Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 7

Latin	English
CAP. 7. DE TERTIO MODO AMPHIBOLIAE.	Chapter 7. On the third mode of amphiboly,
Tertius modus amphiboliae est quando oratio per se prolata tantum habet unum sensum et ex hoc quod coniungitur alteri orationi potest habere plures sensus.	The third type of amphiboly is when a sentence uttered by itself has only one meaning and from the fact that it is connected to another sentence it can have several meanings.
Vel propter protervos potest dici quod tertius modus amphiboliae est quando oratio per se prolata caret aliquo sensu, quem tamen habere potest ex adiunctione ipsius ad aliam orationem.	Or, for the insistent, it may be said that the third mode of amphiboly is when the speech uttered by itself lacks some meaning, which it may have, however, by joining it to another speech.
Sicut ista propositio `scit saeculum' non habet nisi unum sensum, scilicet quod saeculum scit aliquid; et tamen si praeponatur ista propositio `Plato videt Sortem', ut dicatur sic `Plato videt Sortem et scit saeculum', potest habere alium sensum, scilicet istum `Plato habet scientiam de saeculo'.	Just as the proposition `He knows the age' has only one meaning, namely that he knows something about the age; and yet if the proposition `Plato sees Socrates' is put before it, so that it is said thus `Plato sees Socrates and knows his age,' it can have another meaning, namely that `Plato has knowledge of his age.'
Est autem sciendum quod modus iste frequenter contingit in oratione in qua ponitur pronomen relativum. Aliquando enim pronomen positum in una oratione sine adiunctione alterius orationis non potest esse nisi demonstrativum, si tamen aliqua oratio praecedat, potest esse relativum, sicut est de isto pronomine `iste'.	It must be known that this mode frequently occurs in speech in which a relative pronoun is used. For sometimes a pronoun placed in one sentence without the addition of another sentence can only be demonstrative, but if some sentence precedes it, it can be relative, as is the case with the pronoun 'this'.
Unde ista non est distinguenda penes amphiboliam `illa salvavit', sed si ista propositio praecedat `mulier damnavit' et sic dicatur `mulier damnavit et illa salvavit', modo distinguenda est, eo quod potest esse relatio personalis vel simplex, secundum modum loquendi grammaticorum, hoc est dictu, eo quod potest referre antecedens pro eodem numero vel pro eadem specie.	Wherefore this is not to be distinguished by amphibole: `she saved,' but if this proposition is preceded by `the woman condemned,' and thus it is said, `the woman condemned and she saved,' it is only to be distinguished by the fact that the relation may be personal or simple, according to the manner of speaking of the grammarians, that is to say, by the fact that the antecedent may refer to the same number or to the same species.
Primo sensu est falsa, secundo sensu est vera. Est etiam sciendum quod potest contingere talis multiplicitas ex tali relativo eo quod potest referre pro eodem numero vel pro eadem specie; aliquando autem relatio potest ferri ad significationem, aliquando ad vocem tantum. Et penes istum modum possunt distingui istae orationes `homo albus est homo et iste differt ratione ab homine', nam si relatio referatur ad vocem vel conceptum, vera est, sed si ad rem significatam, falsa est. Et similiter, sicut tales propositiones ubi ponitur hoc relativum `iste' possunt distingui, ita propositiones multae in quibus ponitur hoc relativum `qui' possunt distingui.	In the first sense it is false, in the second sense it is true. It is also to be known that such a multiplicity can occur from such a relative that it can refer to the same number or to the same species; but sometimes the relation may be carried to the signification, sometimes to the voice only. And according to this method can be distinguished the statements, `a white man is a man and this man differs in reason from a man', for if the relation refers to a word or a concept, it is true, but if it refers to the thing signified, it is false. And similarly, just as such propositions in which the relative `he' is placed can be distinguished, so many propositions in which the relative `who' is placed can be distinguished.
Utrum tamen ista distinctio sit penes aequivocationem vel penes amphiboliam, et si penes amphiboliam, penes quem modum sint distinguendae, causa brevitatis omitto prolixe discutere.	Whether, however, this distinction is closer to equivocation or closer to amphiboly, and if it is close to amphiboly, it depends on the manner in which they are to be distinguished, for the sake of brevity I omit to discuss at length.
Hoc tamen sufficiat scire pro nunc quod tales propositiones sunt distinguendae `aliqua quae differunt ratione, sunt idem realiter'. Unus sensus est iste `aliqua differunt ratione et illa eadem numero sunt idem realiter', et iste sensus est falsus, nam quae differunt ratione, sunt diversa definibilia vel sunt diversae rationes, sed nec diversa definibilia nec diversae rationes sunt una res.	This, however, is sufficient to know for now that such propositions are to be distinguished, `in some respects they differ, they are really the same.' One sense is this, `they differ in some reason and those in the same number are really the same', and this sense is false, for what differs in reason are different definables or are different reasons, but neither different definables nor different reasons are one thing.
Alius sensus est iste `aliqua differunt ratione, et tamen de illis significative sumptis praedicatur esse idem realiter' vel `illud quod importatur per utrumque et pro quo supponit utrumque est idem realiter', et ita fit relatio ad rem, non ad signum.	Another sense is that `they differ in some respect, and yet, taken as significant, it is predicated that they are really the same' or `that which is implied by both and for which both stand is really the same', and thus the reference is to the thing, not to the sign.
Sed in ista `aliqua sunt idem realiter, quae differunt ratione' sub illo sensu in quo est vera fit relatio ad voces vel ad signa, sicut in tali propositione `dat Deus aureolam, quod habetur ab auro'.	But in these `some are really the same thing, which differ in reason', under that sense in which it is true, the relation to verbalizations or signs is made, as in such a proposition, `God gives a halo, which is made of gold.'
Sic possent tales distingui `homo est musicus, quod dicitur a musica'. Et sicut tales propositiones possunt distingui ubi ponitur hoc relativum `qui', sic etiam possunt propositiones distingui ubi in secunda oratione supprimitur pronomen relativum sed subintelligitur, scilicet tales: homo et homo albus sunt idem realiter et differunt ratione; materia et privatio sunt unum numero et differunt ratione; subiectum et praedicatum sunt unum numero et differunt ratione; intellectus et voluntas sunt idem realiter et differunt ratione; et multae consimiles distinguendae sunt penes amphiboliam. Et universaliter omnis oratio de qua diversi capiunt diversos sensus, quae diversitas sensuum non oritur ex una dictione praecise posita in una oratione, nec ex diversa punctuatione earundem dictionum sub eodem ordine, nec ex diverso accentu, distinguenda est penes amphiboliam, et hoc penes primum modum, secundum vel tertium.	Thus they could be distinguished as `a man is a musician, which is said by music'. And just as such propositions can be distinguished where this relative `who' is used, so also propositions can be distinguished where in the second sentence the relative pronoun is suppressed but implied, namely such: man and white man are really the same and differ in reason; Matter and privation are one in number and differ in reason; subject and predicate are one in number and differ in reason; The understanding and the will are the same in reality and differ in reason, and many similar ones are to be distinguished around amphibole. And universally every speech of which different people have different meanings, which diversity of meanings does not arise from one word precisely placed in one sentence, nor from different punctuation of the same phrases in the same order, nor from a different accent, is to be distinguished as amphiboly, and this as regards the first mode, the second, or the third.
Si dicatur quod ista multiplicitas in ista oratione `Sortes et Sortes albus sunt idem realiter et ista differunt ratione' oritur ex hac dictione `ista', igitur hic est aequivocatio: Similiter, multiplicitas istius `aliqua quae sunt idem realiter distinguuntur ratione' oritur ex hac dictione `quae', igitur hic est aequivocatio et non amphibolia: Dicendum est quod non est magna cura pro nunc sive assignetur ibidem aequivocatio vel amphibolia, quia forte potest esse ibi tam amphibolia quam aequivocatio, nec est inconveniens quod fallaciae istae concurrant.	If it is said that the multiplicity in this sentence, `Socrates and white Socrates are really the same and these differ in reason' arises from this saying `these', then here is an equivocation: Similarly, this multiplicity of `some things which are the same are really distinguished by reason' arises from this saying 'which', therefore this is an equivocation and not an amphibole: It must be said that it is not a great concern for now whether equivocation or amphibole be assigned there because perhaps both amphiboly and equivocation can be there, and it is not inconceivable that these fallacies should coincide.
Unde in prima est amphibolia pro tanto quod nulla est ibi multiplicitas nisi una oratio alteri coniungatur. In secunda autem est amphibolia eo quod oritur diversitas sensuum ex hoc quod eadem oratio diversis orationibus exprimi potest, quamvis illud non sufficiat ad multiplicitatem amphiboliae.	Hence in the first there is amphiboly to such an extent that there is no complexity there unless one speech is joined to another. In the second, there is amphiboly in that the diversity of meanings arises from the fact that the same statement can be expressed by different sentences, although this is not sufficient for the multiplicity of amphiboly.
Potest tamen dici quod in talibus est secundus modus amphiboliae, quia proprie per tales orationes importatur quod illa eadem et non alia quae differunt ratione sunt una res.	It may be said, however, that in such there is a second mode of amphiboly, because properly it is implied by such speeches that they are the same thing and not others which differ in reason.
Quod est impossibile. Improprie autem importatur per hoc quod illa eadem quae habent distinctas definitiones verificantur de eodem pro eodem, non tamen pro se, sed pro illo eodem quod significant; sicut isti termini `album' et `musicum' habent diversas definitiones exprimentes quid nominis, et tamen significant eundem hominem et supponunt pro eodem homine, sic dicendo `album est musicum'.	That is impossible. Now it is improperly implied by this that those same things which have distinct definitions are verified of the same thing for the same thing, yet not for themselves, but for that same thing which they signify; just as these terms `white man' and `musician' have different definitions expressing what the name means, and yet they signify the same person and stand for the same person, thus saying `a white man is a musician'.
Et ita illa quae distinguuntur ratione sunt termini, sed illud quod est idem realiter est aliqua res importata per terminum. Quod non est aliud quam dicere quod signa sunt distincta et significatum est idem.	And so those things which are distinguished by reason are terms, but what is really the same is some thing implied by the term. This is no other than to say that the signs are distinct and the meaning is the same.