Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 3

Latin	English
CAP. 3. DE SECUNDO MODO AEQUIVOCATIONIS.	Chapter 3. On the second mode of equivocation.
Circa secundum modum aequivocationis est sciendum quod tunc est secundus modus aequivocationis quando eadem dictio primo et principaliter imponitur ad significandum vel consignificandum aliquid vel aliqua, et secundario propter aliquam attributionem alterius rei ad primum significatum imponitur ad significandum aliud vel alia, ita quod in aliquibus propositionibus utimur illo vocabulo aliter quam primo erat institutum, et non in omnibus.	Concerning the second mode of equivocation, it should be known that there is a second mode of equivocation when the same expression is primarily imposed to signify or co-signify some thing or things, and secondarily, on account of some attribution of another thing to the first significate, is imposed to signify the other thing or things, so that in some propositions we use that word otherwise than it was first established, and not in all cases.
Sicut est de isto nomine `homo', quod primo erat impositum ad significandum animalia rationalia et secundo propter similitudinem statuae ad hominem utimur hoc nomine `homo' pro statua in aliquibus propositionibus, sicut in talibus `homo depingitur', `homo est aureus vel argenteus', quando statua fit ex auro vel argento.	Just as it is with the name 'man', which was first imposed for signifying rational animals, and secondly on account of the similitude of a statue to a man, we use the name 'man' for a statue in some propositions, for example in such propositions as 'the man is painted', 'the man is gold or silver' (when the statue is made from gold or silver.
In multis autem aliis propositionibus non utimur illo vocabulo pro tali secundario significato; sicut in talibus propositionibus `homo currit', `homo est animal' et consimilibus non utimur hoc nomine `homo' nisi pro primario significato et non pro secundario significato.	But in many propositions we do not use that word for such a secondary significate, for example, in the such propositions as 'a man runs', 'a man is an animal', and similar ones, we do not use the name 'man' except for the primary significate, and we do not use it for the secondary significate.
Ex hoc oritur una regula talis, quod numquam est propositio distinguenda penes secundum modum aequivocationis nisi quando illud vocabulum quod potest sic aequivoce accipi comparatur alicui verificabili de secundario significato vel pro aliquo consimili.	From this there arises another rule: that a proposition is never to be distinguished in the second mode of equivocation, except when that word that can be understood equivocally is compared to something verifiable of the secondary significate, or for something similar.
Et ideo ista est distinguenda `homo depingitur' et non ista `homo currit' nec ista `homo est animal', et sic de aliis. Et huius ratio est quia semper terminus, ubicumque ponatur, potest stare pro suo primario significato, sed non potest semper stare pro suo secundario significato, sed tantum in propositione ubi comparatur alicui verificabili de suo secundario significato.	And therefore 'a man is painted' should have distinct senses, and not 'a man runs', nor 'a man is an animal', and so on.  And the reason of this is because a term, wherever it is given, can always stand for its primary significate, but cannot always stand for its secondary significate, but only in a proposition where it is compared to something verifiable of its secondary significate.
Et ideo tantum talis propositio est distinguenda penes secundum modum aequivocationis.	And therefore only such a proposition should have distinct senses in the second mode of equivocation.
Et si quaeratur causa et ratio huius, dicendum est quod principalis ratio istius est voluntas utentium, et ideo si placeret utentibus, posset utraque distingui, hoc tamen usus non habet. Penes istum modum peccant tales discursus `quidquid currit, habet pedes; aqua currit; igitur aqua habet pedes'; `omnis homo est animal rationale; ista imago est homo; igitur ista imago est animal rationale'; `petra erat Christus, igitur aliquod irrationale erat Christus' et huiusmodi.	And if you ask the cause and reason of this, it should be said that the principal reason of this is the choice of the users, and therefore it it pleased the users, it could be distinguished in both senses, but this usage does not hold.  In that mode such discursions as 'whatever runs, has feet; water runs, therefore water has feet'; 'every man is a rational animal, this image is a man, therefore this image is a rational animal'; 'Christ was a rock, therefore Christ was something irrational' etc.
Et similiter non sequitur `omne sanum est animal; urina est sana; igitur urina est animal', 'diaeta est sana, igitur diaeta est corpus animatum', et sic de multis talibus. Et universaliter quando aliqua dictio potest sumi metaphorice et transumptive, potest causare fallaciam aequivocationis.	And similarly 'everything healthy is an animal, urine is healthy, therefore urine is an animal', 'diet is healthy, therefore diet is an animate body', and so for many others.  And generally, when some expression can be understood metaphorically and transmutatively, can cause the fallacy of equivocation.
Sicut in talibus `subiectum scientiae est materia scientiae, igitur scientia componitur ex materia et forma'; nam antecedens istius consequentiae est distinguendum ex eo quod hoc nomen `materia' potest accipi proprie, et sic est falsa `subiectum scientiae est materia scientiae'; vel potest accipi metaphorice et improprie, et sic non valet consequentia. Similiter est hic `figura est forma aeris, igitur aes et figura distinguuntur realiter'; nam `forma' potest accipi proprie, et sic est antecedens falsum, vel potest accipi improprie, et sic consequentia non valet. Similiter est hic `statua componitur ex aere et figura, igitur aes et figura distinguuntur realiter'; nam `componi' potest accipi proprie, et sic est antecedens falsum, vel metaphorice et improprie, et sic consequentia non valet.	As in such cases, `the subject of science is the matter of science, therefore science is composed of matter and form'; for the antecedent of this consequence is to be distinguished from the fact that this name 'matter' can be taken properly, and thus it is false that 'the subject of science is the matter of science'; or it may be taken metaphorically and improperly, and thus the inference is invalid. It is the same here, `the shape is the shape of brass, therefore brass and shape are really distinguished'; for 'form' can be taken properly, and thus the antecedent is false, or it can be taken improperly, and so the conclusion is invalid. It is the same here, `a statue is composed of brass and a figure, therefore the brass and the figure are really distinguished'; for `composed' can be taken literally, and thus the antecedent is false, or metaphorically and improperly, and thus the conclusion is invalid.
Et sicut est de istis, ita est de innumerabilibus aliis, quia vix est aliqua dictio, maxime multum usitata, quin aliquando accipiatur improprie et metaphorice. Et ideo summe necessarium est inspicienti dicta auctorum scire quando accipiunt vocabula proprie et quando improprie, quia aliter faciliter decipitur. Et propter hoc scriptores veteres, quia tam profunditate scientiae quam splendore eloquentiae praepollebant, necesse fuit eos propter ornatum eloquii per diversa vocabula et varias dictionum et orationum formas suam intentionem exprimere, ipsas voces frequenter a significatione propria ad impropriam transferendo.	And as it is with these, so it is with innumerable others, because there is scarcely any expression, especially much in use, which is not sometimes taken improperly and metaphorically. And therefore it is very necessary for the observer to know the words of the authors when they take the terms properly and when improperly, because otherwise he is easily deceived. And for this reason the ancient writers, because they excelled both in the depth of their knowledge and in the splendor of their eloquence, it was necessary for them to express their intention by means of different terms and different forms of speech and oratory, for the sake of their ornamentation of speech, frequently transferring the words themselves from their proper meaning to an improper one.
Cuius translationis et locutionis metaphoricae grammatici diversas species in auctoribus usitatas tradunt, quarum aliquae fiunt quando dictio transfertur a significatione propria ad impropriam, et illae deserviunt secundo modo fallaciae aequivocationis; aliquae autem accidunt ex hoc quod una oratio transfertur a significatione propria ad impropriam, et illae deserviunt fallaciae amphiboliae, de quarum aliquibus est nunc breviter transcurrendum.	The grammarians of the translation and metaphorical expression of this convey the different species used in the authors, some of which occur when the expression is transferred from its proper meaning to an improper one, and these serve as the second way of fallacy of equivocation; but some occur from the fact that one sentence is transferred from its proper meaning to an improper one, and these serve the fallacy of amphibolism, some of which we must now briefly run through.
Unde una translatio est quando nomen totius ponitur pro nomine partis vel e converso; sicut si dicatur `hoc corpus est Sortes', demonstrando cadaver quod fuit pars Sortis. Alia est quando unum contrariorum ponitur pro reliquo. Alia quando ponitur causa pro causato vel e converso. Quandoque autem continens pro contento vel e converso.	Hence there is one translation when the name of the whole is used for the name of a part, or vice versa; as if it were said, `this body is Socrated', showing that the corpse was a part of Socrates. It is different when one of the opposites is substituted for the other. Another is when the cause is used for the effect or vice versa. And sometimes the container for the content or vice versa.
Et quandoque nomen inventoris pro nomine inventi vel e converso. Et quandoque nomen unius speciei pro nomine alterius speciei, ratione alicuius proprietatis convenientis individuis utriusque speciei.	And sometimes the name of the inventor is the name of the thing invented or vice versa. And sometimes the name of one species is used for the name of another species, on account of some property suitable to the individuals of both species.
Quandoque ponitur nomen materiati pro nomine materiae et e converso. Quandoque ponitur nomen temporis pro effectu temporis et e converso. Quandoque nomen antecedentis pro nomine consequentis et e converso. Et quandoque nomen efficientis pro nomine effectus et e converso. Et quandoque nomen commune appropriatur uni. Quandoque ponitur nomen concretum pro abstracto et e converso. Et quandoque nomen passionis humanae attribuitur Deo et e converso. Et quandoque verbum unius temporis ponitur pro verbo alterius temporis. Et quandoque unus casus ponitur pro alio casu. Et quandoque proprietas unius partis attribuitur alteri parti seu nomini alterius partis. Quandoque singulare ponitur pro plurali et e converso. Et quandoque proprietas animalis attribuitur non animali et e converso. Et quandoque una propositio ponitur pro alia. Et quandoque dictio unius partis orationis ponitur pro dictione alterius partis orationis. Istis modis et multis aliis possunt dictiones a propria significatione transferri ad impropriam, cuiusmodi translationis grammatici diversas docent species.	Sometimes the name of the product is used for the name of the material (from which it is made) and vice versa. Sometimes the name of time is used for the effect of time and vice versa. Sometimes the name of the antecedent for the name of the consequent and vice versa. And sometimes the name of the producer for the name of the effect and vice versa. And sometimes a common name is appropriated to a particular one. Sometimes a concrete name is used for an abstract one and vice versa. And sometimes the name of human attribute is attributed to God and vice versa. And sometimes a word of one time is used for a word of another time. And sometimes one case is used for another case. And sometimes the property of one part is attributed to another part or to the name of another part. Sometimes the singular is used for the plural and vice versa. And sometimes the property of an animal is attributed to a non-animal, and vice versa. And sometimes one proposition is used for another. And sometimes the expression of one part of the sentence is used for the expression of another part of the sentence. In these and many other ways, expressions can be transferred from their proper meaning to an improper one, for which grammarians teach different types of translation.
Inter quas continentur istae: metaphora, synecdoche, metonymia, antonomasia, emphasis, catachresis, metalempsis, anthropopathos, onomatopoeia, phantasia, paralange et multae aliae, quarum notitiam in grammatica, quae omnibus scientiis subministrat, perfecte traditam omni volenti studere in libris auctorum et in Scriptura sacra puto multum necessariam, sine qua frequenter accidet error, pervertendo intentionem scribentium. Et nota quod aequivocum tale, iuxta istum secundum modum, vocatur a Boethio aequivocum a consilio.	Among which these are included: metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy, antonomasia, emphasis, catachresis, metalempsis, anthropopathos, onomatopoeia, phantasy, paralange, and many others, the knowledge of which in grammar, which supplies all sciences, is perfectly handed down to all who wish to study in the books of the authors and in the sacred Scriptures, and is much necessary, without which, I think, error frequently occurs, perverting the intention of the writers. And note that such an equivocal, according to this second method, is called by Boethius an equivocal by counsel.