Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 4

Latin	English
[CAP. 4. DE TERTIO MODO AEQUIVOCATIONIS]	[Chapter 4. On the third mode of equivocation]
Circa tertium modum aequivocationis est primo sciendum quod tunc est tertius modus aequivocationis quando aliqua dictio non accipitur pro diversis significatis, sed ex hoc solum quod alicui comparatur quod non plus pertinet ad primarium significatum quam ad secundarium. Et iste modus non accidit ex hoc quod vox potest significare diversa, sicut contingit in duobus primis modis, sed ex hoc quod eadem vox potest supponere pro diversis. Et ideo pro isto modo dantur diversae regulae, quibus potest cognosci. Est autem una regula quod quando unum extremum propositionis est nomen primae intentionis, sumptum sine signo universali et particulari, et aliud extremum est nomen secundae intentionis, illa propositio est distinguenda penes tertium modum aequivocationis, eo quod nomen primae intentionis potest supponere simpliciter vel personaliter, et secundum hoc potest accidere in argumento fallacia aequivocationis.	Concerning the third mode of equivocation it should first be known that it is the third mode of equivocation when some diction is not accepted for diverse significates, but rather, from this alone, that is is compared to something that is not more relevant to the primary significate than to the secondary.  And this mode does not happen because an utterance can signify diverse things, as happens in the first two modes, but because the same utterance can supposit for diverse things. And so there are diverse rules given for this mode, from which it can be recognized; Now there is one rule that when one extreme of the proposition is a name of first intention, taken without a universal or particular sign, and the other extreme is a name of second intention, that proposition is distinguished under the third mode of equivocation, in that the name of first intention can supposit simply and personally, and according to this as the fallacy of equivocation can happen in an argument.
Et secundum istum modum peccant talia sophismata `attributa non sunt idem essentiae divinae; sapientia est attributum, et similiter iustitia est attributum; igitur sapientia et iustitia non sunt idem essentiae divinae'.	And according to this mode err such sophisms as `attributes are not the same as the divine essence, wisdom is an attribute, and similarly justice is an attribute, therefore wisdom and justice are not the same as the divine essence'.
Respondeo: ista propositio est distinguenda `sapientia est attributum', eo quod `sapientia' potest supponere simpliciter vel personaliter. Si primo modo, tunc est fallacia aequivocationis, quia in minore accipitur simpliciter et in conclusione personaliter, et per consequens aequivoce.	I answer: this proposition is to be distinguished, `wisdom is an attribute,' by the fact that `wisdom' can be supposited simply or personally. If in the first way, then there is the fallacy of equivocation, because in the minor it is taken simply and in the conclusion personally, and consequently equivocally.
Si supponat secundo modo, sic minor est falsa, quia tunc non denotatur quod ille conceptus qui attribuitur et concluditur de Deo sit attributum, sed quod illa res quam significat talis conceptus est attributum.	If it supposits in the second mode, then the falsity is less, because then it is not denoted that the concept which is attributed and concluded of God is an attribute, but that the thing which such a concept signifies is an attribute.
Quod falsum est, quia non plus est illa res quae est sapientia divina attributum quam illa res quae est essentia divina. Et per consequens accipiendo terminos personaliter et significative non plus est haec vera `sapientia est attributum' quam ista `essentia est attributum'.	This is false, because that thing which is divine wisdom is no more an attribute than that thing which is divine essence. And consequently, taking the terms personally and meaningfully, this `wisdom is an attribute' is no more true than this `essence is an attribute'.
Accipiendo tamen terminos simpliciter et pro intentionibus animae, est una vera et alia falsa. Similiter accidit hic `unum est passio entis; unum est idem realiter cum ente; igitur idem est passio sui ipsius'.	However, taking the terms simply and for the intentions of the soul, one is true and the other is false. Similarly it happens here that one is an attribute of a being; one is really identical with being; therefore the attribute is the same as the self.
Similiter hic `rationale et homo sunt idem realiter; sed ``rationale est differentia et ``homo est species; igitur species et sua differentia sunt idem realiter'. Similiter hic `homo et risibile sunt idem realiter; sed ``risibile est passio hominis et ``homo est subiectum; igitur passio et suum subiectum sunt idem realiter'.	Similarly this: `rational and man are really the same; but rational is the difference, and man is the species; therefore, the species and its difference are really the same thing.' Similarly here, "man and something able to laugh are really the same thing; but man's attribute is the ability to laugh and man is the subject; therefore the attribute and its subject are really the same thing'.
Responsio ad omnia ista patet: nam istae propositiones `unum est passio entis', `rationale est differentia hominis', `risibile est passio hominis', `homo est subiectum risibilis', non sunt verae nisi subiectis supponentibus simpliciter.	The answer to all these is clear: for these propositions, `the attribute of being is one,' `man's difference is rational,' `man's attribute is the ability to laugh,' and `man is a subject that can laugh,' are not true unless the subjects supposit simply.
Aliae autem praemissae non sunt verae nisi eisdem terminis acceptis personaliter. Et ideo manifestum est quod in illis est fallacia aequivocationis penes tertium modum. Similiter est hic `homo et animal rationale sunt idem realiter; homo et animal rationale differunt ratione; igitur aliqua quae differunt ratione sunt idem realiter'. Similiter est hic `sapientia et essentia differunt ratione, quia sunt distincti conceptus; sapientia et essentia sunt idem realiter; igitur aliqua quae sunt idem realiter differunt ratione'.	But other premises are not true unless they are taken personally. And therefore, it is manifest that in them there is a fallacy of equivocation, according to the third mode. It is the same here, `man and rational animal are really the same; man and rational animal differ in reason; therefore some things that differ in reason are really the same. It is the same here, `wisdom and essence differ in reason, because they are distinct concepts; wisdom and essence are really the same; therefore, some things which are the same really differ in reason.'
Similiter hic `homo et animal rationale sunt idem realiter; homo et animal rationale sunt definitio et definitum; igitur definitio et definitum sunt idem realiter'. Similiter hic `homo et animal sunt eadem res; homo est species, animal est genus; igitur genus et species sunt eadem res'.	Similarly, this `man and rational animal are really the same; man and rational animal are the definition and the defined; therefore, the definition and the defined are really the same thing. Similarly this, `man and animal are the same thing; man is a species, animal is a genus; Therefore genus and species are the same thing'.
Unde in istis et in infinitis consimilibus aliquae propositiones non possunt esse verae nisi terminis sumptis simpliciter et aliae non possunt esse verae nisi eisdem terminis sumptis personaliter.	Hence, in these and in infinite similar propositions, some propositions cannot be true except in terms taken simply, and others cannot be true except in the same terms taken personally.
Et ita patet quod si propositiones sunt verae, termini aequivoce accipiuntur, et per consequens nullam inferunt conclusionem. Alia regula est quod quando unum extremum propositionis est nomen primae impositionis et aliud extremum est nomen secundae impositionis, si nomen primae impositionis non sumatur cum signo universali vel particulari ista propositio est distinguenda, eo quod nomen primae impositionis potest accipi personaliter vel materialiter.	And so it is clear that if the propositions are true, the terms are taken equivocally, and consequently they do not infer any conclusion. Another rule is that when one end of a proposition is the name of the first imposition and the other end is the name of the second imposition, if the name of the first imposition is not taken with a universal or particular sign, that proposition is to be distinguished by the fact that the name of the first imposition can be taken personally or materially.
Sicut ista propositio est distinguenda `homo est nomen', eo quod `homo' potest accipi personaliter et significative, et sic est falsa, vel materialiter pro ista voce, et sic est vera. Et sic solvuntur talia sophismata: `Deus et deitas sunt idem realiter; et Deus et deitas sunt concretum et abstractum; igitur concretum et abstractum sunt idem realiter'.	Just as this proposition is to be distinguished, `man is a noun,' by the fact that `man' can be taken personally and meaningfully, and thus it is false, or materially for that word, and thus it is true. And thus such sophisms are resolved: `God and deities are really the same; Both God and deity are concrete and abstract; therefore the concrete and the abstract are really the same thing'.
Responsio: ista est distinguenda `Deus et deitas sunt concretum et abstractum', eo quod isti termini `Deus' et `deitas' possunt supponere materialiter, et sic est vera; et tunc aequivoce accipiuntur in maiore et in minore, et per consequens nullam inferunt conclusionem.	Answer: this is to be distinguished, `God and deity are concrete and abstract,' by the fact that these terms 'God' and 'deity' can represent materially, and so it is true; and then they are taken equivocally in the major and in the minor, and in consequence lead to no conclusion.
Vel possunt supponere personaliter, et tunc est ista propositio falsa.	Or they may supposit personally, and then that proposition is false.
Eodem modo fallit hoc argumentum `homo et risibile sunt idem realiter; homo et risibile sunt convertibilia; igitur convertibilia sunt idem realiter'. Et eodem modo est solvendum. Alia regula potest dari quod quando nomen primae intentionis comparatur alicui nomini communi praecise intentionibus animae et nominibus secundae impositionis, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod illud nomen potest supponere simpliciter vel personaliter vel materialiter, sicut patet in aliquibus exemplis praeadductis.	In the same way this argument, `man and something able to laugh are really the same thing', fails. man and something able to laugh are convertible; therefore, they are really the same convertibles. And it must be solved in the same way. Another rule can be given that when the name of the first intention is compared to a common name, precisely the intentions of the soul and the names of the second imposition, that proposition is to be distinguished by the fact that that name can simply supposit either personally or materially, as is clear in some of the examples cited above.
Et ista exempla adducta sunt tantum gratia exempli. Talia nomina, communia praecise intentionibus animae et nominibus secundae impositionis, sunt ista `universale', `commune', `praedicabile', `subicibile', `nomen' et huiusmodi multa.	And these examples are given only for the sake of example. Such names, common precisely to the intentions of the soul and names of secondary imposition, are these: `universal', `common', `predicable', `submitable', `name' and many such things.
Est etiam sciendum quod praecedentes regulae non tantum sunt intelligendae de nominibus sed etiam de omni parte orationis. Quarta regula est quod quando terminus communis supponit personaliter et subicitur respectu verbi de praeterito, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod terminus subiectus potest supponere pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae fuerunt.	It must also be known that the previous rules are not only to be understood about nouns but also about every part of speech. The fourth rule is that when a common term supposits personally and is subordinated with respect to a verb about the past, that proposition is to be distinguished by the fact that the subject term can supposit for things that are or for things that were.
Sicut haec est distinguenda `aliquis puer fuit senex', eo quod li puer potest supponere pro eo qui est puer, et tunc aequivalet isti `aliquis, qui modo est puer, fuit senex'; vel potest supponere pro eo qui fuit puer, et tunc est sensus `aliquis, qui fuit puer, fuit senex'.	Just as this is to be distinguished, `someone who was a child was an old man', by the fact that a child can stand for someone who is a child, and then it is equivalent to this `someone who is only a child was an old man'; or it may stand for him who was a child, and then there is the sense of 'someone who was a child was old'.
Et per istam distinctionem solvuntur talia sophismata `aliquod album fuit Sortes, igitur Sortes fuit albus', quia si subiectum antecedentis stet pro his quae sunt, consequentia non valet; si pro his quae fuerunt, consequentia est bona.	And by this distinction are resolved such sophisms as `something white was Socrates, therefore Socrates was white', because if the subject of the antecedent stands for those things, the consequence is not valid; if for what they were, the consequence is good.
Quinta regula est quod quando terminus communis supponens personaliter subicitur respectu verbi de futuro, illa propositio est distinguenda penes tertium modum aequivocationis, eo quod subiectum potest supponere pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae erunt.	The fifth rule is that when a common suppositing term is suppositing personally with respect to a verb about the future, that proposition is to be distinguished according to the third mode of equivocation, in that the subject can supposit for things that are or for things that will be.
Sexta regula est quod quando terminus communis supponens personaliter subicitur respectu verbi de possibili vel de contingenti, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod terminus subiectus potest stare pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae possunt esse vel pro his quae contingunt esse.	The sixth rule is that when a common suppositing term is suppositing personally with respect to a possible or contingent verb, that proposition is to be distinguished, in that the subject term can stand for things that are or for things that can be or for things that happen to be.
Alia regula est quod quando eadem dictio potest esse diversorum casuum, generum vel numerorum vel aliorum accidentium grammaticalium, illa propositio est distinguenda penes tertium modum aequivocationis.	Another rule is that when the same expression can be of different cases, genders or numbers or other grammatical accidents, that proposition is to be distinguished under the third mode of equivocation.
Sicut ista `isti asini sunt episcopi', eo quod li episcopi potest esse nominativi casus vel genitivi. Verumtamen in tali paralogismo potest frequenter assignari primus modus aequivocationis; sed quando hoc habeat fieri et quando non, propter brevitatem omitto.	Like these, `these donkeys are the bishop's [or - are bishops]', because bishops can either be in the nominative case or in the genitive case. Nevertheless, in such a paralogism, the first mode of equivocation can frequently be assigned; but when this should be done and when not, I omit it for the sake of brevity.
Et est notandum quod iste tertius modus aequivocationis potest reperiri in propositione pure mentali, quamvis duo primi modi non habeant locum nisi in signis ad placitum institutis.	And it must be noted that this third mode of equivocation can be found in a purely mental proposition, although the first two modes have no place except in the standards established by convention.
Unde ista propositio mentalis `homo est species' distingui potest, eo quod subiectum potest supponere significative vel pro se ipso. Et sic de consimilibus est dicendum.	Hence this mental proposition, `man is a species,' can be distinguished, by what the subject can supposit for significatively or for itself. And so it must be said of the like.