Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 2

Latin	English
CAP. 2. DE AEQUIVOCATIONE ET PRIMO EIUS MODO.	Chapter 2. On equivocation - and first, of its mode.
His visis dicendum est de fallaciis in speciali. Et primo de aequivocatione. Circa quam primo videndum est quid sit aequivocatio; secundo de modo et forma respondendi ad paralogismum aequivocationis; tertio quot modis fit aequivocatio.	With these things in view, we should speak of fallacies specifically.  And first of equivocation.  Concerning which it should be seen what equivocation is.  Second, of the mode and form of replying to a paralogism of equivocation.  Third, in how many modes equivocation occurs.
Circa primum dicitur quod aequivocatio est diversa significatio alicuius termini positi in oratione, ita quod secundum istos causa non-exsistentiae est diversitas significationis. Sed istud non est bene dictum, nam non semper ubi est aequivocatio ibi est diversitas significationis. Bene enim potest esse aequivocatio in pure univoco; sicut ista propositio 'homo est nomen' est distinguenda penes aequivocationem, etiam si hoc nomen 'homo' non significaret nisi unum, nec proprie nec improprie, et tamen hic non est diversa significatio. Et ideo dicendum est quod aequivocatio magis proprie definitur sic: aequivocatio est multorum vocatio sub eadem voce vel sub eodem signo. Ut `vocatio' non accipiatur hic pro significatione tantum sed magis pro suppositione seu pro alicuius positione.	Concerning the first, it is said [by some] that equivocation is the diverse signification of some term given in speech, so that, according to those [persons], the cause of non-existence is the diversity of signification.  But that is not well said, for there is not always a diversity of signification where there is equivocation.  For there can well be equivocation in a pure univocal [term].  For example, the proposition 'man is a name' should be distinguished by equivocation, even if the name 'man' were only to signify one thing, neither properly nor improperly, and yet here there is no diverse signification. And therefore it should be said that equivocation is more properly defined as follows.  Equivocation is the multiple calling of many things under the same utterance and under the same sign. (So as 'calling' is not understood here for signification only, but more for supposition or for some positing).
Et debet intelligi quod sit 'multorum vocatio' praedicto modo, vel quod denotetur fieri multorum vocatio vel non fieri, quia non semper quando est aequivocatio stat ibi terminus pro diversis, sed aliquando denotatur stare pro diversis et aliquando non denotatur stare pro diversis.	And it ought to be understood that it is 'multiple calling' in the previous mode, when it is denoted to be made multiple calling, or not to be made, because it is not always equivocation when a term stands for diverse things, but rather sometimes it is denoted to stand for diverse things and sometimes not denoted to stand for diverse things.
Verbi gratia si dicam sic `homo est species', ista est distinguenda, quia iste terminus 'homo' potest stare pro multis, scilicet pro intentione animae et pro homine extra. Sed si dicam sic `homo albus fuit homo', posito quod numquam aliquis homo fuerit albus, subiectum non stat pro multis, --- scilicet pro illis qui fuerunt albi vel pro his qui sunt albi ---, quia numquam fuit aliquis talis, sed denotatur stare pro talibus in ista negativa `homo albus non fuit'. Denotatur enim stare pro talibus saltem sub disiunctione.	For example, if I say 'man is a species', this has distinct senses, because the term 'man' can stand for many things, namely for an intention of the soul, and for a man external [to the soul].  But if I say 'a white man was a man', supposing that there never was a man who was white, the subject does not stand for many things, namely for those who are white or for those who are white, because there never was such a thing. Rather, it is denoted to stand for such things in the negative 'a white man was not'. For it is denoted to stand for such things at least under a disjunction.
Sciendum tamen quod `stare pro diversis' non facit aequivocationem, sed `stare pro diversis, ita quod pro uno et non pro alio' facit aequivocationem. Sicut in ista `omnis homo est animal', `homo' stat pro diversis, et tamen non est aequivocatio; sed in ista `homo est species' potest sic stare pro diversis, quia potest stare pro intentione et non pro re extra, vel potest stare pro re extra et non pro intentione, ita scilicet quod aliquis utatur hac voce pro uno et non pro alio.	Nevertheless, it should be known that 'to stand for diverse things' does not cause equivocation, but rather 'to stand for diverse things so that [it stands] for one and not another' causes equivocation.  For example, in the proposition 'every man is an animal', 'man' stands for diverse things, and yet there is no equivocation.  But in 'man is a species' it can thus stand for diverse things, because it can stand for an intention and not for an external thing, or it can stand for an external thing and not for an intention, namely, so that someone uses this utterance for one thing and not for another.
Ex hoc patet quod causa apparentiae istius fallaciae est identitas vocis vel signi, causa nonexsistentiae est diversitas usus, quia scilicet contingit ea uti uno modo vel alio.	From this, it is clear that the cause of the appearance of this fallacy is the identity of utterance or of sign, the cause of non-existence is the diversity of use, namely because it is possible to use it in one way or another.
Circa secundum est sciendum quod forma respondendi ad talem paralogismum debet esse ista: quod posita aliqua propositione in qua ponitur aliqua una dictio qua contingit sic diversimode uti, ista propositio est distinguenda, eo quod contingit uti tali dictione sic vel sic. Et sic respondendum est vel concedendo argumentum vel negando, vel in uno sensu concedendo et in alio negando, vel in utroque concedendo vel in utroque negando.	Concerning the second, it should be known that the form of responding to such a paralogism ought to be this: that given some proposition in which a single expression is posited which can be used in diverse ways, that proposition has distinct senses, in that such an expression can be used in one way or another. And thus it should be answered to either by conceding the argument, or denying it, either by conceding it in one sense or denying it in the other, or conceding or denying both.
Circa tertium sciendum est quod tres ponuntur modi aequivocationis. Primus modus est quando aliqua dictio est aequivoca a casu. Vocatur autem 'aequivocum a casu' quando dictio aeque primo --- non semper quidem aeque primo tempore sed intentione --- pluribus impositionibus, vel una aequivalenti pluribus, imponitur ad significandum, ita scilicet quod una impositione imponitur ad significandum ac si non esset prius imposita. Sicut contingit quando eadem dictio est eadem in diversis idiomatibus, sicut haec dictio `me' et est Latinum et est Anglicum, ideo est aequivocum a casu. Ita etiam est in eisdem dictionibus eiusdem idiomatis frequenter.	Concerning the third, it should be known that there are supposed to be three modes of equivocation. The first mode is called 'equvocation a casu' when an expression applies equally primarily (not always equally primarily by time but by intention, of course) to several impositions, or one equivalent to several,that is to say, it is imposed by one imposition to signify as if it had not been imposed before. As it happens when the same word is the same in different idioms, as this word 'me' is both Latin and English, it is therefore equivocal by chance. This is also the case frequently in the same expressions of the same idiom.
Et est sciendum quod non solum dictio quae proprie aliquid significat, cuiusmodi est dictio categorematica, sed etiam dictio quae nihil per se et proprie significat sed tantum consignificat, cuiusmodi sunt dictiones syncategorematicae, possunt esse aequivocae, sicut patebit de adverbiis, coniunctionibus et aliis signis.	And it must be known that not only an expression which properly means something, such as a categorematic expression, but also an expression which does not mean anything by itself and properly but only connotes, such as syncategorematic expressions, can be equivocal, as will be clear from adverbs, conjunctions and other signs.
Secundo notandum est quod quaelibet propositio in qua ponitur talis dictio aequivoca semper de virtute sermonis est distinguenda, eo quod potest accipi sic vel sic, et hoc sive sit in uno sensu vera et in alio sensu falsa, sive in utroque sensu falsa sive in utroque vera. Tamen aliquando disputantes possunt illos terminos arctare ad certum sensum vel ad certam significationem, et tunc non est distinguenda. Potest autem hoc fieri vel per consuetudinem vel per certam ordinationem inter eos.	Secondly, it must be noted that every proposition in which such an equivocal expression is used must always be distinguished by the power of speech, by that which can be taken one way or the other, and this whether it is true in one sense and false in another sense, or false in both senses or true in both. However, sometimes disputants can narrow those terms to a certain sense or to a certain meaning, and then it is not necessary to distinguish them. But this can be done either by custom or by a definite arrangement between them.
Potest etiam hoc fieri per additionem alicuius; sicut si opponens dicat: volo quod quandocumque addo huic dictioni `canis' a, quod stet praecise pro animali latrabili. Tunc si opponens proponat istam propositionem `omnis canis a est latrabilis', non est distinguenda; si autem proponat istam `omnis canis est latrabilis', est distinguenda. Potest etiam fieri sine additione tali; sicut si opponens dicat sic: volo in tota ista disputatione accipere hoc nomen `canis' praecise pro animali latrabili. Tunc quandocumque in ista disputatione proponatur propositio in qua ponitur haec dictio 'canis', non est distinguenda.	This can also be done by the addition of something; as if the objector were to say: I want that whenever I add to this expression `dog,' it stands precisely for a barking animal. Then if the opponent puts forward this proposition, `every dog ​​is a barker, it is not to be distinguished; but if he proposes that `every dog ​​is barking,' it must be distinguished. It can also be done without such an addition; as if the objector were to say thus: I want in this whole discussion to take this name 'dog' precisely for a barking animal. Then whenever in this discussion a proposal is put forward in which this word 'dog' is used, it is not to be distinguished.
Et si quaeratur an talis propositio distinguenda sit vera vel falsa, dicendum est quod vocando `verum' omne illud quod est signum subordinatum verae propositionis in mente, talis propositio distinguenda est; si habeat unum sensum verum et alium falsum ipsa est tam vera quam falsa, quia sibi correspondet tam vera propositio quam falsa in mente.	And if it is asked whether such a proposition is to be distinguished as true or false, it must be said that by calling `true' all that which is a subordinate sign of a true proposition in the mind, such a proposition is to be distinguished; if it has one meaning true and another false, it is itself both true and false, because both true and false propositions correspond to it in the mind.
Vocando autem `verum' illud cui correspondet praecise una propositio in mente vera et non falsa, sic accipiendo hoc vocabulum talis propositio nec est vera nec falsa. Et ideo quod aliquando dixi quod eadem propositio est vera et falsa, necessaria et impossibilis, et aliquando quod eadem propositio non est vera et falsa, aequivoce accepi `verum' et `falsum' in uno loco et in alio.	But by calling `truth' that which corresponds to precisely one proposition in the mind that is true and not false, thus accepting this term such a proposition is neither true nor false. And because I sometimes said that the same proposition is true and false, necessary and impossible, and sometimes that the same proposition is not true and false, I equivocally took 'true' and 'false' in one place and in another.
Quam aequivocationem tunc intellexi, quamvis non expresserim, sicut nec aliqui scribentes semper exprimunt aequivocationes quas advertunt in dictis suis. Penes istum primum modum peccant talia argumenta `omnis canis est animal; caeleste sidus est canis; igitur caeleste sidus est animal', nam tam maior quam minor est distinguenda, eo quod li canis in utraque potest stare pro animali latrabili, et tunc valet syllogismus, sed minor est falsa, ista scilicet `caeleste sidus est canis'.	What equivocation I then understood, although I did not express it, just as some writers do not always express the equivocations which they notice in their sayings. According to this first method, such arguments as `every dog ​​is an animal' fall into error. the celestial star is the dog; therefore, the celestial star is an animal, for both the greater and the lesser are to be distinguished, by the fact that in both cases a dog can stand for a barking animal, and then the syllogism is valid, but the falsehood is smaller, that is, 'a celestial star is a dog'.
Vel potest stare tam in maiore quam in minore pro caelesti sidere, et tunc etiam valet syllogismus, sed maior est falsa, ista scilicet `omnis canis est animal', quia tunc denotatur quod caeleste sidus est animal.	Or it may stand both in the greater and in the lesser for the celestial star, and then the syllogism is also valid, but it is a greater falsehood, namely, that `every dog ​​is an animal,' because then it is denoted that the celestial star is an animal.
Vel potest `canis' in maiore stare pro animali latrabili et in minore pro caelesti sidere, et tunc non valet syllogismus sed est fallacia aequivocationis, quia `canis' aequivoce accipitur in maiore et in minore.	Alternatively, `dog' can stand in the major for a barking animal and in the minor for a celestial star, and then the syllogism is not valid but is a fallacy of equivocation, because ``dog is taken equivocally in the major and the minor.
Similiter talis consequentia peccat secundum fallaciam aequivocationis `omnis canis est animal, ergo caeleste sidus est animal', nam illud antecedens `omnis canis est animal' est distinguendum, eo quod `canis' potest stare pro animali latrabili; et tunc non valet consequentia, quia tunc arguitur a termino stante pro uno significato ad eundem terminum stantem pro alio significato quam pro illo pro quo stat in antecedente, sicut manifeste patet.	Similarly, such a conclusion sins according to the fallacy of equivocation, `every dog ​​is an animal, therefore the celestial star is an animal', for the preceding one `every dog ​​is an animal' is to be distinguished by the fact that `dog' can stand for a barking animal; and then the inference is not valid, because then it is argued from a term standing for one meaning to the same term standing for another meaning than for that for which it stands in the antecedent, as is clearly evident.
Si autem li canis stet pro caelesti sidere in antecedente, tunc est consequentia bona, quia arguitur a termino stante pro uno significato ad illud idem significatum, vel magis proprie loquendo ad eundem terminum stantem pro eodem significato; et ita tunc consequentia est bona, sed antecedens est falsum.	Similarly, such a conclusion fails according to the fallacy of equivocation, `every dog ​​is an animal, therefore the celestial star is an animal', for the preceding one `every dog ​​is an animal' is to be distinguished by the fact that `dog' can stand for a barking animal. and then the inference is not valid, because then it is argued from a term standing for one meaning to the same term standing for another meaning than for that for which it stands in the antecedent, as is clearly evident.
Et iste modus respondendi vel consimilis debet servari in respondendo ad quodcumque argumentum in quo ponitur aliqua propositio distinguenda penes quamcumque fallaciam. Penes istum modum peccant tales paralogismi `tantum aqua est in vase; color est in vase; igitur color est aqua', nam li in diversimode et aequivoce accipi potest: uno modo ut denotet aliquid esse in aliquo loco, sicut locatum dicitur esse in loco, et sic est maior vera; aliter accipitur in minore, ut denotet aliquid esse in aliquo tamquam accidens in subiecto.	And this mode of answering, or something like it, must be observed in replying to any argument in which any proposition is put forward to be distinguished, regardless of any fallacy. According to this method, such paralogisms are wrong as `there is only water in the vessel; color is in the vessel; therefore the color is water', for it can be taken in different ways and equivocally: in one way it denotes that something is in a certain place, just as it is said to be located in a place, and thus it is a greater truth; it is taken differently in the minor, to denote that something is in someone as an accident in the subject.
Et sicut accidit aequivocatio propter hanc dictionem `in', ita frequenter accidit aequivocatio propter alias dictiones syncategorematicas. Quando autem hoc contingat, scitur per usum et exercitium in diversis scientiis.	And just as equivocation occurs because of this expression 'in', equivocation frequently occurs because of other syncategorematic expressions. But when this happens, it is known through use and exercise in different sciences.