Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 5

 

Latin	English
[CAP. 5. DE FALLACIA AMPHIBOLIAE]	[Chapter 5. On the fallacy of amphiboly (first mode)]
Post fallaciam aequivocationis sequitur fallacia amphiboliae. Circa quam primo sciendum est quod sicut fallacia aequivocationis accidit ex hoc quod aliqua dictio potest diversimode accipi, ita fallacia amphiboliae accidit ex hoc quod aliqua oratio potest diversimode accipi, absque hoc quod aliqua dictio primo diversimode accipiatur; ita quod sicut dictio est multiplex, ita tota oratio est multiplex.	After the fallacy of equivocation there comes the fallacy of 'amphiboly'.  Concerning which, first, it should be known that just as the fallacy of equivocation happens because some expression can be understood in diverse ways, so the fallacy of amphiboly happens because some sentence  can be understood in diverse ways, but without some expression first being understood in diverse ways. Thus, just as an expression has different meanings, so a whole sentence has different meanings.
Secundo sciendum est quod sicut aequivocationis sunt tres modi, ita amphiboliae sunt tres modi. Primus modus est quando aliqua oratio aeque primo et aeque proprie per se posita potest habere multos sensus. Quando autem hoc contingit, pro diversis casibus sunt diversae regulae dandae.	Second, it should be known that, just as there are three modes of equivocation, so there are three modes of amphiboly.  [1] The first mode is when some sentence, equally primarily and equally properly per se posited, can have many senses. Now then this happens, there are diverse rules to be given for diverse cases.
Potest autem una regula esse talis: quando aliqua nomina eiusdem casus praecedit verbum quod potest regere utrumque casum et inter illa ponitur aliquod aliud verbum infinitivi modi, illa oratio est ambigua et potest habere diversos sensus. Sicut accidit hic `audio Graecos vicisse Romanos'; nam unus sensus est iste `audio quod Romani vicerunt Graecos', et alius sensus est iste `audio quod Graeci vicerunt Romanos'.	(i) One rule can be this: when to some names in the same case there precedes a verb that can govern both cases, and between them there is placed some other verb in the infinitive mode, the sentence is ambiguous and can have diverse senses. As happens in "I hear the Greeks the Romans have conquered", for one sense is "I hear that the Romans have conquered the Greeks", and the other is "I hear that the Greeks have conquered the Romans".
Et ideo quando una dictio potest esse unius casus vel alterius, non est amphibolia, sicut dicunt aliqui, sed aequivocatio. Sed in tali casu quando in omni sensu est eiusdem casus, est amphibolia, sicut est in exemplo proposito.	And therefore when one expression can be one case or another, it is not amphiboly, as some say, but equivocation.  But in such a case, when in every sense it is in the same case, it is amphiboly, as in the example put forward.
Alia regula est quod oratio in qua ponitur ablativus casus absolutus est multiplex secundum amphiboliam, quia talis propositio potest aequivalere condicionali, temporali vel causali. Sicut ista est distinguenda `nullo currente crescunt tibi cornua fronte'; unus sensus est iste: si nullus currit, crescunt tibi cornua fronte; alius sensus est iste: quia nullus currit, crescunt tibi cornua fronte; tertius sensus est iste: dum nullus currit, crescunt tibi cornua fronte. Et quilibet istorum est falsus.	(ii) Another rule is that a sentence in which the ablative absolute is given has multiple senses according to amphiboly, because such a proposition can be equivalent to a conditional, temporal or causal proposition.  For example, "with nothing running, horns grow on your forehead".  One sense is "if nothing runs, horns grow on your forehead", another sense is "because nothing is running, horns grow on your forehead", the third is "when nothing runs, horns grow on your forehead".  And all of these are false.
Similiter ista est distinguenda `nullo homine exsistente homo non est animal'; unus sensus est iste: si nullus homo exsistit, homo non est animal. Et iste sensus est verus. Alius sensus est iste: quia nullus homo exsistit, homo non est animal. Et iste sensus est falsus. Tertius sensus est iste: dum nullus homo exsistit, homo non est animal. Qui similiter est falsus.	Similarly "with no man existing, a man is not an animal".  One sense is "if no man exists, a man is not an animal", and this sense is true.  Another is "because no man exists, a man is not an animal", and this sense is false.  The third sense is "when no man exists, a man is not an animal", which similarly is false.
Notandum quod eadem regula est quando ponitur gerundivum cum aliqua propositione, sicut est hic: neutrum oculum habendo potes videre. Ista enim habet istos sensus: si neutrum oculum habes, potes videre; quia neutrum oculum habes, potes videre; dum neutrum oculum habes, potes videre. Alius sensus posset esse iste `quamvis nullum oculum haberes, posses videre', hoc est dictu, istae duae stant simul `nullum oculum habes' et `tu vides'.	It should be noted that the same rule is when the gerundive is given with some proposition, as in "by having neither eye you can see".  For this has the following senses: "if you have neither eye, you can see", "because you have neither eye, you can see", "while you have neither eye, you can see". Another sense could be "although you had neither eye, you could see", that is to say, "you have no eye" and "you see" are consistent.
Ex isto patet quod tales consequentiae non valent `isto currente non crescunt tibi cornua fronte, illo currente non crescunt tibi cornua fronte, et sic de singulis, ergo nullo currente crescunt tibi cornua fronte'; `istum oculum non habendo potes videre, illum oculum non habendo potes videre, igitur neutrum oculum habendo potes videre', quia sicut hypotheticae non possunt sic induci, ita tales aequivalentes hypotheticis non possunt sic induci.	From this it is clear that consequences such as the following are not valid. "with this thing running, horns will not grow on your forehead, with that thing running, horns will not grow on your forehead etc, therefore with nothing running, horns will not grow on your forehead"; "not having this eye, you can see, not having that eye, you can see, therefore not having either eye, you can see", because, just as hypotheticals cannot be induced, so propositions equivalent to hypotheticals cannot be induced.
Unde sicut non sequitur `si iste homo currit, non crescunt tibi cornua fronte, si ille homo currit non crescunt tibi cornua fronte, et sic de singulis, igitur si nullus homo currit, crescunt tibi cornua fronte', sic non sequitur `isto currente non crescunt tibi cornua fronte, et illo currente non crescunt etc., et sic de singulis, igitur nullo currente crescunt etc.'. Et eodem modo de consimilibus est dicendum.	Hence, just as "if this man runs, horns will not grow on your forehead, if that man runs, horns will not grow on your forehead, etc., therefore if no man runs, horns will grow on your forehead" does not follow, so "with this thing running, horns will not grow on your forehead, and with that thing running, horns will not grow on your forehead, etc., therefore with nothing running, horns willgrow on your forehead" does not follow. And in the same way it should be said of similar propositions.
Alia regula est: quando dictum exclusivae accipitur cum modo, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod potest denotare modum verificari de tota exclusiva vel potest denotare modum illum verificari de praeiacente exclusivae et de nullo alio. In primo sensu dictio exclusiva deservit primo subiecto praeiacentis, in secundo sensu facit exclusionem circa totam praeiacentem. Sicut ista est distinguenda secundum amphiboliam `tantum hominem esse Sortem est verum'; in primo sensu denotatur quod haec sit vera `tantum homo est Sortes', et iste sensus est verus. Et ita patet quod haec dictio `tantum' exercet exclusionem circa hoc subiectum `homo'.	(iii) Another rule is that when the dictum of an exclusive proposition is accepted modally, that proposition has distinct senses, in that it can denote that the mode is verified of the whole exclusive, or can denote that the mode is verified of the pre-adjoining exclusive and no other.  In primo sensu dictio exclusiva deservit primo subiecto praeiacentis, in the second sense it causes an exclusion in the whole prefix.  For example, "only a man being Socrates is true" has distinct senses by amphiboly.  In the first sense it is denoted that "only a man is Socrates" is true, and this sense is true. And so it is clear that the expression 'only' exercises exclusion with regard to the word 'man'.
In secundo sensu denotatur quod tantum ista propositio sit vera `homo est Sortes', et ita exercet exclusionem circa istam propositionem `homo est Sortes', et denotatur quod haec propositio sit vera et nulla alia.	In the second sense, it is denoted that only the proposition "a man is Socrates" is true, and so it exercises exclusion with regard to the proposition "a man is Socrates", and it is denoted that this proposition is true and no other.
Quarta regula est quod quando accipitur modus cum dicto, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod potest denotari modus competere toti propositioni cuius est dictum, vel propositioni de inesse in qua supponit pronomen demonstrativum vel nomen proprium alicuius pro quo supponit subiectum respectu eiusdem praedicati mediante hoc verbo `est' de praesenti. Sicut ista est distinguenda secundum amphiboliam `contingit tacentem loqui'; unus sensus est iste `haec est contingens: tacens loquitur', et iste sensus est falsus.	(iv) The fourth rule is that when a mode is accepted with the dictum, that proposition has distinct senses, in that the mode can be denoted to belong to the whole proposition of which it is the dictum, or to an assertoric proposition in which a demonstrative pronoun or a proper name of something supposits for what the subject supposits for in respect of the same predicate with the intermediary verb 'is' in the present tense. For example, "it is contingent for a silent thing to speak" has distinct senses by amphiboly.  One sense is "this is contingent: a silent thing speaks", and this sense is false.
Alius sensus est iste `aliqua talis est contingens: iste loquitur', demonstrando aliquem qui tacet. Intelligendum est quod tales propositiones de quibus dantur duae regulae immediate praecedentes, communiter distinguuntur secundum compositionem et divisionem, qua distinctione frequenter usus sum loquendo de eis.	The other sense is "some such thing is contingent: this speaks", pointing to something which is silent.  It should be understood that such propositions of which the two immediately preceding rules are given, are commonly distinguished according to composition and division, by which distinction I am frequently used to speaking of them.
Cum hoc tamen stat quod possint distingui secundum amphiboliam. Et mihi videtur quod facilius est distinguere eas secundum amphiboliam quam secundum compositionem et divisionem, quia a multis non potest videri quomodo in talibus propter solam punctuationem diversam, retentis eisdem dictionibus et eodem ordine, diversi sensus causantur. Sed si tales orationes distinguuntur secundum amphiboliam, faciliter sensus deprehenduntur, servata arte Boethii in libro Divisionum in assignatione orationum ambiguarum, quia talis assignatio facienda est aut per adiectionem aut per diminutionem aut per divisionem aut per aliquam transmutationem.	It is consistent with this that the propositions could be distinguished by amphiboly. And it seems to me that it is easier to distinguish them by amphiboly than according to composition and division, for it cannot be seen by many how in such cases, because of diverse punctuation [parsing] alone, keeping the same expressions and in the same order, diverse senses are produced. But if such sentences are distinguished by amphiboly, the senses are easily perceived, by mainting the art of Boethius (in the book of Division) of the assignation of ambiguous sentences, because such an assignation should be made either by diminution, or division, or by some other transformation.
Et iste modus servandus est in talibus propositionibus, ut proposita ista oratione ambigua `album esse nigrum est possibile', determinantur sic sensus `haec est possibilis: album est nigrum', `album potest esse nigrum'.	And this mode should be kept in such propositions, so that, given the ambiguous proposition "that a white thing is black is possible", the senses are determined as "this is possible: a white thing is black" and "a white thing can be black".
Et ita patet quod tales orationes sive distinguantur secundum compositionem et divisionem sive secundum amphiboliam, sensus non variantur. Secundo sciendum est quod duae praedictae regulae non tantum sunt intelligendae de quatuor modis famosis, sed etiam intelligendae sunt de omnibus modis.	And so it is clear that whether such sentences are distinguished by composition and division, or by amphiboly, the senses are not varied. Second, you should know that the two previous rules should not only be understood of the four well-known modes, but should also be understood of all modes.
Unde omnes tales sunt distinguendae `omnem hominem esse animal est scitum a te'; `album aedificare est per se verum'; `omnem triangulum habere tres etc. est demonstrabile', et ita de aliis.	Hence, all such propositions are to be distinguished: "that every man is an animal is known by you", "that a white person builds is per se good, "that every triangle has three sides etc., is demonstrable" and so on.
Tertio est sciendum quod ultima regula non tantum intelligenda est quando ponitur modus cum dicto propositionis, sed etiam locum habet quando coniungitur modus cum propositione mediante aliquo verbo et hac dictione `quod'.	Third, it should be known that the last rule should not only be understood when the mode is given with the dictum of the proposition, but also applies when the mode is joined with a proposition mediating some verb with the expression 'that'.
Unde omnes tales sunt praedicto modo distinguendae `scio quod omnis homo est animal', `possibile est quod album sit nigrum', et huiusmodi, puta tales `quod quilibet homo sit Sortes, est possibile', `quod nullum album sit homo, est necessarium.	Hence, all such propositions should be distinguished in the previous mode: "I know that every man is an animal", "it is possible that a white thing is black" and so forth, such as "that any man is Socrates is possible", "that no white thing is a man is necessary"
Nam prolata tali propositione `possibile est quod album sit nigrum', potest unus apprehendere talem sensum `haec propositio est possibilis: album est nigrum', alius autem potest intelligere talem sensum `possibile est quod aliquid, quod modo est album, fiat postea nigrum'.	For when such a proposition as "it is possible that a white thing is black", one person can apprehend such a sense as "this proposition is possible: a white thing is black", but another can understand such a sense as "it is possible that something, which is now white, can later be black".
Et ita tales propositiones sunt distinguendae. Et quia tales sensus diversi possunt haberi sine diversitate punctuationis, ideo est ibi amphibolia, non obstante quod esset ibi compositio et divisio.	And so such propositions should be distinguished. And because such diverse senses can be entertained without diversity of punctuation [parsing], therefore it is amphiboly, notwithstanding that there would be composition and division.
Quarto notandum est quod ad istum modum habet reduci distinctio istius propositionis `quicumque dicit te esse animal, dicit verum', ut unus sensus sit iste: quicumque dicit hanc propositionem `tu est animal', dicit verum. Et iste sensus est verus. Alius sensus est iste: quicumque dicit aliquam propositionem ex qua sequitur quod tu es animal, dicit verum. Et iste sensus est falsus, quia omnes tales propositiones `tu es asinus', `tu es bos', `tu es capra' et consimiles, inferunt istam `tu es animal', et tamen non quicumque dicit eas, dicit verum.	Fourth, it should be noted that the distinction of the proposition "whoever says you to be an animal, speaks the truth" has to be reduced to that mode. And one sense is "whoever says the proposition "you are an animal" says the truth. And that sense is true. Another sense is "whoever says a proposition from which it follows that you are an animal, speaks the truth". And that sense is false, for such propositions as "you are a donkey", "you are an ox", "you are a goat", implies "you are an animal", and yet not everyone who says them speaks the truth.
Et si quaeratur quare tales propositiones sunt distinguendae, de quibus dantur praedictae regulae, dicendum est quod sicut non potest dari ratio quare aliqua dictio est aequivoca nisi voluntas utentium, ita non potest dari aliqua ratio quare oratio est aequivoca nisi voluntas utentium.	And if it is asked why such propositions should be distinguished, of which the previous rules are given, it should be said that just as a reason cannot be given why some expression is equivocal, except by the wish of the users, so a reason cannot be given why some sentence is equivocal, except by the wish of the users.
Et ideo quia diversi ex tali oratione prolata diversos sensus tales concipiunt, ideo talis oratio est distinguenda secundum amphiboliam, secundum doctrinam Boethii, in libro Divisionum, dicentis: In ambiguis uterque auditor rationabiliter se ipsum intellexisse arbitratur, ut cum dicit quis `audio Graecos vicisse Romanos', unus potest intelligere quod Graeci Romanos vicerunt, alius e converso.	And therefore, because diverse persons conceive such diverse senses from such a sentence being uttered, therefore such a sentence should be distinguished by amphiboly, according to the teaching of Boethius, in the book of Division, saying "with ambiguous sentences, both hearers can reasonably judge themselves to have understood, as when someone says "I hear the Greeks the Romans have conquered", one can understand that the Greeks have conquered the Romans, the other conversely so.
Ita est de talibus propositionibus, quod prolata hac propositione `scio quod omnis homo est animal', unus potest intelligere quod `scio istam propositionem: omnis homo est animal', alius potest intelligere `scio de quolibet homine quod ipse est animal'.	So it is with such propositions, that when the proposition "I know that every man is an animal", one person can understand that "I know that proposition: every man is an animal", another can understand "I know, of every man, that he is an animal".
Quinta regula est: quando haec coniunctio `vel' ponitur inter duos vel plures terminos, illa est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse disiunctiva, et tunc disiungit inter propositiones, vel potest esse de disiuncto extremo, et tunc disiungit inter terminos, et est categorica.	(v) The fifth rule is when the conjunction 'or' occurs between two or more terms, then it can be distinguished, in that it can be disjunctive, and then it disjoins two propositions, or it can disjoin the extremes, in which case it disjoins terms, and is categorical.
Unde ista `omnis homo est sanus vel aeger' est isto modo distinguenda, quia unus sensus est iste `omnis homo est sanus vel omnis homo est aeger', qui est falsus; alius sensus est iste `de quolibet homine dicitur hoc praedicatum: sanus vel aeger', qui verus est.	Hence "every man is healthy or sick" should be distinguished, for one sense is "every man is healthy or every man is sick", which is false. The other sense is "of every man the predicate 'healthy or ill' is predicated", which is true.
Sexta regula est: quando haec coniunctio `et' ponitur inter duos terminos, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse copulativa vel de copulato extremo. Sicut haec est distinguenda `isti sunt Sortes et Plato', demonstratis Sorte et Platone; unus sensus est iste `isti sunt Sortes et isti sunt Plato', et iste sensus est falsus; alius sensus est iste `isti sunt isti homines', et iste sensus est verus.	(vi) The sixth rule is when the conjunction 'and' occurs between two terms, the proposition should be distinguished in that it can be a conjunction, or can be of a conjoined extreme. For example "these are Socrates and Plato" (pointing to Socrates and Plato): one sense is "these are Socrates and these are Plato", and this sense is false.  The other sense is "these are these men", and this sense is true.
Septima regula est: quando haec coniunctio `si' ponitur inter duos terminos, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse condicionalis vel de condicionato extremo. Sicut haec est distinguenda `omne animal, si est rationale, est homo'; unus sensus est iste `si omne animal est rationale, omne animal est homo', et iste sensus est verus.	(vii) The seventh rule is when the conjunction 'if' occurs between two terms, the proposition should be distinguished, in that it can be conditional, or of a conditioned extreme.  For example, "every animal, if it is rational, is a man".  One sense is "if every animal is rational, every animal is a man, and this sense is true.
Alius sensus est iste: de quocumque dicitur hoc totum `animal si est rationale', de eodem dicitur hoc praedicatum `homo'; et iste sensus est falsus, nam de asino praedicatur hoc totum condicionatum `animal, si est rationale', et tamen de asino non praedicatur `homo'.	Another sense is "of whatever the whole expression 'animal if it is rational' is predicated, of the same is predicated the predicate 'man', and this sense is false, for if the whole condition 'animal if it is rational' is predicated of a donkey, and yet 'man' is not predicated of a donkey.
Et per hoc possunt solvi talia sophismata `omne verum, si est necessarium, est verum; te esse asinum est verum, si est necessarium; igitur te esse asinum est verum', quia maior est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse condicionalis, et tunc est vera, sed discursus non valet, quia ex tali condicionali et tali categorica non sequitur conclusio categorica. Vel potest esse maior de condicionato subiecto, et tunc est consequentia bona, sed tunc maior est falsa.	And by this can be resolved such sophismata as "every truth, if it is necessary, is true, it is true that you are a donkey, if it is necessary, therefore it is true that you are a donkey", for the major should be distinguished, in that it can be a conditional, and then it is true, but the argument is not valid, because from such a conditional and such a categorical such a conclusion does not follow. Or it can be a major of 'conditioned subject', and then the consequence is good, but then the major is false.
Octava regula est quod quando haec coniunctio `quia' ponitur inter duos terminos, illa est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse causalis vel de causali extremo.	(viii) The eighth rule is when the conjunction 'because' occurs between two terms, the proposition should be distinguished, in that it can be causal, or of a causal extreme.
Nona regula est quod quando aliquod adverbium temporale ponitur inter duos terminos, illa oratio est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse temporalis vel de temporali extremo.	(ix) The ninth rule is when some temporal adverb occurs between two terms, the sentence should be distinguished, in that it can be temporal, or of a temporal extreme.
Decima regula est quod quando aliquod adverbium locale ponitur inter duos terminos, illa oratio est distinguenda secundum amphiboliam, eo quod potest esse localis vel de locali extremo.	(x) The tenth rule is when some local adverb occurs between two terms, the sentence should be distinguished by amphiboly, in that it can be local, or of a local extreme.
Sciendum est quod orationes de quibus dantur sex ultimae regulae a multis ponuntur esse distinguendae secundum compositionem et divisionem; et sive dictum eorum sit verum sive falsum, non obstat quin sint distinguendae secundum amphiboliam.	It should be known that sentences of which the last six rules are given are supposed by many to be distinguished by composition and division. And whether what they say is true or false, it does not prevent their being distinguished by amphiboly.
Et quidquid sit de illo dicto, dico quod distinctio illarum secundum amphiboliam est manifestior quam distinctio secundum compositionem et divisionem, quia difficile vel impossibile est in talibus concipere diversos sensus propter solam diversam punctuationem earundem dictionum sub eodem ordine prolatarum.	And whatever is said about that, I say that the distinction of those sentences by amphiboly is more manifest than distinction by composition and division, for in such cases it is difficult or impossible to conceive diverse senses because of the diverse punctuation alone of those expressions, uttered in the same order.
Secundo sciendum est pro isto modo amphiboliae et pro sequentibus quod in assignando diversos sensus alicuius orationis multiplicis secundum amphiboliam, non debent assignari illi sensus sub eisdem dictionibus sed sub diversis, et hoc vel per additionem vel per diminutionem aut per divisionem aut per transmutationem, sicut docet Boethius in libro Divisionum.	Second, it should be known that for this mode of amphiboly, and for the following, that in assigned diverse senses of some sentence that has multiple senses by amphiboly, those senses ought not be assigned under the same expressions but under diverse ones, and this is by addition or by diminution or by division or by transformation, as Boethius teaches in the book of Divisions.
Per additionem, ut cum dicitur `audio Troianos vicisse Graecos' sensus potest sic assignari per additionem `audio Troianos vicisse, Graecos vinci'; `audio Troianos vinci, Graecos vicisse'.	By addition, as when it is said "I hear that the Trojans the Greeks have conquered", the sense can be assigned by addition by "I hear that the Trojans have conquered, the Greeks have been conquered", or "I hear that the Trojans have been conquered, the Greeks have conquered".
Per diminutionem sic `audio Graecos vicisse'. Per divisionem sic ut `Graeci vicerunt, Troiani victi sunt'. Per transmutationem sic `audio quod Graeci vicerunt Troianos' vel `audio quod Troiani vicerunt Graecos'. Et sicut sensus istius propositionis multiplicis `audio Graecos vicisse Troianos' possunt diversis modis praedictis assignari, ita aliae orationes multiplices secundum amphiboliam possunt omnibus praedictis modis vel aliquibus illorum assignari. Et ideo non semper eiusdem orationis multiplicis ambiguae sensus sub eisdem verbis assignantur, quamvis diversae assignationes idem significent.	By diminution, as in "I hear the Greeks have conquered". By division, as in "the Greeks have conquered, the Trojans have been conquered". By transformation as in "I hear that the Trojans have conquered the Greeks". And just as the sense of the proposition "I hear that the Greeks the Trojans have conquered" can be assigned senses in the previous diverse modes, so that other sentences, with multiple senses by amphiboly, can be assigned in all the previous modes, or some of them. And therefore the ambiguous senses of the same sentence with multiple senses are not always assigned under the same words, although the diverse assignations may signify the same.
Hoc addidi de Boethio propter aliquas cavillationes quae possunt fieri contra aliqua dicta hic et contra aliqua quae dixi in diversis opusculis. Praeter istas etiam decem regulas possent dari aliae multae deservientes primo modo amphiboliae, de quibus propter brevitatem pertranseo.	I added this about Boethius because of some cavils which can be made against some of the things said here, and against some things which I have said in diverse works. Also, beyond these ten rules there could be given many others serving the first mode of amphiboly, which I pass over by reason of brevity.