Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 11
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[CAP. 11. DE FALLACIA ACCIDENTIS] | [Chapter 11. On the fallacy of accident] |
Post fallacias in dictione dicendum est de fallaciis extra dictionem, inter quas primo ponitur fallacia accidentis. Circa quam sciendum quod hic non accipitur `accidens' illo modo quo accipitur prius, ubi determinatur de accidente quod ponitur unum quinque universalium, sed accipitur hic 'accidens' pro omni termino qui potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum distinctum ab alio. Unde omnis terminus qui potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis potest esse et est accidens respectu alicuius, quia est distinctum praedicabile vel subicibile ab alio praedicabili. | After linguistic fallacies we should speak of non-linguistic fallacies, of which first is given the fallacy of accident. Concerning this it should be known that ‘accident’ is not understood here in the mode in which it was accepted before, where it was determined before that an accident is one of the five universals. Rather, ‘accident’ is understood here for any term which can be a subject or predicate distinct from another. Hence, every term which can be the subject or predicate of a proposition can be and is an accident in respect of another, for it is a distinct predicable or ‘subjectible’ from another predicable. |
Causa apparentiae istius fallaciae est identitas praedicationis unius termini cum alio, hoc est, causa quare decipit: quia videmus unum terminum de alio praedicari affirmative vel negative, credimus quod quidquid dicitur de uno, dicetur de reliquo. | The reason for the appearance of this fallacy is the identity of predication of one term with another, that is, the reason why it deceives, for we see one term predicated affirmatively or negatively of another, [and] we see that whatever is said of one, will be said of the other. |
Causa non-exsistentiae est, quia quamvis unus terminus praedicetur de alio, non est necesse quod quidquid dicitur de accidente, hoc est de uno illorum, quod propter hoc dicatur de reliquo; vel non est necesse eodem modo dici de reliquo quo unum illorum dicitur de alio. | The cause of non-existence is that although one term is predicated of another, it is not necessary that whatever is said of the accident, i.e. of one of them, is said on that account of the other, or that it is not necessary to be said in the same way of the other, by which one of them is said of another. |
Et ideo responsio generalis ad omnes paralogismos accidentis est dicere quod non est necesse sequi conclusionem ex praemissis, hoc est, non est necesse praedicatum conclusionis dici de subiecto conclusionis propter unionem illorum in praemissis cum aliquo uno. | And therefore the general reply to all paralogisms of accident is to say that it is not necessary that the conclusion follows from the premisses, i.e. that it is not necessary that the predicate of the conclusion is predicated of the subject of the conclusion, because of their union in the premisses with some single thing. |
Sicut non est necesse ista extrema <'homo --- asinus'> coniungi per praedicationem, sic dicendo `homo est asinus', quamvis isti duo termini `homo' et `asinus' coniungantur per praedicationem cum hoc medio `animal', sic dicendo `asinus est animal', `homo est animal'. | For example, it is not necessary for the extremes “man … donkey” to be joined in predication, in saying “a man is a donkey”, although the two terms ‘man’ and ‘donkey’ are joined by predication with the middle term ‘animal’, in saying “a donkey is an animal”, “a man is an animal”. |
Et ista est responsio generalis ad omnes paralogismos accidentis. Sed praeter istam responsionem generalem oportet, secundum Aristotelem, proferre `ut', hoc est oportet assignare aliquam regulam evidentem specialem quare non sequitur, et pro diversis oportet diversas regulas speciales assignare. Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod duo sunt modi principales istius fallaciae. Unus modus est quando aliqua quae per praedicationem coniunguntur in praemissis cum tertio, concluduntur coniungi inter se in conclusione. Secundus modus est quando aliqua coniuncta cum aliquo uno per propositiones diversas concluduntur per unicam propositionem coniungi cum eodem tertio. | And that is a general reply to all paralogisms of accident. But beyond that general response we have, according to Aristotle, to utter ‘as’, i.e. we have to assign some evident specific rule why it does not follow, and we have to assign diverse specific rules for diverse cases. For evidence of this you should know that there are two principal modes of this fallacy. One mode is when things which are joined in predication are joined in the premisses with a third, are concluded to be joined with one another in the conclusion. The second mode is when things joined with some single thing by diverse propositions are concluded, by a single proposition, to be joined with the same third thing. |
Et est sciendum quod fallacia accidentis non est assignanda ex variatione medii, quia non oportet medium in fallacia accidentis variari. Hic enim nulla est variatio medii `Sortes est homo; Plato est homo; ergo Plato est Sortes'. Sed semper vel frequenter accidit fallacia accidentis ex identitate medii; quando enim propter hoc quod aliqua coniunguntur per praedicationem in medio non variato creditur quod coniungantur per praedicationem inter se, et tamen non oportet, est fallacia accidentis. Sed hic non potest dari aliqua regula generalis sufficiens, quia nec per variationem medii, sicut dictum est, nec per reduplicationem minoris propositionis super maiorem extremitatem, quia frequenter talis reduplicativa est impossibilis, et tamen syllogismus est bonus. | And it should be known that the fallacy of accident should not be assigned from the variation of the middle, because the middle does not have to be varied in the fallacy of accident. For in “Socrates is a man, Plato is a man, therefore Plato is Socrates” there is no variation of the middle term. But always or frequently the fallacy of accident happens with the identity of the middle, for when, from the fact that some things are joined by predication in a middle which is not varied, it is believed that they are joined by predication between themselves, and yet this does not have to be fallacy of accident. But here there cannot be given some general rule that is sufficient, because it is neither by variation of the middle, as was said, nor by reduplication of the minor proposition above the major extremity, because frequently such a reduplicative is impossible, and yet the syllogism is good. |
Sicut hic est bonus syllogismus `omnis homo est lapis; omnis albedo est homo; ergo omnis albedo est lapis', et tamen ista reduplicativa est impossibilis `omnis albedo est homo in quantum est lapis'. | For example, the syllogism “every man is a stone, every whiteness is a man, therefore every whiteness is a stone” is good, and yet the reduplicative “every whiteness is a man insofar as it is a stone”. |
Non potest igitur dari regula generalis pro omnibus paralogismis per quam sufficienter sciatur fallacia accidentis in quolibet casu. Est igitur sciendum quod primus modus fallaciae accidentis est quando praemissae disponuntur in figura et non in modo. | Nor can there be given a general rule for all paralogisms through which fallacy of accident is sufficiently known in every case. Therefore, it should be known that the first mode of the fallacy of accident is when premisses are disposed in figure and not in mode. |
Et hoc potest accidere vel quando praemissae sunt simpliciter categoricae et de praesenti et de inesse, vel quando sunt de modo, vel una est de modo et alia de inesse, vel de praeterito vel de futuro. | And this can happen either when the premisses are simply categorical and present tense assertoric, or when they are modal, or one is modal and the other assertoric, or past or future. |
Unde penes istum modum fallaciae accidentis peccant omnes coniugationes inutiles, sive uniformes sive mixtae, de quibus loquitur Philosophus I Priorum et de quibus dictum est prius. | Hence, all useless coniugationes err in this mode of the fallacy of accident, whether they are uniform or mixed, of which the Philosopher speaks about in the Prior Analytics, and of which we spoke earlier. |
Et ideo ad sciendum quando est iste modus fallaciae accidentis, oportet scire omnes regulas illas et oportet scire penes quam illarum regularum peccat paralogismus, et ideo pro diversis oportet diversas regulas assignare. | And therefore it should be known that when it is this mode of the fallacy of accident, one has to know all the rules, and to know according to which of those rules the paralogism errs, and therefore one has to assign diverse rules for diverse cases. |
Unde hic est fallacia accidentis `veniens cognoscitur a te; Coriscus est veniens; igitur Coriscus cognoscitur a te'. Et in assignando debes proferre `ut', et dicere quod hic est fallacia accidentis, quia maior est particularis vel indefinita in prima figura in syllogismo affirmativo; quae maior si esset in proposito universalis, non esset aliqua fallacia. | Hence "the one coming is known by you, Coriscus is coming, therefore Coriscus is known by you". And in assigning, you ought to proferre `ut', and say that this is the fallacy of accident, because the major is particular or indefinite in the first figure in an affirmative syllogism, which if the major were universal, there would be no fallacy. |
Unde hic nulla est fallacia `omnis veniens cognoscitur a te; Coriscus est veniens; igitur Coriscus cognoscitur a te', quia maior est universalis. Similiter hic est fallacia accidentis `omnis homo est animal; omnis asinus est animal; igitur omnis asinus est homo'. | Hence there is no fallacy in "everything coming is known by you, Coriscus is coming, therefore Coriscus is known by you", for the major is universal. Similarly "every man is an animal, every donkey is an animal, therefore every donkey is a man" is a fallacy of accident. |
Et assignatio generalis debet esse ista, quod hic est fallacia accidentis, quia quamvis animal praedicetur de homine, non oportet quod de quocumque dicitur `animal' quod de eodem dicatur `homo' tali modo quo animal dicitur de homine. | And the general assignment must be this, that here is a fallacy of accident, because although an animal is predicated of a man, it is not necessary that whatever is said of an 'animal' should be said of the same thing as a 'man' in the same way that an animal is said of a man. |
Et proferendo `ut', debes dicere in speciali quod hic est fallacia accidentis, quia arguitur ex omnibus affirmativis in secunda figura. Et ita pro diversis debent diversae regulae assignari, et sine illis regulis non potest sciri universaliter quando est fallacia accidentis et quando non. | And in pronouncing 'so', you must say in particular that here is a fallacy of accident, because it is argued from all the affirmatives in the second figure. And so different rules must be assigned to different things, and without those rules it cannot be universally known when the fallacy of an accident is and when it is not. |
Quando igitur accidit fallacia accidentis penes istum modum arguendi ex propositionibus mere categoricis et mere de inesse et mere de praesenti facile est scire per regulas Aristotelis, traditas in I Priorum, de uniformi generatione syllogismorum de inesse, praeterquam in uno casu, scilicet in divinis, ubi concedendum est quod una res simplex est plures personae, quae inter se sunt distinctae realiter, de quibus tactum est prius, quia in talibus terminis est frequenter fallacia accidentis et non in aliis. | When, therefore, the fallacy of accident occurs close to this method of arguing from propositions that are merely categorical and merely of being and merely of the present, it is easy to know by Aristotle's rules, handed down in Prior 1, of the uniform generation of syllogisms of being, except in one case, that is, of the divine, where it must be admitted that one simple thing is a plurality of persons, which are distinct from each other in reality, of which we have touched before, because in such terms the fallacy of accident is frequent and not in others. |
Unde hic est fallacia accidentis `omnis essentia divina est Pater; Filius est essentia divina; ergo Filius est Pater'. Et debet specialis regula assignari talis: quia una essentia est plures personae, quae personae sunt distinctae inter se, non oportet quod omne nomen personae de quo praedicatur nomen essentiae praedicetur de nomine alterius personae. | Whence here is a fallacy of accident, `every divine essence is the Father; The Son is the divine essence; therefore the Son is the Father. And a special rule must be assigned as follows: since one essence is many persons, which persons are distinct from one another, it is not necessary that every name of a person of which the name of the essence is predicated is predicated of the name of another person. |
Similiter hic est fallacia accidentis `haec essentia est Pater; haec essentia est Filius; ergo | Similarly here is a fallacy of accident, `this essence is the Father; this essence is the Son; therefore |
Filius est Pater'. Et isti deservit consimilis regula; quia enim una essentia est plures personae, ideo non sequitur quod quamvis de nomine proprio illius vel de pronomine demonstrante illam essentiam praedicentur nomina illarum personarum quod propter hoc unum nomen unius personae praedicetur de reliquo. | the Son is the Father. And a similar rule serves these; For since one essence is many persons, it does not follow that although the names of those persons are predicated of the proper name of that person or of the pronoun showing that essence, that for this reason the one name of one person is predicated of the rest. |
Sicut propter hoc quod iste terminus `homo', qui significat plures homines, praedicetur de nominibus singulorum hominum, non oportet quod illa nomina quae praedicantur de hoc nomine `homo' sine signo universali, praedicentur de se invicem. | Just as because this term `man', which signifies many men, is predicated of the names of individual men, it is not necessary that those names which are predicated of this name `man' without a universal sign be predicated of each other. |
Similiter hic est fallacia accidentis, propter similem regulam `haec spiratio est paternitas; haec spiratio est filiatio; ergo filiatio est paternitas'. Similiter hic `haec essentia est Pater; haec essentia est Filius; ergo Filius est Pater'. Similiter hic `haec essentia est Pater; Filius non est Pater; igitur Filius non est essentia'. | Similarly here is a fallacy of accident, because of a similar rule `this spiration is paternity; this spiration is filiation; therefore filiation is paternity'. Similarly here `this essence is the Father; this essence is the Son; therefore the Son is the Father'. Similarly here `this essence is the Father; the Son is not the Father; therefore the Son is not an essence'. |
Similiter hic `omnis Deus est Pater; Filius est Deus; igitur Filius est Pater'. Et si dicatur quod hic non est fallacia, quia haec est falsa `omnis Deus est Pater', contra hoc potest argui, quia si haec sit falsa `omnis Deus est Pater', ergo sua opposita est vera `aliquis Deus non est Pater'. | Similarly here `every God is the Father; the Son is God; therefore the Son is the Father'. And if it is said that there is no fallacy here, because `every God is the Father' is false, it can be argued against this, because if `every God is the Father' is false, then its opposite is true `some God is not the Father'. |
Et manifestum est quod haec est vera `aliquis Deus est Pater'; igitur sunt plures dii, quorum unus est Pater et alius non est Pater, sicut sequitur `aliqua essentia divina est Pater; et aliqua essentia divina non est Pater; igitur sunt plures essentiae'. | And it is clear that this is true: `some God is the Father'; therefore there are many gods, one of whom is the Father and another is not the Father, as follows: `some divine essence is the Father; and some divine essence is not the Father; therefore there are many essences'. |
Similiter hic est fallacia accidentis `contradictoria verificantur de essentia et Patre; et essentia et Pater sunt idem; igitur contradictoria verificantur de essentia et Patre pro eodem'. | Similarly, here is a fallacy of accident: 'Contradictory things are verified about the essence and the Father; and the essence and the Father are the same; therefore contradictory things are verified about the essence and the Father for the same thing'. |
Similiter hic est fallacia accidentis `essentia est Pater; Pater non est Filius; igitur essentia non est Filius'. Et pro omnibus talibus non potest assignari nisi talis regula: essentia divina, quae est unus | Similarly, here is a fallacy of accident `the essence is the Father; the Father is not the Son; therefore the essence is not the Son'. And for all such things, no other rule can be assigned than this: the divine essence, which is one. |
Deus et unica essentia, est plures personae. Propter quod ubi non obviat relationis oppositio quod conceditur de una persona concedendum est de alia; ubi autem obviat relationis oppositio non est concedendum de qualibet persona quod de una conceditur. | God, and the one essence, is many persons. Wherefore, where there is no opposition of relation to it, what is conceded of one person must be conceded of another; but where there is opposition of relation to it, what is conceded of one person must not be conceded of any (other) person. |
Et ad hoc est semper aspiciendum in respondendo ad discursus ex terminis importantibus divinas personas. Et ideo quamvis in talibus discursibus, in quibus exemplificatum est, sit fallacia accidentis, tamen in talibus discursibus compositis ex terminis importantibus creaturas numquam est fallacia accidentis. | And this is what must always be observed in responding to discourses made up of terms that imply divine persons. And therefore, although in such discourses, in which the example was given, there is a fallacy of accident, nevertheless in such discourses composed of terms that imply creatures there is never a fallacy of accident. |
In terminis tamen et discursibus compositis ex terminis importantibus divinas personas est fallacia accidentis. Et ideo secus est de discursibus compositis ex terminis importantibus creaturas et de discursibus de quibus exemplificatum est. | However, in terms and discourses composed of terms that imply divine persons, there is a fallacy of accident. And therefore it is different with discourses composed of terms that imply creatures and with the discourses of which example has been given. |
Propter quod dico quod in terminis importantibus creaturas, ubicumque sunt praemissae dispositae vocaliter in modo et in figura, secundum regulas traditas superius de syllogismis uniformibus et mixtis, numquam est fallacia accidentis, quamvis aliquando possit esse fallacia aequivocationis et amphiboliae et compositionis et divisionis et accentus et in uno casu fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, nisi aliqui termini includant aequivalenter aliqua syncategoremata vel aliquas alias determinationes, de quibus dictum est in primo tractatu istius Summa. | Because of this I say that in terms that imply creatures, wherever the premises are arranged vocally in mode and figure, according to the rules given above about uniform and mixed syllogisms, there is never a fallacy of accident, although sometimes there can be a fallacy of equivocation and amphiboly and composition and division and accent and in one case a fallacy secundum quid and simplistically, unless some terms include equivalently some syncategorematic terms or some other determinations, of which we spoke in the first treatise of this Summa. |
Propter quod omnes tales syllogismi sunt boni `omnis intellectus humanus est anima intellectiva; omnis voluntas humana est anima intellectiva; ergo aliqua voluntas humana est intellectus humanus'. | Because of this, all such syllogisms are good: 'every human intellect is an intellectual soul; every human will is an intellectual soul; therefore some human will is a human intellect'. |
'Omnis creatura est creata; omnis creatio est creatura; igitur omnis creatio est creata', et innumerabiles tales, quos nonnulli ignorantes logicam negant, propter quod in errores varios elabuntur. | 'Every creature is created; every creation is a creature; therefore every creation is created', and countless others like it, which some ignorant of logic deny, because of which they slip into various errors. |
Sicut autem nonnunquam accidit fallacia accidentis propter hoc quod praemissae de inesse et de praesenti non ordinantur secundum regulas debitas in modo et in figura, ita etiam accidit fallacia accidentis propter hoc quod praemissae de praeterito vel de futuro vel de modo non ordinantur secundum veras regulas in modo et figura. | But just as the fallacy of accident sometimes occurs because premises about innate and present things are not ordered according to the due rules in mode and figure, so too does the fallacy of accident occur because premises about past or future or mode are not ordered according to the true rules in mode and figure. |
Propter hoc hic est fallacia accidentis `Filius Dei fuit Deus ab aeterno; Filius Dei non fuit homo ab aeterno; igitur homo non fuit Filius Dei ab aeterno'. Similiter hic `Deus non potest facere actum meritorium sine voluntate; actus meritorius est aliquid; igitur aliquid non potest fieri a Deo sine voluntate'. | For this reason, here is a fallacy of accident: `The Son of God was God from eternity; the Son of God was not man from eternity; therefore man was not the Son of God from eternity'. Similarly here: `God cannot do a meritorious act without will; a meritorious act is something; therefore something cannot be done by God without will'. |
Similiter hic `naturaliter potest sciri quod omnis Deus est immortalis; tres personae sunt Deus, vel Pater est Deus; ergo naturaliter potest sciri quod tres personae sunt immortales, vel quod Pater est immortalis'. | Similarly here `it can be known naturally that all God is immortal; three persons are God, or the Father is God; therefore it can be known naturally that three persons are immortal, or that the Father is immortal'. |
Similiter est hic, secundum unam opinionem, `scio quod omnis anima intellectiva est substantia; intellectus est anima intellectiva; ergo scio quod intellectus est substantia'. Et sicut est de talibus, ita est de multis aliis, quae tamen possunt sciri evidenter, scitis regulis datis de generatione syllogismorum uniformium et mixtorum, propter quarum ignorantiam multi decipiuntur per fallaciam accidentis. | Similarly, according to one opinion, `I know that every intellectual soul is a substance; the intellect is an intellectual soul; therefore I know that the intellect is a substance.' And as it is about such things, so it is about many others, which, however, can be known clearly, knowing the rules given for the generation of uniform and mixed syllogisms, because of the ignorance of which many are deceived by the fallacy of accident. |
Secundus modus principalis fallaciae accidentis est quando aliqua per praedicationem coniunguntur cum tertio non variato in diversis propositionibus et in conclusione coniunguntur illa eadem cum illo tertio non variato; sicut sic arguendo `iste canis est tuus; iste canis est pater; ergo iste canis est tuus pater'. | The second main mode of the fallacy of accident is when some things are joined by predication to an unvaried third in different propositions and in the conclusion the same things are joined to that unvaried third; as in arguing thus `this dog is yours; this dog is a father; therefore this dog is your father'. |
Verumtamen non semper quando sic arguitur est fallacia accidentis. | However, it is not always so that when arguing in this way it is a fallacy of accident. |
Hic enim nulla est fallacia accidentis `iste homo est albus; iste homo est animal; ergo iste homo est animal album'. Et ideo ad cognoscendum quando in tali modo arguendi est fallacia accidentis et quando non, videndum est an ex propositione in qua illa duo praedicantur coniunctim de aliquo contingat inferre praedicationem unius de altero et an talis oratio sit propria. | For here there is no fallacy of accident `this man is white; this man is an animal; therefore this man is a white animal'. And therefore, to know when there is a fallacy of accident in such a way of arguing and when there is not, we must see whether from a proposition in which those two are predicated jointly of something it is possible to infer the predication of one of the other and whether such an argument is proper. |
Et si sic, non est ibi fallacia accidentis. Propter quod hic non est fallacia accidentis `Sortes est rationalis; Sortes est animal; igitur Sortes est animal rationale'. | And if so, there is no fallacy of accident there. Because of this, there is no fallacy of accident here: 'Socrates is rational; Socrates is an animal; therefore Socrates is a rational animal'. |
Si autem talis oratio sit impropria, tunc non valet, sicut non sequitur `Sortes est animal; Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes est homo --- animal'. | But if such a sentence is improper, then it is not valid, just as it does not follow that `Socrates is an animal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is a man = animal'. |
Nec sequitur `Sortes est lapis; Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes est homo --- lapis'. Similiter si ex tali praedicatione propria non contingat inferre praedicationem unius illorum coniunctorum de reliquo, est fallacia accidentis. | Nor does it follow that `Socrates is a stone; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is a man - stone'. Similarly, if from such a proper predication it is not possible to infer the predication of one of those conjoined things from the rest, it is a fallacy of accident. |
Et ideo quia ista consequentia non valet `iste est pater tuus, ergo est tuus', ideo hic est fallacia accidentis `iste canis est tuus; iste canis est pater; ergo iste canis est pater tuus'. Similiter, quia non sequitur `iste est monachus albus, igitur est albus', ideo hic est fallacia accidentis `iste est albus; iste est monachus; ergo iste est albus monachus', et ita est de consimilibus. | And therefore because this consequence is not valid `this is your father, therefore he is yours', therefore here is the fallacy of accident `this is your dog; this dog is a father; therefore this dog is your father'. Similarly, because it does not follow `this is a white monk, therefore he is white', therefore here is the fallacy of accident `this is white; this is a monk; therefore this is a white monk', and so it is with the like. |
Verumtamen sciendum est quod semper in tali argumento est fallacia figurae dictionis, et ita semper in tali modo arguendi concurrunt fallacia accidentis et fallacia figurae dictionis. Tamen quando quis credit quod sequitur conclusio propter hoc quod illa coniungebantur eidem tertio in praemissis, decipitur per fallaciam accidentis. | However, it should be known that in such an argument there is always a fallacy of figure of speech, and thus in such a way of arguing there always concur the fallacy of accident and the fallacy of figure of speech. However, when someone believes that the conclusion follows because they were connected to the same third in the premises, he is deceived by the fallacy of accident. |
Si autem credat conclusionem sequi propter similitudinem illarum dictionum ad alias dictiones, in quibus scit tenere talem modum arguendi, decipitur per fallaciam figurae dictionis. | But if he believes that the conclusion follows because of the similarity of those words to other words in which he knows that such a way of arguing holds, he is deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech. |
Et in isto casu potest assignari aliqua multiplicitas in fallacia figurae dictionis, pro eo quod unus terminus aliter accipitur in una propositione et in alia; quia tamen nulla una oratio est multiplex, ideo non est ibi nec aequivocatio, nec amphibolia, nec compositio et divisio, nec accentus. | And in this case some multiplicity can be assigned in the fallacy of the figure of speech, because one term is understood differently in one proposition and in another; yet because no one utterance is multiple, therefore there is neither equivocation, nor amphiboly, nor composition and division, nor accent. |
Unde sciendum est quod si semper quaelibet dictio in tali modo arguendi uniformiter acciperetur, non esset ibi aliqua fallacia dictarum; immo, si servaretur forma syllogistica, non ponendo medium terminum in conclusione, non esset ibi fallacia accidentis.
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Hence it should be known that if every statement in such a way of arguing were always accepted uniformly, there would be no fallacy of what was said; indeed, if the syllogistic form were observed, by not placing a middle term in the conclusion, there would be no fallacy of accident. |
Sicut hic non est fallacia accidentis `iste canis est tuus; iste canis est pater; ergo aliquis pater est tuus'; sicut nec hic `iste est albus; iste est monachus; igitur aliquis monachus est albus'. | Just as here there is no fallacy of accident `this dog is yours; this dog is a father; therefore some father is yours'; just as here there is no fallacy of accident `this is white; this is a monk; therefore some monk is white'. |
Sed in tali modo arguendi aliqua dictio diversimode accipitur in diversis propositionibus. Unde in ista `iste canis est tuus' li tuus significat possessionem, in ista autem `iste canis est tuus pater' li tuus non significat possessionem sed significat patrem istius hominis; propter quod aliter accipitur in una propositione et in alia. Nulla tamen oratio est multiplex. Et si quaeras, unde est hoc quod aliud significat in una propositione et in alia, dicendum est quod causa quare ista vox significat aliud in una propositione et in alia non potest esse nisi voluntas utentium, qui sic volunt uti. | But in such a way of arguing, a certain expression is taken differently in different propositions. Hence in this `this dog is yours', 'yours' signifies possession, but in this `this dog is your father', 'your' does not signify possession but signifies the father of that man; for which reason it is taken differently in one proposition and in another. Yet no sentence is multiple. And if you ask, whence it is that it signifies one thing in one proposition and in another, it must be said that the reason why this expression signifies one thing in one proposition and in another cannot be except the will of the users, who wish to use it in this way. |
Sed ex hoc videtur quod hic est praecise fallacia in dictione. Potest dici quod hic non est praecise fallacia in dictione, quia non est inconveniens ponere quin talis modus arguendi possit servari in propositionibus mentalibus. | But from this it is seen that here there is precisely a fallacy in diction. It can be said that here there is not precisely a fallacy in the word, because it is not unreasonable to suppose that such a mode of argument cannot be observed in mental propositions. |
Unde non est inconveniens quin sicut aliqua dictio ad placitum significativa significat unum quando per se ponitur et aliud quando adiungitur alteri ita idem signum naturale naturaliter significat unum quando per se ponitur et aliud quando coniungitur alteri, sicut posset exemplificari de multis naturalibus. | Hence it is not unreasonable that just as some word used to signify a particular thing signifies one thing when it is used by itself and another thing when it is joined to another, so the same natural sign naturally signifies one thing when it is used by itself and another thing when it is joined to another, as could be exemplified by many natural things. |
Sciendum est autem quod non tantum contingit sic arguere ex omnibus affirmativis, sed etiam contingit arguere ex una affirmativa et alia negativa. Unde hic est fallacia accidentis `iste non est albus, iste est monachus; igitur iste non est monachus albus'. | It should be noted, however, that it is not only possible to argue in this way from all affirmatives, but it is also possible to argue from one affirmative and another negative. Hence here is a fallacy of accident `this is not white, this is a monk; therefore this is not a white monk'. |
Similiter hic `hoc non est tuum; hoc est opus; ergo hoc non est opus tuum'. Et consimiliter est in aliis. | Similarly here, `this is not yours; this is a work; therefore this is not your work.' And it is similar in other cases. |