `the foundation of understanding is God' and the like, because these introduce these falsities, `man is an aggregate by accident'; `the donkey is a diminutive being'; `matter lacks form'; `man differs from man'; `divine understanding is a posterior person'; `the divine essence is posterior to the Father'; `Man was from eternity'; `the stone is God', by that rule, which never fails: from the lower to the higher without distribution is a good consequence if the terms assume a personal and significant meaning. But if any of the aforesaid propositions, or something similar is found in any author, it must be explained that he does not speak of the power of speech but in another way, or that such a term is not taken personally but simply or materially.
Alia regula est quod ab uno convertibilium ad reliquum est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `homo currit, ergo risibile currit'. Intelligendum est quod omnes praedictae regulae intelligendae sunt quando omnes termini supponunt personaliter et significative, quia si termini supponant simpliciter vel materialiter, non valet; vel etiam si ille terminus ratione cuius teneret consequentia supponat aliter quam personaliter, non oportet consequentias valere. Et ideo tales consequentiae non valent `animal rationale est definitio, igitur homo est definitio'; `animal gressibile bipes est descriptio, igitur homo est descriptio'; `homo est definitum, igitur animal rationale est definitum'; `homo est species, igitur animal est species'; `homo non est genus, igitur animal non est genus'; `risibile est passio hominis, igitur homo est passio hominis' et huiusmodi.	Another rule is that there is a good consequence from one convertible to the other; as it follows, `a man runs, therefore he runs laughably'. It is to be understood that all the aforesaid rules are to be understood when all the terms assume a personal and significant meaning, because if the terms assume simply or materially, it does not apply; or even if that term presupposes consequences other than personally by the reason of which it holds, the consequences need not be valid. And therefore such conclusions do not hold: `a rational animal is a definition, therefore a man is a definition'; `A bipedal animal is a description, therefore a man is a description'; `man is defined, therefore the rational animal is defined'; `man is a species, therefore an animal is a species'; `man is not a genus, therefore animal is not a genus'; `Man's attribute is laughable, therefore man is man's attribute' and the like.
Alia regula est: ab aliquo sumpto cum determinatione ad ipsum sumptum sine determinatione est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `homo albus currit, igitur homo currit'. ƿ Notandum est quod aliquando de toto aggregato ex determinatione et determinabili praedicatur altera pars, aliquando utraque pars, aliquando neutra. Verbi gratia de isto toto `homo albus' praedicatur utraque pars; haec enim est vera `homo albus est homo' et similiter haec est vera `homo albus est albus', et si `homo albus' sit, oportet quod utraque istarum sit vera. Aliquando autem altera pars solum praedicatur de illo toto; ut de isto toto `homo mortuus' praedicatur altera pars, puta haec pars `mortuus' et non haec pars `homo', nam haec est vera `homo mortuus est mortuus' et haec est falsa `homo mortuus est homo'. Similiter haec est vera `falsus syllogismus est falsus' et tamen haec non est vera `falsus syllogismus est syllogismus'. Similiter est de talibus `falsum argumentum', `syllogismus sophisticus' et huiusmodi. Aliquando autem neutra pars praedicatur de toto, quamvis totum praedicetur de toto, sicut est de isto `album secundum dentes'. Neutra enim istarum est vera `album secundum dentes est album', `album secundum dentes est dentes', quamvis haec vera possit esse `album secundum dentes est album'; et quando contingit, non erit nisi gratia materiae. Dicendum est ergo quod quando utraque pars praedicatur de toto, semper a tali toto ad quamcumque partem est consequentia bona. Unde haec consequentia est bona `homo albus currit, igitur album currit' et similiter `igitur homo currit'. Ex quo patet quod tales consequentiae sunt bonae `homo albus est ens per accidens, igitur homo est ens per accidens'; `intellectio creaturarum est posterior Patre, igitur intellectio est posterior Patre'; `lapis intellectus est realiter Deus, igitur lapis est realiter Deus'.	Another rule is: from something taken with determination to the same taking without determination is a good consequence; as it follows, `a white man runs, therefore a man runs'. It should be noted that sometimes the second part is predicated of the whole aggregate from determination and determinable, sometimes both parts, sometimes neither. For example, both parts are predicated of this whole `white man'; for this is true, `a white man is a man,' and likewise this is true, `a white man is white,' and if `a white man' is true, both of these must be true. Sometimes, however, the second part alone is predicated of that whole; so that the other part is predicated of this whole: `a dead man,' suppose this part is `dead,' and not this part, `a man,' for this is true, `a dead man is dead,' and this is false, `a dead man is a man.' Similarly, this is true: `a false syllogism is false' and yet this is not true: `a false syllogism is a syllogism'. The same applies to such things as `false argument', `sophisticated syllogism' and the like. Sometimes, however, neither part is predicated of the whole, although the whole is predicated of the whole, as it is of this 'white according to the teeth'. For neither of these is true: `white according to teeth is white', `white according to teeth is teeth', although the latter may be true, `white according to teeth is white'; and when it happens, it will be nothing but the grace of matter. It must therefore be said that when each part is predicated of a whole, there is always a good consequence from such a whole to whatever part it may be. Hence this conclusion is good: `a white man runs, therefore a white man runs' and similarly, `therefore a man runs.' From this it is clear that such conclusions are good: `a white man is a being by accident, therefore man is a being by accident'; `The understanding of creatures is posterior to the Father, therefore the understanding is posterior to the Father'; `the foundation of understanding is really God, therefore the foundation is really God'.
Similiter ista consequentia est bona `lapis intellectus fuit ab aeterno, igitur lapis fuit ab aeterno'. Quando autem altera pars tantum praedicatur de toto, tunc a toto ad illam partem est bona consequentia.	Similarly, this conclusion is good: `the foundation of understanding was from eternity, therefore the foundation was from eternity. But when the second part is only predicated of the whole, then there is a good consequence from the whole to that part.
Unde ista consequentia est bona `Sortes est homo mortuus, igitur Sortes est mortuus'.	Whence this conclusion is good, `Socrates is a dead man, therefore Socrates is dead.
ƿ Sed ad alteram partem non valet consequentia; unde non sequitur `Sortes est homo mortuus, igitur Sortes est homo'. Quando autem neutra pars praedicatur de toto, ad neutram partem valet consequentia; et ideo ista consequentia non valet `Aethiops est albus secundum dentes, igitur Aethiops est albus' vel `ergo Aethiops est dentes'. Ex istis patet quod istae consequentiae non valent `iste est albus monachus, igitur est albus', quia ista stant simul `aliquis est albus monachus' et tamen quod `nullus albus monachus est albus'.	But the consequence does not apply to the other side; whence it does not follow that 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore Socratesis a man'. But when neither part is predicated of the whole, the consequence applies to neither part; and therefore this conclusion does not hold: `The Ethiopian is white according to his teeth, therefore the Ethiopian is white' or `therefore the Ethiopian is the teeth.' From these it is clear that the following conclusions are not valid: `This is a white monk, therefore he is white', because they stand the same as `someone is a white monk' and yet that `no white monk is white'.
Similiter non sequitur `iste est tuus pater, igitur est tuus', quia ista stant simul quod `iste est tuus pater' et tamen `tuus pater non est tuus', si `tuus' in praedicato dicat circumstantiam possessionis.	Similarly, it does not follow that `this is your father, therefore he is yours', because these things stand together as `this is your father' and yet `your father is not yours', if `yours' in the predicate indicates the circumstance of possession.
Alia regula est: a propositione sumpta cum adverbio determinante compositionem ad ipsam sine tali determinatione sumpta est consequentia bona affirmative; sicut sequitur ` Sortes velociter currit, igitur Sortes currit'; `Sortes male disputat, igitur Sortes disputat'.	Another rule is: taken from a proposition with an adverb determining the composition to itself without such a determination, the consequence is good in the affirmative; as it follows, `Socrates runs fast, therefore Socrates runs'; `He disputes Socrates badly, therefore he disputes Socrates'.
Alia regula est: a propositione sumpta cum praepositione et suo casuali, vel alia determinatione aequivalente adverbio vel praepositioni et suo casuali, ad ipsam sine tali addito est consequentia bona.	Another rule is: taken from a proposition with a preposition and its casual, or another determination equivalent to an adverb or preposition and its casual, to it without such addition is a good consequence.
Sicut sequitur `homo de necessitate est animal, igitur homo est animal'; `homo dat denarium cum tristitia, igitur homo dat denarium'; `homo per se est animal, igitur homo est animal'; `homo, in quantum albus, differt ab homine, igitur homo differt ab homine'; `essentia divina et sapientia divina differunt ratione, igitur essentia divina et sapientia divina differunt'.	As it follows, `man is of necessity an animal, therefore man is an animal'; `a man gives a penny when he is sad, therefore a man gives a penny'; `man is essentially an animal, therefore man is an animal'; `man, in so far as he is white, differs from man, therefore man differs from man'; `Divine essence and divine wisdom differ in reason, therefore divine essence and divine wisdom differ.'
Ex isto patet quod omnes tales de virtute sermonis sunt falsae `quaelibet creatura de se est non-ens'; `quaelibet materia de se caret forma'; `passivum de se caret actu'; `idem sub una ratione est prius et sub alia ratione est posterius'; `idem sub una ratione est inferius et sub alia est superius'; `idem ut sic est album et ut sic est nigrum'; `idem secundum ƿ quod consideratur ut sic, est tale, et ut sic, non est tale'.	From this it is clear that all such sayings about the power of speech are false: 'every creature is of itself a non-being'; `every matter of itself lacks form'; `the passive actually lacks itself'; `The same thing is before under one reason, and after under another reason'; `the same thing is inferior under one reason and superior under another'; `the same as so is white and so is black'; `the same according to that which is considered as such, is such, and as such, is not such'.
Unde quidquid affirmatur de aliquo cum aliquo adverbio vel cum praepositione et suo casuali vel aliqua determinatione aequivalente adverbio vel tali praepositioni cum suo casuali, debet absolute concedi de eo.	Therefore, whatever is asserted about someone with some adverb or with a preposition and its casual, or with some determination equivalent to an adverb or such a preposition with its casual, must be absolutely granted about him.
Quidquid etiam praedicatur de aliquo cum dictione reduplicativa, absolute sine tali dictione vel aliquo aequivalenti praedicatur de eodem. Ex quo patet quod omnes tales consequentiae sunt bonae `natura specifica est realiter differentia individualis, igitur natura specifica est differentia individualis'; `genus et species sunt idem realiter, igitur genus et species sunt idem'; `homo est realiter humanitas, igitur homo est humanitas'; `intellectus est realiter voluntas, igitur intellectus est voluntas'; `agens est realiter passum, igitur agens est passum'; `album per accidens non est idem homini, igitur album non est idem homini'.	Whatever is also predicated of something with a reduplicative expression is absolutely predicated of the same without such an expression or something equivalent. From this it is clear that all such consequences are good: 'specific nature is really individual difference, therefore specific nature is individual difference'; `genus and species are really the same, therefore genus and species are the same'; `man is really humanity, therefore man is humanity'; `the understanding is really the will, therefore the understanding is the will'; `the agent is really suffering, therefore the agent is suffering'; `white is not the same as man by accident, therefore white is not the same as man'.
Et sic de aliis multis, quae tamen a modernis negantur.	And so about many others, which, however, are denied by the moderns.
Notandum quod istae regulae intelligendae sunt quando per talem additionem non datur intelligi propositio condicionalis. Et per hoc solvitur instantia quae posset adduci. Nam non sequitur `vellem esse in luto cum centum marchis, igitur vellem esse in luto'; nam per istam propositionem `vellem esse in luto cum centum marchis' intelligitur ista condicionalis `vellem esse in luto, si possem lucrari per hoc vel habere centum marchas'. Secundo notandum est quod ista regula habet intelligi --- et praecedentes aliae --- quando nulla est variatio in antecedente et consequente nisi quod ista determinatio ponitur in antecedente et non in consequente.	It should be noted that these rules are to be understood when a conditional proposition is not understood by such an addition. And by this the instance which might be brought is resolved. For it does not follow that `I would like to be in the mud with a hundred marks, therefore I would like to be in the mud'; for by this proposition 'I would like to be in the mud with a hundred marks' is meant the conditional 'I would like to be in the mud if I could gain by this or have a hundred marks'. Secondly, it must be noted that this rule is to be understood --- and other preceding ones --- when there is no variation in the antecedent and the consequent except that this determination is placed in the antecedent and not in the consequent.
Per hoc possunt solvi istae instantiae quae possent fieri de II Elenchorum, ubi videtur	By this means those instances which might be made of the 2 lists can be solved, where it seems
Philosophus in tali modo arguendi assignare fallaciam secundum quid et simpliciter. Unde in talibus assignat fallaciam secundum quid et simpliciter `amittere aegritudinem est bonum, igitur aegritudo est bona'; `quod non vult sapiens, est malum; sapiens non ƿ vult amittere bonum; igitur bonum est malum'.	A philosopher in such a way of arguing assigns a fallacy in a certain and simple way. Hence in such cases he assigns a fallacy in the sense and simply that `losing sickness is good, therefore sickness is good'; `What the wise man does not will is evil; the wise man does not want to lose the good; therefore good is evil.'
Patet manifeste quod in istis et multis aliis non servatur modus arguendi de quo ponuntur praedictae regulae. Sciendum est etiam quod si istae regulae alicubi patiantur instantiam, tunc patiuntur instantiam quando participium verbi non praedicatur de toto aggregato ex eodem participio et illa determinatione adiuncta; et ideo quandocumque tale participium praedicatur de tali aggregato, regulae sunt verae.	It is manifestly clear that in these and many others the method of reasoning about which the aforesaid rules are laid down is not observed. It must also be known that if these rules admit of instance anywhere, then they admit of instance when the participle of the verb is not predicated of the whole aggregate from the same participle and that determination attached; and therefore whenever such a participle is predicated of such an aggregate, the rules are true.
Possunt enim omnia talia enthymemata reduci in syllogismum per assumptionem talis propositionis quae est medium intrinsecum talis consequentiae. Unde sicut ista consequentia est bona `omnis homo currit, igitur Sortes currit', quia per assumptionem istius medii `Sortes est homo' reducitur in syllogismum, sic arguendo `omnis homo currit; Sortes est homo; igitur Sortes currit', similiter ista consequentia est bona `Sortes currit velociter, igitur Sortes currit', quia iste syllogismus est bonus `omne currens velociter est currens; Sortes currit velociter; igitur Sortes currit'.	For all such enthymemes can be reduced to a syllogism by the assumption of such a proposition which is the intrinsic means of such a conclusion. Hence, just as this conclusion is good, `every man runs, therefore Socrates runs, because by the assumption of this middle `Socrates is man' is reduced to a syllogism, thus arguing that `every man runs; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates runs', similarly this conclusion is good `Lots runs fast, therefore Socrates runs, because this syllogism is good, `everything that runs fast is running; Socrates of running fast; So Socrates runs.
Et ita est de aliis.	And so it is with others.
Et ista regula generalis intelligenda est quando participium verbi praedicatur universaliter de participio eodem, sumpto cum tali determinatione; et quando non, non.	And this general rule is to be understood when the participle of a word is universally predicated of the same participle, taken with such determination; and when not, no.
Alia regula est ista: a propositione universali affirmativa ad quamlibet eius indefinitam, particularem vel singularem, de cuius subiecto vere praedicatur subiectum universalis, est bona consequentia respectu eiusdem praedicati, nulla variatione exsistente a parte determinationis; sicut sequitur `omnis homo currit, igitur album currit', quando haec est vera `aliquod album est homo'.	Another rule is this: from a universal affirmative proposition to any of its indefinites, particular or singular, of whose subject the universal subject is truly predicated, is a good consequence with respect to the same predicate, without any variation existing on the part of the determination; as it follows that `every man runs, therefore white runs', when this is true `some man is white'.
Similiter sequitur `omnis homo est animal, igitur substantia est animal', ex quo haec est vera `substantia est homo'. Notandum est quod ista regula non habet locum quando subiectum vel praedicatum universalis importat aliquam rem unam numero quae est plures res numero vel importat aliquam rem quae est eadem realiter ƿ cum tali re quae est plures res.	Similarly, it follows that `every man is an animal, therefore a substance is an animal', whence this is true: `a substance is man.' It should be noted that this rule does not apply when the universal subject or predicate conveys some single thing in number which is several things in number, or it conveys some thing which is really the same with such a thing which is several things.
Et propter hoc ista consequentia non valet `omnis persona producta distinguitur realiter a persona producente, igitur essentia divina distinguitur realiter a persona producente', quantumcumque haec sit vera `essentia divina est persona producta'.	And for this reason this conclusion does not hold: "Every produced person is really distinguished from the producing person, therefore the divine essence is really distinguished from the producing person", no matter how true this may be, that the "divine essence is a produced person".
Nec ista consequentia valet `omnis essentia divina est Pater, igitur Filius est Pater', quamvis haec sit vera `Filius est essentia'. Est tamen advertendum quod haec regula non fallit semper quando tale praedicatum vel subiectum sumitur, immo aliquando non fallit.	Nor is this conclusion valid, `the Father is the divine essence of all, therefore the Son is the Father,' although this is true, `the Son is the essence.' However, it must be noted that this rule does not always fail when such a predicate or subject is taken, indeed sometimes it does not fail.
Unde ista consequentia est bona `omne ens est creatum vel increatum, igitur essentia divina est creata vel increata'; similiter `omnis persona divina est producens vel producta, igitur Pater est producens vel productus'.	Whence this consequence is good: 'every being is created or uncreated, therefore the divine essence is created or uncreated'; similarly, `every divine person is the producer or the product, therefore the Father is the producer or the product'.
Quando autem valeat talis consequentia in talibus terminis et quando non, potest sciri per illa quae dicta sunt in materia de uniformi generatione syllogismorum de inesse et per ea quae dicta sunt super Sententias.	But when such a conclusion is valid in such terms and when it is not, it can be known by what has been said in the matter of the uniform generation of syllogisms and by what has been said about Sentences.
Sed in omnibus aliis terminis est regula generaliter vera, sine instantia, si termini supponant personaliter et nullus eorum includat aliquod syncategorema vel aequivalens. Ideo ista consequentia est bona, et omnes tales sunt bonae: `omne animal est ens per se, igitur homo albus est ens per se'; `quaelibet persona divina de necessitate est Deus, igitur homo de necessitate est Deus'; `quaelibet persona divina fuit ab aeterno, igitur homo fuit ab aeterno'; `omnis aedificator per se aedificat, igitur album per se aedificat'; `omne album per accidens aedificat, ergo aedificator per accidens aedificat', ex quo istae propositiones sunt verae `homo albus est animal', `homo est persona divina', `aliquod album est aedificator', `aliquis aedificator est albus'.	But in all other terms it is a generally true rule, without exception, if the terms stand personally and none of them include any syncategorematic word or equivalent. Therefore this conclusion is good, and all such are good: "Every animal is a being in itself, therefore a white man is a being in itself." `every divine person is necessarily God, therefore man is necessarily God'; Every divine person was from eternity, therefore man was from eternity; `every builder builds by himself, therefore a white thing builds by itself'; `everything white builds by accident, therefore the builder builds by accident', whence these propositions are true: `a white man is an animal', `man is a divine person', `something white is a builder', ``some builder is white'.
Et ideo ista consequentia est bona `omnis natura specifica de se est communicabilis, igitur differentia individualis de se est communicabilis', si haec sit vera `differentia individualis est natura specifica', quae sequitur ex ista `differentia indiviƿdualis est realiter natura specifica', sicut patet per regulam supra positam.	And therefore this conclusion is good, `every specific nature is communicable of itself, therefore individual difference is communicable of itself', if this is true, `individual difference is specific nature', which follows from this ``individual difference is really specific nature', as is clear from the rule stated above.
Similiter ista consequentia est bona `omnis differentia individualis de se est incommunicabilis, igitur natura specifica de se est incommunicabilis', si haec sit vera `natura specifica est differentia individualis'.	Similarly, this conclusion is good: 'every individual difference is incommunicable of itself, therefore specific nature is incommunicable of itself', if this is true 'specific nature is individual difference'.
Similiter ista consequentia est bona `omne genus praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie, ergo species praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie', si haec sit vera `species est realiter genus'.	Similarly, this conclusion is good: 'every genus is predicated of several different species, therefore a species is predicated of several different species', if this is true, 'a species is really a genus'.
Similiter omnes tales consequentiae sunt bonae `omnis intellectio divina est prior actu generandi, igitur intellectio creaturarum est prior actu generandi', ex quo haec est vera `intellectio creaturarum est intellectio divina'; `omnis intellectus est intellectus speculativus, igitur intellectus practicus est intellectus speculativus'; `omnis habitus speculativus est in intellectu speculativo, igitur habitus practicus est in intellectu speculativo', vel sic `igitur habitus speculativus est in intellectu practico', si omnis intellectus sit intellectus practicus.	Similarly, all such consequences are good: "the divine understanding of everything is prior to the act of begetting, therefore the understanding of creatures is prior to the act of begetting," whence this is true: "the understanding of creatures is the divine understanding"; `every intellect is a speculative intellect, therefore the practical intellect is a speculative intellect'; `every speculative attitude is in the speculative understanding, therefore there is a practical attitude in the speculative understanding', or so `therefore the speculative attitude is in the practical understanding', if every intellect is a practical intellect.
Similiter haec est bona consequentia `omnis essentia divina est principium producendi Verbum, igitur intellectio creaturarum est principium producendi Verbum'. Et si dicatur quod talis consequentia non valet, quia si intellectio creaturarum esset principium producendi Verbum, igitur Pater prius intelligeret creaturas quam produceret Verbum, ex quo principium producendi est prius producto: Hoc non obstat.	Similarly, this is a good consequence: "every divine essence is the principle of producing the Word, therefore, the understanding of creatures is the principle of producing the Word." And if it is said that such a conclusion does not hold, because if the understanding of creatures were the principle of producing the Word, then the Father would understand creatures before he produced the Word, from which the principle of production is first produced: This does not stand in the way.
Unde quo modo intellectio creaturarum est prior Verbo et quo modo non, et quo modo Pater prius intelligit creaturas quam producat Verbum et quo modo non, dictum est super Sententias, ideo de illis ad praesens pertranseo.	Hence, in what way the understanding of creatures is prior to the Word and in what way not, and in what way the Father understands creatures before he produces the Word and in what way not, was said in the Sentences above, therefore I will pass on them to the present.
Sed ad istam formam arguendi `intellectio creaturarum est prior in Patre quam producat Verbum, igitur Pater prius producit creaturas quam producat Verbum', dicendum quod ista forma arguendi non valet, sicut non valet `Sortes albus fuit prior Platone, igitur Sortes fuit albus antequam Plato fuit albus'.	But to this form of argument, `The understanding of creatures is prior to the Father producing the Word, therefore the Father produces creatures before the Word produces', we must say that this form of argument does not hold, just as it does not hold: `Socrates was white before Plato, therefore Socrates was white before Plato was white.'
Nam posito quod Plato sit filius Sortis et quod Sortes nunc primo vel hodie primo sit albus, haec tunc est vera `Sortes albus fuit ƿ prior Platone vel ante quam Plato', quia Sortes fuit prior, et Sortes est Sortes albus, igitur Sortes albus fuit prior, et tamen haec est falsa `Sortes fuit albus ante quam Plato'.	For supposing that Plato were the son of Socrates, and that Socrates is now the first or today the first to be white, then this is true: `Socrates was white before Plato or prior to Plato, because Socrates was before, and Socrates is white Socrates, therefore Socrates was white first, and yet this is false: `Socrates was white before Plato.
Immo etiam haec poterit esse falsa `Sortes fuit albus ante quam Plato fuit albus', posito quod Sortes hodie primo fuit albus et quod Plato a principio nativitatis fuerit albus. Et notandum est hic quod aliquae talium consequentiarum sunt solum ut nunc et aliquae sunt simplices.	Nay, even this may be false, `Socrates was white before Plato was white,' on the supposition that Socrates was first white today and that Plato was white from the beginning of his birth. And it is to be noted here that some of these consequences are only for now and some are simple.
Quando enim praedicatio subiecti antecedentis de subiecto consequentis est necessaria, tunc est consequentia simplex, quando autem talis categorica est contingens et non necessaria, tunc est consequentia ut nunc solum.	For when the predication of the antecedent subject is necessary from the subject of the consequent, then it is a simple consequence, but when such a categorical one is contingent and not necessary, then it is a consequence for now only.
Unde ista consequentia est simplex `quaelibet persona divina fuit ab aeterno, igitur immortale fuit ab aeterno', quia haec est necessaria `aliquod immortale est persona divina'. Haec autem consequentia est ut nunc solum `quaelibet persona divina fuit ab aeterno, igitur creans fuit ab aeterno', accipiendo subiectum consequentis pro eo quod est, quia haec est contingens `creans est Deus'.	Whence this conclusion is simple, `every divine person was from eternity, therefore he was immortal from eternity,' because this is necessary, `something immortal is a divine person.' Now this is the consequence that now only 'every divine person was from eternity, therefore he was creative from eternity', taking the subject of the consequence for what it is, because this is the contingent 'creator is God'.
Si autem subiectum consequentis accipiatur pro eo quod fuit, consequentia est modo simplex, quia haec est necessaria `creans fuit Deus', accipiendo subiectum pro eo quod fuit, quia haec est necessaria sicut haec est necessaria `Deus fuit creans'.	But if the subject of the consequent is taken for what was, the consequence is only simple, because this is necessary, `the creator was God,' taking the subject for what was, because this is necessary, just as this is necessary, `God was the creator.'
Intelligendum est tamen quod quando arguitur in tali modo arguendi ab inferiori ad superius, est consequentia simplex, quamvis talis categorica non sit necessaria.	It must be understood, however, that when it is argued in such a manner of reasoning from the lower to the higher, it is a simple consequence, although such a categorical one is not necessary.
Unde haec est consequentia simplex `omnis homo est animal, igitur aliqua substantia est animal', quamvis haec non sit necessaria `aliqua substantia est homo'. Notandum quod omnes regulae praedictae sunt intelligendae quando termini supponunt personaliter, quia si aliquis terminus supponeret aliter quam personaliter, non oporteret consequentiam valere.	Whence this is a simple consequence, `every man is an animal, therefore some substance is an animal,' although this is not necessary, `some substance is a man.' It should be noted that all the aforesaid rules are to be understood when the terms supposit personally, because if any term supposited otherwise than personally, the conclusion would not have to be valid.
Alia regula est: a nomine numerali respectu huius verbi `est' ad ƿ nomen partis est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `quatuor sunt, ergo duo sunt'.	Another rule is: from the numerical noun in relation to this word 'is' to the noun of its part is a good consequence; as it follows, `there are four, therefore there are two.'
Alia regula: a nomine collectivo ad nomen partis est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `populus est, igitur homo est'.	Another rule: from the collective name to the name of its part is a good consequence; as it follows, ``there is a people, therefore there is a man.
Et debet ista regula intelligi quando tale totum non potest esse sine parte illa, sicut exercitus non potest esse sine homine, ideo bene sequitur `exercitus est, igitur homo est'; sed quia exercitus potest esse sine equo, ideo non sequitur `exercitus est, igitur equus est', quamvis equi aliquando sint pars exercitus.	And this rule must be understood when such a whole cannot exist without that part, just as an army cannot exist without a man, therefore it follows well that `there is an army, therefore there is a man'; but since an army can exist without a horse, it does not follow that `there is an army, therefore there is a horse,' although horses are sometimes part of an army.
Et ideo notandum quod duae regulae praedictae debent intelligi quando termini supponunt personaliter et respectu istius verbi `est' quando praedicatur secundum adiacens, quia respectu aliorum praedicatorum non valet consequentia talis.	And therefore it is to be noted that the two aforesaid rules must be understood when the terms presuppose personally and with respect to that word 'is' when it is predicated according to the adjacency, because with respect to other predicates such a consequence does not hold.
Non enim sequitur `quatuor excedunt tria, igitur duo excedunt tria; nec sequitur `populus est plures homines, igitur homo est plures homines'.	For it does not follow that four exceed three, therefore two exceed three; nor does it follow that `a people is a plurality of men, therefore a man is a plurality of men.'
Tamen respectu aliquorum praedicatorum tenet consequentia. Bene enim sequitur `populus est hic intus, igitur homo est hic intus'; `quatuor sunt homines, igitur duo sunt homines'; `quatuor sunt hic, ergo duo sunt hic'; `quatuor sunt alba, igitur duo sunt alba'.	However, with respect to some of the predicates, the conclusion holds. For it follows well that `the people are here within, therefore a man is here within'; `there are four men, therefore there are two men'; `there are four here, therefore there are two here'; `There are four whites, therefore there are two whites'.
Unde quando praedicatum non potest competere toti nisi competat alicui parti, tunc semper vel frequenter est consequentia bona respectu talis praedicati a toto numerali et collectivo ad partem, aliter non.	Hence, when a predicate cannot belong to the whole unless it belongs to a part, then there is always or frequently a good consequence with respect to such a predicate from the numerical and collective whole to the part, otherwise not.
Alia regula est: quando sunt duae contrarietates, si unum extremum unius contrarietatis praedicatur de uno extremo alterius contrarietatis, reliquum extremum praedicabitur de reliquo; sicut sequitur `iustitia est virtus, igitur iniustitia est vitium'.	Another rule is: when there are two contraries, if one extremity of one contrariety is predicated of one extremity of the other contrariety, the other extremity shall be predicated of the rest; as it follows, `justice is a virtue, therefore injustice is a vice'.
Sciendum est quod ista regula habet veritatem quando neutra contrarietatum habet medium; si enim altera habet medium, non valet; sicut non sequitur `prodigalitas est vitium, igitur illiberalitas est virtus'.	It must be known that this rule has truth when neither of the opposites has a mean; for if the other has a mean, it is not valid; just as it does not follow that 'prodigality is a vice, therefore illiberality is a virtue'.
Alia regula est: si generatio alicuius est bona, ipsum est bonum; et ideo sequitur `generatio hominis est bona, igitur homo est bonus'.	Another rule is: if the generation of something is good, it is good itself; and therefore it follows that `the generation of a man is good, therefore a man is good'.
Alia regula est: si generatio alicuius est mala, ipsum est malum; et ideo sequitur `generatio hominis est mala, igitur homo est malus'.	Another rule is: if the generation of something is evil, it is itself evil; and therefore it follows that `the generation of a man is evil, therefore a man is evil.
ƿ Alia regula: si corruptio alicuius est bona, ipsum est malum, et si corruptio alicuius est mala, ipsum est bonum. Notandum quod bonum est duplex, scilicet naturale et morale; similiter malum est duplex, naturale et morale; et de bono et malo primo modo dicto sunt regulae intelligendae.	Another rule: if the corruption of something is good, it is itself evil, and if the corruption of something is evil, it is itself good. It should be noted that good is twofold, namely, natural and moral; Similarly, evil is twofold, natural and moral. and of good and evil are the rules to be understood in the first way said.
Sed de hoc dicetur alias, ideo pertranseo.	But this will be discussed elsewhere, so I will pass on.