Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 1

Latin	English
CAP. 1. DE SPECIEBUS FALLACIARUM.	Chapter 1. On the species of fallacy
Cum dictum sit de argumentis et speciebus argumentorum, restat nunc dicere de defectibus argumentorum et consequentiarum. Huiusmodi autem defectus vocantur fallaciae, penes quas peccant argumenta falsa. Et ideo de fallaciis est nunc dicendum; circa quas primo sunt aliqua generalia praemittenda, secundo de eis tractandum est in speciali.	Since we have spoken of arguments and of the species of arguments, it now remains to speak of the defects of arguments and of consequences.  Now defects of this sort are called fallacies, by which false arguments are in error. And therefore we should now speak of fallacies, concerning which there are first some general preliminaries, and secondly a specific treatment of them.
Est autem primo sciendum quod quamvis a Philosopho et aliis ponantur tredecim fallaciae, cum omne argumentum apparens et sophisticum peccans in forma peccet vel per aequivocationem vel per amphiboliam vel compositionem et divisionem vel accentum vel figuram dictionis vel secundum accidens vel secundum quid et simpliciter vel secundum consequens vel secundum ignorantiam elenchi, sicut tractando de fallaciis in speciali ostendetur, verumtamen praeter fallacias enumeratas sunt tres aliae quibus peccat opponens in arguendo contra respondentem.	And it should first be known that although the Philosopher and others have given thirteen fallacies, since every apparent and sophistical argument, erring in form, errs either by equivocation, or by amphiboly, or by composition and division, or by accent, or by 'figure of speech', or by fallacy of accident, or by secundum quid, or by fallacy of consequent, or by irrelevant thesis, just as will be shown when we deal with fallacies specifically, nevertheless, beyond the fallacies just enumerated there are three others by which an opponent is in error when arguing with a respondent.
Et quia Philosophus docet vitare et deprehendere defectus opponentis in arguendo, ideo tredecim fallacias enumerat.	And because the Philosopher teaches to avoid and recognise the defects of an opponent in arguing, therefore he enumerates thirteen fallacies.
Secundo sciendum quod istarum fallaciarum quaedam ponuntur in dictione, quaedam extra dictionem. Sex autem fallaciae ponuntur in dictione et septem extra dictionem.	Second, it should be known that of these fallacies, some are linguistic, others are extra-linguistic.  And six linguistic fallacies are given, and seven extra-linguistic.
Et est notandum quod 'dictio' hic accipitur non solum pro voce sed pro omni signo ad placitum instituto, sive sit vox sive scriptura sive quodcumque aliud. Et dicuntur fallaciae in dictione illae penes quas peccant argumenta quae non haberent defectum nisi essent aliqua signa ad placitum instituta, ita quod ille qui praecise facit argumenta in mente, sine omni idiomate et omni signo voluntarie instituto, non deciperetur penes illas fallacias.	And it should be noted that here 'linguistic' is understood not only for utterance, but also for every sign established by convention, whether it is an utterances, or written down, or anything else.  And 'linguistic fallacies' are those by which arguments which would not have a defect unless there were some signs established by convention, are in error: so that someone who made the argument precisely in his mind, without any idiom and any sign established by convention, would not be deceived by those fallacies.
Talia autem argumenta non potest facere penes omnes modos talis fallaciae, quamvis in casu possit penes aliquem modum. Aliae autem fallaciae quae possunt reperiri in argumentis compositis ex propositionibus habentibus tantum esse in mente, etiamsi nullum signum esset voluntarie institutum, quantumcumque argumenta prolata vel scripta possint habere consimiles defectus, vocantur fallaciae extra dictionem.	Now one cannot make such arguments in all the modes of such fallacies, although in casu one could make them in some mode.  But other fallacies which can be found in arguments composed from propositions having being only in the mind, even if no sign were established by convention, to whatever degree spoken or written arguments could have similar defects, are called extra-linguistic fallacies.
Et ideo falsum est quod dicunt aliqui quod fallaciae in dictione sunt a parte vocis et fallaciae extra dictionem sunt a parte rei vel ex natura rei, quia non plus sunt istae ex natura rei quam illae.	And therefore what some say is false, that linguistic fallacies are on the side of utterance and extra-linguistic fallacies are on the side of reality or in the nature of reality, for the one sort are no more in the nature of reality than the other sort.
Sed sic debet dici quod fallaciae in dictione sunt illae penes quas secundum omnes modos peccant omnia argumenta et sola argumenta composita ex signis voluntarie institutis, fallaciae extra dictionem sunt illae penes quas peccant argumenta tam composita ex signis voluntarie institutis quam etiam argumenta composita ex solis signis naturaliter significantibus.	But rather it should be expressed as follows. Linguistic fallacies are those in which,  in all modes, all and only those arguments composed from signs established by convention are in error.  Extra-linguistic fallacies are those in which arguments composed from signs established by convention as well as arguments composed only from signs that are naturally signifying, are in error.
Tertio notandum est quod logicus et non sophista habet cognoscere istas fallacias, ita scilicet quod habet cognoscere quasdam regulas generales applicabiles ad omnes scientias, per quas, simul cum aliis scitis in aliis scientiis particularibus, potest deprehendere omnes defectus omnium falsorum argumentorum peccantium in forma, in quacumque materia fiant.	Third, it should be noted that the logician and not the sophist has to be acquainted with those fallacies, namely, so that he has to be acquainted with certain general rules, applicable to all sciences, through which, together with other things known in other particular sciences, he can recognise all defects of all false arguments erring in form, in whatever material they are made.
Ex quo patet utilitas istius notitiae, nam per istam notitiam deprehenditur de quolibet argumento peccante in forma quod non valet, et sine ista notitia impossibile est hoc scire.	From which the usefulness of this knowledge is clear, for through this knowledge it is recognised that any argument erring in form is invalid, and without that knowledge it is impossible to know this.
Propter quod impossibile est aliquam scientiam naturalem vel moralem vel quamcumque aliam sine ista notitia perfecte habere. Et ideo ignorantes istam artem et aliis scientiis intendentes, sive intendant philosophiae naturali sive morali, sive etiam iuri civili vel canonico, sive theologiae sive scientiae cuicumque, si velint ex capite proprio multa docere vel scribere praeter illa quae inveniuntur expresse in sacra Scriptura et praeter ista quae vocaliter inveniuntur in libris scientium logicam, necessario in multos errores prolabentur.	Because of this it is impossible to have a perfect natural, or moral science, or any other science, without having this knowledge.  And therefore those ignorant of that art and meaning to study other sciences, whether they mean to study natural philosophy or moral, or even civil or canon law, whether theology or any science, ... [TO COMPLETE]
Unde non dubito quin multitudo et contrarietas opinionum tam in theologia quam in philosophia modernis temporibus ex hoc provenit quod multi ignorantes logicam novas opiniones, praeter vocaliter expressas in Scriptura sacra et dictis Sanctorum et Aristotelis, publice docuerunt et --- replendo quaternos non paucos --- in scriptis reliquerunt.	Hence I do not doubt that the multitude and contrariety of opinions in theology as well as in philosophy in modern times derives from the fact that many persons ignorant of logic have publicly taught and - filling not a few volumes, have left in writing - new opinions beyond those verbally expressed in the Scriptures and in the sayings of the saints and of Aristotle.
Quarto sciendum est quod penes istas fallacias non tantum peccant paralogismi stricte sumpti, qui scilicet sunt ex duabus propositionibus et una conclusione, sed etiam omnes falsae consequentiae peccant penes has fallacias, sive istae consequentiae sint enthymemata sive inductiones sive exempla, quae ideo vocari possunt paralogismi quia in syllogismum reduci possunt.	Fourth, it should be known that by these fallacies not only do paralogisms err, strictly understood (i.e. which are [composed?] of two propositions and one conclusion), but also all false connsequences err by these fallacies, whether those consequences are enthymematic or inductions or examples, which can therefore be called paralogisms because they can be reduced to syllogisms.