Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 10

Latin	English
CAP. 10. DE FALLACIA FIGURAE DICTIONIS.	Chapter 10. On the fallacy of 'figure of speech'.
Post fallacias in dictione, iuxta quas sunt aliquae orationes multiplices, dicendum est de fallacia figurae dictionis, quae non oritur ex alicuius orationis multiplicitate, sed oritur magis ex aliquarum dictionum similitudine.	After fallacies in diction, according to which some speeches are multiple, we must speak of fallacies of figure of speech, which does not arise from the multiplicity of any speech, but arises rather from the similarity of some wordings.
Ita quod fallacia figurae dictionis est deceptio proveniens ex aliqua similitudine dictionis, ita quod causa apparentiae est similitudo dictionis ad dictionem et causa non-exsistentiae est diversitas significatorum vel modorum significandi vel accidentium grammaticalium dictionum.	So that the fallacy of the figure of speech is a deception resulting from some similarity of wording, so that the cause of appearance is the similarity of statement to statement and the cause of non-existence is the diversity of meanings or ways of signifying or grammatical accidents of speech.
Et accipio hic `significata' largissime. Unde generalis modus solvendi paralogismos penes istam fallaciam est ostendere aliquam diversitatem inter significata vel modos significandi vel accidentia dictionum propter quam non valet argumentum. Ista enim fallacia semper ex hoc accidit quod quia aliquis modus arguendi tenet in aliquibus dictionibus creditur ex hoc quod talis modus arguendi valeat in aliis consimilibus dictionibus, in quibus tamen non valet propter hoc quod illae dictiones diversae, quamvis videantur similes, habent diversa significata, large accipiendo significata, vel diversum modum significandi vel diversa accidentia grammaticalia.	And I take `significant' here very liberally. Hence the general method of resolving paralogisms involving this fallacy is to show some difference between the signifieds, or modes of signification, or accidents of speech, because of which the argument is invalid. For this fallacy always occurs from the fact that because a certain method of reasoning holds in some expressions it is believed from this fact that such a method of reasoning is valid in other similar expressions, in which it is not valid because those different expressions, although they seem similar, have different meanings, understanding meanings broadly, or a different mode of meaning or different grammatical accidents.
Verbi gratia: videmus enim quod iste syllogismus est bonus `omnis substantia corporea est colorata; capra est substantia corporea; igitur capra est colorata', ita quod nulla est variatio inter praedicatum maioris et praedicatum conclusionis.	For example: for we see that this syllogism is good: `every corporeal substance is colored; A goat is a corporeal substance; therefore the goat is colored', so that there is no variation between the predicate of the major and the predicate of the conclusion.
Si propter hoc credatur quod in consimili modo arguendi ex aliis terminis non sit aliqua variatio facienda inter praedicatum maioris et praedicatum conclusionis, sicut sic arguendo `omnis substantia corporea est colorata; patriarcha est substantia corporea; igitur patriarcha est colorata', deceptio fiet per fallaciam figurae dictionis.	If, for this reason, it is believed that in a similar way of arguing from other terms there is no variation to be made between the predicate of the major and the predicate of the conclusion, just as by arguing that `every corporeal substance is colored; the patriarch is a corporeal substance; therefore the patriarch is colored', the deception will be done through the fallacy of the figure of speech.
Unde generaliter quandocumque est fallacia figurae dictionis, contingit invenire consimilem modum arguendi bonum ex aliis terminis, et hoc propter diversitatem accidentium grammaticalium vel modorum significandi vel propter diversitatem significatorum, largissime accipiendo `significata'.	Hence, in general, whenever there is a fallacy of a figure of speech, it is possible to find a similar way of arguing well from other terms, and this because of the diversity of grammatical accidents or ways of signifying, or because of the diversity of things signified, taking signified very broadly.
Iuxta praedicta possunt accipi tres modi istius fallaciae.	According to what has been said, there are three modes of this fallacy.
Quorum primus est quando accidit defectus in arguendo propter diversitatem accidentium grammaticalium diversarum dictionum. Et talis modus arguendi sophisticus vel semper vel frequenter ducit ad soloecismum. Unde si arguatur sic `omne animal est coloratum; homo est animal; igitur homo est coloratum', dicendum est quod hic est fallacia figurae dictionis.	The first of these is when a failure occurs in reasoning because of the diversity of the grammatical accidents of different expressions. And such a sophistic way of reasoning either always or frequently leads to soloecism. Wherefore if it be argued thus, `every animal is a colored thing; man is an animal; therefore man is a colored thing', it must be said that here is the fallacy of the figure of speech.
Quia enim `homo' non est neutrius generis sicut `animal' est neutrius generis, ideo non debet inferri ista conclusio `homo est coloratum' sed ista `homo est coloratus'. Et quandoque variatio vocalis alicuius termini debet fieri in diversis propositionibus propter variationem accidentium diversorum terminorum.	For since `man' is not of either kind, just as `animal' is of neither kind, therefore the conclusion should not be inferred that ``man is a colored thing but rather that `a man is colored'. And sometimes the variation of the vowel of a certain term must be made in different propositions because of the variation of the accidents of the different terms.
Similiter hic potest assignari fallacia figurae dictionis `omne album est corpus; omnis homo est album; igitur omnis homo est corpus'. Et si dicatur quod semper in omni fallacia debet esse aliqua apparentia, hic autem nulla videtur, igitur etc., dicendum est quod non requiritur in omni fallacia tanta apparentia quae decipiat sapientes, sed sufficit tanta quae aliquos simplices fallere possit.	Similarly, here may be assigned the fallacy of the figure of speech, `every white thing is a body; every man is a white thing; therefore every man is a body'. And if it is said that in every fallacy there must always be some appearance, but here nothing is seen, therefore, etc., it must be said that in every fallacy it is not necessary to have so much appearance as to deceive the wise, but so much as to be able to deceive some simple people is sufficient.
Et sic est in proposito, quia aliqui simplices possent in consimilibus decipi. Secundus modus principalis istius fallaciae accipitur ex diversitate significatorum diversarum dictionum.	And so it is in a proposition, because some simple people might be deceived in the similarity. The second main mode of this fallacy is taken from the diversity of meanings of different expressions.
Verumtamen aliqua diversitas talis est sufficiens ad istam fallaciam in aliquo modo arguendi et aliqua non sufficit. Sed ad sciendum in speciali quando sufficit et quando non sufficit, per logicam sciri non potest, sicut nec per logicam sciri potest in speciali de qualibet dictione an sit aequivoca vel non sit aequivoca, sed hoc debet sciri per speciales scientias.	Nevertheless, some such diversity is sufficient to justify this fallacy in some way, and some is not. But in order to know in particular when it is sufficient and when it is not sufficient, it cannot be known through logic, just as neither can it be known through logic in particular whether any saying is equivocal or not equivocal, but this must be known through special sciences.
Penes istum modum peccant talia argumenta sophistica `calefacere est agere, igitur videre est agere', `calefieri est pati, ergo videri est pati'. Causa apparentiae istarum consequentiarum sophisticarum est similis terminatio istorum verborum `videre --- calefacere', `videri --- calefieri'.	According to this method, such sophistic arguments as `to warm up is to act, therefore to see is to act', `to be warmed is to experience, therefore to be seen to experience'. The reason for the appearance of these sophisticated consequences is the similar ending of these words `to see --- to heat', `to be seen --- to be heated'.
Causa non exsistentiae est diversitas significatorum.	The reason for its non-existence is the diversity of meanings.
Quia enim `calefacere' significant calorem causatum a calefaciente in calefacto et `videre' significat visionem causatam a viso in vidente et non causatam a vidente in viso, ideo non valet consequentia.	For 'to heat' signifies the heat caused by the heating in the heated, and 'to see' signifies the vision caused by the seen in the seer and not caused by the seer in the seen, therefore the conclusion is invalid.
Similiter tales consequentiae non valent `calefaciens est agens, igitur videns est agens',	Similarly, such conclusions do not hold: `Heating is the agent, therefore the seeing is the agent'.
'calefactum patitur, igitur visum patitur'. Et universaliter quando dictiones habent eadem accidentia grammaticalia et eosdem modos significandi, et propter hoc quod habent consimiles terminationes et consimiles modos significandi creditur quod illud commune praedicabile quod verificatur de uno verificetur de reliquo, et tamen propter hoc quod significant diversa non est sic, sed est fallacia figurae dictionis.	`heated is experienced, therefore sight is experienced'. And universally, when expressions have the same grammatical accidents and the same ways of signifying, and because they have similar endings and similar ways of signifying, it is believed that the common predicate which is verified of one is verified of the other, and yet because of the fact that the signifiers are different, it is not so, but is a fallacy of the figure of speech.
Et accidit frequenter iste modus figurae dictionis quando arguitur per locum a simili vel per aliquem locum consimilem. Puta: quia enim `visum' est participium verbi passivi, secundum grammaticos, ideo potest credi quod sicut `calefactum', quod est participium verbi passivi, non potest verificari nisi de passo, sic quod `visum' non possit verificari nisi de passo.	And this mode of figure of speech frequently occurs when it is argued by a similar passage or by some similar passage. For example, because `seen' is a participle of the passive verb, according to the grammarians, therefore it can be believed that just as `heated', which is a participle of the passive verb, cannot be verified except from experience, so that `seen' cannot be verified except from experience.
Et talis sic credens, nesciens naturam significatorum per istos terminos vel nesciens quid et quomodo significant, decipitur per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Si enim credat quod sicut `calefactum' significat illud quod patitur, et in quo est calor, in recto et illud a quo patitur in obliquo, sic `visum' significet illud in quo est visio in recto et illud a quo est visio in obliquo, decipitur.	And such a person believing in this way, not knowing the nature of what is signified by these terms or not knowing what and how they mean, is deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech. For if he believes that just as 'heated' signifies that which is experienced, and in which there is heat, in the nominative case and that from which it is experienced in the oblique, so 'sight' signifies that in which the vision is directly and that from which the vision is in the oblique, he is deceived.
Et ideo ad istum modum figurae dictionis perfecte sciendum necesse est scire naturas rerum et etiam necesse est scire grammaticam per quam scitur quid vox significat uno modo et quid alio modo significandi.	And therefore, in order to know perfectly this mode of figure of speech, it is necessary to know the natures of things, and it is also necessary to know the grammar by which it is known what a word means in one way and what it means in another way.
Nec tamen iste modus est ex diversitate modorum significandi aliquarum dictionum, ex hoc scilicet quod una dictio habet unum modum significandi, et alia dictio non habet illum modum significandi, sed est ex diversitate significatorum.	And yet this mode is not due to the diversity of the modes of signifying certain expressions, namely, from the fact that one expression has one mode of signifying, and another expression does not have that mode of signifying, but it is due to the diversity of the things signified.
Quia enim diversa, quamvis eisdem modis significandi, significantur per istum terminum	Because different things, although they are signified by the same modes, are signified by this term
'visum' et per istum terminum `calefactum' ideo est ibi fallacia. Oportet autem scire quod iste modus non contingit tantum quando propter consimiles terminationes et consimiles modos significandi creditur quod illud quod est commune uni est commune alteri, sicut sic arguendo `albedo est qualitas, igitur hirundo est qualitas', `qualitas differt realiter a substantia, igitur quantitas differt realiter a substantia', `musica est feminini generis, igitur propheta est femini generis', et sic de multis aliis, sed etiam iste modus reperiri potest quando propter naturam rei significatae aliquis discursus vel consequentia valet et tamen alio termino posito in praedicto discursu vel consequentia loco alicuius termini ibi positi non valeret.	`seen' and by that term `heated' is therefore a fallacy there. It is necessary to know that this method does not occur only when, because of similar endings and similar ways of signifying, it is believed that what is common to one is common to the other, as in arguing that `whiteness is a quality, therefore a swallow is a quality', `a quality really differs from a substance, therefore a quantity really differs from a substance', `music is of the feminine gender, therefore the prophet is of the feminine gender', and so on with many others, but this mode can also be found when, because of the nature of the thing signified, as someone is discussing it the consequence is valid, and yet if another term were placed in the aforesaid discourse, the consequence would not be valid for any term placed there.
Verbi gratia secundum opinionem Aristotelis hoc est bonum argumentum `iste dabit bovem coloratum; iste non habet bovem coloratum; igitur iste dabit bovem quem non habet', et tamen sic arguendo `iste dabit bovem album; iste non habet bovem album; igitur iste dabit bovem quem non habet' non valet, quia praemissae possunt esse verae conclusione exsistente falsa. Similiter talis discursus est bonus `iste est modo albus; iste cras non erit albus; igitur iste amittet aliquam rem quam modo habet'. Et tamen iste discursus secundum principia Aristotelis non valet `iste aer est nunc bicubitus; iste aer cras non erit bicubitus; ergo iste aer amittet cras aliquam rem quam nunc habet', et tamen idem modus arguendi videtur utrobique.	For example, according to the opinion of Aristotle, this is a good argument: `this man will give a colored ox; he has no colored ox; therefore he will give an ox which he does not have', and yet arguing thus, `this man will give a white ox; he has no white ox; therefore this man will give an ox which he does not have' does not hold, because the premises may be true with the existing conclusion being false. Similarly, such a discourse is good, `this man is now white; he will not be white tomorrow; therefore, he will lose some property which he has right now'. And yet this discourse is not valid according to Aristotle's principles: `this air is now calm; this air will not be calm tomorrow; therefore, this air will tomorrow lose some of the property it has now', and yet the same method of reasoning seems to be the same on both sides.
Et ideo si propter hoc credatur, quia alicubi tenet talis modus arguendi quod ubique valeat, fiet deceptio per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Et si quaeratur quare magis est fallacia figurae dictionis in uno discursu quam in alio, dicendum est quod hoc est propter hoc quod medium intrinsecum per quod tenet unus discursus est necessarium et medium intrinsecum per quod tenet alius discursus non est necessarium.	And therefore, if because of that it is believed, because elsewhere such a method of reasoning holds that is valid everywhere, it will be a deception through the fallacy of a figure of speech. And if it is asked why there is more fallacy of the figure of speech in one discourse than in another, it must be said that this is because the intrinsic medium by which one discourse holds is necessary, and the intrinsic medium by which another discourse holds is not necessary.
Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod quaedam consequentiae, etiam formales, tenent per medium intrinsecum et quaedam tenent per medium extrinsecum. Illae tenent per medium intrinsecum quae tenent virtute unius propositionis formatae ex eisdem terminis, sicut ista consequentia `omnis homo est animal, igitur Sortes est animal' tenet per medium intrinsecum, quia tenet virtute unius propositionis formatae ex eisdem terminis, puta ex istis terminis `Sortes' et `homo', quia tenet virtute istius medii `Sortes est homo'.	For the evidence of which it is necessary to know that certain consequences, even formal ones, hold through an intrinsic medium and others through an external medium. Those hold by virtue of an intrinsic medium which hold by virtue of a single proposition formed from the same terms, just as this conclusion `every man is an animal, therefore Socrates is an animal' holds by an intrinsic medium, because it holds by virtue of a single proposition formed from the same terms, for example from these terms `Socrates' and `man', because it holds by virtue of that medium `Socrates is a man'.
Si enim ista propositio esset falsa, consequentia prima in nullo valeret. Illae autem consequentiae vel discursus tenent per medium extrinsecum quae tenent sufficienter virtute alicuius regulae generalis non formatae ex terminis talis consequentiae vel discursus, vel si formetur ex illis hoc accidit, quia aliae consequentiae et discursus tenent aeque bene per hoc medium vel per tale medium extrinsecum ex quorum terminis non formatur talis regula generalis. Sicut patet de ista consequentia `omnis homo est animal, igitur tantum animal est homo', quae tenet per istud medium `ab universali ad exclusivam de terminis transpositis est bona consequentia'. Et ista consequentia `omnis homo est animal, igitur aliquod animal est homo' tenet per istam regulam `universalis affirmativa convertitur per accidens'.	For if this proposition were false, the first consequence would have no validity. But those consequences or discourses hold through an external medium which hold sufficiently by virtue of some general rule not formed from the terms of such a consequence or discourse; or if it is formed from them, this happens because other consequences and discourses hold equally well through this medium or through such an external medium from the terms of which such a general rule is not formed. This is clear from this conclusion, `every man is an animal, therefore only an animal is a man', which holds through this medium, `from the universal to the exclusive is a good consequence transposed from the extremes'. And this conclusion, `every man is an animal, therefore some animal is a man,' holds by this rule, `the universal affirmative is converted by accident.'
Et ideo quandocumque accipiuntur aliquae consequentiae vel discursus quae non rectificantur vel regulantur per aliquam regulam generalem, videndum est si possint rectificari per aliquam propositionem veram formatam ex eisdem terminis.	And therefore whenever some conclusions or discourses are accepted which are not rectified or governed by any general rule, it must be seen whether they can be rectified by some true proposition formed from the same terms.
Et si sic, consequentia erit bona; si non, consequentia non valebit. Sic autem est in proposito. Nam tales consequentiae `iste non habet bovem coloratum; iste dabit bovem coloratum; igitur iste dabit bovem quem non habet', `iste dabit bovem album; iste non habet bovem album; ergo iste dabit bovem quem non habet' non possunt regulari per aliquam regulam generalem; igitur si valeant, oportet habere aliquod medium verum ex eisdem terminis.	And if so, the consequence will be good; if not, the consequence will not be valid. And so it is in a proposition. For such consequences as `this man does not have a colored ox; he will give a colored ox; therefore he will give an ox which he does not have', `this man will give a white ox; he has no white ox; therefore he will give an ox which he does not have' cannot be governed by any general rule; therefore, if they are valid, it is necessary to have some true medium from the same terms.
Nunc autem ita est quod prima consequentia tenet per medium verum et necessarium, secundum principia Aristotelis, quod est istud `si aliquid est bos, ipsum est coloratum'.	But now it is so that the first consequence holds by means of truth and necessity, according to Aristotle's principles, which is that if something is an ox, it is itself colored.
Unde quia secundum principia Aristotelis impossibile est quod aliquid sit bos et non sit coloratus, ideo ista consequentia est bona `iste dabit bovem coloratum; et iste non habet bovem coloratum; igitur iste dabit bovem quem non habet'.	Hence, since according to Aristotle's principles it is impossible for anything to be an ox and not be colored, therefore this conclusion is good: `this man does not have a colored ox; he will give a colored ox; therefore he will give an ox which he does not have'
Sed quia possibile est quod idem bos numero sit primo non albus et postea albus, ideo illud medium intrinsecum per quod tenet alia consequentia `si aliquid est bos, ipsum est album', est simpliciter falsum.	But since it is possible for the same number of cattle to be first non-white and then white, therefore that intrinsic means by which other consequences hold, `if something is an ox, it is itself white,' is simply false.
Et ideo iste discursus non valet `iste dabit bovem album; iste non habet bovem album; igitur dabit bovem quem non habet', quia iste poterit dare bovem quem habet, qui nunc non est albus, sed poterit esse albus quando dabit eum.	And therefore this discourse is not valid: 'this man will give a white ox; he has no white ox; therefore he will give an ox which he does not have', because he will be able to give the ox which he has, which is not white now, but will be able to be white when he gives it.
Similiter ista consequentia est bona `iste nunc est albus; iste cras non erit albus; ergo iste carebit aliqua re quam nunc habet', et tenet virtute istius medii `album significat aliquam rem distinctam secundum se totam ab illo quod est album'.	Similarly, this conclusion is good: `This thing is now white; this thing will not be white tomorrow; therefore this thing will lack something that it now has', and it holds by virtue of this medium that 'white signifies something distinct in its entirety from that which is white'.
Sed ista consequentia secundum principia Aristotelis non valet `iste aer est nunc bicubitus; iste aer cras non erit bicubitus; igitur iste aer carebit aliqua re quam nunc habet', quia secundum principia Aristotelis ista est falsa `bicubitum significat aliquam rem secundum se totam distinctam ab illo quod est bicubitum et a parte eius'.	But this conclusion is not valid according to Aristotle's principles: `this air is now calm; this air will not be calm tomorrow; therefore this air will lack some thing which it now has', because according to Aristotle's principles this is false: `calm signifies some thing in its own right distinct from that which is calm and from its part'.
Et ita, universaliter, quando aliqua consequentia tenet in aliquibus terminis virtute medii necessarii intrinseci et aliqua consequentia habens terminos habentes consimiles modos significandi, quamvis non significent eadem eodem modo quo alii termini significant illa vel alia, propter defectum talis medii intrinseci non valet, potest ibi assignari fallacia figurae dictionis.	And so, universally, when some consequence holds in some terms by virtue of a necessary intrinsic medium, and some consequence having terms having similar ways of signifying, although they do not mean the same thing in the same way as other terms mean that or the other, is not valid because of the lack of such an intrinsic medium, the fallacy of the figure of speech may be assigned there.
Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `iste est pater; iste non fuit pater; igitur iste est mutatus', `iste est similis; iste non erit similis; ergo iste mutabitur', et sic de multis aliis. Est autem sciendum quod iste modus fallaciae figurae dictionis numquam habet locum quando accipiuntur duae praemissae mere categoricae et mere de inesse et mere de praesenti, dispositae vocaliter in modo et figura.	Whence here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `This one is a father; he was not a father; therefore he has changed', 'this thing is similar; this thing will not be similar; therefore this thing will be changed', and so about many others. It must be known, however, that this mode of illusory figure of speech never takes place when two premises are taken that are purely categorical and purely about being and purely about the present, arranged verbally in manner and form.
Et ideo accidit frequenter iste modus arguendi ex aliqua propositione de praeterito vel de futuro vel de modo. Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `iste potest esse albus; iste non est albus; igitur iste potest esse aliquid quod nunc non est'.	And therefore this frequently happens in this way of arguing from some statement about the past or the future or a mode. Whence this is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `This man may be white; this man is not white; therefore, he may be something which he is not now.
Similiter hic `Filius Dei non fuit homo ab aeterno; Filius Dei fuit homo ex tempore; ergo	Similarly here, `the Son of God was not a man from eternity; The Son of God was a man from a time; therefore
Filius Dei fuit aliquid ex tempore quod non fuit ab aeterno'. Tamen in istis potest assignari non tantum iste modus sed etiam tertius modus, de quo statim post dicetur, sicut in simili patebit ibidem.	the Son of God was something from a time that was not from eternity'. However, in these, not only this mode can be assigned, but also a third mode, which will be spoken about immediately after, as will be clear in the same place.
Tertius modus principalis figurae dictionis est habens ortum ex diversitate modorum significandi diversarum dictionum quae videntur similes inter se, propter quod quandoque deceptus credit quod similiter est arguendum ex una dictione et ex alia.	The third principal mode of figure of speech is that which has arisen from the diversity of the ways of signifying different sayings which seem similar to each other, because of which a deceived person believes that the same thing is to be argued from one statement and from another.
Et potest iste modus subdividi.	And this mode can be subdivided.
Ad cuius intellectum sciendum quod modi significandi non sunt aliquae res additae ipsis dictionibus, advenientes eis, sed est metaphorica locutio, dicendo quod dictiones habent diversos modos significandi, quia per talem orationem intelligitur ista oratio `diversae dictiones diversimode significant illa quae significant'. Quia aliquae dictiones proprie non significant, sed magis adiunctae aliis consignificant vel dant aliis supponere vel determinato modo stare, cuiusmodi sunt syncategoremata, videlicet coniunctiones, praepositiones et huiusmodi. Aliquae autem significant determinate res et finita significatione, secundum modum loquendi Boethii, sicut nomina categorematica et pronomina et participia et huiusmodi; et illorum quaedam sunt nomina mere absoluta et quaedam connotativa, sicut dictum est prius in primo tractatu.	For the understanding of which it is necessary to know that the ways of signifying are not some things added to the statements themselves, coming into them, but it is a metaphorical expression, saying that the statements have different ways of signifying, because by such a speech is meant the speech 'different statements signify in different ways what they signify'. Because some expressions do not have a proper meaning, but rather are attached to others and signify or allow others to assume or stand in a specific way, such as syncategorematic terms, that is, conjunctions, prepositions and the like. Some, however, signify definite things and a finite meaning, according to Boethius' manner of speaking, such as categorical nouns and pronouns and participles and the like; and some of these are purely absolute names and some are connotative, as was said before in the first treatise.
Similiter, quaedam sunt propria, sicut pronomina et nomina propria, et quaedam sunt communia, quae ideo habent diversum modum significandi quia unum significat unum et non plura et reliquum significat plura vel potest significare.	Similarly, some are proper, like pronouns and proper nouns, and some are common, which therefore have a different way of signifying because one signifies one and not several, and the other signifies or can signify several.
Et secundum praedicta sub isto tertio modo principali possunt accipi tres modi speciales istius fallaciae. Primus modus potest esse secundum dictiones quae habent finitas significationes et quae non habent finitas significationes.	And according to what has been said, under this third mode may be understood three principal special modes of this fallacy. The first mode can be based on words that have finite meanings and those that do not have finite meanings.
Et penes istum modum peccant consequentiae in quibus commutatur unus modus supponendi in alium; sicut si arguatur sic `omnis homo est animal, ergo animal est omnis homo'.	And according to this mode, the consequences in which one mode of supposition is exchanged for another are wrong; just as if it were argued that `every man is an animal, therefore an animal is every man'.
Et ad evidentiam istius exempli et sibi similium est primo sciendum quod hic potest assignari fallacia figurae dictionis propter hoc quod eadem dictio in antecedente habet unam suppositionem et in consequente habet aliam, quamvis hoc non sit sufficiens, sicut ostendetur.	And for the evidence of this example and others similar to it, it is first to be known that the fallacy of the figure of speech can be attributed to this because the same saying has one supposition in the antecedent and another in the consequent, although this is not sufficient, as will be shown.
Et similitudo dictionum est causa istius deceptionis; quia enim in multis non refert sic transponere dictiones, --- bene enim sequitur `homo albus est homo, ergo homo est homo albus', similiter sequitur `animal rationale est homo, ergo homo est animal rationale' --- propter hoc potest aliquis deceptus credere quod talis modus arguendi valeat in omnibus, et decipitur per fallaciam figurae dictionis.	And the similitude of the sayings is the cause of this deception; for in many cases it does not matter to transpose sayings in this way, --- for it follows well that `a white man is a man, therefore a man is a white man', similarly it follows that `a rational animal is a man, therefore a man is a rational animal' --- because of this, someone may be deceived into believing that such a way of reasoning is valid in all things, and is deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech.
Et oritur haec fallacia ex diversitate modorum significandi. Propter hoc enim quod `omnis' non habet talem modum significandi qualem habet `album' vel aliqua dictio talis, sed tantum consignificat sive facit terminum cui additur stare pro omnibus suis significatis, et facit terminum mediate sequentem stare confuse tantum, qualiter non stat in consequente, ideo est fallacia figurae dictionis et oritur ex similitudine dictionis ad aliam dictionem. Et est sciendum quod non quaelibet variatio suppositionis causat fallaciam figurae dictionis. Tunc enim in demonstratione potissima esset fallacia figurae dictionis. Sed generaliter quando arguitur a termino stante confuse tantum ad terminum stantem determinate, saltem enthymematice, est fallacia figurae dictionis, si circa alium terminum et dispositiones eius nulla sit penitus facta variatio; quamvis simul cum hoc sit ibi fallacia consequentis, sicut est in exemplo proposito.	And this fallacy arises from the diversity of modes of signifying. Because `all' does not have the same mode of signifying as does `white' or any such expression, but it only connotes whether it makes the term to which it is added stand for all its signified things, and makes the term that follows mediately stand confused only, as it does not stand in the consequent, therefore it is a fallacy of the figure of speech and arises from the similitude of the saying to another saying. And it must be known that not every variation of the supposition causes the fallacy of the figure of speech. For then the fallacy of the figure of speech would be most important in the demonstration. But in general, when it is argued from a term standing confusedly only to a term standing determinately, at least enthymematically, it is a fallacy of the figure of speech, if there is no corresponding variation of another term and its dispositions; although at the same time as this there is the fallacy of the consequent, as it is in the example provided.
Si tamen argueretur sic `omnis homo est animal, igitur animal est homo', quamvis in antecedente supponat confuse tantum et in consequente determinate, quia tamen signum additum homini in antecedente non additur sibi in consequente, non est ibi fallacia figurae dictionis.	If, however, it were argued thus, `every man is an animal, therefore an animal is a man,' although in the antecedent it supposits only confusedly and in the consequent definitely, because the sign added to man in the antecedent is not added to man in the consequent, there is no fallacy of the figure of speech.
Penes istum modum peccant omnia talia sophismata `omni parte continui est aliqua pars minor, igitur aliqua pars est minor omni parte continui'. Antecedens est verum, quia quaelibet singularis est vera, et consequens est falsum, quia quaelibet singularis est falsa.	According to this method, all such sophistries fall into error: `every part of the continuum has some smaller part, therefore some part is smaller than every part of the continuum'. The antecedent is true, because each individual is true, and the consequent is false, because each individual is false.
Sed consequentia non valet, quia `pars' in antecedente supponit confuse tantum et in consequente supponit determinate. Sed quia evidentius est in talibus fallacia consequentis quam fallacia figurae dictionis, ideo quando de fallacia consequentis agetur, diversa exempla adducentur.	But the inference is not valid, because `part' supposits in the antecedent only confusedly and in the consequent it supposits determinately. But since in such cases the fallacy of the consequent is more evident than the fallacy of the figure of speech, therefore, when it comes to the fallacy of the consequent, different examples will be adduced.
Similiter, arguendo a termino stante determinate vel confuse tantum ad eundem terminum stantem confuse et distributive, est fallacia figurae dictionis, quamvis etiam sit ibi fallacia consequentis, sicut hic `tu dubitas aliquod verum, igitur tu nescis aliquod verum'.	Similarly, by arguing from a term standing determinately or confusedly only to the same term standing confusedly and distributively, there is a fallacy of the figure of speech, although there is also a fallacy of consequence, as here: `you doubt a certain truth, therefore you do not know a certain truth'.
Unde si arguatur sic `illud quod tu dubitas, tu non scis; tu dubitas aliquod verum; igitur tu non scis aliquod verum' est fallacia figurae dictionis, quia in antecedente stat `verum' determinate et in consequente stat confuse tantum.	Hence, if it is argued thus, `that which you doubt, you do not know; you doubt some truth; therefore, you do not know some truth' is a fallacy of the figure of speech, because in the antecedent 'truth' stands determinately and in the consequent it stands only confusedly.
Similiter hic `illud quod non est aliquid, ab illo differt; Sortes non est omnis homo; igitur Sortes ab omni homine differt', nam in antecedente `homo' stat determinate, propter negationem praecedentem, et in consequente stat confuse et distributive.	Similarly here, `that which is not something differs from it; every man is Socrates; therefore, Socrates differs from every man', for in the antecedent 'man' stands determinately, because of the preceding negation, and in the consequent it stands confusedly and distributively.
Oportet autem scire quod non tantum contingit facere fallaciam figurae dictionis propter varium modum supponendi eiusdem termini sed etiam propter varium modum supponendi diversorum terminorum, ita quod alius terminus correspondens non mutetur.	It is necessary to know that it is not only possible to make a fallacy of the figure of speech because of a different mode of suppositing the same term, but also because of a different mode of suppositing different terms, so that another corresponding term is not changed.
Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `omnis homo est animal, igitur substantia est omnis homo', et ita est de consimilibus. Non solum autem tertius modus accidit ex vario modo significandi, qui frequenter accidit ex modo significandi termini categorematici et syncategorematici, sed etiam accidit ex diversis modis significandi incomplexorum in diversis praedicamentis.	Hence this is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `every man is an animal, therefore every man is a substance', and so it is with the like. Not only does the third mode occur from a different mode of signifying, which frequently happens from the mode of signifying categorematic and syncategorematic terms, but it also happens from different modes of signification by complexes in different propositions.
Quando enim propter hoc quod si arguatur ex omnibus terminis eiusdem praedicamenti erit bonum argumentum creditur propter hoc quod similiter arguendo ex terminis diversorum praedicamentorum sit conveniens argumentum et tamen non est, tunc accidit fallacia figurae dictionis.	For when, since if it is argued from all the terms of the same proposition, it will be a good argument, it is believed that by similarly arguing from the terms of different predicates, it is a suitable argument, and yet it is not, then the fallacy of the figure of speech occurs.
Creditur enim propter similitudinem dictionum quod consimiliter contingit arguere ex istis terminis sicut ex illis, et tunc fiet deceptio per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Est autem primo sciendum quod non semper quando arguitur ex terminis diversorum praedicamentorum est fallacia figurae dictionis, quia universaliter quando praemissae sunt mere de inesse et de praesenti et categoricae et in recto, et dispositae in modo et in figura, non est fallacia figurae dictionis, qualescumque sint termini.	For it is believed, because of the similarity of the wordings, that it is possible to argue similarly from these terms as from those, and then there will be deception through the fallacy of the figure of speech. But first of all it must be known that there is not always a fallacy of figure of speech when it is argued from the terms of different categories, because universally when premises are merely of inherence and of the present and categorical and correct, and arranged in manner and figure, there is no fallacy of figure of speech, whatever the terms may be.
Nec plus refert quod omnes termini sint eiusdem praedicamenti quam diversorum.	Nor does it matter more that all the terms are of the same category than of different ones.
Unde ita valet iste syllogismus `omnis homo est animal; album est homo; igitur album est animal' sicut iste `omnis homo est animal; Sortes est homo; igitur Sortes est animal'. Et ita, universaliter, est de consimilibus.	Hence this syllogism is valid: `every man is an animal; a man is a white thing; therefore, a white thing is an animal', just as this `every man is an animal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is an animal.' And so it is universally about propositions like these.
Et ideo ad assignandum fallaciam figurae dictionis non sufficit dicere quod commutatur unum praedicamentum in reliquum, sed oportet dicere rationem magis specialem. Est igitur sciendum quod quamvis syllogistice arguendo ita contingit arguere ex terminis diversorum praedicamentorum sicut ex terminis eiusdem praedicamenti, tamen non syllogistice frequenter contingit arguere ex terminis eiusdem praedicamenti et non ex terminis diversorum praedicamentorum.	And therefore, to assign the fallacy of the figure of speech, it is not sufficient to say that one predicate is exchanged for the others, but it is necessary to say a more special reason. It must therefore be known that although in arguing syllogistically it is possible to argue from the terms of different predicates as well as from the terms of the same predicate, yet it is not frequently possible to argue syllogistically from the terms of the same predicate and not from the terms of different predicates.
Et hoc multipliciter contingere potest, nam uno modo potest contingere propter diversitatem signorum distributivorum. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod sicut diversis praedicamentis congruunt diversa interrogativa, ita quod ad diversa interrogativa per incomplexa diversorum praedicamentorum fit responsio, --- nam si quaeratur quid est homo, convenienter respondetur quod est animal; et si quaeratur qualis est homo, convenienter respondetur quod est albus vel musicus, et non quod est animal; et si quaeratur ubi est homo, convenienter respondetur quod est in foro vel in campis, et sic de aliis ---, sic diversis praedicamentis correspondent diversa distributiva, sicut praedicamento substantiae correspondet `quilibet', `quidquid' et huiusmodi.	And this can happen in many ways, for it can happen in one way because of the diversity of distributive signs. For the evidence of which we must know that just as different questions correspond to different predicates, so the answer to different questions is made through the complexities of the different predicates. And if it is asked what a man is, it is properly answered that he is white or a musician, and not that he is an animal; and if it is asked where a man is, the appropriate answer is that he is in the market or in the fields, and so on of other things. Thus different distributives correspond to different predicates, just as `anyone', `anything' and the like correspond to the predicate of substance.
Hoc tamen est sciendum quod talia distributiva aequaliter conveniunt omnibus nominibus mere absolutis, sive illa nomina significent substantias sive qualitates sive res quascumque. Praedicamento autem quantitatis correspondent ista distributiva `quantumcumque' et `quotcumque', loco quorum nonnumquam ponuntur `quantum' et `quot'.	This, however, must be known, that such distributives apply equally to all merely absolute nouns, whether those nouns signify substances or qualities or things of any kind. Now these distributives correspond to the predicate of quantity, `however many' and `however much', in the place of which are sometimes put `how many' and `how much'.
Praedicamento qualitatis correspondet hoc signum `qualecumque'. Et praedicamento `ubi' hoc signum `ubicumque'. Et praedicamento `quando' hoc signum `quandocumque', et sic de aliis, nisi forte nomina nobis deficiant. Differt autem distributivum substantiae sive distributivum correspondens nominibus mere absolutis ab aliis, quia quandoque aequaliter contingit assumere sub nomina connotativa vel respectiva sicut nomina mere absoluta. Unde aequaliter valet iste modus arguendi `quidquid est homo, est animal; bicubitum est homo; igitur bicubitum est animal' sicut iste `quidquid est homo, est animal; Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes est animal', et hoc quia talis maior aequivalet isti `omnis homo est animal'.	This term `whatever kind' corresponds to the predication of quality. And with the predicate `where' this term is `wherever'. And with the predicate `when' the term `whenever', and so on for the others, unless perhaps names fail us. Now the distributive of substance, or the distributive corresponding to merely absolute nouns, differs from others, because sometimes it is equally possible to assume under connotative or relative nouns as merely absolute nouns. Hence this method of arguing, `whatever man is, is an animal' is equally valid. `A man is sleeping; Therefore, an animal is sleeping', just as this, `whatever is a man, is an animal; `Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is an animal' and this because such a major is equivalent to this: `every man is an animal'.
Sed de aliis distributivis non est sic, quia sub aliis distributivis numquam contingit --- servando modum debitum arguendi --- sumere sub nisi incomplexa convenientia tali distributivo et propria sibi.	But this is not the case with other distributives, because under other distributives it is never possible --- observing the modes required for arguing --- to subordinate things except the uncomplicated compatibility of such as is distributive and proper to itself.
Propter quod arguendo ex talibus necesse est scire naturas praedicamentorum, scilicet quid significant et quae significant et quomodo significant et quod non omnia praedicamenta significant unum, sed multa eorum significant plura, quamvis non omnia univoce nec eodem modo significandi.	Therefore, in reasoning from such, it is necessary to know the nature of predicates, namely, what they signify and why they signify and how they signify, and that not all predicates signify one thing, but many of them signify several things, although not all of them univocally or in the same way.
Et qui hoc scit, est prope videre verum in multis, secundum Philosophum in libro Elenchorum.	And he who knows this is close to seeing the truth in many things, according to the Philosopher in the Book of Lists.
Sciendum est igitur quod quandocumque sumpta maiore habente hoc signum distributivum `quantumcumque' vel `quotcumque', si sumatur sub aliquod incomplexum nisi per quod contingit respondere ad quaestionem factam per `quantum' vel `quot', est fallacia figurae dictionis propter distinctionem praedicamentorum.	It must therefore be known that whenever the distributive sign `how many' or `how much' is taken as a major, if it is taken under some complex other than that by which it is possible to answer the question `how many?' or `how much?', it is a fallacy of the figure of speech due to the distinction of categories.
Et hoc, quia si assumeretur sub aliquod incomplexum per quod convenienter respondetur ad talem quaestionem, non esset aliqua fallacia. Et ideo si aliquis credat quod propter hoc contingit assumere sub in minore unum terminum sicut alium, secundum quod hoc contingit in multis aliis, decipietur per fallaciam figurae dictionis; sicut hic `quantum est a tantum est b; a est lignum; igitur b est lignum'.	And this, because if it were supposed to be under some complex by which such a question is appropriately answered, there would not be any fallacy. And therefore if any one believes that for this reason it is possible to assume one term under the minor as another, according to the fact that this happens in many others, he will be deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech; as here: `as much as there is of a, there is so much of b; a is wood; therefore b is wood.
Et tamen si loco istius termini `lignum' poneretur iste terminus `tricubitum', esset bonum argumentum, sic arguendo `quantum est a tantum est b; tricubitum est a; igitur tricubitum est b'.	And yet if instead of this term `wood' the term `three cubits' were put, it would be a good argument: `a is three cubits; therefore b is three cubits'.
Similiter, si post hoc signum `qualecumque' in maiore, accipiatur sub in minore aliquod incomplexum per quod non respondetur ad quaestionem factam per `quale', est fallacia figurae dictionis.	Similarly, if after this sign `whatever kind' in the major, some complex is taken under the minor by which the question posed by `what kind' is not answered, it is a fallacy of the figure of speech.
Et si accipiatur sub incomplexum per quod convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam per `quale', erit bonum argumentum. Sicut hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `qualecumque currit, disputat; Sortes currit; igitur Sortes disputat', et tamen non hic `qualecumque currit, disputat; nigrum currit; igitur nigrum disputat'.	And if it is taken under the complex by which it is suitably answered to the question made by `how', it will be a good argument. Just as here is the fallacy of the figure of speech, `however he runs, he argues; Socrates is running; therefore, Socrates argues', and yet not here: `however he runs, a black thing runs; therefore, a black thing argues'.
Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quandocumque est accidens, tunc est suum subiectum; accidens est inhaerens; igitur subiectum est inhaerens', et non hic `quandocumque est accidens, est suum subiectum; accidens est in hoc tempore; igitur subiectum est in hoc tempore.	Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech: `whenever there is an accident, then it is its subject; an accident is inherent; therefore, the subject is inherent', and not here, 'whenever there is an accident, it is its own subject; an accident is at this time; therefore, the subject is at this time'.
Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `ubicumque est substantia, ibi est quantitas; angelus est substantia; igitur angelus est quantitas', sed non hic `ubicumque est substantia, ibi est quantitas; substantia est in hoc loco; igitur quantitas est in hoc loco'.	Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech: `wherever there is substance, there is quantity; An angel is substance; Therefore, an angel is a quantity', but not here: `wherever there is substance, there is quantity; there is substance in this place; therefore quantity is in this place'.
Et sic contingit arguere in aliis ubi ponitur signum distributivum correspondens interrogativo ad quod contingit convenienter respondere per incomplexa alicuius praedicamenti et non per alia.	And so it is possible to argue in other cases where a distributive sign is placed corresponding to an interrogative, to which it is possible to answer conveniently by means of the incomplexes of some category and not by others.
Tamen de distributivis substantiae est difficultas specialis.	However, there is a special difficulty about distributive substance.
Pro quo sciendum quod quando distributivum substantiae ponitur in propositione mere de praesenti et mere de inesse, non refert quodcumque accipere sub in minore. Et ideo talis modus arguendi valet `quidquid emis, comedis; carnes crudas emis; igitur carnes crudas comedis', `quidquid est substantia corporea, est quantitas; corpus Christi est substantia corporea; igitur corpus Christi est quantitas', et sic de aliis. Ita tamen quod in minore non accipiatur aliqua determinatio compositionis quae non accipiebatur in maiore et simul cum hoc quod non commutetur unus numerus in alium numerum, quia si alterum illorum fiat, accidet fallacia figurae dictionis, sicut ostendetur.	For which reason it should be known that when the distributive of substance is placed in a proposition merely of the present and merely of being, it does not matter if one takes anything under the minor. And therefore this method of reasoning is valid: `whatsoever you buy, you eat; you buy raw meat; therefore eat raw meat', `whatsoever is a corporeal substance is a quantity; the body of Christ is a corporeal substance; therefore, the body of Christ is a quantity', and so of the others. Nevertheless, in the minor, no determination of composition is accepted which was not accepted in the major, and at the same time that one number is not changed into another number, because if one of them becomes another, a fallacy of the figure of speech will occur, as will be shown.
Unde pluribus modis, quando non accipiuntur praemissae dispositae in modo et in figura nec aequivalentes talibus, accidit fallacia figurae dictionis: vel sumendo aliud nomen quam per quod respondetur ad quaestionem factam per `quid est' de re una; quandoque enim hoc accidit arguendo ex propositionibus de praesenti, quandoque ex propositionibus de praeterito vel de futuro, quandoque ex propositionibus de modo. Si arguatur ex propositionibus de praesenti et de inesse, hoc potest contingere vel addendo aliquam determinationem per quam potest, partialiter saltem, responderi ad quaestionem factam per aliud interrogativum de re una quam per `quid est'. Sicut si arguatur `quidquid currit est corpus; homo velociter currit; igitur homo velociter est corpus', quia in minore additur `velociter', per quod respondetur aliquo modo ad aliam quaestionem quam ad quaestionem factam per `quid est', ideo est fallacia figurae dictionis. Et tamen si poneretur haec determinatio `realiter', esset bonum argumentum, sic arguendo	Hence, in several ways, when the premises arranged in mode and form are not accepted, nor are they equivalent to such, the fallacy of the figure of speech occurs: either by taking a different name than that by which the question made by `what is?' about one thing is answered; for sometimes this happens by arguing from propositions about the present, sometimes from propositions about the past or the future, sometimes from propositions of a mode. If it is argued from propositions about the present and about being, this can happen either by adding some determination by which it is possible, at least partially, to answer the question made by another interrogative about the same thing than by `what is?'. Just as if it were argued that anything that moves is a body; a man runs fast; Therefore, man is quickly a body, because in the minor is added `quickly', by which it is answered in some way to a different question than to the question posed by 'what is?', therefore there is a fallacy of the figure of speech. And yet, if this determination were to be posited `really', it would be a good argument, arguing in this way:
'quidquid currit est corpus; homo realiter currit; ergo homo realiter est corpus'. Unde universaliter quando in tali modo arguendi additur in minore aliqua determinatio quae potest competere et non competere eidem, causatur fallacia figurae dictionis, et alia non causat fallaciam figurae dictionis.	'whatever moves is a body; the man is really running; therefore man is really a body'. Hence, universally, when in such a way of arguing some minor determination is added which may and may not belong to the same person, a fallacy of the figure of speech is caused, and another does not cause a fallacy of the figure of speech.
Tale tamen signum posset accipi in minore quod non foret ibi fallacia figurae dictionis. Sicut ponatur quod `qualiter' sit adverbium interrogativum ad quod convenienter respondetur per talia `cito', `velociter', `tarde', `violenter' et huiusmodi, et sibi correspondeat hoc signum `qualitercumque'; quo posito iste modus arguendi erit bonus `qualitercumque aliquid currit, est corpus; homo velociter currit; igitur homo velociter est corpus'. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `omnis substantia materialis habet partem distantem a parte; corpus Christi in sacramento Altaris est substantia materialis; igitur corpus Christi est in sacramento Altaris habens partem distantem a parte'. Similiter hic `omne corpus est quantum; corpus Christi est corpus in sacramento Altaris; igitur corpus Christi est quantum in sacramento Altaris'.	Such a sign, however, might be taken in a lesser degree, as there would be no fallacy of the figure of speech. Just as it is assumed that `how' is an interrogative adverb to which it is suitably answered by such things as `quickly', `rapidly', `slowly', `violently' and the like, and the sign `however' corresponds to it; on the basis of which this method of reasoning will be good: `whatever way something runs, it is a body; a man runs fast; therefore man is a swift body'. Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `every material substance has a part distant from another part; the body of Christ in the sacrament of the Altar is a material substance; therefore, the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the Altar, having a part distant from another part. Similarly here, `every body is a quantity; the body of Christ is the body in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore, the body of Christ is a quantity in the sacrament of the Altar'.
Similiter hic `omne corpus est circumscriptum loco; corpus Christi est corpus in sacramento	Similarly here, every body is circumscribed by place; `the body of Christ is the body in the sacrament
Altaris; igitur corpus Christi est circumscriptum loco in sacramento Altaris'. Similiter hic, secundum unam opinionem, `omnis substantia materialis est quantitas; corpus Christi est substantia materialis in sacramento Altaris; igitur corpus Christi est quantitas in sacramento Altaris'.	of the Altar; therefore the body of Christ is confined to a place in the sacrament of the Altar'. Similarly here, according to one opinion, `every material substance is a quantity; the body of Christ is the material substance in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore, the body of Christ is a quantity in the sacrament of the Altar'.
Similiter hic `quidquid est substantia, est quantitas; corpus Christi est substantia in sacramento Altaris; igitur corpus Christi est quantitas in sacramento Altaris'. Et tamen sic arguendo `ubicumque aliquid est substantia, ibi illud est quantitas; corpus Christi est substantia in sacramento Altaris; igitur corpus Christi est quantitas in sacramento Altaris', est bonum argumentum.	Similarly here, `whatever is a substance is a quantity; the body of Christ is the substance in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore the body of Christ is the quantity in the sacrament of the Altar'. And yet arguing thus, `wherever there is substance, there is that quantity; the body of Christ is the substance in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore the body of Christ is the quantity in the sacrament of the Altar', is a good argument.
Et ita patet quod ponendo hoc signum `ubicumque' loco istius signi `quidquid' non est aliqua fallacia sumendo sub aliquid per quod respondetur ad quaestionem factam per `ubi'. Propter quod summe necesse est scire qualia et quae significant praedicamenta et quomodo ad hoc quod sciatur de multis an sit ibi fallacia figurae dictionis.	And so it is clear that by placing this sign `anywhere' in place of this sign `anything', there is no fallacy in taking something under it by which the question posed by `where' is answered. For this reason it is very necessary to know what kind the predicates are and what they signify, and how, in order that it may be known of many whether there is a fallacy of the figure of speech.
Ex praedictis patet quod hic nulla est fallacia `ubicumque aliquid habet quantitatem inhaerentem sibi, ibi est quantum; substantia corporis Christi habet quantitatem inhaerentem sibi in sacramento Altaris; igitur substantia corporis Christi est quanta in sacramento Altaris'.	It is clear from what has been said that there is no fallacy here: `wherever something has a quantity inherent in it, there is a quantity; The substance of Christ's body has an inherent quantity in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore, the substance of Christ's body is a quantity in the sacrament of the Altar.
Nec hic `ubicumque aliquid habet longitudinem, latitudinem et profunditatem inhaerentem sibi, ibi est longum, latum et profundum; sed substantia corporis Christi habet longitudinem, latitudinem et profunditatem inhaerentem sibi in sacramento Altaris; igitur substantia corporis Christi est in sacramento Altaris longa, lata et profunda'.	Nor here, `wherever anything has length, breadth, and depth inherent in itself, there it is long, broad, and deep; but the substance of Christ's body has the length, breadth, and depth inherent in it in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore the substance of Christ's body in the sacrament of the Altar is long, wide and deep'.
Nec hic `ubicumque aliqua substantia habet extensionem inhaerentem sibi, ibi est extensa; substantia corporis Christi habet extensionem inhaerentem sibi in sacramento Altaris; igitur substantia corporis Christi est extensa in sacramento Altaris'.	Nor here, `wherever any substance has extension inherent in itself, there it is extended; the substance of Christ's body has an inherent extension in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore, the substance of Christ's body is extended in the sacrament of the Altar'.
Aliter contingit peccare per fallaciam figurae dictionis in tali modo arguendi, commutando unum numerum in alium, puta numerum singularem in pluralem, sic `quidquid est scitum, est scitum per inventionem vel per doctrinam; ista sunt scita, --- demonstrando unum scitum per inventionem et aliud per doctrinam ---; igitur ista sunt scita per inventionem vel per doctrinam'.	In another way, it is possible to err through the fallacy of the figure of speech in such a way of reasoning, as by exchanging one number for another, for example a singular number for a plural one, thus: `whatever is known is known by discovery or by teaching; these things are known, showing that one thing is known by discovery and another by teaching; therefore, these things are known by discovery or by teaching.
Similiter hic `quaelibet persona divina est Deus; Pater et Filius sunt personae divinae; igitur	Similarly here, ``every divine person is God; the Father and the Son are divine persons; therefore
Pater et Filius sunt dii'. Similiter hic `quaelibet persona divina producens personam est principium Spiritus Sancti; Pater et Filius sunt personae divinae producentes personam; igitur Pater et Filius sunt principia Spiritus Sancti'.	the Father and the Son are Gods'. Similarly here, `every divine person producing a person is the principle of the Holy Spirit; the Father and the Son are divine persons producing a person; therefore, the Father and the Son are the principles of the Holy Spirit'.
Hoc tamen est sciendum quod vix aut numquam potest impediri talis modus arguendi ex talibus duabus propositionibus nisi ubi arguitur disiunctive et ubi accipitur terminus significans aliquam rem unam quae est plures personae, quo modo est de Deo, qui unus Deus est, et tamen est plures personae.	This, however, must be known, that such a way of arguing from two such propositions can scarcely or never be prevented except where it is argued disjunctively, and where the term is taken to signify some one thing which is many persons, as it is of God, who is one God, and yet is many persons.
Similiter unum principium Spiritus Sancti est duae personae.	Similarly, the one principle of the Holy Spirit is two persons.
Tamen, frequenter, arguendo enthymematice et commutando numerum singularem in numerum pluralem est fallacia figurae dictionis in aliis casibus quam in illis. Et hoc ubicumque terminus non significat plura; sicut non sequitur `sol est corpus, igitur soles sunt corpora'; nec sequitur `phoenix est animal, igitur phoenices sunt animalia', et hoc propter falsam implicationem in consequente. Et ideo hic est tantum consequentia ut nunc `homo est animal, igitur homines sunt animalia'.	However, frequently, arguing enthymematically and changing the singular number into a plural number is the fallacy of figure of speech in other cases than in these. And this wherever the term does not signify more; just as it does not follow that `the sun is a body, therefore suns are bodies'; nor does it follow that `the phoenix is ​​an animal, therefore phoenixes are animals,' and this because of a false implication in the consequent. And therefore, here is such a consequence that now 'man is an animal, therefore men are animals'.
Et tales falsae consequentiae possunt reduci ad primum modum, in quo oritur deceptio propter diversa accidentia grammaticalia diversarum dictionum. Aliter peccat talis modus arguendi penes fallaciam figurae dictionis, arguendo ex propositionibus de praeterito et de futuro, et hoc vel arguendo ex omnibus de praeterito vel ex una de praeterito et una de praesenti.	And such false conclusions can be reduced to the first mode in which deception arises because of the different grammatical accidents of different expressions. In another way, such a way of reasoning is wrong, and is close to the fallacy of a figure of speech, by arguing from propositions about the past and the future, and this either by arguing from all the past or from one of the past and one of the present.
Et eodem modo, proportionaliter, dicendum est de illis de futuro. Si primo modo, aut assumptum in minori ponitur a parte subiecti aut a parte praedicati. Si primo modo, resolvendae sunt propositiones in propositiones aequivalentes quae possunt disponi in modo et in figura, et tunc utendum est arte quae data est de modo syllogizandi ex propositionibus de praeterito et de futuro.	And in the same way, proportionally, it must be said of those of the future. If in the first mode, either the predicate is placed in the minor on the part of the subject or on the part of the predicate. If in the first way, the propositions must be resolved into equivalent propositions which can be arranged in mode and form, and then we must use the art that has been given on the mode of syllogizing from propositions about the past and the future.
Verbi gratia si arguatur sic `quidquid heri emisti, hodie comedisti; carnes crudas heri emisti; igitur carnes crudas hodie comedisti' resolvenda est maior in istam sibi aequivalentem `omne heri emptum fuit hodie comestum a te' et minor in istam aequivalentem sibi `carnes crudae fuerunt heri emptae' et conclusio in istam sibi aequivalentem `carnes crudae fuerunt hodie comestae a te'. Et subiectis in omnibus istis acceptis pro his quae fuerunt, tenet syllogismus. Sed si subiectum conclusionis sumatur pro his quae sunt, non valet, sed est tam fallacia accidentis quam fallacia figurae dictionis.	For example, if it is argued that `whatever you bought yesterday, you ate today; You bought raw meat yesterday; therefore you have eaten raw meat today' is to be resolved into the major equivalent of `everything bought yesterday was eaten by you today' and the minor into its equivalent `raw meat was bought yesterday' and the conclusion into its equivalent `raw meat was eaten by you today'. And the syllogism holds that the subjects in all these are taken for what they were. But if the subject of the conclusion is taken for what it is, it does not hold, but is as much a fallacy of accident as a fallacy of figure of speech.
Si autem ponatur assumptum a parte praedicati, semper est fallacia figurae dictionis. Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid heri emisti, hodie comedisti; tu emisti heri carnes crudas; ergo hodie comedisti carnes crudas'.	But if the thing assumed is placed on the part of the predicate, there is always a fallacy of the figure of speech. Hence here is a fallacy of the figure of speech: `whatever you bought yesterday, you ate today; yesterday you bought raw meat; therefore, today you have eaten raw meat'.
Et multo magis erit fallacia figurae dictionis si maior sit de praesenti et minor de praeterito vel de futuro. Propter quod hic est fallacia figurae dictionis, secundum illam opinionem quae ponit quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, `quidquid fuit heri, est hodie; Sortes fuit heri bicubitalis quantitatis; igitur Sortes est hodie bicubitalis quantitatis'.	And the fallacy of the figure of speech will be much greater if it is more about the present and less about the past or the future. Because of this, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, according to that opinion which posits that quantity is not a different thing from substance and quality, `whatever was yesterday is today; yesterday Socrates was two cubits in size; therefore Socrates is today two cubits in size.
Similiter hic `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; Sortes fuit triangularis figurae; igitur Sortes est triangularis figurae'. Similiter hic `quidquid fuit, est; ignis produxit vel calefecit; ergo ignis producit vel calefacit'. In omnibus enim talibus est fallacia figurae dictionis. Et tamen accipiendo sub nomina mere absoluta non est aliqua fallacia. Sicut hic est bonum argumentum `quidquid fuit, est; homo fuit; igitur homo est'. Et similiter hic `quidquid fuit est; albedo fuit; ergo albedo est'. Et similiter hic `quidquid fuit, est; Sortes fuit homo; igitur Sortes est homo'.	Similarly here, `whatever was, is still; Socrates was triangular in shape; therefore Socrates is triangular in shape'. Similarly here, `whatever was, is; Fire produced or heated; therefore fire produces or heats'. For in all such there is a fallacy of the figure of speech. And yet there is no fallacy in accepting them under purely absolute names. As here is a good argument, `whatever was, is; he was a man; therefore he is a man'. And likewise here, `whatever was is; he was white; therefore he is white'. And likewise here, `whatever was, is; Socrates was a man; therefore Socrates is a man'.
Et similiter hic `quidquid fuit, est; haec albedo fuit color; igitur haec albedo est color'. Et tamen secundum illam opinionem quae ponit quantitatem non esse aliam rem a substantia et qualitate hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; haec substantia fuit quantitas; ergo haec substantia adhuc est quantitas'.	And likewise here, `whatever was, is; this color was white; Therefore, this white is a color.' And yet according to that opinion which posits that quantity is not a different thing from substance and quality, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever was, still is; this substance was a quantity; therefore, this substance is still a quantity'.
Sed hic est bonum argumentum `quandocumque aliquid fuit substantia, tunc fuit quantitas; haec substantia fuit substantia; ergo haec substantia fuit quantitas'. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid est, fuit prius; a est simul cum b; igitur a fuit prius simul cum b'.	But here is a good argument: `whenever there was a substance, then there was a quantity; this substance was substance; therefore, this substance was quantity`. Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever is, was before; a is together with b; Therefore, a was first at the same time as b'.
Similiter est hic fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; hoc corpus fuit coniunctum illi corpori; igitur hoc corpus est adhuc coniunctum illi corpori'.	Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `Whatever was, is still; this body was joined to that body; therefore, this body is still joined to that body.'
Et tamen hic est bonum argumentum `quidquid fuit, est; albedo fuit; igitur albedo est'. Et sicut dictum est de propositionibus de praeterito, ita, proportionaliter, dicendum est de propositionibus de futuro.	And yet here is a good argument, `whatever was, is; whiteness existed; therefore, whiteness exists'. And as it was said of propositions concerning the past, so, proportionally, it must be said of propositions concerning the future.
Aliter contingit fallacia figurae dictionis ex diversitate praedicamentorum in propositionibus modalibus, sicut sic arguendo `quidquid potest Deus facere mediante causa secunda, potest facere se solo; sed Deus potest facere actum meritorium mediante causa secunda; igitur potest se solo facere actum meritorium'.	In another way, the fallacy of the figure of speech occurs from the diversity of predicates in modal propositions, as in arguing that `whatever God can do by means of a second cause, He can do by Himself alone; but God can do a meritorious act by means of a second cause; therefore He can do a meritorious act by Himself.
Responsio: hic est fallacia figurae dictionis, quia si acciperetur sub nomen mere absolutum, esset bonum argumentum; sicut hic est bonum argumentum `quidquid potest Deus facere mediante causa secunda, potest facere se solo; sed Deus potest facere ignem mediante causa secunda; igitur etc.'.	Response: Here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, because if it were taken under the mere name of the absolute, it would be a good argument; as here is a good argument, `whatever God can do by means of a second cause, he can do by himself alone; but God can make fire by means of a second cause; therefore, etc.'
Et ideo si propter similitudinem dictionum credat quis quod unum argumentum est bonum sicut aliud, decipietur per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Verumtamen sciendum est quod si `actum meritorium' poneretur a parte subiecti, non esset fallacia figurae dictionis.	And therefore if, because of the similarity of the sayings, anyone believes that one argument is as good as another, he will be deceived by the fallacy of figure of speech. Nevertheless, it must be known that if a `meritorious act' were put on the part of the subject, it would not be a fallacy of a figure of speech.
Unde hic non est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid Deus potest facere mediante causa secunda etc.; sed omnem actum meritorium potest Deus facere mediante causa secunda; igitur omnem actum meritorium potest Deus facere se solo', quia conclusio est vera si praemissae sunt verae, sive subiectum accipiatur pro his quae sunt sive pro his quae possunt esse.	Hence there is no fallacy here of the figure of speech, `whatever God can do by means of a second cause, etc. but God can do every meritorious act by means of a second cause; therefore God alone can do every meritorious act', because the conclusion is true if the premises are true, whether the subject is taken for what is or for what may be.
Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `omnem rem potest Deus facere sine alia re distincta totaliter; album est res alia ab albedine; ergo Deus potest facere album sine albedine'.	Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `God can do all things without another thing being completely distinct; white is something different from whiteness; therefore God can make white without whiteness'.
Et tamen ista conclusio bene sequitur `album Deus potest facere sine albedine', quia illam rem quae est alba potest Deus facere sine albedine; et tamen haec est impossibilis `album facit Deus sine albedine'.	And yet this conclusion follows well, `God can make a white thing without whiteness', because that thing which is white can be made by God without whiteness; and yet this is impossible: `God makes a white thing without whiteness'.
Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `Deus potest causare omnem rem possibilem quae non est Deus; veritas istius propositionis ``Deus nihil causat potest esse; igitur Deus potest causare veritatem huius propositionis', propter hoc quod iste terminus `veritas istius propositionis' non est incomplexum mere absolutum.	Similarly here is a fallacy of figure of speech, "God can cause every possible thing that is not God; the truth of that proposition, `God cannot cause anything'; therefore God can cause the truth of this proposition", for the reason that this term 'the truth of this proposition' is not a complex, merely absolute.
Oportet autem scire quod non solum iste modus fallaciae figurae dictionis est in talibus discursibus compositis ex pluribus praemissis, sed etiam accidit in consequentiis et enthymematibus; quia iste modus non est tantum ex hoc quod unum praedicamentum commutatur in aliud, hoc est ex hoc quod primo in maiore accipitur signum distributivum correspondens uni praedicamento et postea accipitur sub incomplexum alterius praedicamenti.	Now it is necessary to know that not only is this mode of fallacious figure of speech in such discourses composed of several premisses, but it also occurs in inferences and enthymemes; because this method is not only from the fact that one predicate is changed into another, this is from the fact that first the distributive sign corresponding to one predicate is taken in the major and then it is taken under the complex of the other predicate.
Quia numquam dicit Philosophus quod figura dictionis est ex commutatione unius praedicamenti in aliud, sed dicit quod est ex hoc quod diversa sunt praedicamenta et easdem res diversimode significant, ideo frequenter non valent consequentiae ex incomplexis aliquorum praedicamentorum.	Because the Philosopher never says that the figure of speech is from the exchange of one predicate for another, but says that it is from the fact that the predicates are different and signify the same thing in different ways, therefore the consequences from the complexities of some predicates are frequently not valid.
Et tamen si loco illorum ponerentur incomplexa alterius praedicamenti, essent consequentiae bonae; sicut hic est consequentia bona `homo fuit animal, igitur animal fuit homo'.	And yet if, in their place, complexities of another category were put, the consequences would be good; as here is a good consequence, `man was an animal, therefore an animal was a man.'
Similiter `albedo fuit nigredo, ergo nigredo fuit albedo'. Similiter `albedo potest esse color, ergo color potest esse albedo'. Similiter tales consequentiae sunt bonae `albedo cessat esse albedo, igitur albedo cessat esse'; `homo desinit esse homo, igitur homo desinit esse' et huiusmodi. Quae ideo bonae consequentiae sunt quia termini ex quibus componuntur non significant aliquid in recto et aliquid in obliquo, nec significant aliquid primo et principaliter et aliquid secundario, nec significant aliquid affirmative et aliquid negative, sed eodem modo significant omnia sua significata. Quod secundum principia Aristotelis non est verum nisi de incomplexis in genere substantiae et de abstractis in genere qualitatis quibus correspondent concreta supponentia pro distinctis rebus ab illis pro quibus supponunt abstracta, et ideo tales consequentiae ex talibus terminis bonae sunt et non aliae.	Similarly, `whiteness was blackness, therefore blackness was whiteness.' Similarly, `whiteness can be a color, therefore a color can be whiteness.' Similarly, such consequences are good: `whiteness ceases to be whiteness, therefore whiteness ceases to be'; `a man ceases to be a man, therefore a man ceases to be' and the like. Which therefore are good consequences, because the terms from which they are composed do not signify something directly and something obliquely, nor do they signify something first and principally and something secondary, nor do they signify something affirmatively and something negatively, but they signify in the same way all their signifieds. This, according to Aristotle's principles, is only true of complex things in the genus of substance, and of abstracts in the genus of quality, to which correspond concrete suppositions for distinct things from those for which they suppose abstract ones, and therefore such inferences from such terms are good and not others.
Propter quod si aliquis credat quod consequentiae consimiles valent ex aliis terminis sicut ex talibus, decipietur per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis penes istum modum `album desinet cras esse album, ergo album desinet cras esse'; `motus cessabit esse motus quando quiescet mobile, igitur motus cessabit esse quando quiescet mobile', sicut hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `forma partibiliter adquisita cessabit esse partibiliter adquisita quando quiescet mobile, ergo forma partibiliter adquisita cessabit esse quando quiescet mobile'.	Because of this, if anyone believes that similar consequences are valid from other terms as from such, he will be deceived by the fallacy of figure of speech. Hence here is the fallacy of the figure of speech in this way: `a white thing will cease to be a white thing tomorrow, therefore a white thing will cease to be tomorrow'; `motion will cease to be motion when the mobile is at rest, therefore motion will cease to be when the mobile is at rest', as here is the fallacy of the figure of speech, `a partially acquired form will cease to be partially acquired when the mobile is at rest, therefore a partially acquired form will cease to be when the mobile is at rest'.
Similiter hic `actum meritorium potest Deus facere sine voluntate efficiente, igitur Deus potest facere actum meritorium sine voluntate efficiente'. Similiter hic `istam veritatem potest Deus facere, --- demonstrando veritatem istius: Deus nihil facit ---, ergo Deus potest facere hanc veritatem'.	Similarly here, `God can do a meritorious act without an efficient will, therefore God can do a meritorious act without an efficient will'. Similarly here, `God can make this truth,' by demonstrating the truth of this: God makes nothing, therefore God can make this truth.
Similiter hic `homo ab aeterno fuit Deus, igitur Deus ab aeterno fuit homo'. Et pro isto exemplo et pro aliis praecedentibus est sciendum quod quamvis hoc nomen `homo' secundum usum philosophorum sit nomen mere absolutum, non plus significans unum significatum in recto quam aliud, tamen secundum usum theologorum non est ita mere absolutum, quia si sic, esset convertibile cum hoc nomine `humanitas'. Et tunc sicut haec est neganda `Filius Dei est humanitas,' ita esset haec neganda `Filius Dei est homo', quod falsum est. Et ideo secundum usum theologorum hoc nomen `homo' connotat vel consignificat, potentialiter saltem, suppositum divinum, quod quamvis non esset homo, posset tamen esse homo. Et propter hoc quando posui multa exempla de hoc nomine `homo', locutus sum secundum usum philosophorum. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `Filius Dei potest non esse homo, igitur homo potest non esse Filius Dei', propter eandem rationem.	Similarly, here `man was God from eternity, therefore God was man from eternity'. And for this example and for others that precede it, it must be known that although this name `man' according to the usage of the philosophers is a purely absolute name, signifying no more one signified in the right than another, yet according to the usage of the theologians it is not so purely absolute, because if so, it would be convertible with the noun `humanity'. And then, just as this is to be denied, `The Son of God is humanity,' so it would be to deny that `The Son of God is man,' which is false. And therefore, according to the use of theologians, the word `man' connotes or signifies, at least potentially, the divine supposition that, although he was not a man, he could still be a man. And for this reason, when I set forth many examples of this noun `man,' I spoke according to the usage of the philosophers. Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `The Son of God may not be a man, therefore a man may not be the Son of God,' for the same reason.
Scire autem quare in praedictis est fallacia figurae dictionis non spectat ad logicum, sed spectat ad illum qui perfecte novit tam logicam quam alias artes sive scientias speciales, et ideo qui in omnibus argumentis novit artificialiter assignare fallaciam figurae dictionis est prope videre verum in omnibus scientiis.	Now to know why there is a fallacy in the figure of speech in the aforesaid, do not look to the logician, but look to him who perfectly knows logic as well as other special arts or sciences, and therefore he who knows how to artificially assign in all arguments the fallacy of a figure of speech is close to seeing the truth in all sciences.
Est etiam sciendum quod quamvis tales consequentiae habeant talem defectum generalem, tamen quandoque aliquae gratia materiae possunt tenere. Et tunc ad ostendendum quod aliquae tales consequentiae tenent gratia materiae et aliquae non, oportet recurrere ad secundum modum principalem istius fallaciae et ad artem traditam ibi.	It must also be known that although such consequences have such a general failure, they can still sometimes hold thanks to their subject matter. And then, in order to show that some of these consequences hold due thanks to the subject matter and some do not, we must return to the second principal mode of this fallacy and to the art which was handed down there.
Nec est inconveniens quod in eodem argumento concurrant aliquando duo modi eiusdem fallaciae. Ad istum etiam modum habent reduci omnes paralogismi in quibus arguitur a praemissis habentibus aliquam determinationem ad conclusionem sine illa determinatione, quamvis nonnulli tales possent reduci ad secundum modum principalem.	Nor is it inconvenient that two modes of the same fallacy sometimes meet in the same subject. All paralogisms, in which it is argued from premises having some determination to a conclusion without that determination, can also be reduced to this mode, although some of these could be reduced to the second principal mode.
Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `tu non habes denarium cum tristitia; et tu das denarium cum tristitia; ergo das quod non habes'. Similiter hic `tu non habes unum solum denarium; et das unum solum denarium; ergo das quod non habes'.	Whence here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `You have not a penny with sorrow; and you give a penny with sadness; therefore you give what you do not have'. Similarly here, `you do not have a single penny; and you give only one penny; therefore you give what you do not have'.
Et causa quare in talibus est fallacia figurae dictionis est ista, quia si in talibus praemissis loco istorum terminorum `denarium cum tristitia', `unum solum denarium' ponerentur termini mere absoluti non esset aliqua fallacia respectu eiusdem conclusionis.	And the reason why there is a fallacy of figure of speech in such cases is this, because if in such premisses, instead of these terms `a penny with sadness', `one penny only' were put as purely absolute terms, there would not be any fallacy with regard to the same conclusion.
Sicut hic nulla est fallacia `tu non habes animal rationale; tu das animal rationale; igitur tu das quod non habes'; nec hic `tu das bovem et non habes bovem, igitur das quod non habes'.	Just as here there is no fallacy, `you have no rational animal; you give a rational animal; therefore you give what you do not have'; nor here, `you give an ox and have no ox, therefore you give what you do not have.'
Sed numquid est hic fallacia figurae dictionis `tu das bovem album; et non habes bovem album; igitur das quod non habes'? Dicendum est quod hic est bonum argumentum, quia non semper dimissio determinationis in conclusione facit fallaciam figurae dictionis, sed quando determinatio illa est in uno praedicamento tunc causat et quando est in alio tunc non causat fallaciam figurae dictionis.	But is there a fallacy here in the figure of speech, `You give a white ox; and you have no white ox; So you give what you don't have'? It must be said that this is a good argument, because the omission of a determination in a conclusion does not always cause the fallacy of a figure of speech, but when that determination is in one category then it causes it and when it is in another then it does not cause the fallacy of a figure of speech.
Unde bene sequitur `tu das unum denarium; et non habes unum denarium; igitur das quod non habes'; et tamen non sequitur `tu das bovem in isto loco; et non habes bovem in isto loco; igitur das quod non habes'.	Whence it follows well, `You give one penny; and you have not one penny; therefore you give what you do not have'; and yet it does not follow that you give an ox in that place; and you have no ox in that place; therefore you give what you do not have'.
Nec potest dari regula generalis quando talis consequentia valet et quando non valet. Similiter potest accidere fallacia figurae dictionis propter hoc quod aliqui termini significant aliquid negative et aliquid affirmative, sicut in isto exemplo `tu das unum solum denarium; et non habes unum solum denarium; ergo das quod non habes'. Unde propter hoc quod `unum solum' significat plura negative, ideo talis consequentia non valet.	Nor can a general rule be given when such a conclusion is valid and when it is not. In the same way, errors of the figure of speech can occur due to the fact that some terms mean something negatively and something else positively, as in this example: `You give only one penny; and you do not have one single penny; therefore, you give what you do not have'. Therefore, on account of the fact that `only one' signifies several things negatively, therefore such a conclusion is not valid.
Non solum autem accidit fallacia figurae dictionis propter hoc quod incomplexa categorematica et syncategorematica diversimode significant et propter hoc quod diversa praedicamenta significant diversimode et propter hoc quod aliqui termini significant aliquid negative et aliquid affirmative et aliquid affirmative et negative, sed etiam ex hoc quod aliqui sunt termini communes pluribus et aliqui sunt proprii, inter quos computanda sunt nomina propria et pronomina demonstrativa et relativa.	Not only does the fallacy of figure of speech occur because of the fact that complex categorematics and syncategorematics mean things differently and because different predicates mean things differently and because some terms mean something negative and something positive and something affirmative and negative, but also from the fact that some terms are common to several and some are proper, among which are to be reckoned proper nouns and demonstrative and relative pronouns.
Et est iste modus quando aliquod argumentum teneret si loco termini communis, vel loco termini habentis terminum communem pro parte, poneretur nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrativum vel relativum; et tamen quia ponitur alius terminus quam pronomen demonstrativum vel relativum vel nomen proprium non valet argumentum, vel quando accidit e converso.	And this is the mode when an argument would hold if instead of a common term, or instead of a term having a common term as part, a proper noun or a demonstrative or relative pronoun were put; and yet because a term other than a demonstrative or relative pronoun or a proper noun is used, the argument is not valid, or when it happens the other way around.
Verbi gratia si arguatur sic `Marcus potest esse alter a Tullio; Marcus est Tullius; igitur Marcus potest esse alter a se', hic est bonum argumentum si `Marcus' sit nomen proprium istius hominis et similiter `Tullius'.	For example, if it is argued that 'Marcus may be different from Tullius; Marcus is Tullius; therefore Marcus can be different from himself', here is a good argument if 'Marcus' is the proper name of that man and likewise 'Tullius'.
Si tamen loco istius nominis `Tullius' poneretur hoc commune `musicum' vel sibi adderetur idem commune, argumentum non valeret; sicut non sequitur `Marcus potest esse alter a musico, vel a Tullio musico; Marcus est musicus, vel Tullius musicus; igitur Marcus potest esse alter a se'.	If, however, instead of this name `Tullius' the common term `musician' were put, or the same common was added to it, the argument would not be valid; as it does not follow that `Marcus may be the other than a musician, or a musician from Tullius; Marcus is a musician, or Tullius a musician; Therefore Marcus can be different from himself'.
Similiter hic est bonum argumentum `Marcus est tertius a Sorte et a Tullio, ergo Marcus est tertius a se'; et tamen hoc argumentum non valet `Marcus est tertius a Sorte et ab homine, ergo Marcus est tertius a se'.	Similarly, here is a good argument, `Marcus is third from Socrates and from Tullius, therefore Marcus is third from himself'; and yet this argument is not valid, `Marcus is third from Socrates and from a man, therefore Marcus is third from himself.
Et tamen non est differentia aliqua nisi in hoc quod in uno accipitur nomen commune et in alio loco termini communis accipitur nomen proprium. Propter hoc si aliquis credat quod illud argumentum valet ubi ponitur nomen commune sicut valet illud in quo ponitur nomen proprium, decipitur per fallaciam figurae dictionis, dum credit propter similitudinem dictionum unum valere sicut reliquum.	And yet there is no difference except in the fact that in one place a common noun is taken and in another place a proper noun is taken as a common term. Because of this, if anyone believes that the argument in which a common noun is used is as valid as that in which a proper noun is used, he is deceived by the fallacy of figure of speech, while he believes that one is as valid as the other because of the similarity of the expressions.
Similiter hic est bonum argumentum `Marcus non est tertius a se et a Sorte; Marcus est	Similarly, here is a good argument: `Marcus is not third from himself and from Socrates; Marcus is
Tullius; ergo Marcus non est tertius a Sorte et a Tullio'. Et tamen si loco istius nominis proprii `Tullius' poneretur hoc nomen commune `homo', argumentum non valeret, quia non sequitur `Marcus non est tertius a se et a Sorte; Marcus est homo; ergo Marcus non est tertius a Sorte et ab homine'.	Tullius; therefore Marcus is not third from Socrates and from Tullius'. And yet if instead of this proper name `Tullius' the common name `man' were put, the argument would not be valid, because it does not follow that `Marcus is not third from himself and from Socrates; Marcus is a man; therefore Marcus is not third from Socrates and from a man.
Et ita patet quod aliquando ponendo nomen proprium est argumentum bonum et ponendo loco illius nomen commune non valet.	And so it is clear that sometimes putting a proper name is a good argument, and putting a common name in its place is not valid.
Et iste est unus modus tertii modi principalis. Nec tamen est dicendum quod semper accipiendo nomen proprium loco nominis communis vel e converso est fallacia figurae dictionis.	And this is one of the main modes of the third mode. And yet it must not be said that always taking a proper name instead of a common name, or vice versa, is a fallacy of a figure of speech.
Unde errant dicentes quod hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `Coriscus est alter a Corisco musico; Coriscus est Coriscus musicus; ergo Coriscus est alter a se', si Coriscus sit nomen proprium et non aequivocum; quia si esset nomen aequivocum, esset ibi fallacia figurae dictionis.	Hence they err in saying that here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `Coriscus is other than Coriscus the musician; Coriscus is Coriscus the musician; therefore Coriscus is other than himself', if Coriscus is a proper name and not equivocal; for if there were an equivocal name, there would be a fallacy of the figure of speech.
Quod autem non sit ibi fallacia figurae dictionis, patet; nam sequitur `Coriscus est alter a Corisco musico, ergo Coriscus non est Coriscus musicus', et sequitur `Coriscus non est Coriscus musicus, ergo Coriscus musicus non est Coriscus'.	Now that there is no fallacy in the figure of speech is evident; for it follows that `Coriscus is different from Coriscus the musician, therefore Coriscus is not Coriscus the musician', and it follows that `Coriscus is not Coriscus the musician, therefore Coriscus the musician is not Coriscus'.
Similiter sequitur `Coriscus est Coriscus musicus, ergo Coriscus musicus est Coriscus'. Ex istis duobus sequitur conclusio principalis, sic `Coriscus musicus non est Coriscus;	Similarly, it follows that `Coriscus is Coriscus the musician, therefore Coriscus the musician is Coriscus'. From these two the main conclusion follows, thus `Coriscus the musician is not Coriscus;
Coriscus musicus est Coriscus; ergo Coriscus non est Coriscus', et ultra `ergo Coriscus est alter a se'. Nec valet dicere quod non sequitur `Coriscus est alter a Corisco musico, igitur Coriscus non est Coriscus musicus', quia sequitur `Coriscus est alter a Corisco musico, ergo Coriscus musicus est alter a Corisco'; et ultra `ergo Coriscus est alter a Corisco'; et ultra `ergo Coriscus non est Coriscus musicus'; igitur a primo ad ultimum.	Coriscus the musician is Corsicus; therefore, Coriscus is not Coriscus', and further, 'therefore Coriscus is other than himself'. Nor is it worth saying that it does not follow that `Coriscus is other than Coriscus the musician, therefore Coriscus is not Coriscus the musician', because it follows that `Coriscus is other than Coriscus the musician, therefore Coriscus the musician is other than Coriscus'; and further, `therefore Coriscus is other than Coriscus'; and further, `therefore Coriscus is not Coriscus the musician'; therefore from the first to the last.
Dicendum est ergo quod talis discursus est bonus ex propositionibus mere de inesse et mere de praesenti. Sed iste discursus non valet `Coriscus potest esse alter a Corisco musico; Coriscus est Coriscus musicus; igitur Coriscus potest esse alter a se'; et tamen si loco istius termini `Coriscus musicus' poneretur aliquod pronomen demonstrativum vel relativum vel nomen proprium esset discursus bonus.	It must be said, then, that such a discourse is good from propositions purely about existence and merely about the present. But this argument does not hold: `Coriscus may be different from Coriscus the musician; Coriscus is Coriscus the musician; therefore Coriscus can be another from himself'; and yet if instead of this term `Coriscus the musician' some demonstrative or relative pronoun or proper noun were put, the discussion would be good.
Et si quaeratur causa istius, dicendum est quod causa est quia affirmativae multae, in quibus ponuntur termini communes vel pronomina sive nomina propria cum terminis communibus, possunt habere plures causas veritatis quam si loco illorum poneretur nomen proprium vel pronomen.	And if the reason for this is sought, it must be said that the reason is that many affirmatives, in which common terms or pronouns or proper nouns are put together with common terms, can have more grounds of truth than if a proper name or pronoun were put in their place.
Ista enim `Coriscus potest esse alter a Corisco musico' potest habere omnes istas causas veritatis `Coriscus potest esse alter a Corisco'; `Coriscus potest esse alter a musico'; `Coriscus potest non esse Coriscus musicus'.	For the statement `Coriscus can be another from Coriscus the musician' can have all these reasons for the truth `Coriscus can be other than Coriscus'; `Coriscus can be different from a musician'; `Coriscus may not be Coriscus the musician'.
Et non omnes istas causas veritatis potest habere ista `Coriscus potest esse alter a se', nec ista `Coriscus potest esse alter a Corisco'. Et si dicatur quod tunc est ibi fallacia consequentis, dicendum est quod non est inconveniens ibi accidere fallaciam consequentis.	And not all these causes of truth can have the statement `Coriscus can be other than himself', nor that `Coriscus can be other than Coriscus.' And if it is said that then there is a fallacy of the consequent, it must be said that it is not inconvenient for a fallacy of the consequent to occur there.
Si tamen quis decipiatur propter hoc quod videt quod talis modus arguendi tenet in consimilibus dictionibus, decipietur per fallaciam figurae dictionis.	If, however, one is deceived because he sees that such a mode of reasoning holds in similar sayings, he will be deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech.
Penes istum modum peccant talia sophismata `quandocumque aliqua sunt idem realiter, ubicumque aliquid est unum illorum, ibi illud est reliquum illorum; sed substantia corporis Christi et substantia corporis Christi habens partem distantem a parte sunt idem realiter, et corpus Christi est in sacramento Altaris substantia corporis Christi; igitur corpus Christi est in sacramento Altaris habens partem distantem a parte', quia si loco istius termini `substantia corporis Christi habens partem distantem a parte' poneretur nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrans illam rem quae est substantia corporis Christi habens partem distantem a parte, esset bonum argumentum. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `haec substantia est substantia habens partem distantem a parte; haec res est substantia in sacramento Altaris; ergo haec res est substantia habens partem distantem a parte in sacramento Altaris'. Et tamen si in conclusione poneretur loco istius termini `substantia habens partem distantem a parte' nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrativum, esset bonum argumentum. Et propter hoc est ibi fallacia figurae dictionis penes modum alium prius positum. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quando aliqua sunt idem realiter, unum non potest esse sine reliquo; sed Sortes et simile sunt idem realiter; ergo Sortes non potest esse nisi simile sit', quia si loco istius termini `simile' poneretur nomen proprium illius similis vel pronomen demonstrans ipsum simile, esset bonum argumentum. Similiter in talibus est fallacia figurae dictionis `mobile quando exsistet, potest non esse motus, igitur motus realiter distinguitur a mobili'. Similiter hic `ipsa substantia exsistente potest non esse quanta, igitur substantia distinguitur realiter a quantitate'. Similiter hic, secundum principia Aristotelis, `substantia, quamvis non desinat esse, potest non esse quantitas, ergo substantia non est eadem realiter quantitati'; `albedo, quamvis non desinat esse, potest non esse similitudo, igitur albedo non est eadem res cum similitudine'.	It is in this way that such sophists err: whenever some things are really the same, wherever one of them is, there are the rest of them; but the substance of the body of Christ and the substance of the body of Christ having a part distant from that part are really the same, and the body of Christ in the sacrament of the Altar is the substance of the body of Christ; therefore the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the Altar having a part distant from a part, because if instead of this term `the substance of Christ's body having a part distant from a part' a proper noun or a pronoun was put, showing that thing which is the substance of the body of Christ having a part distant from the part, it would be a good argument. Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `this substance is a substance having a part distant from a part; this thing is the substance in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore this thing is a substance having a part distant from the part in the sacrament of the Altar'. And yet if, in the conclusion, a proper noun or a demonstrative pronoun were put instead of the term `a substance having a part distant from a part,' it would be a good argument. And for this reason there is a fallacy of the figure of speech, according to another mode previously set forth. Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `when some things are really the same, one cannot exist without the rest; but Socrates and the like are really the same thing; therefore Socrates cannot be unless he is similar', because if instead of this term 'similar' a proper noun or a pronoun indicating what is similar were put, it would be a good argument. Similarly, in such cases there is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `when a mobile thing exists, it may not be moving, therefore movement is really distinguished from a mobile thing'. Similarly, here `substance itself in existence may not be quantitative, therefore substance is really distinguished from quantity'. Similarly here, according to Aristotle's principles, `substance, although it does not cease to be, may not be quantity, therefore substance is not really the same as quantity'; `whiteness, although it does not cease to be, may not be likeness, therefore whiteness is not the same thing as likeness.'
Et tamen in omnibus istis si loco termini communis poneretur nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrativum, esset bonum argumentum. Sciendum est tamen quod quamvis praedictae consequentiae non teneant ponendo terminos communes a parte praedicati in propositione categorica, tamen si ponerentur a parte subiecti in copulativa, essent consequentiae bonae.	And yet in all these, if a proper noun or a demonstrative pronoun were put instead of a common term, it would be a good argument. It must be known, however, that although the aforesaid consequences do not hold by placing the common terms on the part of the predicate in a categorical proposition, yet if they were placed on the part of the subject in a copulative, the consequences would be good.
Sicut sequitur `mobile potest esse in a; et tunc motus potest non esse, quamvis mobile sit tunc; ergo motus non est idem realiter cum mobili'. Similiter sequitur `substantia potest esse in aliquo tempore; et tunc quantum potest non esse, quamvis substantia tunc exsistat; ergo quantum non est idem realiter cum substantia'.	As it follows, `mobility can be in a; and then there may be no movement, although it is then mobile; therefore motion is not really the same as mobile'. Similarly, it follows that `substance can exist at any time; and then quantity can not be, although the substance then exists; therefore quantity is not really the same as substance.
Sed altera praemissarum tunc erit falsa. Et causa quare unus modus arguendi tenet et non alius, est quia `quantum' potest esse substantia quando ipsa substantia non erit quanta, sicut `album' erit Sortes quando Sortes non erit albus. Ponatur quod Sortes sit modo albus et quod fiet niger cras: tunc haec est vera `album cras erit Sortes' et haec falsa `Sortes cras erit albus'. Et ista est causa quare tenet unus modus arguendi et non alius. Et unde oritur ista causa? Dicendum est quod oritur ex hoc quod alium modum significandi habet hoc nomen `Sortes' et hoc nomen `album', quia `album' significat Sortem in recto quando Sortes est albus et significat in obliquo albedinem quae potest destrui Sorte manente.	But the second of the premises will then be false. And the reason why one way of reasoning holds and not another is because a substance can be a quantum when the substance itself will not be quantitative, just as a white thing will be Socrates when Socrates will not be white. It is supposed that Socrates is only white and that he will become black tomorrow: then this is true: `A white thing will be Socrates tomorrow' and this is false: `Socrates will be white tomorrow'. And this is the reason why one way of reasoning holds and not another. And where does this cause arise? It must be said that it arises from the fact that this name `Socrates' and this name `white' have a different meaning, because `white signifies Socrates directly when Socrates is white and it signifies in the oblique the whiteness which can be destroyed although Socrates remains.
Similiter quod haec sit vera, secundum unam opinionem, `quantitas potest esse substantia quando substantia non erit quantitas', causa est, secundum eos, quia hoc nomen `quantitas' significat partem rei distare a parte, et Deus potest facere quod substantia maneat et tamen quod una pars non distet situaliter ab alia parte.	In the same way that this is true, according to one opinion, `a quantity can be a substance when a substance will not be a quantity', the reason, according to them, is because this word `quantity' means that a part of a thing is distant from a part, and God can cause a substance to remain and yet that one part is not situationally distant from another part.
Et ita est de omnibus consimilibus quod diversus modus significandi causat fallaciam figurae dictionis in talibus sophismatibus. Propter quod ad cognoscendum istum tertium modum principalem figurae dictionis necesse est cognoscere quas res termini significant et qualiter significant eas, scilicet an in recto vel in obliquo, et an affirmative vel negative, et an tamquam termini categorematici vel syncategorematici, et an tamquam nomina propria vel communia, quamvis istud ultimum reduci posset ad secundum modum principalem.	And so it is with all similar things that a different way of signifying causes the fallacy of figure of speech in such sophistry. Because of this, in order to know this third principal mode of figures of speech, it is necessary to know what things the terms signify and how they signify, that is, whether they are direct or oblique, and whether affirmative or negative, and whether as categorematic or syncategorematic terms, and whether as proper or common nouns, although this last could be reduced to the second principal mode.
Unde quidquid sit dicendum de distinctione illorum modorum, hoc tamen tenendum est, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, quod tunc semper est fallacia figurae dictionis quando non similiter contingit arguere ex diversis terminis propter diversitatem dictionum quae videntur similes, propter quam similitudinem potest alicui videri quod arguendum est similiter ex illis.	Hence, whatever may be said about the distinction of those modes, this must still be held, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, that then there is always a fallacy of figure of speech when it is not possible to argue in the same way from different terms because of the diversity of sayings which seem similar, because of which similarity it can appear to someone that it is to be argued in the same way as them.
Hoc tamen semper servandum est quod quandocumque praemissae sunt dispositae in modo et in figura, secundum regulas quae datae sunt in principio istius tractatus de syllogismis tam uniformibus quam mixtis, numquam est fallacia figurae dictionis.	This, however, must always be observed, that whenever the premises are arranged in a manner and in a figure, according to the rules given at the beginning of this treatise on both uniform and mixed syllogisms, there is never a fallacy of figure of speech.