Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 8

Latin	English
CAP. 8. DE FALLACIA COMPOSITIONIS ET DIVISIONIS CONIUNCTIM.	Chapter 8. On the fallacy of composition and division together.
Post haec dicendum est de compositione et divisione coniunctim.	After this we must speak of composition and division together.
Et est primo sciendum quod tunc est aliqua oratio multiplex secundum compositionem et divisionem quando aliqua oratio prolata vel scripta propter solam diversam punctuationem dictionum potest habere diversos sensus. Sicut ista oratio `quidquid vivit semper est' si punctuaretur sic `quidquid vivit semper, est' habet unum sensum, si autem punctuaretur sic `quidquid vivit, semper est' habet alium sensum. Ita quod causa apparentiae istius fallaciae est identitas earundem dictionum in oratione composita et divisa, causa non-exsistentiae est diversitas punctuationis. Istius autem fallaciae sunt duo modi principales.	And the first thing to know is that then there is a complex statement in terms of composition and division, when a spoken or written statement can have different meanings simply because of the different punctuation of the words. Just as the sentence `whatever lives always is,' if punctuated with `whatever lives always is,' has one meaning, but if punctuated like `whatever lives, always is,' it has another meaning. So that the cause of the appearance of this fallacy is the identity of the same words in the compound and divided speech, the cause of its non-existence is the diversity of punctuation. But there are two principal modes of this fallacy.
Primus est quando tota oratio, sive sit composita sive divisa, remanet in utroque sensu categorica vel hypothetica. Secundus modus est quando sensus compositionis est propositio categorica et sensus divisionis est propositio hypothetica. Et secundum hoc posset poni distinctio inter compositionem et divisionem, ut illae orationes dicantur multiplices secundum compositionem quando uterque sensus est propositio categorica vel uterque sensus est propositio hypothetica; et illae orationes dicantur multiplices secundum divisionem quando unus sensus est propositio categorica et alius sensus est propositio hypothetica. Utrum tamen isto modo sit accipienda distinctio istarum fallaciarum non multum curo, quia hoc scire non reputo multum utile scientiis specialibus, quamvis notitia distinguendi tales orationes magnam habeat utilitatem. Iuxta primum modum sunt tales orationes multiplices quas ponit Philosophus in libro Elenchorum `possibile est sedentem ambulare' et `possibile est non scribentem scribere'; nam si proferantur sic `possibile est sedentem, ambulare', `possibile est non scribentem, scribere' verae sunt, quia tunc denotatur per eas quod ille qui est modo sedens potest nunc vel postea ambulare et ille qui est modo non scribens potest nunc vel postea scribere, et sic verae sunt.	The first is when the whole statement, whether compound or divided, remains in either sense categorical or hypothetical. The second mode is when the sense of composition is a categorical proposition and the sense of division is a hypothetical proposition. And according to this a distinction could be made between composition and division, so that those statements are said to be multiple according to composition when one sense is a categorical proposition and the other sense is a hypothetical proposition; and those statements are said to be multiple according to division when one sense is a categorical proposition and another sense is a hypothetical proposition. However, whether the distinction between these fallacies is to be accepted in this way, I do not care much, because I do not think that knowing this is very useful for special sciences, although the knowledge of distinguishing such statements is of great use. According to the first mode, there are such multiple statements such as the Philosopher puts in the book of Lists: `it is possible to walk while sitting' and `it is possible to write without writing'; for if they are uttered thus, `it is possible for a sitting person to walk,' and `it is possible for a non-writer to write,' they are true, because then it is denoted by them that he who is only sitting can now or later walk, and he who is only not writing can write now or later, and so they are true.
Aliter possunt proferri sic `possibile est, sedentem ambulare', `possibile est, non scribentem scribere'; et tunc denotatur quod possibile est quod non scribens scribat tunc et quod sedens tunc ambulet, et sic sunt falsae.	They can be pronounced in another way: `it is possible to walk while sitting', `it is possible to write without writing'; and then it is noted that it is possible that when he is not writing he then writes, and that when he is sitting he then walks, and so they are false.
Et eodem modo possunt distingui omnes propositiones in quibus ponitur aliquis modus cum dicto propositionis, quamvis etiam possunt distingui secundum amphiboliam. Et mihi videtur quod apertius et manifestius possint distingui in lingua Latina penes amphiboliam, quamvis forte in idiomate Aristotelis vel in lingua Graeca manifestior sit talis multiplicitas talium orationum penes compositionem et divisionem quam penes amphiboliam.	And in the same way all propositions can be distinguished in which some mode is used with the said proposition, although they can also be distinguished according to amphibole. And it seems to me that they can be more openly and clearly distinguished in the Latin language near amphibole, although perhaps in the idiom of Aristotle or in the Greek language such a multiplicity of such sentences, a placement near composition and division is more obvious than near amphibole.
Sive tamen distinguantur penes unam fallaciam sive penes aliam, dico quod sensus non variantur. Unde sic habent distingui tales orationes multiplices `possibile est suppositum esse assumptum a Verbo'.	However, whether they are distinguished by one fallacy or by another, I say that the meanings do not vary. Whence they have thus to distinguish such multiple statements, `it is possible that the supposition is assumed by the Word.'
Unus sensus est per quem denotatur quod aliquid quod nunc est suppositum potest nunc vel postea assumi a Verbo. Et hoc est verum, quia illa natura quae modo est natura intellectualis completa et non est plura supposita nec ab alio supposito sustentata, et per consequens est suppositum, potest postea assumi, sicut potest ab alio supposito sustentari.	There is one sense by which it is denoted that something which is now supposited may now or later be assumed by the Word. And this is true, because that nature which is only a complete intellectual nature, and is not supposited of more, nor sustained by another supposited, and consequently is a supposited thing, can be assumed afterwards, just as it can be sustained by another supposited thing.
Alius sensus est per quem denotatur quod possibile est quod aliquid sit simul suppositum et assumptum a Verbo. Quod est impossibile, sicut haec est impossibilis `aliquod suppositum est assumptum a Verbo'.	There is another sense by which it is denoted that it is possible for something to be both supposited and assumed by the Word. Which is impossible, just as this is impossible, `something supposited is assumed by the Word.
Similiter haec est distinguenda `possibile est substantiam quantam non esse quantitatem'. Unus sensus est iste `possibile est quod substantia quanta, quando est quanta, non sit quantitas', et iste sensus est falsus secundum illam opinionem quae ponit quod substantia quanta est quantitas. Alius sensus est iste `possibile est quod illa substantia quae nunc est quanta, postea non sit quantitas', et iste sensus est verus.	Similarly, this is to be distinguished: `it is possible for a quantified substance not to be a quantity'. One sense is this, `it is possible that a quantified substance, when it is quantified, is not a quantity', and this sense is false according to that opinion which posits that a quantified substance is a quantity. Another sense is this, `it is possible that that substance which now is a quantity, will not be a quantity afterwards', and this sense is true.
Similiter ista est distinguenda `possibile est istum hominem non esse Deum', demonstrando Christum. Unus sensus est per quem denotatur quod possibile sit quod haec sit vera `iste homo non est Deus', et haec vera est, quia haec est possibilis.	Similarly, this is to be distinguished: `it is possible that this man is not God', pointing to Christ. There is one sense by which it is denoted that it is possible for this to be true: `this man is not God', and this is true because this is possible.
Si enim Filius Dei dimitteret naturam humanam haec esset vera `iste homo non est Deus', quia haberet istam causam veritatis `iste non est homo'. Alius sensus est per quem denotatur quod possibile sit quod iste qui nunc est homo, postea non sit Deus.	For if the Son of God were to let go of human nature, this would be true: `This man is not God,' because he would have this reason for the truth, `This man is not man.' There is another sense by which it is denoted that it is possible that he who is now a man may not afterwards be God.
Et hoc est impossibile, quia iste Filius Dei qui nunc est homo, semper et necessario erit Deus. Et consimiliter sunt tales propositiones distinguendae: possibile est creantem non esse	And this is impossible, because this Son of God, who is now a man, will always and necessarily be God. And similarly such propositions are to be distinguished: it is possible for God not to be creative;
Deum; possibile est praedestinatum damnari; possibile est praescitum salvari; possibile est verum esse impossibile. Similiter tales: verum est album per se aedificare; hominem esse Deum est necessarium; creantem esse Deum est necessarium, et huiusmodi.	it is possible for the predestined to be damned; it is possible to be saved; it is possible that the truth is impossible. Similarly such: it is true for a white thing per se to build; It is necessary for man to be God; It is necessary for God to be a creator, and the like.
Et in quo sensu sunt verae et in quo sensu falsae, potest patere ex prioribus. Similiter plures orationes distinguendae sunt ex hoc quod una dictio potest copulari cum una vel cum alia, sicut ista `quod quis scit nunc didicit', quia hoc adverbium `nunc' potest determinare li scit, ut sit sensus `quod quis scit nunc, didicit', et hic sensus est verus, quia quod nunc scit, aliquando didicit. Vel potest determinare hoc verbum `didicit', ut sit sensus `quod quis scit, nunc didicit', et iste sensus est falsus.	And in what sense they are true, and in what sense they are false, may be seen from the foregoing. Similarly, many speeches are to be distinguished from the fact that one expression can be coupled with one or another, such as `what one knows now he has learned', because this adverb `now' can determine whether he knows, so that the sense is `what one knows now, he has learned', and this sense is true, because what he knows now, he once learned. Or it is possible to determine this word `learned' to mean `what one knows, he has now learned', and this sense is false.
Similiter est in istis orationibus quas ponit Philosophus: ego posui te servum entem liberum; quadraginta virorum centum reliquit dives Achilles. Similiter tales quas ponit Philosophus, quas, quamvis non exprimat, supponit esse distinguendas: baculo vidisti hunc percussum; oculis vidisti hunc percussum.	The same is the case in these statements which the Philosopher posits: I made thee a slave, a free being; The rich Achilles left forty men and a hundred. Similarly, those which the Philosopher posits, which, although he does not express it, he supposes to be distinguished: you saw him struck with a staff; you saw with your own eyes that he was struck.
Similiter, ut frequenter, orationes in quibus ponitur adiectivum cum substantivo distinguendae sunt, sicut tales `iste est bonus sutor', demonstrando malum hominem. Si sit oratio divisa, falsa est, quia tunc denotatur quod est bonus et quod est sutor; si sit composita, tunc vera est, quia tunc denotatur quod habet perfecte talem artem suendi.	Similarly, as is often the case, speeches in which an adjective is used must be distinguished from a substantive, such as `he is a good tailor', pointing to a bad person. If the speech is divided, it is false, because then what is good and what is tailor is denoted; if it is composed, then it is true, because then it is denoted that he has perfectly the art of sewing.
Et quamvis tales orationes possunt distingui secundum compositionem et divisionem, tamen mihi videtur quod possunt etiam distingui secundum amphiboliam, et sensus non variabuntur.	And although such speeches may be distinguished according to composition and division, yet it seems to me that they may also be distinguished according to amphiboly, and the meaning will not vary.
Similiter tales propositiones `iste est albus monachus' possunt distingui; in uno sensu denotatur quod est albus et quod est monachus, in alio sensu denotatur quod est monachus talis professionis.	Similarly such propositions as `this is a white monk' can be distinguished; in one sense it is denoted that he is white and that he is a monk, in another sense it is denoted that he is a monk of such a profession.
Iuxta secundum modum sunt propositiones distinguendae in quibus ponuntur dictiones facientes propositiones hypotheticas inter duos terminos, et in uno sensu erit propositio categorica et in alio sensu erit propositio hypothetica.	Propositions are to be distinguished according to the manner in which statements forming hypothetical propositions are placed between two terms, and in one sense it will be a categorical proposition and in another sense it will be a hypothetical proposition.
Et eodem modo distinguuntur quo dictum est prius de fallacia amphiboliae. Unde ista est distinguenda `quinque sunt duo et tria', quia in uno sensu denotatur quod quinque sunt duo et quod quinque sunt tria, in alio sensu denotatur quod quinque sunt ista, demonstratis duobus et tribus. Similiter ista est distinguenda `iste potest ferre unum lapidem et alium'; in uno sensu denotatur quod iste potest ferre unum lapidem et quod potest ferre alium lapidem, et iste est sensus divisionis; in alio sensu denotatur quod iste simul potest ferre istum et alium lapidem.	And they are distinguished in the same manner as was said before of the fallacy of amphibole. Whence it is to be distinguished that `five are two and three,' because in one sense it is denoted that five are two and that five are three, in another sense it is denoted that these five are indicated by two and three. Similarly, this is to be distinguished, `he can carry one stone and another'; In one sense it is denoted that he can carry one stone and that he can carry another stone, and this is the sense of division. in another sense it is denoted that he can carry this and another stone at the same time.
Sic igitur ista propositio est distinguenda quae est una praemissa in paralogismo quo concluditur ista conclusio `quod potest unum solum ferre, potest plura ferre'. Quae non est distinguenda secundum compositionem et divisionem, sed potest distingui secundum amphiboliam, quia unus sensus potest esse iste `qui potest ferre unum lapidem, quamvis non ferat plures lapides, potest plures ferre', et hoc est verum; alius sensus est iste `qui potest ferre unum lapidem et non plures, potest ferre plures', et hic sensus est falsus.	Thus, therefore, this proposition must be distinguished, which is one premise in the paralogism in which the conclusion is concluded, `that which can bear only one thing, can bear many things.' Which is not to be distinguished according to composition and division, but can be distinguished according to amphibole, because one meaning can be this, 'he who can carry one stone, although he cannot carry many stones, can carry many', and this is true; there is another sense of this, `he who can carry one stone and not many, can carry many,' and this sense is false.
Et est hic amphibolia, sicut hic `omnis homo est unus solus homo', quia unus sensus est iste `omnis homo est unus homo et non sunt plures homines quam unus', alius sensus est `omnis homo est unus homo et nullus homo est plures homines'.	And here there is an amphiboly, just as here, `every man is one man only', because this is one sense, `every man is one man and there are no more men than one', another sense is, `every man is one man and no man is many men'.
Similiter est ista distinguenda `tantum unum est'.	Similarly, it is to be distinguished that `there is only one'.