Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 7

Latin	English
CAP. 7. DE REGULIS INFERENTIBUS AFFIRMATIVAM EX AFFIRMATIVA PER MEDIUM EXTRINSECUM.	Chapter 7. On the rules of inferring an affirmative from an affirmative through an external medium.
Datis aliquibus regulis deservientibus consequentiis inferentibus affirmativam ex affirmativa per medium intrinsecum, dicendum est de regulis inferentibus affirmativam ex affirmativa per medium extrinsecum.	Given some rules that govern consequences inferring an affirmative from an affirmative through an intrinsic medium, we must speak of the rules inferring an affirmative from an affirmative through an external medium.
Et est una regula talis: si principale de principali et coniugatum de coniugato et casus de casu, et e converso. `Coniugatum' vocatur concretum, `principale' abstractum, et `casus' vocatur adverbium correspondens. Unde sequitur `iustitia est virtus, igitur iustus est virtuosus', et `qui iuste aliquid facit, virtuose aliquid facit'.	And there is one rule like this: if the principal is from the principal and the conjugate from the conjugate and the case from the case, and vice versa. The `conjugate' is called the concrete, the `principal' the abstract, and the `case' is called the corresponding adverb. Hence it follows that 'justice is a virtue, therefore the just is virtuous', and 'he who does something justly, does something virtuously'.
Notandum est hic quod ista regula habet intelligi si concretum et abstractum significent idem, et tunc semper verum est `si abstractum de abstracto et concretum de concreto', sed non oportet semper e converso.	It must be noted here that this rule must be understood if the concrete and the abstract mean the same thing, and then it is always true 'if the abstract is from the abstract and the concrete from the concrete', but it need not always be so and vice versa.
Sed ad hoc quod e converso teneat consequentia, oportet quod concreta semper se habeant secundum superius et inferius. Unde bene sequitur `albedo est musica, igitur album est musicum'; sed non sequitur e converso `album est musicum, igitur albedo est musica'.	But in order for the converse to hold, it is necessary that the concrete should always be according to the superior and the inferior. Whence it well follows that `white is music, therefore white is musical'; but it does not follow on the contrary that `white is musical, therefore white is music'.
ƿ Et nota quod illud est inferius ad aliud quando ab illo ad aliud est consequentia formalis affirmative, et non e converso; sicut sequitur formaliter `Sortes est homo albus, igitur Sortes est homo', et ideo non sufficit ad hoc quod aliquid sit superius quod praedicetur de omnibus de quibus aliud et de pluribus.	And note that it is inferior to another when from that to another there is a formal consequence in the affirmative, and not the other way around; as it formally follows, `Socrates is a white man, therefore Socrates is a man,' and therefore it is not sufficient for this to be something superior that is predicated of all of which one thing and of more.
Unde quamvis omnia animalia essent alba, adhuc album non esset superius ad hominem, quantumcumque `album' praedicaretur de omni homine et de pluribus aliis; et hoc quia ista consequentia non est simplex `Sortes est homo, igitur Sortes est albus'.	Hence, even if all animals were white, white would still not be superior to man, no matter how much 'white' was predicated of every man and of many others; and this is because this conclusion is not a simple one: `Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is white.
Et propter hoc non valet ista consequentia `Deus est homo, igitur deitas est humanitas', quantumcumque quilibet Deus et quaelibet persona divina esset homo; et hoc quia Deus non est inferius ad hominem, sicut nec Filius Dei est inferius ad hominem.	And for this reason the following conclusion, `God is man, therefore deity is humanity,' is not valid, no matter how much every God and every divine person were a man; and this because God is not inferior to man, just as neither is the Son of God inferior to man.
Nec hic praedicatur superius de inferiori `Filius Dei est homo' sicut nec hic `Sortes est albus'. Et si dicatur quod hic est praedicatio superioris de inferiori `Christus est homo'; igitur sequitur `Christus est homo, ergo deitas est humanitas', quia Christus non habet aliud abstractum: Dicendum est quod si hic sit praedicatio superioris de inferiori, hoc est quia subiectum aequivalet duobus concretis habentibus duo abstracta, quorum unum est `deitas' et aliud `humanitas', et concreta sunt `Deus' vel `Filius Dei' et `hic homo', quia `Christus' tunc aequivalebit isti toti `Filius Dei qui est hic homo'. Et quia Christus non est inferius ad hominem nisi quia includit aequivalenter illud concretum `hic homo' et non quia includit aequivalenter hoc concretum `Filius Dei' vel `Verbum', ideo ex ista `Christus est homo', si sit in ea praedicatio superioris de inferiori, contingit inferre istam `haec humanitas est humanitas' et non istam `deitas est humanitas'.	Neither here is the superior predicated from the inferior, `The Son of God is a man,' just as neither here is `Socrates is white.' And if it be said that here is the predication of the superior from the inferior, `Christ is man'; therefore it follows that Christ is man, therefore deity is humanity, because Christ has no other abstract: It must be said that if this is the predication of the superior from the inferior, this is because the subject is equivalent to two concretes having two abstracts, one of which is 'deity' and the other 'humanity', and concrete are 'God' or 'Son of God' and 'this man', because 'Christ' will then be equivalent to the whole 'Son of God who is this man'. And since Christ is not inferior to man except because he includes equivalently the concrete `this man' and not because he includes equivalently this concrete `Son of God' or `the Word', therefore from this `Christ is man', if there is in it a predication of the superior from the inferior, it happens to infer that `this humanity is humanity' and not that `deity is humanity'.
Exemplum est ad hoc: nam hic est praedicatio superioris de inferiori `homo albus est albus', non quia homo sit inferius ad album, sed quia `hoc album', demonstrando quemcumque hominem album, est inferius; et ideo ex ƿ ista `homo albus est albus' non sequitur ista `humanitas est albedo' sed ista `haec albedo' --- demonstrando albedinem hominis --- `est albedo'.	There is an example of this: for here is the predication of the superior over the inferior, `a white man is white,' not because a man is inferior to white, but because `this white,' indicating any white man, is inferior; and therefore from that `a white man is white' does not follow that `humanity is white' but that `this white thing' --- showing the whiteness of man --- `is white'.
Ex isto patet quod tales consequentiae sunt bonae `homo est animal, igitur humanitas est animalitas'; `equus est animal, igitur equinitas est animalitas'. Secundo est intelligendum quod ista regula est intelligenda quando concreta eodem modo se habent ad sua abstracta.	From this it is clear that such conclusions are good: 'man is an animal, therefore humanity is animality'; `a horse is an animal, therefore equineness is animality'. Secondly, it is to be understood that this rule is to be understood when concrete things have the same relation to their abstract counterparts.
Ita scilicet quod si unum concretum necessario supponat pro alia re quam suum abstractum, vel denotetur supponere in propositione, quod aliud similiter supponat pro alia re quam suum abstractum.	That is to say, if one concrete thing necessarily supposits for another thing than its abstract, or is denoted to supposit in a proposition, that it likewise supposits something else for another thing than its abstract.
Unde si unum concretum supponat pro alio quam suum abstractum et aliud concretum supponat pro eodem pro quo supponit suum abstractum, non oportet quod si concretum praedicetur de concreto quod abstractum praedicetur de abstracto.	Hence, if one concrete supposits for other than its abstract, and another concrete supposits for the same for which it supposits its abstract, it is not necessary that if the concrete is predicated of the concrete that the abstract be another concrete predicated of the abstract.
Et propter hoc ista consequentia non valet `homo est animatus, igitur humanitas est anima', nam `homo' supponit pro eodem pro quo supponit `humanitas', vel saltem supponere potest.	And because of this reason this conclusion does not hold, `man is animate, therefore humanity is a soul', for `man' stands for the same thing for which `humanity' stands, or at least it can stand for it.
Nam si nulla humanitas esset assumpta, manifestum est quod non pro alio supponerent subiecta istarum propositionum `homo est animal', `humanitas est animal'; nam cum `homo' supponat pro toto composito ex omnibus partibus essentialibus hominis, `humanitas' supponeret pro aliqua parte hominis vel pro aliquo quod nec esset illud totum nec pars, si non supponat pro toto.	For if no humanity were assumed, it is clear that the subjects of these propositions would not suppose for something else, `man is an animal,' and `humanity is an animal,' for another. for when 'man' supposits to be a whole composed of all the essential parts of man, 'humanity' supposits to be some part of man, or for something which is neither the whole nor a part, if it does not suppose it to be the whole.
Nec valet dicere quod `homo' supponat pro toto composito ex humanitate et differentia individuali contrahente humanitatem, nam idem argumentum est de Sorteitate: pro quo supponit?	and it is valid to say that `a man' stands for a whole composed of humanity and individual difference constraining humanity, for the same argument is made about Socrates: for what does it stand?
Aut pro toto aut pro parte. Similiter est de hac humanitate: pro quo supponit? Et manifestum est quod non pro alio quam pro quo supponit hic homo. Similiter `humanitas' supponit pro hac humanitate, cum haec humanitas sit humanitas. Sed `haec humanitas' includit tam naturam quam differentiam individualem, si esset aliqua talis, igitur supponit pro eodem pro ƿ quo supponit `homo'. Sed non sic se habent `animatum' et `anima', nam `animatum' supponit pro toto composito ex materia et forma, `anima' supponit pro parte tantum, et ideo non valet `homo est animatus, igitur humanitas est anima'. Haec regula `si abstractum de abstracto et concretum de concreto' habet intelligi quando subiectum et praedicatum sunt termini positivi; non enim sequitur `grammatica est non­ musica, igitur grammaticus est non-musicus'. Regula etiam est intelligenda quando nullum syncategorema vel aequivalens includitur in abstracto quod non includitur in concreto.	Either in whole or in part. The same is true of this humanity: for what does it stand? And it is clear that it is for no other than that for which this man supposits. Similarly, `humanity' stands for this humanity, since this humanity is humanity. But `humanity' includes both nature and individual difference, if there were any such, therefore it stands for the same thing that `man' stands for. But 'animated' and 'soul' are not related in this way, for 'animated' stands for the whole composed of matter and form, 'soul' stands for a part only, and therefore it does not apply to 'man is animate, therefore humanity is a soul'. This rule, `if the abstract is from the abstract and the concrete from the concrete', is to be understood when the subject and the predicate are positive terms; for it does not follow that 'grammar is not music, therefore a grammarian is a non-musician'. There is also a rule to be understood when no syncategoric term or equivalent is included in the abstract that is not included in the concrete.
Alia regula est: si aliqua consequentia est bona, eodem addito utrobique erit consequentia bona; sicut si ista consequentia sit bona `homo currit, igitur animal currit' ista consequentia est bona `homo albus currit, igitur animal album currit'.	Another rule is: if any consequence is good, by the same addition, both consequences will be good; just as if the following conclusion is good: `a man runs, therefore an animal runs', this conclusion is good: `a white man runs, therefore a white animal runs'.
Sciendum est quod ista regula debet intelligi quando illud additum est adiectivum vel substantivum respectu illius cui additur et est purum categorema, non includens aequivalenter aliquod syncategorema; et propter istud quamvis sequatur `homo currit, igitur animal currit', tamen addito eodem signo utrobique, non valet consequentia.	It must be known that this rule must be understood when it is added to an adjective or substantive in relation to that to which it is added and is a pure category, not including any syncategorematic word equivalently; and for this reason, although it follows that `a man runs, therefore an animal runs,' yet by adding the same sign on both sides, the conclusion is invalid.
Non enim sequitur `omnis homo currit, igitur omne animal currit'. Similiter sequitur `Sortes est albus, ergo Sortes est coloratus', et tamen addito utrobique `nunc primo' non valet consequentia.	For it does not follow that 'every man runs, therefore every animal runs'. Similarly, it follows that `Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is colored,' and yet by adding `now first' in both cases, the conclusion does not hold.
Non enim sequitur `Sortes nunc primo est albus, igitur Sortes nunc primo est coloratus', nam `primo' vel est syncategorema vel includit aequivalenter aliquod syncategorema, scilicet hoc syncategorema `non'.	For it does not follow that `Socrates is now first white, therefore Socrates now is first colored', for `first' is either a syncategorematic word or equivalently includes some syncategorematic word, namely this syncategormatic word `not'.
Propter idem bene sequitur `homo currit, ergo animal currit', etiam si homo non sit, et tamen negatione addita utrobique non valet.	For the same reason it follows well that `a man runs, therefore an animal runs,' even if it is not a man, and yet the addition of the negation does not hold either way.
Non enim sequitur `homo non currit, igitur animal non currit'. Si enim nullum animal esset nisi unus asinus, et ille curreret, antecedens esset verum et consequens falsum.	For it does not follow that `a man does not run, therefore an animal does not run.' For if there were no animal but one donkey, and it ran, the antecedent would be true and the consequent false.
ƿ Alia regula est: quod sapiens dicit, est verum.	Another rule is: what a wise man says is true.
Et ideo sequitur `Philosophus dicit substantiam suscipere contraria, ergo substantia suscipit contraria'. Sciendum est quod ista regula non est generalis nisi de auctore qui errare non potest vel qui in dicto suo a tali instruitur.	And so it follows, `The philosopher says that substance receives opposites, therefore substance receives opposites'. It must be known that this rule is not general except for an author who cannot err or who is instructed in his saying by such an author.
Et ideo de homine, loquente praecise ex iudicio suae rationis, non est regula intelligenda, sed praecise de Deo et de illis qui instructi a Deo loquebantur. Et ideo ista consequentia non est formalis `Aristoteles dicit hoc, igitur hoc est verum', nam inter vera, quae locutus est, multa etiam falsa dixit.	And therefore of man, speaking precisely from the judgment of his reason, there is no rule to be understood, but precisely of God and of those who were instructed by God. And therefore this conclusion is not formal `Aristotle says this, therefore this is true', for among the truths he spoke, he also said many falsehoods.
Intelligendum est etiam quod regula debet intelligi quando aliquid dicitur assertive, non recitative tantum, nec ut reprobetur.	It must also be understood that the rule must be understood when something is said assertively, not merely recitatively, nor as a rebuke.
Alia regula est: si simpliciter ad simpliciter, et magis ad magis, et maxime ad maxime, et e converso. Unde sequitur `peccans est malus, ergo magis peccans est magis malus'. Sciendum quod ista regula habet intelligi quando praedicatum in prima propositione praedicatur de subiecto universaliter, ita quod a nullo contento possit negari. Habet etiam intelligi quando nihil additur in una consequentia quod non addatur in alia, nisi illud adverbium `magis'.	Another rule is: if simply to simply, and more to more, and most to most, and vice versa. Hence it follows that ``sinning is bad, therefore more sinning is more bad. It must be known that this rule is to be understood when the predicate in the first proposition is universally predicated of the subject, so that it cannot be denied by any content. It must also be understood when nothing is added in one consequence that is not added in another, except that adverb 'more'.
Similiter habet intelligi nulla facta mutatione, vel non facta mutatione nisi circa significatum illius termini. Per primum excluduntur tales instantiae `bibere est bonum, igitur magis bibere est magis bonum'; `dormire est bonum, ergo magis dormire est magis bonum', quia non omne dormire vel bibere est bonum, immo aliquod dormire vel aliquod bibere non est bonum.	Similarly, it must be understood that no change has been made, or that no change has been made except in relation to the signification of that term. By the first, such instances as `drinking is good, therefore more drinking is more good' are excluded. `Sleeping is good, therefore more sleeping is more good,' because not all sleeping or drinking is good, indeed some sleeping or some drinking is not good.
ƿ Per secundum excluduntur tales instantiae: sequitur `iste est iustus, ergo iste est virtuosus' et tamen non sequitur `iste est magis iustus quam ille, ergo est magis virtuosus quam ille'. Similiter sequitur `iste est ebriosus, ergo est malus' et tamen non sequitur `iste est magis ebriosus quam ille, igitur iste est magis malus quam ille', quia si iste sit praecise ebriosus et excedat alium in ebrietate et non habeat aliud vitium, et alius sit modicum ebriosus et tamen cum hoc sit homicida, blasphemus, adulter, et sic de aliis vitiis, tunc iste est magis ebriosus quam ille, et tamen non est magis malus quam ille.	Secondly, such instances are excluded: it follows that `this one is just, therefore this one is virtuous' and yet it does not follow that `this one is more just than that one, therefore he is more virtuous than that one.' Similarly, it follows that `this one is drunk, therefore he is evil' and yet it does not follow that `this one is more drunk than that one, therefore this one is more evil than that one', because if this one is precisely drunk and exceeds another in drunkenness and has no other vice, and another is a little drunk and yet since this one is a murderer, blasphemer, adulterer, and so on of other vices, then this one is more drunk than that one and yet is not more evil than that one.
Per tertium excluduntur tales instantiae: sequitur `iste est iustus, igitur est virtuosus' et tamen non sequitur `iste est magis iustus, igitur est magis virtuosus'. Ponatur enim quod augmentato in isto habitu iustitiae diminuatur habitus aliarum virtutum, --- quod est possibile, sicut in Moralibus ostendetur ---, tunc antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Et si dicatur quod non sequitur `omne simplex est perfectum, igitur magis simplex est perfectius', igitur regula secundum intellectum datum non est bona, dicendum est quod ista consequentia non valet, sed excluditur per secundum, quia simplicius non dicitur aliquid quia in se sit praecise simplicius, sed necessario dicitur respectu alterius. Et ideo sicut non sequitur `ebriosus est malus, igitur magis ebriosus quam Sortes est magis malus quam Sortes', ita non sequitur `simplex est perfectum, igitur magis simplex quam a est magis perfectum quam a'. Et propter hoc non sequitur `simplex est perfectum, igitur magis simplex est magis perfectum', quia semper ista nomina `magis simplex', `magis perfectum' requirunt aliquid aliud ad quod dicantur. Non sic est de isto `magis album', quia posito quod nihil sit album nisi Sortes, adhuc poterit Sortes esse magis albus quam sit, sive sit sive non sit magis albus quam alius. Universaliter igitur per iam dicta excluduntur omnia quae non possunt competere eidem in se sine comparatione ad aliud; ƿ cuiusmodi est `simplex', nam impossibile est quod idem sit aliquando magis simplex in se et aliquando minus simplex vel e converso. Unde compositum semper est aeque compositum dum est; et similiter simplex, quantumcumque componat cum aliis, tamen semper est in se aeque simplex dum est. Et sicut est de isto, ita est de multis aliis.	Thirdly, such instances are excluded: it follows that `he is just, therefore he is virtuous' and yet it does not follow that `he is more just, therefore he is more virtuous'. For if it is assumed that when this attitude of justice is increased, the attitude of the other virtues is diminished, --- which is possible, as will be shown in the Morals ---, then the antecedent is truth and the consequent is false. And if it is said that it does not follow that `everything simple is perfect, therefore more simple is more perfect', then the rule given according to the understanding is not good, it must be said that this conclusion is not valid, but is excluded by the second rule, because something is not said to be simpler because it is precisely simpler in itself, but it is necessarily said with respect to another. And therefore, just as it does not follow that `a drunkard is bad, therefore a drunkard more than Socrates is more bad than Socrates', so it does not follow that `simple is perfect, therefore more simple than a is more perfect than a'. And for this reason it does not follow that `simple is perfect, therefore more simple is more perfect', because these names `more simple', `more perfect' always require something else to be applied to. This is not the case with `more white,' because, supposing that there is nothing white but Socrates, it would still be possible for Socrates to be whiter than he is, whether or not it is more white than another. Universally, therefore, by what has already been said, all things are excluded which cannot belong to the same in itself without reference to something something else; of this kind is `simple,' for it is impossible for the same thing to be sometimes more simple in itself and sometimes less simple, or vice versa. Hence a composite is always equally composite as long as it exists; and likewise a simple thing, no matter how much it combines with others, is always just as simple in itself as long as it is. And as it is about this, so it is about many others.
Alia regula est: si singulare de singulari et plurale de plurali et e converso; ideo sequitur `homo est animal, igitur homines sunt animalia'.	Another rule is: if the singular is from the singular and the plural from the plural and vice versa; therefore it follows that `man is an animal, therefore men are animals'.
Notandum quod ista regula non habet veritatem quando alterum illorum nominum pluralis numeri non praedicatur vere de aliquo subiecto. Et propter hoc non sequitur `Deus est ens, ergo dii sunt entia', quia illud subiectum `dii' non dicitur vere de aliquo subiecto, immo nec de se ipso.	It should be noted that this rule has no truth when the second of those plural nouns is not really predicated of any subject. And for this reason it does not follow that `God is a being, therefore gods are beings', because that subject `god' is not really said of any other subject, indeed not even of himself.
Haec enim praedicatio est falsa `dii sunt dii'. Similiter, si nullus homo esset nisi unus, haec consequentia non valeret `homo est animal, igitur homines sunt animalia', quia antecedens esset verum et consequens falsum, quia sua conversa esset falsa, scilicet `animalia sunt homines', cum quaelibet singularis sit falsa. Similiter, praedicta regula habet instantiam quando alter terminorum importat rem quae est plures res, quamvis non semper sit neganda consequentia talis. Et ideo ista consequentia non valet `persona est deitas, igitur personae sunt deitates'. Similiter habet instantiam quando alter terminorum est in recto et alter in obliquo. Et ideo non sequitur `effectus est a causa, igitur effectus sunt a causis'. Si enim Deus se solo produceret omnes effectus, antecedens esset verum est consequens falsum. Similiter non sequitur `hominis est asinus, igitur hominum sunt asini', nam posito quod omnes homines non habeant nisi unum asinum, et tamen sunt plures asini, antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Similiter, regula praedicta habet instantiam quando est praedicatio per accidens et contingens, quantumcumque de utroque extremo verificetur esse tam in singulari quam in plurali. Et ideo non sequitur `homo est caecus, igitur homines sunt caeci'.	For this predication is false, `Gods are gods.' Similarly, if there were no man but one, this conclusion would not be valid, `Man is an animal, therefore men are animals,' because the antecedent would be true and the consequent false, because it would be a falsehood of its own, namely, `animals are men,' since each individual is false. Similarly, the aforesaid rule has an instance when one of the terms implies a thing which is several things, although such a consequence is not always to be denied. And therefore this conclusion does not hold: `a person is a deity, therefore persons are deities'. Similarly, it has an instance when one of the terms is in the subject and the other in the oblique. And therefore it does not follow that `the effect is from the cause, therefore the effects are from the causes.' For if God alone produced all effects, the antecedent would be true and the consequent falsity. Similarly, it does not follow that `an ass is a man's, therefore asses are men's', for supposing that all men have but one ass, and yet there are many asses, the antecedent is true and the consequent false. Similarly, the aforesaid rule has an instance when the predicate is accidental and contingent, regardless of whether it is verified that it is both in the singular and in the plural. And therefore it does not follow that `a man is blind, therefore men are blind.'
ƿ Similiter capit instantiam quando alterum extremum est disiunctum. Unde non sequitur `omnis homo est caecus vel videns, ergo omnes homines sunt caeci vel videntes'.	Similarly, it takes an instance when the other end is disconnected. Hence it does not follow that 'every man is blind or sighted, therefore all men are blind or sighted'.
Similiter non sequitur `homo est caecus vel videns, ergo homines sunt caeci vel videntes', nam si non essent nisi duo homines, et unus esset caecus et alter videns, antecedens esset verum et consequens falsum.	Similarly, it does not follow that `man is blind or seeing, therefore men are blind or seeing', for if there were but two men, and one was blind and the other seeing, the preceding would be true and the consequent false.
Alia regula est: si plurale de plurali et singulare de singulari; sicut sequitur `homines sunt animalia, igitur homo est animal'.	Another rule is: if the plural is from the plural and the singular from the singular; as it follows, `men are animals, therefore man is an animal'.
Ista regula et praedicta intelligendae sunt quando singulare et plurale idem significant, quia si non haberent idem significatum non teneret consequentia.	This rule and the above are to be understood when the singular and the plural mean the same thing, because if they did not have the same meaning, the consequences would not hold.