Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 6

 

Latin	English
[CAP. 6. DE SECUNDO MODO AMPHIBOLIAE. ]	[Chapter 6. On the second mode of amphiboly]
Circa secundum modum amphiboliae est sciendum quod tunc est aliqua oratio multiplex penes secundum modum amphiboliae quando aliqua oratio proprie et ex sua primaria significatione seu impositione tantum uno modo accipitur, sed improprie et secundario potest aliter accipi et alium sensum habere. Sicut ista oratio `lupus est in fabula' primo et proprie significat quod fabula est de lupo, sed improprie et secundario significat quod inimicus accedit. Similiter ista oratio `iste vendit oleum' primo et proprie significat quod iste vendit talem liquorem, sed improprie et secundario significat quod iste adulatur.	Concerning the second mode of amphiboly it should be known that a sentence has multiple senses in the second mode of amphiboly when a sentence, properly and from its primary signification or imposition, is understood in only one mode, but improperly and secondarily can be understood in another way, and have another sense. For example, the sentence `the wolf is in the story' primarily and properly signifies that a wolf is in the story, but improperly and secondarily signifies that an enemy approaches. Similarly, the sentence `he sells oil' primarily and properly signifies that he sells such a liquid, but improperly and secondarily signifies that he is a flatterer.
Et ita frequenter una oratio ponitur pro alia, quae si acciperentur proprie, nullam haberent convenientiam nec quantum ad significationes dictionum nec quantum ad significationes totalium orationum.	And so frequently one sentence is given for another, which if it were understood properly, would have no relevance either to the signification of the expressions, nor to the signification of the whole sentences.
Et talis sensus non contingit nisi ex usu loquentium, ponentium unam orationem pro alia. Contingit autem iste modus, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, frequenter in orationibus in quibus ponuntur nomina verbalia, quae secundum usum multorum loquentium non supponunt pro eisdem pro quibus supponunt participia vel abstracta formata a nominibus syncategorematicis et a pronominibus, adverbiis, participiis, coniunctionibus, praepositionibus, interiectionibus, pluribus dictionibus simul iunctis et in quibus ponuntur verba infinitivi modi loco nominis.	And such a sense cannot happen unless by the use of the speakers, giving one sentence for another. And that mode, according to the opinion of Aristotle, frequently happens in sentences in which verbal nouns occur, which, according to the use of many speakers, do not supposit for the same things which the participles, or abstract terms supposit for, which are formed from syncategorematic names and from pronouns, adverbs, participles, conjunctions, prepositions, interjections, several expressions joined at the same time and in which occur verbs of the infinitive mode in place of names.
Unde omnes tales propositiones in quibus ponuntur talia, possunt distingui eo quod possunt accipi uniformiter aliis orationibus compositis ex nominibus pure categorematicis et verbis vel possunt accipi difformiter pro aliis orationibus non habentibus nomina consimilia.	Hence, all such propositions in which such items occur can be distinguished in that they can be accepted uniformly for other sentences composed from purely categorical names, or can be accepted non-uniformly for other sentences not having similar names.
Et ita ista propositio `calefactio est in agente' potest distingui. Unus sensus est quod aliquid distinctum ab agente est in agente, ad modum quo per istam propositionem `albedo est in albo' denotatur una res esse in alia, et sic est falsa `calefactio est in agente'.	And so the proposition `heating is in the agent' can be distinguished. One sense is that something distinct from the agent is in the agent, in the mode where it is denoted by the proposition `whiteness is in a white thing' one thing is in another, and so `heating is in an agent' is false.
Alius sensus est iste `agens calefit', ut ista propositio `calefactio est in agente' ponatur loco istius `agens calefit', et hoc falsum est; sed sub tali sensu haec est concedenda `calefactio est in calefacto'.	Another sense is `an agent heats', so that the proposition `heating is in an agent' is given in place of `an agent heats', and this is false, but under such a sense `heating is in the heated' should be conceded.
Tamen aliter posset accipi ista propositio `calefactio est in agente', ut ponatur pro ista `calefaciens est agens', et tunc haec esset vera.	Still, the proposition `heating is in the agent' could be accepted in another way, as it is given for `a heating thing is an agent', and then this would be true.
Consimiliter sunt tales propositiones distinguendae `motus est in mobili'. Unus sensus est iste `aliquid importatum per motum, de quo verificatur motus, est in mobili sicut res distincta in re distincta', et hoc falsum est secundum opinionem Aristotelis.  Alius sensus est iste `mobile movetur', et hic sensus est verus.	Similarly, such propositions as `motion is in the mobile' should be distinguished. One sense is `something conveyed by motion, of which motion is verified, is in the mobile as a distinct thing in a distinct thing', and this is false according to the opinion of Aristotle. Another sense is `a mobile thing is moved', and this sense is true.
Consimiliter haec est distinguenda `creatio est in Deo'. Unus sensus est quo denotatur una res distincta esse in alia. Alius sensus est quod `Deus creat'. Similiter ista est distinguenda `totalitas Sortis est in Sorte'. Unus sensus est quod totalitas est una res exsistens in Sorte, alius sensus est quod Sortes est quoddam totum.	Similarly, `creation is in God' should be distinguished. One sense is where it is denoted that one distinct thing is in another. Another sense is that `God creates'. Similarly `the whole of Socrates is in Socrates'. One sense is that the whole of Socrates is one thing existing in Socrates, another sense is that Socrates is a certain whole.
Similiter ista est distinguenda `haecceitas Sortis est aliquid'.Unus sensus est quod haecceitas, quae est res distincta ab aliis, est aliquid; alius sensus est iste `Sortes, qui est hic vel haec creatura vel hoc ens, est aliquid'.	Similarly `this being, which is a thing distinct from others, is something' should be distinguished. One sense is that this being, which is a thing distinct from others, is something. Another sense is `Socrates, who is this thing or this creature or this being, is something'.
Consimiliter ista est distinguenda `negatio est in re vel a parte rei'. Unus sensus est quod negatio est quid distinctum ab omnibus aliis et est quaedam res. Alius sensus est iste `aliquid vere negatur ab alio', vel iste: per hoc quod una propositio negativa est vera, non ponitur aliquid esse in rerum natura, sicut per hoc quod haec est vera `homo non est asinus', non sequitur quod homo sit nec quod asinus sit.	In a similar way, this is to be distinguished: `negation is in a thing or part of a thing'. One sense is that negation is something distinct from all others and is a certain thing. Another sense is this, `something is truly denied by another', or this: by the fact that one negative proposition is true, it is not assumed that something exists in the nature of the world, just as from the fact that this is true, `a man is not a donkey,' it does not follow that a man is or that a donkey is.
Similiter ista potest distingui `aditas est aliquid', ut unus sensus sit iste `aditas, quae non est aliquid absolutum, est aliquid'; alius sensus est iste `aliquid est ad aliquid'.	In the same way this can be distinguished, `for-ness (aditas) is something', so that one meaning is this: `for-ness, which is not something absolute, is something'; another sense is 'something is for something'.
Similiter ista potest distingui, si aliquis utatur tali propositione, `aquoeitas est aliquid'. Unus sensus est quo denotatur esse exsistere vere praedicari de illo pro quo supponit haec dictio `aquoeitas'; alius sensus est iste `aliquid est, a quo est aliud'.	In the same way these can be distinguished: if someone uses such a statement, `waterness is something.' There is one sense in which it is denoted that the existence is truly predicated of that for which this expression `waterness' supposits; This is a different sense, `there is something from which there is something else'.
Consimiliter est de talibus `perseitas est aliquid'. Unus sensus est quo denotatur `esse' praedicari de aliquo pro quo supponit hoc nomen `perseitas'; alius sensus est quod aliqua propositio est per se.	Similarly, it is about such things as `essentiality is something'. There is one sense in which `to be' is denoted to be predicated of something for which this name `essentiality' supposits; another sense is that there is a proposition per se.
Similiter est de ista `necessitas propositionis est aliquid'. Unus sensus est quod aliquid verificetur de illo pro quo supponit hoc nomen `necessitas propositionis'; alius sensus est ista `aliqua propositio est necessaria'.	The same is true of this: `necessity of proposition is something'. One sense is that something is verified about that for which the name `necessity of proposition' supposits; another sense is that `some proposition is necessary'.
Et consimiliter est de omnibus talibus. Tamen intelligendum est quod secundum usum auctorum frequenter talia abstracta ponuntur pro concretis et e converso. Similiter, secundum opinionem aliquorum ista est distinguenda `Deus facit peccatum', eo quod potest accipi proprie, et tunc non plus denotatur nisi quod Deus facit aliquid quod est peccatum. Et sic concederent eam, quia ponunt quod aliquis actus positivus est vere peccatum, sicut odire aliquem contra praeceptum divinum est peccatum.	And it is the same with all such things. However, it must be understood that, according to the use of the authors, such abstracts are often considered concrete and vice versa. Similarly, according to the opinion of some, `God makes sin' is to be distinguished from that which can be taken properly, and then nothing more is denoted than that God makes something that is sin. And so they would grant it, because they assume that any positive act is really a sin, just as it is a sin to hate someone against a divine commandment.
Aliter potest accipi illa oratio improprie, secundum eos, et tunc aequivalet isti `Deus facit aliquid quod non deberet facere' sive isti `Deus peccat', quae est simpliciter falsa. Et tenentes istam opinionem assignarent fallaciam amphiboliae in isto discursu: hoc est peccatum, demonstrando aliquod peccatum commissionis; Deus facit hoc; igitur Deus facit peccatum.	In another way, it is possible for that statement to be taken improperly, according to them, and then it is equivalent to this: `God does something that he should not do' or this: `God sins', which is simply false. And those who hold this opinion would assign the fallacy of amphibole in this discourse: this is a sin, by pointing out some sin of commission; God does this; therefore, God makes sin.
Dicerent enim quod conclusio est distinguenda, quia potest habere multos sensus.	For they would say that the conclusion must be distinguished, because it can have many meanings.
Unus est iste `Deus facit aliquid, et illud est peccatum', et istum sensum concederent, et sic concederent discursum. Alius sensus est iste `Deus facit aliquid quod non deberet facere', et tunc est conclusio falsa et non valet discursus. Sicut non sequitur `Deus facit hoc; et hoc est peccatum; igitur facit aliquid quod non deberet facere', sed magis sequitur quod facit aliquid quod ipse vel alius non deberet facere. Consimiliter in isto discursu assignarent fallaciam amphiboliae `hoc est peccatum; Deus non facit peccatum; igitur Deus non facit hoc', quia minorem distinguerent sicut prius, et in uno sensu dicerent eam esse veram et discursum bonum, in alio sensu dicerent eam esse falsam et discursum non valere propter fallaciam amphiboliae.	One is this, `God does something, and that is a sin', and they would grant this meaning, and thus grant the discourse. Another sense is that `God does something that he should not do', and then the conclusion is false and the discussion is not valid. Just as it does not follow, `God does this; and this is sin; therefore, he does something that he ought not to do', but rather it follows that he does something that he or another ought not to do. Similarly, in this discourse they would assign the fallacy of amphibole, `this is sin; God does not commit sin; Therefore God does not do this, because they would distinguish the minor as before, and in one sense they would say that it is true and the discourse is good, in another sense they would say that it is false and that the discourse is not valid because of the fallacy of amphibole.
Et si diceretur contra eos quod secundum omnes Deus non facit peccatum, sicut Deus non peccat, responderent quod ista `Deus peccat' in omni sensu est neganda, similiter ista `Deus male agit', `Deus facit quod non deberet facere' et consimiles.	And if it were said against them that according to all God does not commit sin, just as God does not sin, they would reply that the words `God sins' are to be denied in every sense, similarly the words `God does evil', `God does what he ought not to do' and the like.
Et pro tali oratione semper Sancti et alii utuntur ista oratione `Deus non facit peccatum', `Deus non facit malum', quae tamen secundum eos possunt habere unum sensum verum.	And instead of such a statement, the Saints and others always use this statement, `God does not commit sin', `God does not commit evil,' which, however, according to them, can have one true meaning.
Et sicut dicerent de ista, ita dicerent de ista `Deus vult malum'. Dicerent enim quod ista habet unum sensum verum, istum scilicet `Deus vult illud quod est malum', hoc est `Deus vult aliquid, et tamen illud est malum'.	And just as they would say of those things, so they would say of this, `God wills evil.' For they would say that this has one true meaning, namely, `God wills that which is evil,' that is, `God wills something, and yet it is evil.'
Sed alium sensum habet falsum, scilicet istum `Deus vult aliquid quod non deberet velle' vel `Deus vult aliquid male'. Unde ista `Deus vult aliquid male' est omni modo falsa.	But it has another false meaning, namely that `God wills something that he ought not to will' or `God wills something badly.' Hence the statement, `God wills something badly,' is false in every way.
Et per istum modum assignarent fallaciam amphiboliae in isto discursu `quidquid Deus intelligit, vult vel potest velle; Deus intelligit malum; igitur Deus vult vel potest velle malum', quia conclusio est distinguenda. Unus sensus est iste `Deus vult vel potest velle aliquid quod est malum' hoc est quod male fit ab aliquo alio, puta a creatura, et tunc concederent conclusionem sub illo sensu. Alius sensus est iste `Deus vult vel potest velle aliquid male', et tunc manifeste patet quod discursus non valet.	And in this way they would assign the fallacy of amphibole in this discourse, `whatsoever God understands, He wills or can will; God understands evil; Therefore God wills or can will evil, because the conclusion is to be distinguished. One sense is that `God wills or can will something that is evil', that is, that evil is done by someone else, for example by a creature, and then they would grant a conclusion under that sense. Another sense is that `God wills or can will something badly', and then it is evident that the discussion is not valid.
Penes istum secundum modum amphiboliae possunt distingui omnes propositiones ubi actus signatus ponitur pro actu exercito vel e converso, quia quaelibet talis oratio potest accipi proprie vel improprie. Unde ista propositio `definitio et definitum sunt idem' potest distingui, quia potest accipi proprie sicut sonat, et tunc importatur quod definitio et definitum non distinguuntur, sed quod definitio est definitum et e converso. Aliter potest accipi improprie pro ista propositione `definitio et definitum important idem vel sunt convertibilia', hoc est praedicantur de se invicem convertibiliter, et sic est vera.	According to this method of amphibole, all propositions can be distinguished where the signified act is used for the performed act or vice versa, because any such a statement can be taken properly or improperly. From this the proposition `definition and the defined are the same' can be distinguished, because it can be taken exactly as it sounds, and then it is implied that the definition and the defined are not distinguished, but that the definition is the defined and vice versa. In another way, it can be taken improperly for this statement, `definition and defined carry the same meaning or are convertible', that is, they are predicated of each other in a reversible manner, and so it is true.
Similiter ista potest distingui `aliqua distincta ratione sunt una res', quia si accipiatur proprie, falsa est; si improprie, pro actu signato, ut aequivaleat isti `de aliquibus habentibus distinctas definitiones praedicatur hoc praedicatum: idem realiter', sicut de homine et albo, habentibus distinctas definitiones, praedicatur hoc praedicatum `idem realiter', sic dicendo `album et homo sunt idem realiter', et sic est vera.	In the same way, these can be distinguished, `they are one thing in some distinct way,' because if taken properly, it is false; if improperly, for the signified act, so as to be equivalent to these, `of some things having distinct definitions this predicate is predicated: they are the same thing in reality', just as of man and white, having distinct definitions, this predicate is predicated of 'the same thing in reality', thus saying 'a white thing and a man are the same thing in reality', and so it is true.
Similiter ista potest distingui `substantia praedicatur de substantia extra animam'. Unus sensus est iste `aliqua propositio est vera ubi aliqua substantia extra animam subicitur et substantia praedicatur', et tunc est falsa. Alius sensus est iste `talis propositio est vera: substantia extra animam est substantia', ubi tamen substantia extra animam non subicitur nec praedicatur sed signum eius.	In the same way this can be distinguished, `substance is predicated of substance outside the soul'. One sense is that `a proposition is true where some substance outside the soul is submitted and the substance is predicated', and then it is false. Another meaning is this, `such a proposition is true: a substance outside the soul is a substance', where, however, the substance outside the soul is neither submitted nor predicated, but rather its sign.
Consimiliter tales sunt distinguendae: color est primum obiectum visus; homo primo est risibilis; Deus sub ratione deitatis est subiectum theologiae; subiectum non potest esse sine passione; species non potest esse sine genere, sed e converso; species componitur ex genere et differentia; differentia constituit speciem; ens est idem realiter cum suis passionibus; subiectum et passio sunt idem realiter; et huiusmodi propositiones innumerabiles in logica et metaphysica sunt distinguendae.	Similarly, these are to be distinguished: color is the first object of sight; man is first able to laugh; God under the principle of deity is the subject of theology; the subject cannot exist without an attribute; species cannot exist without genus, but vice versa; species is composed of genus and difference; difference constitutes species; being is really identical with its attributes; the subject and the attribute are really the same; and such innumerable propositions are to be distinguished in logic and metaphysics.
Et similiter in philosophia naturali, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, tales propositiones sunt distinguendae: tantum sunt tria principia rerum naturalium; potentia corrumpitur per adventum formae; artificialia distinguuntur a naturalibus; aes est materia statuae; statua componitur ex aere et figura; motus est actus entis in potentia; motus et tempus differunt; actio et passio sunt unus motus; materia est subiectum generationis; alterabile est subiectum alterationis; album per accidens aedificat; potentiae animae distinguuntur; anima habet plures potentias; et innumerabiles tales propositiones quas Aristoteles ponit pro aliis propositionibus, quae si essent explicitae nulla foret difficultas ubi nunc multi, qui se reputant magnos, magnam patiuntur perplexitatem.	And likewise in natural philosophy, according to Aristotle's opinion, such propositions are to be distinguished: there are only three principles of natural things; potential is corrupted by the advent of form; the artificial are distinguished from the natural; bronze is the material of the statue; the statue is composed of brass and figure; movement is in potential the act of something; movements and time differ; action and effect are one movement; matter is the subject of generation; the subject of alteration is changeable; a white thing builds by accident; the powers of the soul are distinguished; the soul has many powers; and innumerable such propositions as Aristotle puts forward for other propositions, which if they were explicit there would be no difficulty, whereas now many who consider themselves great suffer great perplexity.
Isti autem secundo modo amphiboliae deserviunt multi tropi grammaticales in Scriptura sacra et in libris Sanctorum et philosophorum saepius usitati, videlicet allegoria, quae continet sub se septem species, quae sunt: ironia, antiphrasis, charientismos, aenigma, paroemia, sarcasmos, astismos. Item, homozeuxis, cuius tres species assignantur, scilicet icon, parabola et paradigma.	And these, in the second mode of amphibole, serve many grammatical tropes frequently used in the sacred Scriptures and in the books of saints and philosophers, that is, allegories, which contain under themselves seven species, which are: irony, antiphrasis, charientisms, riddles, paroems, sarcasms, astisms. Also, homozeuxis, of which three species are assigned, namely, icon, parable and paradigm.
Item, hypallagium; et ad illum tropum possunt reduci omnes orationes de quibus exemplificatum est immediata ante et de quibus post dicetur. Item, hyperbole et endiadis, ad quam reduci possunt multae illarum orationum. Et etiam aliae figurae et tropi docentur in grammatica, quae isti fallaciae deservire possunt, de quibus ad grammaticum principaliter tractare pertinet, propter quod causa brevitatis de eis pertranseo. Volo tamen de aliquibus orationibus multum usitatis a theologis exemplificare, et declarare quomodo penes istam fallaciam sunt multiplices.	Also, hypallage; and to that trope can be assigned all the statements of which it was exemplified immediately before and of which it will be said afterwards. Also, hyperbole and endiades, to which many of those speeches can be reduced. And other figures and tropes are also taught in grammar, which may serve these fallacies, and of which it is principally the task of the grammarian to treat, for which reason I pass over them for the sake of brevity. However, I want to exemplify some of the statements that are much used by theologians, and to make clear how they are prone to this fallacy.
Unde dico quod omnes tales: Deus habet iustitiam; Deus habet sapientiam; Deus habet intellectum et voluntatem; Deus habet essentiam; et omnes consimiles, in quibus ponitur aliqua dictio notans distinctionem inter illud pro quo supponit subiectum et pro quo supponit praedicatum, distinguendae sunt, eo quod possunt accipi proprie, et tunc sunt falsae; vel possunt accipi improprie, ut ponantur loco talium `Deus est iustitia', `Deus est sapientia' et huiusmodi, et tunc sunt verae.	Hence I say that all such: God has justice; God has wisdom; God has understanding and will; God has an essence; and all similar ones, in which some expression is used marking a distinction between that for which the subject stands and that for which the predicate stands, are to be distinguished by the fact that they can be taken properly, and then they are false; or they may be taken improperly, so that they are put in the place of such things as `God is justice', `God is wisdom' and the like, and then they are true.
Et distinctionem talium innuit Anselmus, Monologio, cap. 16, ubi vult quod non proprie dicitur quod `summa natura habet iustitiam', sed `exsistit iustitia'. Et ita cum tales propositiones frequenter inveniantur in libris authenticis, oportet quod accipiantur improprie.	And Anselm hints at such a distinction in his Monologue, Chapter 16, where he asserts that it is not properly said that `the highest nature has justice', but that `justice exists'. And so when such propositions are frequently found in authentic books, it must be that they are taken improperly.
Et propter eandem rationem tales orationes `sapientia est in Deo', `iustitia est in Deo', `intelligere et velle sunt in Deo' et huiusmodi distinguendae sunt, eo quod possunt accipi proprie, et tunc falsae sunt, quia tunc important aliquam distinctionem inter Deum et sapientiam et inter Deum et velle et intelligere.	And for the same reason such statements as `wisdom is in God', `justice is in God', `understanding and willing are in God' and the like are to be distinguished by the fact that they can be taken properly, and then they are false, because then they imply some distinction between God and wisdom and between God and willing and understanding.
Si accipiantur improprie, ut per eas intelligantur tales propositiones `Deus est sapientia',	If they are taken improperly, so that by them such propositions as `God is wisdom' are understood,
'Deus est intelligere et velle', et sic de aliis, verae sunt. Et istam distinctionem innuit beatus Augustinus in libro De Trinitate, ubi vult quod magis proprie dicitur `Sapientia est Deus' quam `sapientia est in Deo'.	'God is able to understand and to will', and so of others, are true. And this distinction is hinted at by the blessed Augustine in his book De Trinitate, where he asserts it to be more properly said that `wisdom is God' rather than `wisdom is in God'.
Et similiter, secundum unam opinionem quae ponit quod personae divinae sunt penitus indistinctae ab essentia et a relationibus, istae sunt distinguendae `Pater habet paternitatem', `paternitas est constitutiva Patris', `filiatio est proprietas Filii', `essentia et spiratio passiva constituunt Spiritum Sanctum', et innumerabiles tales, eo quod possunt accipi proprie, et tunc sunt falsae secundum illam opinionem, eo quod denotatur ex prima significatione earum Patrem distingui a paternitate et ab essentia et Filium distingui a filiatione.	And likewise, according to one opinion which posits that the divine persons are completely indistinguishable from essence and relations, these are to be distinguished: `The Father has paternity,' `Paternity is constitutive of the Father,' `Sonship is a property of the Son,' 'Essence and passive breathing constitute the Holy Spirit,' and innumerable such, by the fact that they can be taken properly, and then they are false according to that opinion, by the fact that it is denoted by their first meaning that the Father is distinguished from paternity and from essence, and the Son from sonship.
Quia si hoc non denotaretur, ita proprie posset dici quod Pater habet paternitatem et quod Pater est constitutivus Patris sicut quod paternitas est constitutiva Patris. De virtute igitur sermonis tales propositiones videntur falsae multis sic opinantibus.	Because if this were not indicated, it could be said that the Father has paternity and that the Father is constitutive of the Father just as paternity is constitutive of the Father. Therefore, concerning the power of speech, such propositions seem false to many who have this opinion.
Aliter possunt tales accipi improprie, puta pro talibus `Pater est paternitas', `Pater est essentia', `Filius est filiatio', et sic de aliis, et sic sunt verae. Unde breviter, secundum opinionem illam, omnis propositio per quam secundum proprietatem sermonis denotatur Patrem distingui ab essentia et intellectione et volitione vel sapientia vel paternitate, vel Filium distingui a deitate vel filiatione, vel Spiritum Sanctum distingui ab essentia vel spiratione, falsa est de virtute sermonis, quamvis possit esse vera si accipiatur improprie.	In another way, such things may be taken improperly, for example, for such things as `Father is paternity', `Father is essence', `Son is sonship', and so on of others, and thus they are true. Hence, in short, according to that opinion, every proposition by which, according to the propriety of speech, the Father is distinguished from essence and understanding and volition, or from wisdom or fatherhood, or of the Son from deity or sonship, or the Holy Spirit from essence or inspiration, is false as regards the power of speech, although it may be true if taken improperly.
Et si dicatur contra eos quod tales propositiones multae inveniuntur in libris Sanctorum qui proprie loquebantur, igitur secundum proprietatem sermonis concedendae sunt, isti faciliter responderent quod tales propositiones sumendae sunt in sensu in quo fiunt, non in sensu quem faciunt.	And if it be said against them that many such propositions are found in the books of the Saints who spoke properly, therefore they must be granted according to the propriety of speech, they would easily answer that such propositions are to be taken in the sense in which they are made, not in the sense they make.
Et quod sic sint accipiendae, ex dictis Sanctorum probari potest, ut videtur. In aliis enim locis ponunt quod non est distinctio in divinis nisi inter ingenerationem, generationem et processionem, et quod tres personae sunt una essentia, una deitas, una sapientia. Ex quibus et multis aliis videtur multis quod intentio Sanctorum est quod Pater non distinguitur a paternitate vel ab essentia. Nec videtur inconveniens dicere quod Sancti frequenter loquebantur improprie. Hoc enim asserit beatus Augustinus in libro Confessionum, ubi dicit quod multa loquimur improprie, pauca autem proprie.	And that they are to be accepted in this way can be proved from the sayings of the Saints, as it seems. For in other places they assert that there is no distinction in the divine except between ingeneration, generation, and procession, and that the three persons are one essence, one deity, and one wisdom. From these and many others it seems to many that the intention of the Saints is that the Father is not distinguished from paternity or from essence. Nor does it seem inappropriate to say that the Saints frequently spoke informally. For the blessed Augustine asserts this in the book of the Confessions, where he says that we speak many things improperly, but few properly.
Et ita sic opinantes dicerent quod omnes propositiones quae sonant aliquam distinctionem inter personam divinam vel personas et essentiam vel deitatem, vel inter personas et relationes quae sunt realiter essentia, falsae sunt secundum proprietatem sermonis, quamvis verae sint si accipiantur secundum quod sunt de mente Sanctorum.	And those who think in this way would say that all propositions which sound some distinction between the divine person or persons and essence or deity, or between persons and relations which are really essence, are false according to the property of speech, although they are true if they are taken according to what was in the minds of the Saints.
Et consimiliter dicerent quod omnes tales falsae sunt secundum proprietatem sermonis: velle et intelligere divinum sunt operationes elicitae; operatio elicita in divinis praesupponit suppositum; essentia divina est intellectui divino principium cognoscendi; intellectus divinus prius intelligit essentiam suam quam creaturam; essentia est prior productione Filii; Pater prius intelligit essentiam quam producat Filium; et multae tales propositiones falsae sunt, quamvis multae illarum ad bonum intellectum exponi possent.	And similarly they would say that all such are falsities according to the property of speech: to will and to understand the divine are elicited operations; the operation elicited in the divine presupposes the supposited; The divine essence is to the divine intellect the principle of knowing; The divine intellect understands its essence before the creature; essence is prior to the production of the Son; the Father understands the essence before he produces the Son; and many such propositions are false, although many of them could be explained to a good understanding.
Item, talis propositio `Deus per suam potentiam absolutam potest aliquem acceptare sine gratia sed non per suam potentiam ordinatam' multiplex est. Unus sensus est quod Deus per unam potentiam, quae est absoluta et non ordinata, potest acceptare aliquem sine gratia, et per unam aliam potentiam, quae est ordinata et non absoluta, non potest acceptare eum, quasi essent duae potentiae in Deo per quarum unam posset hoc et non per aliam.	Likewise, such a proposition as `God by his absolute power can accept someone without grace but not by his ordered power' is complex. One sense is that God can accept someone without grace by one power, which is absolute and not ordered, and cannot accept him by another power, which is ordered and not absolute, as if there were two powers in God, by one of which He could do this and not by the other.
Et iste sensus est falsus. Aliter accipitur improprie, ut ponatur ista propositio pro ista oratione: Deus potest acceptare aliquem sine gratia informante, quia hoc non includit contradictionem, et tamen ordinavit quod hoc numquam est facturus.	And this sense is false. In another way, it is taken improperly, so that this proposition is put in place of this statement: God can accept someone without informing him of grace, because this does not include a contradiction, and yet he has ordained that this will never be done.
Et iste sensus verus est. Similiter tales propositiones: creatura, ut in Deo, est eadem Deo; asinus, ut in Deo, est vita; lapis, secundum esse suum in Deo, est aeternus; lapis in esse obiectivo est aeternus, et huiusmodi distinguendae sunt, quia si accipiantur proprie, falsae sunt, nam creatura nullo modo est Deus, ubicumque fuerit.	And this meaning is true. Similarly, such propositions: the creature, as in God, is the same as God; the donkey, as in God, is life; the stone, according to its being in God, is eternal; the stone in objective being is eternal, and such things must be distinguished, because if they are taken properly, they are false, for a creature is in no way God, wherever he may be.
Impossibile enim est quod idem sit Deus et creatura. Et sic est dicendum de aliis proportionaliter. Si autem accipiantur improprie, videlicet pro talibus orationibus: causa efficiens creaturae est eadem Deo; causa creativa asini est vita; cognitio qua Deus cognoscit lapidem est aeterna; cognitio qua lapis cognoscitur a Deo est aeterna, verae sunt omnes.	For it is impossible that God and the creature should be the same. And so it must be said of others proportionally. But if they are taken improperly, that is to say, for such statements: the efficient cause of creation is the same as God; the creative cause of the donkey is life; the knowledge by which God knows the stone is eternal; the knowledge by which the stone is recognized by God is eternal, all are true.
Unde nec creaturae sunt in Deo nisi quia Deus cognoscit creaturas et est auctor earum, sicut dicit Magister Sententiarum, libro I, dist. 36, ubi ex sententiis suis elici potest quod creaturae non sunt sic in Deo nec in cognitione Dei quasi quaedam media inter Deum et cognitionem Dei et illas creaturas extra productas, quasi primo sit Deus vel cognitio Dei, deinde sint quaedam aliquo modo distincta, eadem tamen realiter cum Deo, et postea creaturae distinctae realiter a Deo, sicut multi imaginantur.	Hence neither are creatures in God except because God knows creatures and is their author, as the Master of Sentences says, Book 1, Dist. 36, where it can be deduced from his sentences that creatures are not so in God or in the knowledge of God as a sort of means between God and the knowledge of God and those creatures are produced outside, as if first there is God or the knowledge of God, then they are in some way distinct, yet really the same as God, and then creatures really are distinct from God, as many imagine.
Sed quidquid imaginabile est vel esse potest vel est Deus simpliciter et nullo modo creatura nec distinctum aliquo modo a Deo vel est creatura Dei vel potest esse creatura Dei, sicut Antichristus, qui quamvis modo non sit creatura, tamen esse potest.	But whatever is imaginable or can be or is God simply and in no way a creature, nor in any way distinct from God, is either a creature of God or can be a creature of God, like the Antichrist, who, although he is not a creature, can nevertheless be.
Similiter talis propositio `quodlibet attributum est idem realiter cum essentia divina' est distinguenda, quia si proprie accipiatur, falsa est, quia nihil est attributum nisi quoddam praedicabile, quod non est Deus; si improprie, concedi potest, quia illud quod significat attributum est divina essentia.	Similarly, such a proposition as `every attribute is really the same as the divine essence' must be distinguished, because if taken properly, it is false, because there is no attribute but something predicable, which is not God; if improperly, it may be granted, because that which the attribute signifies is the divine essence.
Similiter tales propositiones `quaecumque sunt separabilia, non sunt idem realiter'; `quando aliqua sic se habent quod unum illorum potest esse alio non exsistente, illa sunt distincta' et huiusmodi; quia possunt sumi proprie, et tunc sunt verae, quia ex hoc ipso quod sunt aliqua, sive possint separari sive non, sive unum illorum possit esse sine altero vel altero non exsistente sive non, sunt distincta.	Similarly, such propositions as `whatever are separable are not really the same'; `when certain things are in such a way that one of them can exist when the other does not exist, they are distinct' and the like; because they can be taken properly, and then they are true, because from this very fact that they are some things, whether they can be separated or not, whether one of them can exist without the other or when the other does not exist or not, they are distinct.
Aliter possunt accipi improprie pro istis orationibus quando de aliquibus terminis significative sumptis potest istud praedicatum significative sumptum verificari `separari' vel `sunt separata', tali modo exercendo `albedo et dulcedo sunt separata', de illis verificatur `non esse idem'.	In another way, they can be taken improperly for these statements when, taken significantly, this predicate can be verified as meaning `separate' or `they are separated'.
Quando autem aliqui termini sic se habent quod esse exsistere potest verificari de uno significative sumpto, esse exsistere vere negato a reliquo significative sumpto, de illis significative sumptis verificatur hoc praedicatum `non esse idem' vel `esse distincta'.	But when some terms are such that existence can be verified from one thing taken significatively, being really denied from the other thing taken significatively, this predicate `not being the same' or `being distinct' is verified about those taken significatively.
Et tunc sunt in parte verae et in parte falsae, quia aliquas singulares habent veras et aliquas falsas. Sic enim se habent `homo' et `homo albus', quia ista potest esse vera `homo est', hac exsistente falsa `homo albus est'; et tamen haec nunc est falsa `homo et homo albus sunt distincta' sive `homo et homo albus non sunt idem'.	And then they are partly true and partly false, because they have some aspects true and some others false. In fact, `man' and `white man' are related to each other, because the truth `he is a man' can be true, and the falsehood `the man is white' exists. and yet this is now false: `man and white man are distinct,' or `man and white man are not the same.'
Quando tamen omnes termini sunt mere absoluti, habent tales propositiones veritatem; tamen quaelibet talis est possibilis, sicut haec est possibilis `homo et homo albus non sunt idem'.	When, however, all the terms are merely absolute, such propositions have truth; however, any such thing is possible, just as this is possible: `a man and a white man are not the same'.
Item, tales propositiones `una potentia habet diversos modos operandi', `diversi modi essendi possunt eidem competere sine variatione rei' et huiusmodi; quia si accipiantur proprie, intelligendo per `modum' aliquid distinctum a re, sic tales propositiones sunt falsae.	Likewise, such propositions as `one power has different modes of operation', `different modes of being can belong to the same thing without variation of the thing' and the like; because if they are taken properly, understanding by `mode' something distinct from reality, then such propositions are false.
Quando enim dicimus quod anima respectu intellectionis et volitionis habet diversum modum operandi, non intelligimus quod sint aliqui modi distincti ab anima et ab actibus productis, quasi essent quaedam media; hoc enim simpliciter falsum est, et ideo sub tali intellectu tales propositiones sunt falsae.	For when we say that the soul has a different mode of operation with respect to understanding and volition, we do not understand that there are any modes distinct from the soul and from the acts produced, as if they were certain means; for this is simply false, and therefore under such an understanding such propositions are false.
Alius sensus est iste `eadem res diversimode operatur', puta necessario elicit intellectionem et contingenter et libere elicit volitionem. Similiter, si dicatur quod alius modus essendi competit corpori Christi in caelo et in sacramento Altaris, non est imaginandum quod modus essendi qui competit corpori Christi in caelo sit aliquid adveniens corpori Christi, distinctum ab uno alio quod advenit corpori Christi in sacramento.	Another meaning is that `the same thing works in different ways', for example, it necessarily elicits understanding both contingently and freely elicits volition. Similarly, if it is said that another mode of being belongs to the body of Christ in heaven and in the sacrament of the Altar, it is not to be imagined that the mode of being that belongs to the body of Christ in heaven is something that comes to the body of Christ, distinct from another that comes to the body of Christ in the sacrament.
Sed per talem propositionem non intelligimus nisi quod corpus Christi est circumscriptive in loco in caelo et non in sacramento Altaris. Et si quaeras, quid est illa circumscriptivitas, dico quod est vox non-significativa, sicut bu­ba.	But by such a statement we do not understand except that the body of Christ is circumscribed in a place in heaven and not in the sacrament of the Altar. And if you ask what that limitation is, I say that it is an insignificant sound, like a bug.
Unde fingere talia abstracta de talibus adverbiis, verbis, praepositionibus et huiusmodi, est simplicibus multorum errorum occasio; tamen aliquando utilis potest esse intelligentibus, quia per tales fictiones frequenter brevius loqui possunt.	Hence to imagine such abstracts of such adverbs, words, prepositions, and the like, is the occasion of many errors for the simple; yet sometimes it can be useful to the intelligent, because through such fictions they can frequently speak more briefly.
Item, omnis oratio in qua ponitur modus infinitivus pro supposito, sicut sunt tales `legere est bonum', `currere est moveri', `calefacere est agere' et huiusmodi, distingui possunt, quia unus sensus potest esse per quem denotetur quod praedicatum tale competat alicui quod nec est agens nec patiens nec effectus, quasi tales modi infinitivi importarent res distinctas ab agente et patiente et effectu et ceteris rebus quae possunt esse agentia et patientia et effectus producti.	Likewise, every sentence in which the infinitive mood is used for the suppositum, such as `to read is good', `to run is to move', `to warm up is to act' and the like, can be distinguished, because there can be one sense by which it can be denoted that such a predicate belongs to something that is neither agent nor patient nor effect, as if such infinitive moods import things distinct from the agent and the patient and the effect and the other things which can be agency and patience and produced effects.
Et talis sensus simpliciter falsus est secundum principia Aristotelis. Alius sensus potest esse ut tales propositiones ponantur loco orationum in quibus participium praedicatur de participio vel verbum de participio vel duo verba correspondentia de eodem, ut talis oratio `calefacere est agere' habeat istum sensum `quod calefacit, agit' sive `calefaciens est agens'; et ista `legere est bonum' habeat istum sensum `legens facit bonum opus' sive `qui legit, facit bonum' et huiusmodi. Et per istum modum evacuantur multae difficultates.	And such a sense is simply false according to Aristotle's principles. Another meaning may be that such propositions are put in the place of sentences in which a participle is predicated of a participle or a word of a participle or two words corresponding to the same, so that such a sentence `to heat is to act' has the same meaning as `that which heats, acts' or `heating is an agent'; and this, `reading is good' has this meaning: `reading does good work' or `he who reads does good' and the like. And in this way many difficulties are cleared up.
Item, frequenter propositiones hypotheticae sunt distinguendae, quia frequenter in auctoribus una ponitur pro alia, sicut frequenter temporalis ponitur pro condicionali; sicut ista `omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse'. Ista enim de virtute vocis est temporalis, et tamen ponitur pro ista condicionali `si aliquid est, ipsum est', quae est necessaria.	Again, hypothetical propositions are frequently to be distinguished, because frequently in authors one is substituted for the other, just as the temporal is frequently substituted for the conditional; just like that `everything that is, when it is, must be'. For this by the power of the voice is temporal, and yet it is used for the conditional `if something is, it is', which is necessary.
Et ita est de multis.	And so it is with many.
Et ista exempla ad praesens de amphibolia causa brevitatis sufficiant. Est etiam sciendum de isto secundo modo quod nulla certa regula dari potest per quam regulariter possit cognosci sufficienter an sit iste modus amphiboliae, quia iste modus dependet totaliter ex voluntate et usu loquentium, sicut secundus modus aequivocationis.	And for the sake of brevity these examples of amphibole will suffice for the present. It is also necessary to know about this second mode that no certain rule can be given by which it can regularly be sufficiently known whether this mode is amphibole, because this mode depends entirely on the will and practice of the speakers, just like the second mode of equivocation.